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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to study the triptych of liberalization, globalization and 
financialization of modern capitalism which has not only came up with distressing 
consequences for developing and emerging economies during 1990s, but also devastating 
crisis for developed economies during 2000s - economies with ‘apparently’ well-developed 
financial systems. In this aim, multi-pronged body of theoretical and empirical research has 
been identified, synthesized and analyzed to present a unique debate focusing on unstable and 
factitious nature of neo-liberal and finance-led capitalism, developed during last four decades. 
This dissertation has particular implications for economic growth and development as well as 
for financial stability in developing and emerging economies which also adopted this modern 
capitalism.  
 
In this aim, this dissertation has been divided into four chapters. First chapter is dealing with 
the relationship between finance and growth. In this regard, evolution of key ideas, theories 
and empirical research is presented to reach at the concept of financial repression and its 
implications for developing and emerging economies. Second chapter analyzes the 
propositions for financial liberalization with particular emphasis on Washington Consensus 
and financial globalization as well as the opposition against financial liberalization with 
particular emphasis on critique by New-Structuralists and Institutionalists. Third chapter is 
closely focused on the implications of series of crises and instability in liberalized and open 
financial markets of emerging economies of Asia and Latin America during late 1990s. Final 
chapter is using the incidence of current crisis in developed economies to explore the weak 
foundations of global financial structure and its implications for neoliberal form of finance-
led capitalism which demands more consistent financial framework.  
 
Key Words: Crisis, Economic Growth, Finance-led Capitalism, Financial Liberalization, 
Globalization, Stability  
 
JEL Classification: F65, F36, G01, G15, O43, P1  
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RÉSUMÉ 
 
L'objectif de cette thèse est d'étudier le triptyque de la libéralisation, de la mondialisation et de 
la financiarisation du capitalisme moderne qui a engendré non seulement des conséquences 
pénibles pour les pays en développement et les économies émergentes au cours des années 
1990, mais également une crise dévastatrice pour les économies développées au cours des 
années 2000 (i.e. des économies «aux systèmes financiers apparemment bien développés »). 
Dans cette optique, plusieurs corps de recherches théoriques et empiriques ont été identifiés, 
synthétisés et analysés afin de présenter un débat unique se concentrant sur la nature instable 
et factice du capitalisme néo-libéral, développé pendant les quatre dernières décennies. Cette 
thèse a des implications particulières pour la croissance économique et le développement, 
ainsi que pour la stabilité financière des pays en développement et des économies émergentes, 
qui ont également adopté ce capitalisme moderne. 
 
Par conséquent, cette thèse a été divisée en quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre traite du lien 
entre finance et croissance. À cet égard, l'évolution des idées clés, les théories et les 
recherches empiriques sont présentées pour aboutir à l’analyse de la notion de répression 
financière, ainsi que ses implications dans les pays en développement et les économies 
émergentes. Le deuxième chapitre a analysé d’une part les propositions de libéralisation 
financière, avec un accent particulier sur le Consensus de Washington et la mondialisation 
financière, et d’autre part l'opposition à la libéralisation financière, en mettant cette fois 
l'accent sur la critique des structuralistes et des nouveaux institutionnalistes. Le troisième 
chapitre est, quant à lui, centré sur les implications de la série de crises et de l'instabilité dans 
la libéralisation et l'ouverture des marchés financiers des économies émergentes d'Asie et 
d'Amérique latine au cours des années 1990. Enfin, le dernier chapitre aborde l'incidence de la 
crise actuelle dans les pays développés pour explorer la fragilité des bases de la structure 
financière mondiale et ses implications dans le cadre de ce capitalisme financier néolibéral, 
qui exige une structure plus cohérente. 
 
Mots clé : Crise financière, Croissance économique, Capitalisme financier, Libéralisation 
financière, Mondialisation, Stabilité. 
 
Classification JEL : O43, F65, F36, G15, P1, G01 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Context Information and Theoretical Framework: 
Economic growth and development is a major subject of development economics. While 
discussing factors affecting it, ‘finance’ has been holding a crucial importance since long. By 
‘finance’, we mean the creation and management of money, banking, credit, investment, 
assets, and liabilities at personal, corporate and public levels. Economists like Walter 
Bagehot (1873) even attributed industrial revolution in England to its financial system.  From 
Joseph Schumpeter to Edward Shaw and Ronald McKinnon till today’s modern economists, 
the relation between finance and growth has been analyzed in various manners. A financial 
system acts as a ‘moderator’ to allow funds flowing from those who have surplus of it to those 
who have shortage of it. This moderation can be performed either through direct market-based 
financing or through indirect bank-based financing, generally known as ‘intermediation’. In 
simple terms, financial system channelizes household savings to the corporate sector and 
allocates investment funds. This is considered to be the most simple and common mechanism 
which links finance and growth. Despite of recognition of this finance-growth nexus since 
more than a century, the comprehensive and systematic analysis of the connections between 
financial factors and growth initiated only few decades ago with the advent of modern 
endogenous growth theories and models. These theories and models recognize savings and 
financial intermediation as primary channels through which steady-state growth arises 
endogenously.  
 
Moreover, improved rates and patterns of economic growth in industrial countries having 
advanced financial sectors also motivated economists to deeply study the relationship between 
financial and economic development. Theoretically and empirically, there seems to be close 
ties between financial and economic development. However, little agreement exists on the 
definition and measurement of financial development. Thus for the purpose of this 
Dissertation, financial development is defined as “the factors, policies, and institutions that 
lead to effective financial intermediation and markets, and deep and broad access to capital 
and financial services” (Financial Development Report, 2008). In this respect, the direction of 
causality in finance-growth nexus is of critical importance. Besides relative significance of 
bank-based and market-based structures, legal infrastructure is equally important. However, 
another view is only to focus on range of financial services or functions that a particular 
financial sector provides in order to reduce market frictions. Whatever the nitty-gritties might 
12 
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be, ample theoretical and empirical evidence seemed to assume that well-developed financial 
systems exert influence on economic growth and development.  
 
Further progress in growth theories often infers that countries which save and invest more are 
supposed to grow more and faster in the long run. It highlights the significance of restricting 
measures which can control the pricing and allocation of capital. In this regard, Keynes 
(1936) and Tobin (1965) provided principal theoretical framework for ‘financial repression’ 
and related policies taking place of market-determined pricing and allocation. These 
frameworks generally hypothesized that monetary policy transmission mechanisms like 
interest rate channels influence the investments which in turn affect the income level and 
eventually economic growth and development. This provided a reasonable and logical 
justification for government intervention in financial markets. By financial markets, we mean 
domestic and international markets for the sale and purchase of financial instruments like 
stocks, bonds, bills of exchange, foreign currency, futures and options etc. which work as 
exchange for credit and money and include money markets as well as capital markets. Thus at 
least till late 1970's, financial restrictions were often imposed specifically in capital-scarce 
developing countries and government intervention was a compulsory feature of financial 
policies. It was the seminal work of McKinnon (1973) which provided an entirely different 
perspective of government intervention in financial markets. According to him, the 
fragmentation in the economy provides justification for intervention syndrome which prevails 
generally in all economies, but particularly in developing economies. However, putting 
ceilings on interest rates and other restrictive measures led to adverse consequences which 
motivated McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) to set out the case for the opposite of ‘financial 
repression’ – financial liberalization.  
 
Theory and resultant models of financial liberalization (FL) were founded on blatant faith on 
market clearing forces which asked for complete withdrawal of government from the market 
economy. The main theoretical underpinning in these models was higher interest rates having 
positive relationship with economic growth. In this aim, the Complementarity Hypothesis by 
McKinnon and Debt Intermediation view by Shaw has significant contributions in neoliberal 
agenda which developed afterwards. The theoretical foundations of FL and successive 
refinements transformed the idea of FL into a comprehensive process consisting of mix of 
policy measures depending upon individual country’s conditions and preferences. It gave rise 
to a new phase of capitalism marked by ‘Financialization’, also known as ‘Finance-Led 
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capitalism’ in US and then Europe in which financial sector plays a central role. By the end of 
1980s and 1990s, FL started to widespread in developing world, particularly the emerging 
countries of Asia and Latin America which were restructuring and reforming their economies 
along market-oriented lines. An important force responsible for the popularity of FL in these 
economies was the Washington Consensus, a mix of policy reforms to ease out controls in 
financial markets. Deregulations, privatization, liberalization of financial sector, liberalization 
of trade and of foreign exchange etc. were part of this agenda adopted by most of the 
developing countries in transition towards market economy. Another vital force that played 
primary role in the fad of FL buzzed at the turn of 21st century was financial globalization and 
integration which called for further financial opening. This provided added impetus for the 
extensive implementation of FL reforms in these economies.  
 
Liberalization and globalization of financial markets led to a series of financial crises which 
made the decade of 1990s extremely distressing for the emerging economies of Asia and 
Latin America. Since 1960s, the Asian economies had been outperforming with high growth 
rates, accompanied with gradual and sustained expansion of physical capital accumulation 
which made them to be termed as ‘Asian Tigers’. But pressurized by neoliberal agenda, the 
commencement of liberalization process during 1980s and 1990s with the opening of capital 
markets stimulated the occurrence of financial crises in these economies. Despite of being less 
distortive from previous repression and following policy prescription with all necessary 
caution, the Asian countries particularly the East Asian countries suffered crisis from which 
they could not recuperated for next many years. What started in September 1997 in Thailand 
as currency crisis travelled to Indonesia, Korea and Hong Kong, allegedly known as ‘Asian 
flu’ descended on Russia in August 1998 which led to Russian announcement of moratorium 
on its external liabilities. It then spilled over to Brazil for generating financial crisis in Latin 
America by 1999.  
 
This started a protracted series of FL critique, one set of which was based on the inherent 
evils of the market economy. That is, the assumptions on which theory and models of FL are 
founded are actually non-existent which infers that financial markets are imperfect. For 
instance, incomplete information as stressed by Stiglitz-Weiss model, along with the 
externalities and incompleteness of financial markets are regarded as some of the sources of 
these imperfections.  This critique that emerged as result of financial crashes, chaos and crises 
in emerging countries is responded by the proponents of FL while emphasizing the proper 
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implementation of FL to make it successful. Two key areas in this respect are pre-conditions 
and sequencing. Macroeconomic stability along with efficient regulation and supervision are 
deemed as necessary conditions to be fulfilled before executing FL. The simultaneous 
implementation of internal and external FL i.e. liberalization of capital market along with 
trade liberalization is considered flawed due to which an optimum sequencing of 
liberalization reforms is also recommended. Regarding sequencing, big bang versus gradual 
approaches are debated which developed further criticism on the logic of FL. An important 
intertwined stream of critique is introduced by the New-structuralists and Institutionalists 
schools, characterizing FL as inappropriate for emerging and developing countries due to their 
structural and institutional realities and settings that are inapt as consequence of protracted 
financial repression in these economies. For instance, the wide prevalence of unofficial 
money market is one of such reality.  
 
The devastation of most of the Asian and Latin American economies during late 1990s 
intensified the discussions and debates among theorists and policymakers in order to find out 
the possible rationales. In this respect, the historical crises are studied to determine if the 
sequence from liberalization to crises is inevitable. Once again the flaws of pre-FL setting are 
accused for post-FL crises as it is easy and quick to deregulate interest rates, privatize state-
owned firms and banks, and liberalize capital flows but it is difficult and slow to develop 
institutional infrastructure, acquire supervisory and administrative skills, and manage infected 
portfolios. Moreover, the free mobility of capital also contributed in the volatility of financial 
markets thereby calling in question the stability of financial markets. Hence, contrary to its 
loud claims to bring stability, FL in emerging countries did the opposite by introducing 
instability in their financial markets. Thus the adverse consequences of Asian and Latin 
American crises of 1990s magnified the issue of financial stability which became central 
focus with particular attention given to various mechanisms such as contagion, derivatives 
market, manipulation, speculation, short term booms etc. In this regard, the key challenge is to 
maintain financial stability without inhibiting economic efficiency as overly protective 
structure of financial system can actually hamper economic growth. However, some degree 
and form of protection is desirable given the incidence of crises in liberalized financial 
markets. Third generation models of speculative attack further justify the need for capital 
controls. In this respect, it is of utmost importance to analyze various forms and design of 
capital controls, especially to control short term capital flows, as well as their relative costs, 
benefits and limitations.  
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Thus the triptych of Liberalization, Globalization and (Neoliberal) Financialization changed 
the structure of capitalism over last three decades. Financial markets become more integrated, 
more opened and gravity of economic activity is shifted from production and services to 
finance. This led to growth of profits in financial sector of developed economies of US and 
Europe. But what follows can best be exhibited in following graph which shows GDP share of 
US financial sector. It started around 1860 and went up steadily to almost 6 percent until 
Great Depression of 1930s and 2nd world war during which it went down to almost 2 percent. 
It then again climbed gradually till 1980s to reach at 6 percent but continued its upward trend 
to rise at around 8 percent till mid-2000s. And then – there is a huge crash followed by crisis 
and recession somewhat comparable to Great Depression of 1930s.  
 
 
 
 
This financial crisis began in 2007 in US and rapidly spread to Europe. The genesis of this 
crisis of developed world was defaults on subprime mortgage loans and debt instruments 
backed by those kinds of loans. The realization that huge volume of defaults on subprime 
mortgages are going to spread to other sectors of financial industry started in July 2007 when 
Bear Stearns announced the worthlessness of assets held by two of its subprime hedge funds. 
It followed by collapse of securities market and bankruptcy of Bear Stearns in March 2008. 
From here started the series of bankruptcies, bursts, crashes, crisis and resulting recession. 
Reckless risk taking through complex innovations like financial derivatives along with 
inefficient regulatory measures and irresponsible credit ratings are considered to be main 
causes to explain the financial crisis of 2007/2008.  
 
But the actual roots of this crisis are even far deeper. Current crisis happened despite of 
various measures suggested by international entities like BIS, IMF etc. but these efforts were 
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not sufficient to ensure more disclosure and transparency in the face of more integrated and 
sophisticated financial environment developing since last three decades. It is also 
accompanied by technological advancements and more focus on non-bank financial 
institutions like hedge funds, equity funds etc. This trend enhanced efficiency of private 
finance in various terms but suitability and efficiency of regulatory and supervisory 
approaches were lagged. This led to new and unmeasured risks contributing to the potential 
for volatility, instability, and crises having tendency to spread beyond any virtual or 
geographical boundaries.  
 
Current crisis has highlighted the weak foundations of global financial architecture. Implicit 
or explicit safety nets acted as moral hazard for banks and other financial institutions covered 
under this net because presence of unconditional assurances provide impetus for mindless risk 
taking. The resulting bailouts are distortionary as they put pressure on all citizens in form of 
increased taxation to be given to affluent risk takers and speculators. The failure to distinguish 
risk from ‘uncertainty’ also played important role to weaken the financial systems. Banks, by 
taking advantage of financial derivatives and other innovations, became more involved in 
speculative and risky treasury operation. But they forgot, in their enthusiasm of increasing 
profitability, to distinguish risk from uncertainty. Crises have more to do with uncertainty 
which follows from irrational risk taking. This also made market discipline inept to play any 
significant role in early detection and prevention of imbalances to grow beyond certain limits. 
Moreover, various dynamics of financial markets have also changed significantly to become 
more conducive for ‘feast and famine’ phenomenon of magnifying the scale and frequency of 
crises. In addition to this, nature of systemic risk is also changed which demands 
transformation of preventive measures. Conventional tools are inadequate as they are based 
on assumption that systemic risk involves the flow of problems in one institution to other 
institutions via interbank relations, payment system, deposit run etc. thereby threatening 
whole financial system. Such assumptions narrow down the real threats because they ignore 
the extended opportunities for risk-taking. But the current approach to systemic regulations, 
i.e. micro-prudential regulation, generally characterizes the ‘fallacy of composition’ i.e., what 
is true of the parts of a whole might be wrong of the whole. Keynes’s (1936) “paradox of 
thrift1” and Fisher’s (1933) “stampede to liquidity2” exhibited this fallacy. Thus, it is not 
                                                          
1
 If everyone saves more money during times of recession, the aggregate demand will fall and will in turn lower 
total savings in the population. Thus, if everyone saves, there is a decrease in consumption which leads to a fall 
in aggregate demand and thus leads to a fall in economic growth. 
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possible to ensure the safety of the whole system by merely ensuring the safety of individual 
banks. Here comes the need to study the growing significance of macro-prudential 
framework. 
 
The failure to completely and accurately realize these weaknesses in foundations of financial 
systems played key role in current crisis. And now, the measures to cope with this crisis are 
mainly based on ‘financial repression’ – a notion long rejected by developed economies and 
also made prohibitive for emerging and developing world. Developed economies are doing 
exactly the opposite of what they lectured emerging and developing economies in case of 
crises in those economies. Nobel Laureate, Paul R. Krugman (2002) expressed it bluntly that 
US in particularly, and the West in general, should be feeling little embarrassment about all 
lecturing they did to the Third world3. Developed countries suffering from current crisis are 
now taking various repressionary measures as part of their ‘macroprudential’ framework to 
heal their economies. Governments are directly intervening to nationalize various big banks 
and injecting equity in those banks. Suffering from huge volumes of private and public debt, 
governments are forced to lower the cost of debt by artificially maintaining low interest rates. 
These lower rates become even negative in scenario of steady inflation. Unlike direct taxes or 
spending cuts, this kind of financial repression acts as indirect tax. Financial repression in the 
aftermath of crisis has historical evidence because termination of laissez-faire was also 
followed after Great Depression and 2nd World War. Modern financial repression also has 
various implications, even for emerging and developing economies as it has forced them to 
put capital controls and restrictions. This tendency might encourage de-globalization, but 
chances of such tendency seem meager at this point of time.  
 
Current crisis has developed a new stream of debate which focuses on the ‘parasitical’ nature 
of capitalism. Since this crisis is occurred in the headquarters of capitalism, therefore, various 
voices are rising on the inherently unstable nature of capitalism. However, the actual problem 
lies with ‘neoliberalism’ which motivated financial globalization and liberalization and led to 
‘finance-lead capitalism’ as opposed to ‘golden era of capitalism’ from 1940s to 1970s 
characterized by regulations and state-capitalism. The creation of fictitious wealth 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2
 If large numbers of investors attempt to get out of debt by selling assets, investors dump stocks and property 
for any price they can get – desperate to pay off their debts before they are dragged into bankruptcy. What is 
good for every individual investor turns out to be bad for the economy itself. Asset prices fall leading to falling 
sales and rising unemployment.  
3
 Although Paul Krugman made these remarks in the context of globalization during 2002 meeting of World 
Economic Forum, but they hold perfectly true in today’s scenario. 
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inconsistent with creation of real wealth is the key feature of this ‘neoliberal financialized 
capitalism’ which was destined to be collapsed one day. Irresponsible and dishonest attitude 
of financial institutions is also vital in this regard which have brought the ‘political economy’ 
to the fore. Despite of large body of suggestions to transform regulation and supervision and 
to adopt a macro approach, no concrete step has yet been taken to suppress the hegemony of 
financialized capitalism and chances for such suppression also seem opaque at this moment.  
 
Statement of Research Question(s):  
Within above described context and framework, this dissertation is going to find answers to 
three key questions. First is to explore that how did the role of finance in economic growth 
and development give rise to a new phase of capitalism that is finance-led and based on 
neoliberal agenda. Second question is aimed to find out that is there any relation between 
emerging economies crisis of 1990s and advanced economies crisis of 2000s during this 
journey towards neo-liberal and finance-led capitalism. In this pursuit, the logical question to 
ask is that what are the inferences of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 for the triptych of 
‘liberalization, globalization, and financialization’ – a triptych which characterizes the current 
phase of capitalism. 
 
Aim, Methodology, and Limitations of the research: 
Current crisis has spurred a stream of research mostly focusing on existing failures and future 
remedies. However, this research aims to contribute in new and unique debate connecting 
emerging economies’ crises during late 1990s and developed economies’ crisis during late 
2000s. For this purpose, large body of theoretical and empirical research has been identified, 
synthesized and analyzed to build arguments for reforming existing phase of capitalism due to 
its weak foundations and inherently unstable structure.  
 
The principal limitation of this thesis is that due to broadness of research questions, it was not 
possible to hold an all-inclusive empirical research. Therefore, we have tried to explore wide 
array of literature, theoretical as well as empirical, for the purpose of this thesis.  Moreover, 
there were various areas, especially when we analyze ‘neoliberal agenda’ where role of 
‘political economy’ seems more prevalent than ‘international economics’ or ‘development 
economics’. However, since the scope of this dissertation is mostly confined within the 
boundaries of mainstream economic framework, thus it would not be appropriate here to 
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discuss in detail the implications of political economy. As a future research agenda, the area 
of political economy can be interesting to explore.  
 
Plan of thesis:  
This thesis has been divided into four chapters.  
 
First chapter deals with the relationship between financial and economic development. In this 
regard, evolution of key ideas and theories is presented to reach at the theory of financial 
repression and its implications for developing and emerging economies.  
 
Second chapter analyzes the propositions for financial liberalization with particular emphasis 
on Washington Consensus and financial globalization. This chapter also discusses the 
opposition against financial liberalization with particular emphasis on critique by New-
Structuralists and Institutionalists.  
 
Third chapter closely focuses on the implications of series of crises and instability in 
liberalized and open financial markets of emerging economies of Asia and Latin America 
during late 1990s.  
 
Final chapter highlights the incidence of current crisis in developed economies to explore 
weak foundations of global financial structure and its implications for neoliberal form of 
finance-led capitalism. 
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CHAPTER 1. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT – 
PERSPECTIVE OF FINANCIAL REPRESSION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic growth and the factors affecting it had been one of the major subjects in 
development economics discussed all over the world since long.  From Joseph Schumpeter 
(1911) to John Gurley and Edward Shaw (1955) and from Raymond Goldsmith (1969) and 
Ronald McKinnon (1973) till today’s modern economists, the finance and growth have been 
regarded as relevant to each other, in one way or the other. Even economists like Walter 
Bagehot (1873) and John Hicks (1969) attribute Industrial Revolution to financial system in 
England. “In England,…. capital runs as surely and instantly where it is most wanted, and 
where there is most to be made of it, as water runs to find its level" (Bagehot, 1873, P. 12). 
Well before Bagehot recognized it, William Gladstone, British Prime Minister, expressed the 
importance of finance for the economy in 1858 by stating that “Finance is, as it were, the 
stomach of the country, from which all the other organs take their tone” (cited in speech by 
Duisenberg, 2001). However, at the same time, various prominent researchers, including 
Nobel Laureate, Robert Lucas (1988), considers the role of finance in growth as a subject that 
is ‘over-stressed’ or even simply ignored by Nicholas Stern (1989) in his review of 
development economics.  
 
In the financial system, funds flow from those who have surplus funds to those who have a 
shortage of funds, either by direct, market-based financing or by indirect, bank-based finance. 
To put it in straighter manner, financial system is supposed to direct household savings to the 
corporate sector and allocate investment funds. This is the most common mechanism which 
connects finance to the economic growth. Despite of recognition of this relationship since 
more than a century, the comprehensive and systematic analysis of the connections between 
financial factors and growth has initiated only few decades ago, particularly in the context of 
the new generation of endogenous growth theories and models which recognize savings and 
financial intermediation as primary channels through which steady-state growth arises 
endogenously (Agénor and Montiel, 1996).  In this aim, the section 1 of this chapter analyzes 
the evolution of key ideas on finance, growth and development.  
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Improved rates and patterns of economic growth in developed and industrial countries, which 
have most advanced financial systems, provide impetus to study the relationship between 
financial and economic development. Theoretically and empirically, there seems to be close 
connections between financial and economic development, however, little agreement exists 
on the definition and measurement of financial development. We found the most relevant and 
comprehensive definition in the “Financial Development Report 2008” which defined 
financial development as “the factors, policies, and institutions that lead to effective financial 
intermediation and markets, and deep and broad access to capital and financial services” (P. 
3). In this aim, various aspects of financial system and their relationship with economic 
growth and development are studied by reviewing the literature on this subject. These aspects 
include direction of causality in finance-growth nexus, and the relative significance of 
different financial structures e.g. bank-based view, market-based view, legal view and 
financial services view. Section 2 and 3 discuss these aspects. A range of financial services 
which are deemed to reduce market frictions are further highlighted in section 4.  
 
Since the empirical evidence reviewed in section 5 also seemed to assume well-developed 
financial systems exerting a first-order influence on economic growth and development, it 
motivated policymakers to ‘control’ market forces. Progress in growth theories also generally 
imply that countries which save and invest more are supposed to grow faster in the long run. 
It highlights the significance of the role of policies regarding pricing and allocation of 
‘finance’ which resulted in the policies of repression taking place of market-determined price 
and allocation. Thus, historically, and at least till 1970's, financial restrictions were often 
imposed specifically in capital-scarce countries and government intervention was a mandatory 
factor in financial policies. In short, financial systems were ‘repressed’. Keynes (1936) and 
Tobin (1965) provided the major theoretical framework for ‘financial repression’ and related 
policy context. Based on the complementary view of money and capital, it was hypothesized 
that monetary policy transmission mechanisms like interest rate channels influence the 
investments which in turn affect the income level and eventually economic growth and 
development. This provided a logical justification for government intervention in financial 
markets. The various theoretical and policy related approaches in this context are covered in 
section 6 of this chapter.  
 
However, the ground-breaking research by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) provided an 
entirely different perspective of government intervention in financial markets to control price 
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and allocation of capital. According to them, the fragmentation in the economy provides 
justification for intervention syndrome which is very much prevalent in developing 
economies. Section 7 would explore this dimension of the topic. The reasoning behind putting 
ceilings on interest rates and exercising other restrictive measures for controlling financial and 
capital markets are discussed in section 8.  This section will finally cover the adverse 
consequences of financial repression for financial markets, in form of credit allocation and 
banking activity, as well as for macroeconomy in form of inflation.  
 
Section 1. Finance, Growth and Development - Evolution of Key Ideas 
The interest in economic growth can be traced back as early as the advent of formal 
economics in 1776 when Adam Smith wrote “An inquiry into the nature and causes of the 
wealth of nations”. By using the example of a pin factory, Adam Smith illustrated that how 
division of labor, specialization and technology impact the growth of firms and thereby the 
growth of national economies. David Ricardo (1817) further contributed in classical growth 
model by introducing the concept of diminishing returns to land. The change in classical 
growth is viewed to be brought by Karl Marx (1878) who provided a rigorous formulation of 
a growth model through the ‘reproduction’ schema and the concept of ‘steady-state growth 
equilibrium’ in multi-sectoral context. The mention of these contributions clearly articulates 
that they were focused on economic growth, its mechanisms and different factors affecting it. 
But they didn’t pay much attention to the role of finance in economic growth. It was Bagehot 
(1873), who for the first time gave explicit analysis of how money market developments in 
England made capital flow across the country in search of the highest rate of return and 
contributed in industrialization of England. However, analysis of Bagehot was incomplete. It 
was Schumpeter (1911/1934), who put the role of finance at the center stage of economic 
development. 
 
1.1 Schumpeterian Theory 
Schumpeter (1934) defined ‘Development’ as the carrying out of new combinations. 
According to him, in a competitive economy, in which new combinations mean the 
competitive abolition of the old ones, it describes a whole series of phenomena of the business 
cycle, the mechanism of the formation of private fortunes etc. If the competitive economy is 
broken up by the growth of great combines….The difference so made is great enough to serve 
as the ‘water-shed between two epochs in the social history of capitalism’ (Schumpeter, 1934, 
p. 67). Since new combinations must draw the required means of production from some old 
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combinations, therefore, the carrying out of new combinations means simply the different 
employment of existing productive means of an economic system. Schumpeter criticized pure 
economic theory of development implied in the traditional doctrine of the formation of capital 
as it always refers only to saving and investment and entirely overlooks much more essential 
things.  The continuous increase in the national supply of productive means and of savings is 
obviously an important factor in explaining the course of economic history through the 
centuries, but one should not overlook the fact that growth and development consists 
primarily in employing existing resources in a different way, in doing new things with them, 
regardless of whether or not those resources increase.  
 
Schumpeter’s theory diverges from the traditional views existent in early 20th century. The 
accepted theory sees the problem in the existence of the productive means, which are needed 
for new productive processes. Whereas Schumpeter sees problem in removing already 
employed productive means from the circular flow and allotting them to new combinations. 
This is done by credit, by which whosoever wishes to carry out new combinations overpays 
the producers in the circular flow for the required means of production. Regarding the 
significance of credit, it is established that the structure of modern industry could not been 
erected without it, that it makes the individual to a certain extent independent of inherited 
possessions, that talent in economic life “rides to success on its debts”, even the most 
conservative orthodoxy of the theorists cannot well deny (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 70). 
Therefore, in carrying out new combinations, “financing” is deemed as fundamental, in 
practice as well as in theory. The money and capital market as ‘headquarters of the capitalist 
system’ facilitate trading of credit for the purpose of financing for growth and development 
(ibid, p. 126). Based on credit-driven economy, the focal point of Schumpeterian approach is 
“the banker … authorizes people, in the name of society as it were, to ….(innovate)” (ibid, p. 
74). Thus capitalistic credit system has grown out of and thrived on the financing of new 
combinations in various countries, even though in a different ways. 
 
Schumpeter (1934) defined the kernel of the credit phenomenon by determining credit as 
essential for the creation of purchasing power in order to transfer it to the entrepreneur. 
Besides that, the creation of purchasing power characterizes, in principle, the method by 
which development is carried out in a system with private property and division of labor. By 
credit, entrepreneurs are given access to the social stream of goods before they have acquired 
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the normal claim to it and entrust him with productive forces. And this function creates the 
foundation of the modern credit structure for economic development. 
 
This seminal work of Schumpeter which was presented in early twentieth century4 did not get 
immediate attention. Thus growth theories, presented even later, i.e. mid-century, by Solow 
(1956) and Swan (1956) paid no particular attention to the role of financial system in 
economic growth and development. 
 
1.2 Neo-classical and Endogenous Approaches of Growth 
After the early classical period of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx, growth 
research was somewhat subsided which again came into limelight in 1956 when Robert Solow 
came up with his seminal work on economic growth titling “A contribution to the theory of 
economic growth” (1956) followed by more complete analysis of technical progress by 
Trevor Swan (1956) in “Economic growth and capital accumulation”. This first generation of 
neoclassical growth models, developed by Robert Solow (1956, 1957) and Trevor Swan 
(1956) - commonly known as “Solow-Swan growth model” - attributed economic growth to 
exogenous technical change and population expansion. The neoclassical growth model, also 
known as the Exogenous growth model, is a class of economic models of long-run economic 
growth set within the framework of neoclassical economics. Neoclassical growth models 
attempt to explain long run economic growth by looking at productivity, capital accumulation, 
population growth and technological progress. 
 
Empirical evidence offers mixed support for such models. Limitations include their failure to 
take account of the entrepreneurship, which may be regarded as catalyst for economic growth 
and also ignored the strength of institutions, which may facilitate economic growth. In 
addition, no explanation is given on how or why technological progress occurs. This failing 
has led to the development of endogenous growth theory and models, which endogenize 
technological progress and knowledge accumulation. 
 
In the Neoclassical growth models, capital exhibits diminishing marginal returns in the 
production process. This feature prevents it from explaining the wide differences across 
countries in per capita income or growth rates, because the poor countries do not seem to 
                                                          
4
 Original work by Schumpeter was published in 1911 as ‘Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung’, which was 
later translated in English as ‘The theory of economic development’ in 1934 
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grow faster than rich ones. Moreover, output growth is independent of the saving rate and is 
determined only by rate of population growth and technological progress. But since 
population growth and technological change are assumed to be exogenous, the neoclassical 
models do not explain the mechanisms that generate steady-state growth. The initial research 
in endogenous growth was based on the work of Kenneth Arrow (1962), Hirofumi Uzawa 
(1965), and Miguel Sidrauski (1967). Research on endogenous growth is further extended by 
Romer (1986), who presented a competitive equilibrium model of growth in which 
technological change was endogenous. Then Lucas (1988) considered various mechanisms for 
constructing a growth theory in consistency with the main features of economic development. 
Accumulation of physical and human capital is regarded as key feature by Lucas (1988). 
Afterwards, Rebelo (1991) described a class of models which explained the heterogeneity in 
growth across countries as result of government policies employed by different countries. 
These class of models studied growth as endogenous but the technology exhibited constant 
returns to scale. Growth in all of these extended growth models was mainly attributed to 
indefinite investment in human capital which had spillover effect on economy and reduces the 
diminishing return to capital accumulation. Moreover, new growth literature addresses the 
limitations of earlier neoclassical models by proposing a variety of channels through which 
steady-state growth arises endogenously (Agénor and Montiel, 1996). Channels of savings 
and financial intermediation are among those channels.  
 
1.2.1 Savings 
The advent of endogenous growth theory also changed the message of growth theory 
regarding savings and policies (Meier and Rauch, 2000). The accumulation of physical and 
human capital through savings is argued to be associated with an accumulation of knowledge 
that staved off diminishing returns. The development of endogenous growth theory gave a 
powerful position to savings by recognizing it as the engine of growth, and argued that growth 
rates can be changed by policies that affect the incentive to save5. The AK model, attributable 
                                                          
5
 Whether or not savings and investment play a leading role in economic growth, or to put it more precisely as 
“the engine of growth”, has been a source of controversy since long. The founding intellect of neoclassical 
growth theory was that savings could not be the engine of growth because of diminishing returns to investment 
in capital. As the stock of physical capital per head increased, the rate of return on investment inevitably fell so 
low that the incentive for further saving was eliminated. An exceptionally thrifty population could only postpone 
the inevitable until a higher stock of capital per head was reached. Thus in the long run the propensity to save 
could only affect the level of per capita income, not its growth rate. The engine of growth was taken to be 
improvement in technology, which was considered to be exogenous to the saving process. Government policies 
could affect the rate of growth of per capita income only if it could affect the rate of technological progress. 
(Source: Leading issues in economic development, Gerald M. Meier and James E. Rauch; Chapter 3 “savings 
and investment”) 
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to Rebelo (1991), proved an especially useful vehicle for demonstrating how such policies 
could have the effects on growth. The AK model, which is the simplest model, assumes a 
constant exogenous saving rate and fixed level of the technology. It shows elimination of 
diminishing returns leading to endogenous growth. Easterly, King, Levine, Rebelo (1991) 
show how policies affect growth in AK model either by changing the incentive to save or 
changing the efficiency of saving as measured by the extent to which the marginal private 
product of capital reflects its marginal social product. 
 
1.2.2 Financial Intermediation 
Financial intermediation operates as a tax in the transformation of saving into investment. 
Since intermediaries appropriate a share of private saving, therefore, financial intermediation 
has a growth-deterring effect. If the reforms of the financial system lead to a reduction in the 
cost and inefficiencies associated with the intermediation process, the result would be an 
increase in the growth rate (Agénor and Montiel, 1996). An intermediation industry permits 
an economy to reduce the fraction of its savings held in the form of unproductive liquid 
assets, and to prevent misallocations of invested capital due to liquidity needs. This argument 
suggests that financial intermediaries may naturally tend to alter the composition of savings in 
a way that is favourable to capital accumulation. Then, if the composition of savings affects 
real growth rates, intermediaries will tend to promote growth (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991).  
 
Thus new growth paradigm stressed the importance of innovation, human capital 
accumulation, the development of new technologies, and financial intermediation as 
important determinants of economic growth. A general implication of modern growth theories 
is that countries that save and invest more will grow faster in the long run. Thus, the economic 
agents may form financial intermediaries and markets to mitigate the costs of acquiring 
information and conducting transactions which ultimately influence saving and investment 
decisions. Thus, modern economic theory provides an intellectual framework for 
understanding how, ceteris paribus, countries with “better” financial systems, that is, financial 
institutions, markets and instruments which are better at performing various services e.g. 
acquiring information, exerting corporate control, managing risk, and mobilizing savings etc. 
could grow faster than countries with less developed financial systems (Levine, Loayza and 
Beck, 2000). This angle will be discussed in detail later in this chapter (section. 4). However, 
it would be relevant here to look into some empirical studies on relationship between financial 
variables and economic growth.   
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1.3 Review of Empirical Research 
Host of econometric studies has been conducted in the past decades in order to examine the 
determinants of growth. One of such studies is given in IMF World economic outlook (1993) 
which presents the major characteristics of high, medium and low growth developing 
countries using annual data for the 1970s-90s. The analysis of data implies that fast growing 
economies have substantially higher saving, investment, and export growth rates as compare 
to those of medium and slow growing economies. Levine and Renelt (1992), by examining 
the degree of robustness of some of cross-country growth regressions, found that investment 
rates for physical as well as human capital are positively correlated with average growth rates 
across a wide variety of samples. However, the correlation of other variables such as fiscal 
policy, inflation, rate of increase in population, and the initial level of income etc. does not 
seem to be robust with growth.  
 
Regarding the role of financial variables, King and Levine (1993) show a robust correlation 
between the degree of financial development and growth, investment, and the efficiency of 
capital. The financial indicators used in this study includes the size of the formal financial 
sector relative to output, the importance of banks relative to the central bank, the ratio of 
credit allocated to firms relative to output, and the share of total credit allocated to firms. On 
other hand, Fischer (1993) establishes a negative relation between growth, inflation and fiscal 
deficits in a large group of countries, whereas De Gregorio (1992, 1993) finds evidence of a 
negative relationship between the level of inflation (as indicator of tax system inefficiency), 
the variability of inflation (as indicator of macroeconomic stability), and growth in Latin 
America. Although the study by Nelson and Singh (1994) shows no significant effect of fiscal 
deficits on growth in developing countries during 1970s and 1980s, but private investment 
appears to have a significantly positive role.   
 
Then, Evans et al., (2002) evaluate three different strands in finance- growth relationship: the 
first strand is that derived from the neo-classical growth model, inspired by seminal work of 
Solow (1956, 1957); the second strand is that based on Romer (1986)-Lucas (1988) paradigm 
of endogenous growth; whereas third strand is derived from the work of Goldsmith (1969), 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). This study investigates the contribution of human capital 
and financial development to economic growth in a panel of 82 countries covering the period 
of 22 years from 1972 to 1993. This study found that finance makes a significant contribution 
to growth, irrespective of whether money or credit is employed as a measure of the monetary 
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factor. In addition, results associated with the money-capital interaction clearly support the 
McKinnon’s (1973) complementarity hypothesis and Shaw’s (1973) debt intermediation 
view, irrespective of the definition of the monetary variable used. Although these are the 
hypotheses and views which we will focus in next Chapter, however, it would be relevant to 
briefly mention the two at this point.  McKinnon’s (1973) complementary hypothesis predicts 
that money and investment are complementary due to a self-financed investment, and that a 
real deposit rate is the key determinant of capital formation for financially constrained 
developing economies. Shaw’s (1973) debt-intermediation view postulates that financial 
intermediaries promote investment and raise output growth through borrowing and lending. 
 
In sum, modern growth theories generally imply that countries which save and invest more 
are supposed to grow faster in the long run. It highlights the significance of the role of 
policies. Policies aimed at encouraging savings, particularly those designed to enhance the 
efficiency of financial intermediation, may have a sustained effect on per capita income. 
Therefore, two components to analyze while studying finance-growth nexus are financial 
development and the policies aiming this development. Before that, it is pertinent to describe 
that a common tendency in the area under investigation is to assume that financial 
development automatically results in economic growth and thus regress real economic activity 
on some measures of financial development (Gupta, 1984). However, this view is ambiguous 
and somewhat contentious as there is no consensus in the literature and empirical research 
about the direction of causality.   
 
Section 2. Direction of Causality in Finance-Growth Nexus  
There are different opinions regarding the significance of financial system for economic 
growth. There are certain researchers who attribute the Industrialization in England to its 
financial system as it facilitated the mobilization of capital for “immense works” (Walter 
Bagehot, 1873; John Hicks, 1969).  By specifying the financial system as banks, Joseph 
Schumpeter (1934) argue that well-functioning banks stimulate technological innovation as 
they are enabled to identify and fund those entrepreneurs who can successfully implement 
innovative products and production processes.  
 
Well before Schumpeter, such significance was also identified by economists like Alexander 
Hamilton (1781) who argued that “banks were the happiest engines that ever were invented 
for creating economic growth” (cited in Hammond, 1991, P. 36). Opposed to this mindset that 
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support the finance and cause and growth as effect, there are economists like Joan Robinson 
(1952) who argued that ‘it seems to be the case that where enterprise leads, finance 
follows…The same impulses within an economy which set enterprise on foot make owners of 
wealth venturesome, and when a strong impulse to invest is fettered by lack of finance, 
devices are invented to release it … and habits and institutions are developed’ (Robinson, 
1952, P. 86-87). This view regards growth as cause and finance and effect. That is, it is the 
economic growth which creates demand for certain kinds of financial arrangement and 
resultantly, the financial system responds automatically to these demands. 
 
2.1 Demand-following Approach versus Supply-leading Approach 
One way to analyze the finance-growth causality is through the approaches described by 
Hugh T. Patrick (1966) as “demand-following” and “supply-leading”. Initially put by 
Robinson (1952), the demand-following approach explains that with the growth of the 
economy, new additional demands are generated for financial services which ultimately cause 
the growth of the financial system as result of its supply responses. Thus, the more rapid the 
growth rate of real national income, the greater will be the demand for external funds i.e. 
savings of others, which needs financial intermediation because firms are generally less able 
to self-finance all investment projects. It is also assumed that demand-following supply 
response of emergent financial system happens automatically. It implies that as the result of 
real economic growth, financial systems are perfectly developed to increase the opportunities 
for acquiring liquidity and for reducing risk etc. 
 
However, this is not the case in developing countries where the increased supply of financial 
services as result of demand may not be automatic. It implies that the financial systems in 
these countries are under-developed due to the lack of demand for financial services by their 
savers and investors. Thus, as result of underdeveloped financial system, there is lack of 
saving and investing activities, due to which the real economy is refrained to grow. This 
phenomenon is often associated with a kind of ‘vicious circle’ of underdevelopment which 
these countries are unable to break. One of the historical reference given by Patrick (1966) to 
describe the passivity of finance in growth process is restrictive banking legislation in early 
19th century France, where religious barriers to interest and loans along with imperfections in 
the operation of market mechanism dictated an inadequate demand-following response by the 
financial system. In the similar fashion, Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) analyzes the abortive 
upswing of Italian industrial development in the 1880s by stating that “mainly, it is believed, 
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because the modern investment bank had not yet been established in Italy” (Gerschenkron, 
1962, P. 363). In the underdeveloped countries today, similar impediments may lead to an 
inadequate demand-following response by the financial system. Therefore, in one way or the 
other, the lack of financial services, restricts or limits effective growth patterns and processes.  
 
The other approach is the “supply-leading” where the creation of financial institutions and 
supply of financial services by them is made prior to their demand, by the entrepreneurs in the 
modern and growth-inducing sectors. In this regard, there are two functions associated with 
this approach: one is to transfer resources from traditional non-growth sectors to modern ones, 
and second is to stimulate an entrepreneurial demand in the modern sectors. Financial 
intermediation which transfers resources from traditional sectors, whether by collecting 
wealth and saving from those sectors in exchange for its deposits and other financial 
liabilities, or by credit creation and forced savings, which is analogous to ‘Schumpeterian 
concept of innovation financing’. Patrick (1966) indirectly implies that the foundations of 
Schumpeter’s concept are also laid on supply-leading approach. Due to initial lending to 
nascent modern sectors, supply-leading financial system may not be profitable. However, new 
financial institutions can be made viable through many different ways: For example, the use 
of government capital and direct government subsidies (like Russia did in latter half of 19th 
century), indirect government subsidies, or modern financial institutions may initially lend a 
large proportion of their funds to traditional (agriculture and commercial) sectors profitably, 
gradual shifting of lending portfolio from traditional to modern sectors; a phenomenon more 
closely resembles the demand-following approach, that is, whether a financial institution is 
supply-leading depends mainly on its attitude in searching out and encouraging new ventures 
of a modern nature. Another characterization of supply-leading approach is that it presents an 
opportunity to stimulate real growth by financial means. Therefore, it may play a more 
significant role during the initial phases of growth process than the latter ones. As implied by 
Gerschenkron (1962), the more backward the economy relative to others, the greater would be 
the emphasis placed on supply-leading finance. However, the use of resources, especially 
entrepreneurial talents and managerial skills, and the costs of explicit or implicit subsidies in 
supply-leading development must produce sufficient benefits in the form of stimulating real 
economic growth; a condition necessary to justify this approach.  
 
Which approach to follow to understand finance-growth causality is an area which needs to be 
explored further. According to Patrick (1966), in actual practice, there is likely to be an 
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interaction between demand-following and supply-leading approaches. Before sustained 
modern industrial growth kick starts, real innovation-type investment can be brought by 
supply-leading. As the process of real growth crops up, the supply-leading drive gradually 
subsides whereas the demand-following financial response becomes dominant. Therefore, it is 
the matter of timing of progression of different sectors.   
 
Gurley and Shaw (1955) seems to lean on the view that financial development depends on 
economic growth, that is, demand-following phenomenon. However, they do mention that 
there may also be a ‘retroactive impact of finance upon the real world’, thereby implying a 
role for the supply-leading phenomenon. This position thus advocates a two-way causality 
between real and financial growth. However, Goldsmith (1969) suggested that financial 
development helped economic growth, which implied a supply-leading situation.  
 
Besides considering two-way causality between finance and growth, it is also crucial to take 
into account the ‘complementarity’ of the two phenomena as described by Berthélemy and 
Varoudakis (1996). If ‘supply-leading’ financial development actually accelerates the 
economic growth, the ‘demand-following’ financial development is also not merely a passive 
conformation of the financial system to development requirements of the real sector. Rather, 
real growth enables the financial system to accomplish its own autonomous evolution, 
because the sustained increase in real income provides the means to develop an expensive and 
sophisticated financial intermediation. Another way to look at this complementarity is based 
on the work of Townsend (1983), Greenwood and Jovanovich (1990) and Levine (1992), 
which suggested that if the organization of financial networks is expensive, there may be a 
‘circular relationship’ between real growth and the development of financial system. It 
implies that at one point of time, economic growth makes the development of financial 
systems profitable and, at the same time, the establishment of such systems speeds up growth 
in the real sector along with the structural transformation of the economy.  As emphasized by 
Levine (1992), economic growth even influences the type of financial intermediation systems 
that the economy can afford. It implies that when real income per capita is low, the economy 
will select ‘simple’ forms of financial systems with the main purpose to mobilize savings, 
diversify productivity risks, and manage liquidity risks. However, the rise in per capita 
income enables the economy to develop more “sophisticated” financial systems, whose 
functioning will be correspondingly more costly as they need to be involved in monitoring 
investment projects and in the identification of the cost-effective innovations. 
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2.2 Review of Empirical Research 
As far as the evidence on finance-growth causality is concerned, Kanhaya Lal Gupta (1984) 
studied the causality direction by using Granger-Sims methodology on sample of 14 
developing countries for the period covering 1960-1980. In the case of every country, the 
supply-leading phenomenon exists. Out of fourteen countries covered, in the case of eight, 
only supply-leading phenomenon exists. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest, that at least for the 
sample countries, there is overwhelming support for the supply-leading phenomenon, that is, 
for the situation in which economic growth is stimulated by deliberately planned expansion of 
financial development. Another important finding is that not for a single country covered, the 
evidence of strictly demand-following phenomenon is found.  Moreover, only two countries 
exhibit a simultaneous relationship between financial development and economic growth.  
 
Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejan (1996) found the evidence that investment and saving tend to 
follow rather than lead growth. They find that growth in per capita GDP helps to forecast the 
share of investment in GDP but investment does not help to forecast growth. Similar findings 
for savings are reported by Carroll and Weil (1994) by using both country and individual-
level data. Their findings imply that growth creates opportunities that provoke saving and 
investment, but unfortunately they do not tell us what causes growth in the first place. In 
another study by Murinde and Eng (1994), the focus is on Singapore as a country which has 
implemented financial restructuring strategies that amounts to a 'supply-leading finance' 
experiment. The evidence largely supports the supply-leading hypothesis only when broad 
monetary aggregates and a monetization variable are used as proxy for financial development. 
It is concluded that there is a plausible case for those economies which intend to adopt a 
financial restructuring strategy driven by a supply-leading policy stance that involves 
enhanced monetization of the economy and bank intermediation. In another study by Nicholas 
M. Odhiambo (2007), the direction of causality between financial development and economic 
growth is investigated in three sub-Saharan African countries.  The study finds that the 
direction of causality between financial development and economic growth is sensitive to the 
choice of measurement for financial development. In addition, the strength and clarity of the 
causality evidence is found to vary from country to country and over time, for example, a 
demand-following response is found to be stronger in Kenya and South Africa, whilst in 
Tanzania a supply-leading response is found to be dominant.   
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However, there are certain researchers who find the strong evidence of demand-following 
relationship between finance and growth, that is, financial system exerts a causal influence on 
economic growth. Based on the predictions made in a number of theoretical models (for 
instance, Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; 
Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; and King and Levine, 1993), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) 
constructed a new dataset covering the period from 1960-1995 and focus on three indicators 
of financial intermediation. Econometrically, the results indicate that the exogenous 
component of financial intermediary development is positively correlated with economic 
growth. Economically, it is found that the impact of finance on growth is large. Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) also found from their investigations that in countries with advanced financial 
sectors, industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance grow relatively faster than 
other industries. Alternatively, in countries with poorly developed financial systems, 
industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance grow more slowly than other 
industries. In another study, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), by using firm-level 
data, show that firms in countries with better developed financial systems grow faster than 
they could have grown without this access.  
 
Although there are various qualifications in these empirical studies, the predominance of 
theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between finance 
and growth. The direction of causality is still ambiguous as a large body of research is still 
skeptical about the development of financial markets and institutions as critical part of the 
growth process and views the development of financial system as inconsequential sideshow, 
responding passively to economic growth and industrialization. However, evidence also 
persists that the level of financial development is a good predictor of future rates of economic 
growth and development.   
 
Section 3. Nature of “Financial Structure” for Growth and Development 
The interrelatedness of financial structure and economic growth is a well-known hypothesis 
(Cameron, Crisp, Patrick and Tilly 1967; Goldsmith 1969, McKinnon 1973, Shaw 1973, 
Townsend 1983; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). The much of the mainstream literature on 
finance and economic growth is based on the seminal work of Gurley and Shaw (1955). 
Gurley’s and Shaw’s debt-intermediation view establishes a clear connection between finance 
and economic growth as it implies that growth would stimulate and be stimulated by the 
“institutionalization of savings and investment”. With the growth in income, wealth-holders 
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will need to diversify their asset portfolio. If financial innovation is such as to accommodate 
this diversification demand, financial institutions can enhance their lending capacity and thus 
boost growth and this process then becomes a benign circle (Studart, 1995). However, their 
analysis stresses only the importance of the efficient use of savings; Gurley and Shaw missed 
a fundamental characteristic by ignoring the parts of the credit-driven investment financing of 
the entrepreneurial activities.  Even, most of today’s economists view economic growth as a 
problem of availability and allocation of saving. According to this, the main function of the 
financial system is to allocate savings to investment, that is, intermediation. However, last few 
decades have viewed the evolution of financial “markets” in industrial and emerging 
economies to allocate savings, that is, disintermediation. Now, the question arises that which 
type of financial structure is better or what is the optimal mix of financial intermediaries and 
markets for promoting long-run economic growth and ultimately overall development. This 
has led to, in Levine’s (2002) words, “a century-old debate” on the interrelatedness of 
financial structure and economic growth, that is, which type of financial 
institutions/arrangements are best in mobilizing and allocating resources. 
 
On basis of the existing literature on the area under investigation, the competing views on 
financial structure and growth can be divided into four classes: intermediary-based view, the 
market-based view, the financial services view/functional approach, and the legal view. 
 
3.1 Intermediary-based or Bank-based View 
The intermediary-based view emphasizes the importance of intermediaries in performing key 
functions e.g. identifying good projects, mobilizing resources, monitoring managers, 
managing risk, and easing exchange etc. while stressing the paucity of market-based 
economies. These financial services are crucial for the efficient allocation of resources to 
firms, thereby encouraging long-run economic growth. As argued by Levine (2002), financial 
intermediaries are effective at financing projects that are characterized by substantial 
asymmetric information because they have substantial expertise to distinguish “bad" and 
“good" borrowers. It also highlights the nuisance of market-based financial system because 
well-functioning markets instantly reveal information in public markets, which provides 
individual investors with less incentive to acquire information thereby leading to accentuation 
of information asymmetries (Boyd and Prescott, 1986). This argument is primarily based on 
the well-known free-rider problem. If information is going to be revealed by the market, no 
one has an incentive to collect it. Consequently, well-developed markets have a negative 
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impact on the identification of innovative projects and thereby impede efficient resource 
allocation (Stiglitz, 1985; Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor 1993). The free-rider problem is less 
severe in intermediary-based systems as banks can make investments without revealing their 
actions instantaneously in public markets. Advocates of the intermediary-based view also 
emphasize the fact that liquid markets can create an environment in which individual 
investors behave as if they were myopic (Bhide 1993). Since individual investors are able to 
readily sell their shares in liquid markets, they have fewer incentives to monitor managers 
thoroughly. This implies that greater market development may hinder corporate control and 
economic performance. In contrast, banks can ease distortions stemming from asymmetric 
information through forming long-run relationships with firms, and, through monitoring for 
controlling moral hazard. As a result, bank-based arrangements can produce better 
improvement in resource allocation and corporate governance, as compare to the market-
based financial system (Stiglitz, 1985; Bhide, 1993). Another argument that financial markets 
are not well suited for corporate control, especially in the context of takeovers, is that insiders 
have better information about the firms than outsiders do. This informational asymmetry 
moderates the potential effectiveness of takeovers, given that it is more likely that well-
informed insiders will outbid less-informed outsiders (Levine, 1997). 
 
An important aspect to mention here is the distinction between banking and non-banking 
intermediaries. The growth of non-banking financial intermediaries since 1900 relative to 
commercial banks has prompted Gurley and Shaw (1955) to question the continued 
uselessness of the neoclassical distinction between bank and non-bank financial institutions. 
In their well-known 1955 paper, they argued “we are deviating from conventional doctrine 
regarding the banking system as one among many financial intermediaries, sharing with the 
others the functions of indirect finance. We take exception to the view that banks stand apart 
in their ability to create loanable funds out of hand, while other intermediaries in contrast are 
busy with the modest brokerage function of transmitting loanable funds that are somehow 
generated elsewhere. Neither banks nor other intermediaries create loanable funds. That is 
the prerogative of spending units with surpluses on income and product account” (Gurley and 
Shaw, 1955, P. 521). The acceptance of this view seemed to entail radical redesign of banking 
theory. Later, Gurley and Shaw (1960), in ‘Money in a theory of finance’, argue that both 
monetary and non-monetary intermediaries are “equally” capable of creating loanable funds, 
of bringing about an excess stock of money, and of producing an excess of ex ante investment 
over ex ante savings (Gurley and Shaw, 1960, P. 202, 218). This view is contended by Joseph 
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Aschheim (1966) who argued that Gurley and Shaw failed to recognize the role of monopoly 
and quasi-monopoly institutions (e.g. central bank) as ultimate source of credit creation. Thus, 
the ability of banks and similar financial intermediaries is limited as they can lend no more 
what they receive as deposits. This makes them ‘passive’ credit creators whereas ‘active’ 
credit creators are those institutions which have monopoly or quasi-monopoly in the supply of 
currency (Selgin, 1988).  
 
Regardless of these distinctions, Arestis, Luintel and Luintel (2005) presented “bank-based 
theory” which argues that banks can lead the economy to long-term growth more effectively 
than markets. In this regard, state-owned banks are regarded to be more suitable to overcome 
the market frictions6 and to strategically allocate the savings (Gerschenkron, 1962). The banks 
which are not impeded by regulatory restrictions can exploit economies of scale and scope in 
information gathering and processing. Indeed, bank-based financial systems are in a much 
better position than market-based systems to address agency problems and short-termism 
(Stiglitz, 1985; Singh, 1997). 
 
3.2 Market-based View 
The market-based view stresses the advantageous role of markets in diversifying and 
managing risks as it is argued that financial intermediaries can extract information rents from 
firms. More specifically, at the time of new investments or debt renegotiations, 
intermediaries, particularly banks, can have bargaining power over a firm's expected future 
profits. Powerful intermediaries can obtain a disproportionately large share of the profits, so 
that firms will have fewer incentives to undertake high-risk and profitable projects (Rajan 
1992). Therefore, market-based view stresses the inherent inefficiencies of 
banks/intermediaries for they “can stymie innovation by extracting informational rents and 
protecting firms with close bank-firm ties from competition …. may collude with firm 
managers against other creditors and impede efficient corporate governance” (Levine, 2002, 
p. 3). For this reason, some firms at a certain point of their life-cycle rely mostly on market 
financing. For instance, bond financing is preferred option in mature and relatively safe firms 
(Bolton and Freixas, 2000). 
                                                          
6
 Market friction is anything which interferes with trade, prevents markets from developing and working 
properly. Market friction is a collective expression for all kinds of trading costs like trader’s provisions, 
transaction costs including cost of acquiring information, taxes etc. The sum of these costs is negligible 
compared with the transaction volume if the market friction is low (Paul and Baschnagel, 1999, p. 135). Thus, it 
can be said that a market is “efficient” when there is low “market friction”.  
 
37 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
Another argument for rejecting intermediary-based approach is that when intermediaries enter 
in a debt contract with firms, they have a natural bias towards low-risk projects that have a 
high probability of success. The drawback of this behavior, however, is that low-risk projects 
are generally low-return investments. Therefore, intermediary-based systems can curtail 
technological innovation and long-run economic growth (Levine, 2002). Weinstein and Yafeh 
(1998) have found its evidence in Japan by showing that while close relationships between 
intermediaries and firms increase the availability of capital to borrowing firms, they do not 
necessarily lead to profitability or growth. In fact, the cost of capital for firms with close 
intermediary ties is higher than that of their peers, which suggests that most of the benefits 
from these relationships are appropriated by intermediaries. The slow growth rates of 
intermediary clients also indicate that intermediaries discourage firms from investing in risky 
but profitable projects.   
 
In addition, powerful intermediaries can also conspire with managers against outsiders, which 
in turn impede competition, corporate control, the creation of new firms, and thus long-run 
economic growth. Wenger and Kaserer (1998) provide evidence from Germany where 
intermediaries, particularly banks, misrepresent the balance sheets of firms to the public and 
encourage firm managers to misbehave. Moreover, Allen and Gale (1999) argue that, 
although intermediaries can be effective at eliminating duplication of information gathering 
and processing, they can have less success dealing with uncertainty, innovation, and new 
ideas. Due to little information about some new technological project and its potential returns 
or due to difficultly in judging the available information without some expertise, 
intermediated financing requires delegation of the decision regarding the financing of a 
project to a relatively small number of decision-makers. When there is no disagreement, this 
kind of delegation is very effective and can imply substantial cost savings. However, in case 
of diversity of opinions, some of the providers of funds would disagree with the decision. 
Since markets allow coalitions of people with similar views to join together to finance 
projects, markets are very effective at financing industries that are new, or where little 
information is available and a diversity of opinion perseveres. This approach is founded on 
the hypothesis that markets are more efficient than other more coordinated forms of financing 
the economic activities. As argued by Levine (1998), market-based systems have a 
comparative advantage in providing cross-sectional risk-sharing (i.e., diversification of risk at 
a given point in time). Markets are well suited to achieving cross-sectional risk-sharing 
because of the enormous variety of financial products available in market-based financial 
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systems. It is further established that big, liquid and well-functioning markets foster growth 
and profit incentives, enhance corporate governance and facilitate risk management (Levine, 
2002) 
 
A related argument is developed by Boyd and Smith (1998), who demonstrate through a 
model that financial structure changes as countries go through different stages of 
development, and countries become more market-based as development proceeds. Regarding 
the market-based financial system in developing countries, an important issue is that the 
complexity of modern economic and business activity has greatly increased the variety of 
ways in which insiders can try to conceal firm performance. Although progress in technology, 
accounting, and legal practice has also improved the tools of detection, the asymmetry of 
information between users and providers of funds has not been reduced.   
 
3.3 Financial Services View 
Contrary to intermediary/bank based and market based views, the financial services view 
proposes the complementarity between financial intermediaries and markets for providing 
financial services in a manner that can effectively accelerate economic growth. Financial 
markets and intermediaries, that is, financial system, emerge to reduce transaction and 
information costs. In doing so, financial markets and intermediaries both provide key 
financial functions such as savings mobilization, information acquisition, risk management 
etc. The underlying argument is that the overall level and quality of financial services matters 
rather than the channels through which these services are provided. It is the financial services 
themselves that are more important, than the form of their delivery (Levine, 1998). Thus 
financial services view argues that markets and intermediaries are the financial structures that 
perform more or less the same functions but in different ways and possibly with different 
degrees of success (Allen and Gale, 1999). For example, by encouraging competition for 
corporate control and by creating alternative ways of funding investment opportunities, 
financial markets mitigate the adverse effects of powerful intermediaries. Rajan (1992) shows 
that the firm's choice of borrowing sources (bank and bond finances) and the choice of 
priority for its debt claims attempt to optimally circumscribe the powers of banks. Besanko 
and Kanatas (1993) characterize an economy in which bank and bond market finances coexist 
such that the market reduces the incentive of the bank to excessively monitor the firm.  
 
39 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
As observed in last two views, markets and intermediaries have their own comparative 
advantages in dealing with different types of information. For example, intermediaries can 
benefit from increasing returns to scale in mitigating asymmetric information, but may be 
unsuccessful when dealing with uncertainty, innovation, and new ideas. In contrast, markets 
may be more effective at financing industries that are new or where information is sparse and 
diversity of opinion persists (Levine, 2002).  
 
Another aspect of complementarity of both views stems from the ‘financial stability’, that is, 
in case of vulnerability of one financial arrangement (e.g. intermediaries, particularly banks), 
the other one continues to function thereby ensuring the stability of overall financial system. 
In case, if whole economy is dependent only on one type of financial structure, the whole 
system would be suspended due to the absence of any alternative financial arrangement (e.g. 
markets) to access finance. Therefore, the relationship between financial structure and 
financial stability provides another reason for focusing on presence of well-developed 
intermediaries and markets (Levine, 2002).  
 
Therefore, the significant thing is not the ‘financial structure’, but the performance of 
‘financial functions’ which are deemed to be necessary for ensuring economic growth. Quite 
simply, this view suggests that there are different components of the financial system; they do 
not compete, rather complement each other to ameliorate transaction and information costs, in 
the financial system (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001). Therefore, financial intermediaries 
and markets emerge to ameliorate market imperfections and provide financial services that are 
well placed to facilitate savings mobilization and risk management, assess potential 
investment opportunities, exert corporate control, and enhance liquidity. In this regard, Levine 
(2002) argues that the financial services view places the analytical spotlight on how to create 
better functioning banks and markets, and subsides the debate on bank-based versus market-
based systems. Thus, these two elements of the financial system may act as complements 
during the development process. As claimed by Allen and Gale (2001), at the end of the day, 
it is not an issue of markets versus intermediaries, but rather of markets and intermediaries. 
 
It may be desirable to avoid viewing intermediary - and market-based systems as representing 
a trade-off. Moreover, market-based and intermediary-based systems jointly make whole 
financial market. Thus, both are key elements of one big market – a market that is comprised 
of every type of financial institution, intermediary as well as non-intermediary. This prompts 
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the issue that what conditions are necessary to provide better financial services in a financial 
market. It is the legal environment which is assumed to be the necessary condition to provide 
growth-inducing financial services.  
 
3.4 Legal View 
The law-based view is an extension of the financial services view. It has been put forward by 
La Porta et al, (1998) and Levine (2002), which argues that creation of strong legal systems 
that support the right of outside investors and then efficiently enforcing those legal rules is 
crucial for providing growth-inducing financial services. As a result, the legal view infers that 
the overall financial development defined by the legal and regulatory systems predicts 
economic performance better than any measure of financial structure per se. Chakraborty and 
Ray (2006), in a model where financial structure arises endogenously, show that it is entirely 
possible for two countries to have distinctly different financial systems but enjoy similar 
growth rates over time. Therefore, this view takes the position that it is not the intermediary-
based or market-based systems that really matters, but rather the institutional infrastructure 
like legal environment and the enforcement of contracts etc. which plays fundamental role in 
determining the growth-stimulating nature of a financial sector.  
 
Legal infrastructure is a prerequisite for a financial sector to function properly. Firms are able 
to access external finance in countries where legal enforcement is stronger (La Porta et al., 
1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005), 
whereas better creditor protection increases credit to the private sector (Djankov, McLiesh 
and Shleifer, 2005). Failure to exert corporate governance and to protect investment from 
controlling shareholders/owners/management of companies makes investors investment-
averse. Thus, the creation and maintenance of a legal system for protection the property 
rights, conflict resolution, effective enforcement of contracts along with strong accounting 
infrastructure is crucial in financial system development (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2008). 
In countries where legal systems are more effective, financial systems have lower interest rate 
spreads and are more efficient (Laeven and Majnoni, 2005).  
 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that there are the differences in legal traditions across countries 
which shape the law and enforcement mechanisms for protecting outside investors’ rights 
thereby influencing financial development. In this regard, the two most influential legal 
traditions are the British Common law and the French Civil law, which greatly differs from 
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each other in terms of the legal rules covering secured creditors, the efficiency of contract 
enforcement, and the quality of accounting standards. By describing legal rights of creditors 
(i.e. ability of financial systems to persuade firms to pay their liabilities and repossess 
collateral or liquidate firms in case of default as well as prioritizing secured creditors relative  
other claimants in corporate default), the soundness of contract enforcement (i.e. extent to 
which contracts and other legal obligations are actually met) , and the level of corporate 
accounting standards (i.e. level to which accounting standard simplify the interpretability and 
comparability of information about firms and ensure proper disclosure of information), La 
Porta et al. (1998) argue that English legal tradition countries have laws that emphasize the 
rights of creditors to a greater degree than the French, German, and Scandinavian countries. 
French civil law countries protect creditors the least, with German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries falling in the middle. In terms of enforcement quality, countries with a French legal 
heritage have the lowest quality of law enforcement, while countries with German and 
Scandinavian legal traditions tend to be the best at enforcing contracts. Whereas the countries 
with an English legal tradition tend to have much better accounting standards than French or 
German civil law countries.  
 
Building on same indicators, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) also suggest that creditor 
rights, enforcement quality, and accounting standards influence financial intermediary 
development, and that this component of financial intermediary development positively 
affects economic growth. Thus, the legal and accounting reforms that strengthen these legal 
indicators can boost financial intermediary development thereby accelerating economic 
growth. By extending data set of La Porta et al. (1998) from 44 countries to 71, Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Maksimovic (2000) found that countries with a German legal 
origin have better developed financial intermediaries whereas countries with a French legal 
tradition tend to have less well-developed institutions. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2003) also investigate that differences in initial endowments and legal origins are robustly 
associated with development of financial institutions and markets.  
 
Therefore, countries with particular legal origins tend to create particular types of laws, 
regulations, and enforcement mechanisms which help determine the level of financial sector 
development.  In order to ensure financial sector development, it is crucial to target those 
legal reforms which ensure lenders that financial system will quickly, and effectively enforce 
their claims against borrowers. 
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3.5 Review of Empirical Research 
The empirical investigation of the impact of financial structure on economic growth is 
pioneered by Goldsmith (1969) who traced the relationship between the mix of financial 
intermediaries and economic development for 35 countries over the period 1860-1963 and 
compared financial systems of Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) and their relevance 
for economic growth. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996) extended Goldsmith's work by 
examining the association between the mix of financial intermediaries, markets, and economic 
development for approximately 50 countries over the period 1970-1993. By concluding that 
countries with a well-developed stock market also have well-developed banks and non-bank 
financial intermediaries, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996) supports the complementarity of 
intermediary and market based financial systems in providing growth-inducing financial 
services. However, Levine and Zervos (1998) show that higher stock market liquidity or 
greater bank development leads to higher growth, irrespective of the development of the 
other. It implies the indifference of each view for the other. Whereas, in a study of 36 
countries from 1980-1995, Tadesse (2002) finds that the difference between intermediary-
based and market-based financial systems is important in explaining economic growth. For 
countries with underdeveloped financial sectors, intermediary-based systems outperform 
market-based systems, while for countries with developed financial sectors, market-based 
systems surpass intermediary-based systems. Against this background, it could be tempting to 
establish a link between the acceleration of productivity growth in the US as from the mid-
1990s till mid-2000s, in line with gains arising in the market-dominated American financial 
system, along with advancement in information & communication technology. During the 
same period, productivity growth slowed down in two major bank-dominated areas, Europe 
and Japan. However, findings by Arestis, Demetriades, and Luintel (2001) suggest that 
intermediary-based financial systems may be more growth-promoting than market-based 
financial systems. Their study, by using time series methods, show that while stock markets in 
five developed countries (Germany, United States (US), Japan, UK, and France) may be able 
to contribute to long-run output growth, the influence of the stock market is much smaller 
than that of banks.  
 
Levine (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) have examined the same issue by using 
cross-country regressions, industry panel estimations, and firm-level analyses and found that 
the distinction between intermediary-based and market-based systems is not important for 
explaining the finance-growth nexus or explaining differential growth rates across nations. 
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Rather, this is the institutional infrastructure which is important for accelerating economic 
growth. In short, they find no support for the intermediary- and market-based views of 
financial structure and growth, but find strong support for the financial services view and the 
institutional infrastructure and legal view. Econometrical analysis by Beck (2008a) also 
provide remarkably consistent results, implying that firms grow more rapidly in economies 
with a higher levels of overall financial sector development and in countries with legal 
systems that effectively protect the rights of outside investors. 
 
Overall, there is a rich diversity of opinion in the existing literature on the relationship 
between financial structure and growth and there is no clear cut conclusion.7 However, 
existing literature places more support for the financial services and institutional infrastructure 
such as legal framework, to carry out these functions. After determining that financial 
intermediaries and markets are supposed to be complementary in the provision of growth-
inducing financial services, it is significant to have a detailed analysis of those financial 
services which are supposed to be provided by financial system to attain economic growth. 
 
Section 4. Financial Services 
The body of research built on work by Bagehot (1873), Schumpeter (1934), Gurley and Shaw 
(1955), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) etc. has produced a core result: Countries with 
better developed financial systems tend to grow faster. Over the years, research has improved 
the understanding of the ways in which financial development stimulates economic growth 
(Murinde 1996; Levine 1997). These ways are also known as “financial services” provided by 
financial systems, or ‘financial functions” performed by financial systems. An important point 
to mention here is that this “functional approach” is broad and comprehensive as it does not 
focus on only one financial instrument like money, or only on one institution like bank.  
 
Taking insight from Levine (1997), five broad functions are discussed below, which are 
provided by the financial system to ease market frictions for exerting positive impact on 
economic growth. An interesting figure relating these functions with economic growth is 
given at Annexure I. 
 
                                                          
7
 Levine (1998) has also highlighted various analytical problems associated with studying relationship between 
financial structure and economic growth: for example, failure to quantify the financial structure, inappropriate or 
complex dichotomy between intermediary-based and market-based approaches etc.  
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4.1 Produce information about potential investments 
Generally, individual savers and investors cannot collect and process information on a wide 
array of enterprises, managers, and economic conditions, due to time, money and other 
resources constraints thereby restraining capital to surge to its highest value use. Such 
constraints create incentives for financial intermediaries and markets to emerge (Diamond 
1984; and Boyd and Prescott 1986). Instead of each individual conducting evaluations a 
financial intermediary can do it for all of its members and thus economizing their information 
costs which facilitates the acquisition of information about investment opportunities and 
improves resource allocation (Levine, 1998). Moreover, financial intermediaries have 
expertise to select most capable firms and managers which result in a more efficient allocation 
of capital (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). As argued by Bagehot (1873) over 130 years 
ago, ‘(England's financial) organization is so useful because it is so easily adjusted. Political 
economists say that capital sets towards the most profitable trades, and that it rapidly leaves 
the less profitable non-paying trades. But in ordinary countries this is a slow process, ... In 
England, however, ... capital runs as surely and instantly where it is most wanted, and where 
there is most to be made of it, as water runs to find its level’ (Bagehot, 1873, p. 53). England's 
financial system did a better job at identifying and funding profitable ventures as compared to 
other countries in the mid- 1800s, which helped England enjoy comparatively greater 
economic success.  
 
Besides financial intermediaries, stock markets may also influence the acquisition and 
dissemination of information about firms. This information about firms substantially 
improves resource allocation with corresponding implications for economic growth (Merton 
1987). However, stock markets quickly reveal information through posted prices. Thus, there 
will be few incentives for market participants to spend private resources to acquire 
information that is almost immediately publicly available (Stiglitz, 1985). 
 
Another aspect of this function is the presence of ‘close ties between firms and financial 
intermediaries’ which reduces information costs and eases firm financing constraints. This has 
been proved from the empirical studies of Japan (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1990), 
Italy (Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000), and the US (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
Furthermore, borrowers with longer banking relationships pay lower interest rates and are less 
likely to pledge collateral than borrowers with less mature banking relationships. It implied 
that countries with financial institutions that are effective at mitigating information barriers 
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will promote more economic growth through more investment as compare to the countries 
with financial systems that are less effective at acquiring and processing information.  
 
4.2 Monitor investments and corporate governance 
The extent to which shareholders and creditors effectively monitor firms and induce managers 
to maximize firm value, improves the efficiency with which firms allocate resources and 
motivate savers to finance production and innovation. Financial intermediaries that improve 
corporate governance will reduce credit rationing and thereby boost productivity, capital 
accumulation, and growth (Bencivenga and Smith 1993). Therefore, financial contracts are 
established for mitigating the costs associated with monitoring firm managers and exerting 
corporate control, after the financing is provided to them.  
 
In this respect, an important aspect is the role of financial contracts and collateral which are 
opted to reduce certain impediments to efficient investment. Since it is costly for outsider 
investor to verify project returns, the insiders have incentives to misrepresent project returns 
to outsiders. Due to verification costs, it is socially inefficient for outsiders to monitor in all 
circumstances. Verification costs imply that outsiders constrain firms from borrowing to 
expand investment because higher leverage implies greater risk of default and higher 
verification expenditures by lenders. Thus, collateral and financial contracts that lower 
monitoring and enforcement costs reduce obstacles to efficient investment (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1990). In addition to this, financial intermediaries can economize on monitoring costs 
by mobilizing savings of many individuals and lends these resources to project owners. This 
‘delegated monitoring’ arrangement cuts back on aggregate monitoring costs because a 
borrower is only monitored by the intermediary, not all individual savers (Diamond, 1984).  
 
Besides intermediaries, stock markets may also promote corporate control. Public trading of 
firms’ shares in stock markets reflects information about firms which allows owners to link 
managerial compensation to stock prices. Relating stock performance to managers’ 
compensation helps align the interests of managers with those of owners (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). Similarly, if takeovers are easier in well-developed stock markets, the threat of a 
takeover of poorly managed firms and resulting firing of managers help to align managerial 
incentives with those of the owners (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). However, there are 
disagreements with this argument as insider investors often have better information about the 
corporation than outsiders. Thus, if well-informed owners are willing to sell their company, 
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less-informed outsiders may require a premium to purchase the firm due to the information 
asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, asymmetric information may reduce the 
efficacy of corporate takeovers as a mechanism for exerting corporate control. In addition, 
liquid equity markets that facilitate takeovers may hurt resource allocation (Shleifer and 
Summers, 1988) because a takeover typically involves a change in management. Therefore, 
existing implicit contracts between former managers and workers, suppliers, and other 
stakeholders in the firms do not bind new owners and managers to the same extent that they 
bound the original managers. Thus, a takeover allows new owners and managers to break 
implicit agreements and transfer wealth from firm stakeholders to themselves. While new 
owners may profit, there may be deterioration in the efficiency of resource allocation. Overall 
welfare may fall. Therefore, hostile takeovers may result in the fall of efficiency of resource 
allocation. However, there exists no formal model which directly ties the role of stock 
markets in improving corporate governance with long-run economic growth. 
 
4.3 Facilitate the risk management 
In response to information and transactions costs, financial arrangements may also arise in 
order to ease the trading, hedging, and pooling of risk with repercussions for resource 
allocation and growth. This function can be divided into three categories: cross-sectional risk 
diversification, inter-temporal risk sharing, and liquidity risk.  
 
Traditional finance theory focuses on cross-sectional diversification of risk. Since savers 
generally do not like risk, high-return projects tend to be riskier than low-return projects. 
Thus, systems that make it easier for people to diversify risk tend to induce a portfolio shift 
toward projects with higher expected returns (Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Patrick, 1966; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). In terms of technological change, King and Levine (1993) 
show that cross-sectional risk diversification can also stimulate innovative activity. Agents are 
continuously trying to make technological advances to gain a profitable market niche but 
engaging in innovation is risky. Therefore, the ability to hold a diversified portfolio of 
innovative projects reduces risk and promotes investment in growth-enhancing innovative 
activities. However, there exists very little empirical evidence that directly links risk 
diversification services with long-run economic growth.  
 
Financial intermediaries also enable entrepreneurs to pool risks. Because financial 
intermediaries allow investors to share the uninsurable risk and the diversifiable risk 
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stemming from the inconsistency of the rates of return on alternative assets. The possibility of 
risk sharing affects saving behavior as well as investment decisions. In the absence of 
intermediaries, agents can protect against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks only by investing in 
liquid productive assets, thereby skipping investments that are more productive but less 
liquid. This inefficiency can be considerably reduced by banking intermediaries which pool 
the liquidity risk of depositors and invest most of their funds in more illiquid and more 
productive projects (Agénor and Montiel, 1996). This effect is captured in an endogenous 
growth framework by Bencivenga and Smith (1991) by showing that banks increase the 
productivity of investment waste due to premature liquidation. Alternatively, consumers’ risk 
particularly liquidity risk, can be pooled through a stock market. In the model developed by 
Greenwood and Jovanovich (1990), the stock market allows agents to reduce rate of return 
risk by fostering portfolio diversification. 
 
A third type of risk is liquidity risk. Liquidity allows agents to transact when it comes to the 
institutional setting, with two broad directions standing out. In one view, concerned with 
market structure and marketability, an asset is liquid if it can be bought or sold quickly at low 
transaction costs and at a reasonable price. In other stance, grounded in security design and 
financial engineering, liquidity refers to the availability of instruments that can be used to 
transfer wealth across periods (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997), where wealth transfers are 
gauged by the inter-temporal substitution preferences of the agents in question. Liquidity risk 
arises due to the uncertainties associated with converting assets into a medium of exchange. 
Normally, these uncertainties emerge as result of informational asymmetries and transaction 
costs due to which liquidity is restrained thereby intensifying liquidity risk.  
 
The most common argument to link liquidity with growth is that some high return projects 
require a long run commitment of funds, but savers do not like to intact their savings for 
longer periods. Thus, if the financial system does not augment the liquidity of long term 
investments, less investment is likely to occur in the high return projects thereby restraining 
growth. The historical reasoning of this argument is given by Hicks (1969, p. 143-145) who 
argues that the products manufactured during the first decades of the Industrial Revolution 
had been invented much earlier but it had to wait for the ‘Financial Revolution’.  
 
Economists have modeled the emergence of financial markets in response to liquidity risk 
such as Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig's (1983) seminal model of liquidity, which 
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shows that a fraction of savers receive shocks after choosing between two investments: an 
illiquid, high return project and a liquid, low return project. Those receiving shocks want 
access to their savings before the illiquid project produces. This risk creates incentives for 
investing in the liquid, low return projects. The model assumes that it is prohibitively costly to 
verify whether another individual has received a shock or not. This information cost 
assumption rules out state-contingent insurance contracts and creates an incentive for 
financial markets to emerge. Savers getting shocks that increase their need for liquidity can 
sell their equity claims to the future profits of the illiquid production technology to others. 
Market participants simply trade in impersonal stock exchanges. Thus, with liquid stock 
markets, equity holders can readily sell their shares, while firms have permanent access to 
what has been invested by the initial shareholders. Thus, the stock markets reduce liquidity 
risk by facilitating trade. In order to assess the link between stock market liquidity and 
economic growth rates, capital accumulation rates, and rates of technological change, Levine 
and Zervos (1996) studied 49 countries over the period 1976-1993 and found out that the 
initial level of stock market liquidity, measured either by the turnover ratio or the value traded 
ratio, is a statistically significant predictor of economic growth, capital accumulation, and 
productivity growth over next several years.  
 
Besides markets, financial intermediaries may also enhance liquidity, by offering liquid 
deposits to savers and undertaking a mixture of liquid, low return investments as well as 
illiquid, high return investments, the financial intermediaries provide complete insurance to 
savers against liquidity risk while simultaneously facilitating long run investments in high 
return projects. In terms of growth, Bencivenga and Smith (1991) show that by eliminating 
liquidity risk, banks can increase investment in the high return, illiquid asset and therefore 
accelerate growth. However, the banking equilibrium may not be incentive compatible if 
agents can trade in liquid equity markets i.e. if equity markets exist, all agents will use 
equities and none will use banks.  In this context, banks will only emerge to provide liquidity 
if there are sufficiently large impediment to trading in securities markets (Gorton and 
Pennacchi, 1990; Diamond, 1991). However, this argument seems to view banks in a very 
narrow context. Despite of the presence of equity markets, role of banks in extending credit 
remains distinct from that of equity markets. 
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4.4 Mobilize and pool savings 
Mobilization or pooling of savings is a costly process of gathering capital from distinct savers 
for investment. These costs involved transaction and information costs. Carosso's (1970) 
‘History of Investment Banking in America’ describes the varied and complicated means used 
by investment banks to raise capital. During mid- 1880s, some investment banks used their 
European connections to raise capital from abroad for investment in the US. Other investment 
banks established close connections with major banks and industrialists in the US to mobilize 
capital. For economizing the costs associated with multiple bilateral contracts, the idea is 
emerged to pool the savings through intermediaries for which mobilizers have to convince 
savers about the soundness of the investments. In this regard, intermediaries have to establish 
sound reputations so that savers feel comfortable about entrusting their savings to the 
intermediary (Lamoreaux, 1995). Put it differently by Mavrotas and Son (2008), savings are 
mobilized with a precautionary motive, which is, facilitating the mitigation of future 
uncertainty. In this respect, two important factors are the liquidity of savings and the 
availability of insurance.  In order to encourage individuals to save, well developed financial 
systems are required to liquidate savings when they are needed to cope with an income shock. 
Whereas the insurance aspect reveals that if the financial sector is extraordinarily advanced to 
provide adequate insurance to individuals against future uncertainties, savings will be lower. 
For example, if a rural farmer in a developing country can insure against the loss occurred 
from a bad crop, precautionary savings would not be required to allow for this8. Therefore, 
savings are mobilized to mitigate future uncertainties.  
 
Regarding the positive relationship between savings and growth, number of researchers tried 
to empirically verify it. Traditional neoclassical models of economic growth e.g. Solow 
(1956) and models of endogenous growth (for instance, Romer and Rebelo style growth 
models) view savings leading growth. However, relatively new empirical literature on the 
subject seems to conclude that the direction of causation runs from growth to savings and not 
vice versa. Drawing on the experience of Latin America, Gavin et al., (1997) examines the 
relationship between saving and growth and found that higher growth precedes saving. Only 
after a sustained period of high growth do savings rates increase and this may be with a delay 
                                                          
8
 Thus, if the premium charged is actuarially correct, this will perform the consumption smoothing and 
individuals’ savings will not be required for this purpose. However, if the premium is too high, insurance will 
not be taken, and if it is too low, insurance is not suitable in the long term and there is a risk of default by the 
insurance company. The key to having an effective insurance system is the presence of information. Moral 
Hazard and adverse selection mean that determining actuarially correct premia is difficult (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). 
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that is quite significant. However, it is noted in this study that ‘link between savings and 
growth is not direct, but operates through the effects of investment on growth …there is a 
strong link between savings and investment’ (Gavin et al., 1997, p. 4). It implies that countries 
which succeed in increasing their saving rate, and consequently their investment, would be 
able to accelerate their economic growth. Carroll and Weil (1994) used both cross-country 
panel data and household level data to conclude that there is evidence suggesting that growth 
indeed affects private savings positively. Mavrotas and Kelly (2001) carried out a detailed 
econometric analysis of India and Sri Lanka on saving-growth nexus and revealed that the 
conventional neoclassical view, that savings cause growth, does not hold while looking at 
gross domestic savings.  
 
All of these findings clearly exhibit that the existing evidence on the subject should be treated 
with caution, given the differing results as well as inappropriateness of the econometric 
analysis used in most of these empirical studies. 
 
4.5 Ease the exchange of goods and services 
Financial systems that lower transaction costs can promote specialization, technological 
innovation and growth. The links between facilitating transactions, specialization, innovation, 
and economic growth were core elements of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776). He 
argued that division of labor i.e. specialization is the principal factor underlying productivity 
improvements. With greater specialization, workers are more likely to invent better machines 
or production processes. “I shall only observe, therefore, that the invention of all those 
machines by which labour is so much facilitated and abridged, seems to have been originally 
owing to the division of labour. Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier 
methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards 
that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety of things”  (Smith, 1776, 
p. 3). Adam Smith argued that lower transaction costs would permit greater specialization 
because it requires more transactions than an autarkic environment. This argument about the 
lowering of transaction costs and technological innovation is made by him in terms of the 
advantages of money over barter. Besides transaction costs, information costs may also 
stimulate the emergence of money because it is costly to evaluate the attributes of goods in 
barter exchange. Thus, an easily identifiable medium of exchange may arise to facilitate 
exchange (Williamson and Wright, 1994).  
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Modern theorists have also tried to clarify more precisely the ties between exchange, 
specialization, and innovation. Greenwood and Smith (1996) have modeled the connections 
between exchange, specialization, and innovation. More specialization is followed by more 
transactions. Since each transaction is costly, financial arrangements that lower transaction 
costs will facilitate greater specialization. In this manner, systems that promote exchange 
encourage productivity gains. However, a better market with lower transactions costs does not 
stimulate the invention of new and better production technologies in Greenwood and Smith's 
(1996) model. Instead, lower transaction costs expands the set of ‘on the shelf' production 
processes that are economically attractive. Also, the model defines better "market" as a 
system for supporting more specialized production processes. This does not explain the 
emergence of financial instruments or institutions that lower transactions costs and thereby 
produce an environment that naturally promotes specialized production technologies. 
 
Despite of certain debatable issues, most of the literature suggests that information and 
transaction costs motivate financial systems to arise for providing financial services to the 
economy that facilitate the selection of firms before they are financed, the monitoring of firms 
after they are finance, the management of idiosyncratic project risk and liquidity risk, and the 
exchange of goods, services, and financial claims. This description further strengthens the 
argument favoring ‘financial development’ for growth.  
 
Section 5. Financial Sector Development and Growth – Review of Empirical 
Research 
A large literature, dating at least as far back as Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934), emphasizes a 
positive influence of the development of the country’s financial sector on the level and rate of 
growth of its per capita income.  The empirical studies including cross-country growth 
regressions, panel techniques, and case studies, also reveal a strong positive relationship 
between the level of financial system development and economic growth.9  
 
As far as the country studies are concerned, Goldsmith (1969) has initiated the seminal work 
in this area by using the value of financial intermediary assets divided by GNP to measure 
                                                          
9
 However, there is a lack of proper empirical proxies for financial development and deepening, such as 
M2/GDP ratio is not very good indicator to analyze the ability of financial system to impact real economy by 
providing these services (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2008).   
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financial development, presuming that the size of the financial system is positively correlated 
with the provision and quality of financial services. By using data of 35 countries from 1860 
to 1963, Goldsmith (1969, p. 48) finds that "a rough parallelism can be observed between 
economic and financial development if periods of several decades are considered ... there are 
even indications in the few countries for which the data are available that periods of more 
rapid economic growth have been accompanied, though not without exception, by an above-
average rate of financial development”.  
 
The most influential work in this regard is brought in McKinnon's Money and Capital in 
Economic Development (1973), which studies the relationship between the financial system 
and economic development in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Korea, Indonesia, and 
Taiwan in the post-World War II period. By interpreting mass evidence from these countries, 
it is strongly implied by McKinnon that better functioning financial systems support faster 
economic growth.  
 
However, quite before Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon(1973), Cameron et al., (1967) 
analyze the historical relationships between banking development and the early stages of 
industrialization for England (1750-1844), Scotland (1750-1845), France (1800-1870), 
Belgium (1800-1875), Germany (1815-1870), Russia (1860-1914), and Japan (1868-1914). 
Instead of using formal statistical analysis, these country studies examine the legal, economic, 
and financial linkages between banks and industry during the industrialization of these seven 
countries. While highlighting the analytical limitations of this study, Cameron et al.,(1967) 
concludes that particularly in Scotland and Japan, and also in Belgium, Germany, England, 
and Russia, the banking system played a positive, growth-inducing role10.  
 
                                                          
10
 Few analysts disagree with the facts underlying the conclusion made by Cameron (1967, p. 60) that 
“Scotland’s superior banking system is one of the principal features to explain its comparatively rapid growth as 
compare to England during same period (1750-1845)." According to them, England did not suffer from a lack of 
financial services because nonfinancial enterprises provided financial services in England that Cameron's 
measures of formal financial intermediation neglect. Others argue that Scotland had rich natural resources, a 
well-educated work force, access to British colonial markets which augment its level of income per capita more 
speedily than that of England. Some researchers emphasized the deficiencies in the Scottish system thereby 
rejecting the claim that Scotland ever had a well-functioning financial system (Sidney Pollard and Dieter Ziegler 
1992). Therefore, despite the arguments of Andrew Kerr (1884) about the better banking system of Scotland than 
England from 1750 until 1844, the debate still exists about whether Scottish banking explains its faster economic 
growth over the period 1750-184 (Ross Levine, 1997). 
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King and Levine (1993) advocate Schumpeter’s view by studying the empirical relationship 
between a range of indicators of financial development and economic growth by using the 
date of more than 80 countries for the period 1960-1989. According to them, there exists a 
strong and robust relationship between indicators of financial development - size of formal 
financial intermediary sector relative to GDP, importance of banks relative to the central 
bank, and percentage of credit allocate to private firms, and the ratio of credit issued to private 
firms to GDP - and economic growth, the rate of capital accumulation and improvements in 
the efficiency of capital allocation.  
 
Stephen Haber (1996), by comparing industrial and capital market development in Brazil, 
Mexico, and the US between 1830 and 1930, found that capital market development affected 
industrial composition and national economic performance11. Therefore, “differences in 
capital market development had a significant impact on the rate of growth of industry.... lack 
of access to institutional sources of capital due to poorly developed capital markets was a 
non-negligible obstacle to industrial development in the nineteenth century” (Haber, 1996, 
p.40). Levine and Zervos (1998) add measures of stock market and banking development to 
evaluate independent impact of stock markets and banks on economic growth.  
 
In addition to cross-country studies, there are various industry level studies which have 
studied relation between financial sector development and growth. One of such influential 
study is done by Rajan and Zingales (1998) by using data on 36 industries across 41 countries 
to analyze the mechanisms through financial development may influence economic growth. 
They argue that well-developed financial systems ameliorate those market frictions which 
make it difficult for firms to obtain external finance. This implies that an increase in financial 
development disproportionately boosts the growth of industries that are naturally heavy users 
of external finance as compare to those industries that are not naturally heavy users of 
external finance. Moreover, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) use firm-level data from 
26 countries to test whether financial development influences the degree to which firms are 
                                                          
11
 Haber (1991, 1996) shows that when Brazil overthrew the monarchy in 1889 and formed the First Republic, it 
also drastically liberalized restrictions on its financial markets, thereby giving more easier access to firms to 
external finance. Industrial production boomed as result of Industrial concentration. Although Mexico also 
liberalized its financial sector policies, the liberalization was much milder under the Diaz dictatorship (1877-
1911), which ". . . relied on the financial and political support of a small in-group of powerful financial 
capitalists" (p. 561). Consequently, the decline in concentration and the increase in economic growth were much 
weaker in Mexico than that in Brazil (Levine, 1997). 
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constrained from investing in profitable growth opportunities12.  Based on the results of this 
study, it is argued that both banking system development and stock market liquidity are 
positively associated with the excess growth of firms. Thus, in countries with high turnover 
and high bank Assets/GDP, a larger proportion of firms is growing at a level that requires 
access to external sources of long-term capital, holding other things constant. Moreover, 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) extend the Levine and Zervos (1998) study of stock markets, 
banks, and growth by using annual data and the panel difference estimator. Beck and Levine 
(2004) build on Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) found out that exogenous component of both 
bank and stock market development has an economically large impact on economic growth.  
 
Despite of the presence of large body of empirical evidence on strongly positive relationship 
between financial system development and growth, there are some “outliers” like China 
which is often mentioned as a counterexample to the findings in finance and growth literature. 
Despite weaknesses in its formal banking system, China is one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world. One of its reasons can be attributed to the presence of informal 
financial system which might substitute for formal systems13.  
 
To sum up, it can be concluded that significant advancements have been made in examining 
the relationship between financial and economic development. Rigorous theoretical work has 
highlighted channels and functions through which the emergence of financial markets and 
institutions and economic growth are positively correlated. The large body of empirical 
analyses also reveals a strong positive link between the functioning of the financial system 
and long run economic growth. Some researchers also come up with lists of ‘good’ financial 
                                                          
12
 Questioning the assumptions underlying Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) 
argue that it is important to allow for differences in the amount of external financing needed by firms in the same 
industry in different countries. These differences may arise because firms in different countries employ different 
technologies, because profit rates may differ across countries, or because investment opportunities and demand 
may differ. 
13
 Informal systems might substitute for formal systems. Indeed, inter-provincial differences in growth rates are 
highly correlated with banking debt, but negatively (Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Boyreau- Debray and Wei, 2005). 
This leads to focus more on allocating credit to the private sector, as opposed to all bank intermediation. Hence, 
mobilizing and pouring funds into the declining parts of the Chinese state enterprise system (which principal 
Chinese banks were doing) did not promote growth. However, focus on small and medium firms (which account 
for the most dynamic part of the Chinese economy) shows that those firms receiving bank credit in recent years 
did tend to grow more quickly compared to those receiving funds from informal sources (Ayyagari, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2007). It implies that the ability of informal mechanisms to substitute for formal financial 
systems might be exaggerated. 
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systems which may facilitate to spur growth and development; one such list by Rousseau and 
Sylla (2001) can be found at Annexure II. However, it is still difficult to conclude that 
financial system just simply and mechanically responds to the needs of industrialization and 
economic activity. While all financial systems provide these financial functions, there are 
large differences in how well financial systems do so.  
 
Since the literature and empirical evidence seemed to assume well-developed financial 
systems exerting a first-order influence on economic growth, it motivated policymakers to 
‘control’ market forces. Thus, historically, and prior to the 1970's, financial restrictions were 
often imposed specifically in capital-scarce countries and government intervention was a 
binding factor in financial policies. In short, financial systems, as put by McKinnon (1973), 
were ‘repressed’. 
 
Section 6. Money View of Economy  
The rationale behind government interventions in financial markets is the direction of capital 
mobility through the imposition of restrictions.  Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1965) provided the 
major theoretical framework for restrictive financial system i.e. financial repression. It is 
pertinent to describe here the ‘money view’ of the economy, that is, how can monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms like interest rate channels influence the investments which in turn 
affect the income level. Since this section presents Keynes’s and Tobin’s versions of 
repression for which it is crucial to understand what is “money”. 
 
Money and capital markets have been mentioned in the first section of this chapter; the 
substance bought and sold in these markets is money, present or future. Money is a principal 
vehicle for private savings, so it is closely linked with real investment and growth. Therefore, 
the character of the money system and the way money is supplied always is a matter of prime 
significance in these markets. A functional definition of money can be taken from an old 
saying according to which ‘money is any object that does money work’ (cited in Cecchetti and 
Schenholtz, 2011). Now the question is that what is the work of money? Primarily, it is to act 
as a medium of exchange and as a standard of value. In order to perform these functions, 
money also becomes the unit in which debt contracts are written, and is used as store of value. 
In all economies of today, certain objects perform these functions; metallic coins and currency 
in paper form certainly do so, along with commercial bank demand deposits. Some other 
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financial assets are also good substitutes for money, but none performs all the money 
functions (Robinson, 1970). 
 
However, such definitions of money do not simplify real issues. The problems related with 
the concept and value of money had been recognized since Schumpeter (1934). When the 
quantity theory set up its formula for the value of money, the critics first seized upon the fact 
of other means of payment, besides money. It is well known too that the old question whether 
these means of payment, more especially bank credits, are money has been answered 
affirmatively by many of Schumpeter’s contemporaries. This creation of means of payment 
centers in the banks and constitutes their fundamental function. The creation of money by 
banks establishing claims against themselves has become a commonplace today; it is all the 
same whether or not one regards the expression “creation of money” as theoretically correct 
(Schumpeter, 1934).  
 
This is the point where we can briefly shed light on traditional debate of Endogeneity vs. 
Exogeneity of money. The issue of endogeneity versus exogeneity of the money supply is 
most frequently unresolved dilemma travelling through the history of monetary theory. It is 
usually ‘real bills doctrine versus bullionist doctrine’ controversy since three centuries which 
is regarded as kernel of this debate. To put briefly, the ‘real bills’ doctrine postulates that 
banks notes that are advanced in exchange for ‘real bills’ (i.e. titles to real value) could not be 
issued in excess.  And due to a finite non-bank public demand for currency, the excessive 
notes would return automatically to the issuer. Hence, notes advanced upon real bills of 
exchange are demand determined so in this way the over-issuance is constrained. Thus money 
supply, in terms of the real bills doctrine, is endogenous. Whereas Bullionists disagreed, 
finding a refusal to discount any bills except for those of bona fide transactions as impractical 
and of little value in limiting circulation (Sikorski, 1996). The money supply was proposed to 
be exogenously determined, corresponding solely to the will of the issuers (Green, 1989; 
Laidlern 1989). In this respect, it might be interesting to refer back to historically competing 
monetary schools, i.e. Currency School and Banking School. Currency School, being in 
limelight during 1840s and 1850s, argued price inflation as the result of excessive issuance of 
currency notes. Thus in order to restrict excessive circulation, it suggested the maintenance of 
gold reserves equal to the issue of currency notes. Banking School, on the other hand, 
contended this view by arguing that notes issuance could be restricted naturally by the will of 
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bank depositors to redeem their notes for gold. So these are the historical doctrines which sow 
the seeds of modern debate on the endogeneity and exogeneity of money.   
 
The debate about the characteristics of money is significant as it underlies the way economists 
view the relationship between the quantity of money and national income, and ultimately the 
way monetary analysis is viewed. Hence, an exogenous view of the money considers one or 
all of variables i.e. price level, interest rate, real output etc. as determined by movements in 
the money stock. On the contrary, the endogeneity view of the money proposes the stock of 
money in circulation as determined by one or all of the variables mentioned above. 
Fundamental to this issue is the direction of causality i.e. money to other variables or vice 
versa. The direction of the causation would determine how the monetary transmission 
mechanism is viewed and which monetary policies should be prescribed14. The pertinent 
question is that through what transmission mechanism the stock of money influence both 
nominal national income and its dual components of real income and prices. The discovery of 
this transmission mechanism pointed to the relevant policy prescriptions to be used in 
effectively managing the economy. 
 
6.1 Keynes’s General Theory 
Keynes’s work in the General Theory (1936) proposed the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy and the role of money in the economy in relation to national income. This 
body of work is commonly known “Keynesian” and “Keynesian-Neo-classical” synthesis as it 
is an interpretation of Keynes’ work consistent with classical general equilibrium concepts. 
The construction of the theory originates with a money demand formulation similar to the 
Cambridge quantity theory approach.  
 
The primary theoretical innovation of Keynes stems from his work on liquidity preference, 
which found the presence of a systematic effect of nominal interest rates on people’s demand 
to hold money15. According to Keynes, money balances are held for, besides other purposes, 
‘precautionary’ and ‘speculative’ motives. Speculative balances are held with the desire to 
                                                          
14
 This debate in this form is static, with causality flowing in one-way, one-time format. Once posed in a 
dynamic context, the concept of exogeneity determined by Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) seems more 
relevant.  
15
 The liquidity-preference relation can be represented graphically as a schedule of the money demanded at each 
different interest rate. The supply of money together with the liquidity-preference curve in theory interacts to 
determine the interest rate at which the quantity of money demanded equals the quantity of money supplied. 
IS/LM (IS – saving/Liquidity preference – money supply).  
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secure profit from ‘knowing better than the market what the future will bring forth’ (Keynes, 
1936, p. 170). Differences in individual expectations are vital which cause portfolio shifts 
grounded on expected interest rate differentials. To put it simply, individuals regard a certain 
level of interest rates as normal level. If interest rates rise above that level, individuals would 
expect it to drop again to the “normal level”. Yet interest rates that are lower than normal 
reveal higher capital losses. In such situations, holding money is more attractive than 
alternative assets like public annuities. Thus, this shows a higher speculative demand for 
money16. Precautionary balances are held due to future uncertainty, so the individuals desire 
to hold money balances to avoid any risk. Holding money balances provides certainty as to 
the future cash equivalent of their resources (Harris, 1985). Both of these motives thus 
respond to changes in the interest rate. In focusing on precautionary and speculative motives, 
Keynes describes the role of uncertainty and expectations in economic processes and in 
determining individuals’ demand for money balances. That is, the presence of uncertainty and 
future expectations begins to give money its special characteristic in an economic system.  
 
On basis of these theoretical footings, Keynes stressed the need for careful financial 
management to warrant the smooth running of economic activity and introduced the concept 
of a ‘liquidity trap’ – setting a ceiling to the nominal interest rate. When a trap is obligatory, 
the real interest rate surpasses the equilibrium level consistent with full employment, and 
planned savings surpass planned investments. A decrease in income would therefore reflect a 
fall in savings to equal investments. The alternative to this is an interest rate ceiling to be 
imposed by authorities, maintaining fixed price levels so that an expansionary monetary 
policy could stimulate investments. But this approach is objectionable due to its inflationary 
consequences in monetary expansions which will be elaborated in next section.  
 
6.1.1 Policy Formulations 
Keynes' theory changed the way many economists understood money and monetary policy. In 
those days, the leading theory was the quantity theory of money, developed by American 
economists like Simon Newcomb and Irving Fisher. This theory viewed monetary policy to 
stabilize and boost employment and national income. Keynes argued that monetary policy is 
neither the best way to stabilize the economy nor help the unemployment. Rather, 
governments need to spend when people are unemployed or when national income is low. So 
                                                          
16
 This can be presented in equation as Md = B0  + B1 /(i +it) where Md  is money demand, i is interest rate, it is 
liquidity trap interest rate, and Bt is bond holdings at time t. 
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the policymakers at the Federal Reserve System (FED) started to set monetary policy by 
controlling the amount of money and by influencing interest rates.  
 
Friedman (1956) reaffirmed the argument for the quantity theory of money by maintaining 
that the demand for money could be described as depending on a small number of economic 
variables. Thus, where the money supply expanded, people would not simply wish to hold the 
extra money in idle money balances i.e. if they were in equilibrium before the increase, they 
were already holding money balances as per their requirements, so after the increase they 
would have money balances in excess of their requirements. These surplus money balances 
would therefore be spent which would increase the aggregate demand. Similarly, if the money 
supply were reduced, people would wish to restock their money holdings by reducing their 
spending. In this way, Friedman challenged Keynes by suggesting that “money does not 
matter”. This movement is now identified as monetarism and goes in contradiction to 
Keynesian economics. Monetarists believe that less spending by government and better 
monetary policy is the best way to stabilize employment and national income. Although 
Keynesian economics has changed considerably since the Liquidity Preference Theory was 
first published in 1936, but it still emphasize on government spending i.e. fiscal policy, as the 
best way to stabilize employment and national income. 
 
Keynes’s work during 1937-1939 developed more precise endogenous money view which 
paved the way for such policy formulations that aimed to deal with investment through 
government intervention. Congruent with Keynes theory, government intervention is 
considered necessary to guarantee an active and vibrant economy. Accordingly, government 
should stimulate demand for goods and services in order to encourage economic growth. 
Therefore, it suggests tax cuts and increased government spending during recessions to revive 
growth; and recommends tax increases and spending cuts during economic expansion to 
combat inflation. Many economists believe that Keynesian theory is more efficient than 
supply-side economics, however, critics indicate theory's failure to explain stagflation in the 
US during the 1970s.  
 
6.1.2 Post-Keynesian Approach 
Another approach, mostly aligned to monetarists has been probed by a growing body of 
literature related to post-Keynesians who found that traditional monetary analysis has told 
only half story. The term ‘post-Keynesian’ has been applied to the body of theory associated 
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with economists like Nicholas Kaldor, Basil J. Moore, and Sydney Weintraub. Most post-
Keynesian literature relies on Keynes’s Treatise on Money (1930), and nurtured in the 
banking schools affiliated with Thomas Tooke (1844) and Gunnar Mydral (1939). The central 
tenet of the post-Keynesian approach stressed that the role of financial intermediaries along 
with the behavioral and institutional characteristics of the economy in the money creation 
process are largely ignored. In an economy with a financial sector having a range of financial 
intermediaries and a large spectrum of financial assets, relevant theoretical and policy 
questions concern the mechanism of money creation and the ability of the central bank to 
control the monetary supply. It is this focus on the mechanism of money creation in a credit 
money economy which highlights the claim that the money stock is endogenous, responding 
to changes in national income and prices. Therefore, it is assumed that money supply is 
endogenous, responding to the credit needs of the economy. This assumption is in accordance 
with the ‘reverse causality’ hypothesis connecting prior changes in nominal income to 
changes in the money supply. In addition, it also presumed the significance of profit 
expectations and cost-push factors to result in changing credit needs. Lastly, financial system, 
as result of various institutional reasons, has independent ability to fulfill the demand for 
credit and create money. Thus, the interaction between the public and banking sectors in the 
money creation process becomes a determining factor in consequences of monetary policy on 
the economy.  
 
The recent debate in post-Keynesian monetary theory has identified two strains of thought– 
the ‘accommodative endogeneity’, also termed as ‘reserve price constraint’ (Palley, 1991; 
Moore, 1991) and the ‘structuralist endogeneity’, also termed as ‘reserve quantity constraint’ 
(Wray, 1992a and 1992b; Pollin, 1991). Accommodative endogeneity is focused on the 
response of commercial banks as well as central bank towards production needs and ensuing 
credit demands of economic agents, particularly of firms. On the other hand, structuralist 
endogeneity is rooted in Minsky’s (1957a, 1957b) tradition. Although economic agents and 
firms are important, but this strand gives primary significance to central bank which has the 
freedom to accommodate reserve needs or not. This implies the rejection of passive 
accommodation and the adaptation of resistance towards credit expansion. Although 
theoretical differences between the two groups can be noticed clearly, however, both positions 
are definitely aligned with the post-Keynesian approach and have the endogenous nature of 
money as the theoretical foundation. It infers that both groups agree that loans create deposits 
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and that the supply of credit money should be regarded as endogenously determined. The 
disparity between the two lies more on the exact nature of endogeneity (Sikorski, 1996). 
 
6.2 Tobin’s Portfolio Model and Inflation Tax 
Tobin’s monetary growth model based on the assumption of perfect substitutability of money 
and productive capital provided additional reasoning for government intervention. This model 
demands the return on capital to be more than the return on money which boost a shift from 
money to capital in household portfolios, higher capital to labor ratio, and increased labor 
productivity (Tobin, 1965). 
 
During 1960s and early 1970s, the colonial empires started to eliminate and independent 
developing countries came into being. This was a time when government intervention was 
regarded as a remedy to perceived market failures and this perception resulted in 
‘interventionist’ approach. Tobin’s (1965) seminal paper ‘Money and Economic Growth’ put 
these ideas in a formal and logical theoretical framework. By introducing money, Tobin 
extended Solow model in order to analyze the effects of monetary policy on the steady state 
growth rate. Tobin built a two-asset portfolio choice model by employing the standard neo-
classical market clearing assumptions and assuming that physical savings and investment are 
continuously equilibrated. In the model, growth is dependent on capital deepening, defined as 
an increase in the capital to labour ratio. Individuals’ portfolio allocation between the assets of 
physical capital and the real money balances give rise to capital deepening. The exact 
allocation of individual’s wealth amongst these assets is dependent on the relative yields of 
assets and on the appetites of these asset holders. If the yield on money is lower than the 
return on capital i.e. marginal productivity of capital, the individual’s portfolio would hold 
greater amount of real capital. Such capital deepening leads therefore to higher economic 
growth. 
 
Tobin’s formal analysis introduced money as government fiat into a non-monetary economy. 
The effect of introducing this ‘new’ asset is to lower the steady-state level of capital 
accumulation, as in a non-monetary economy all savings are necessarily held in physical 
capital. The introduction of money means some savings will go into the holding of real money 
balances to satisfy precautionary and speculative demand. The only way for the government 
to offset this is to provide new money to absorb the savings now going into real balances. The 
way to do this is to continuously run a deficit financed by the issue of new money. Fry (1997) 
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and Denizer, Desai, and Gueorguiev, (1998) argue that the central implication of this 
reasoning is that reducing the rate of return through an optimal level of inflation , each of 
which serve as a tax on real money balances, can increase the rate of economic growth. Tobin 
emphasized that the rate of economic growth accelerates as the capital to labor ratio increases, 
demonstrating the need to reduce the return on money holdings. 
 
However, the assumption of the existence of only fiat money limits the relevance of the model 
in a credit money economy. Discussing model’s extension by Sidrauski’s (1966) and Lee 
(1980), Fry (1988) exhibits that the results of this model can be entirely reversed if inside 
money i.e. credit is substituted for outside money i.e. fiat money, and inflation hedges for 
productive capital in households’ portfolios. Any specifications of the behavioral 
characteristics of financial markets and the determinants of credit demand seem to be 
redundant with the assuming away of credit money. Although the transmission mechanism 
between the money supply and nominal income is generally Keynesian, but it loses the 
fundamental characteristics of money in a credit economy which makes this model very 
limited.  However, this is an important model as it formalized these ideas: (i) an inflationary 
policy contributes to economic growth as it stimulates investment (ii) investment and capital 
accumulation occur when the return on money is sufficiently lower than the return on capital. 
Tobin supported monetary expansion and “inflation tax” as means to finance growth. For this 
to happen, he discouraged households’ monetary holdings and asked to substitute them for 
productive capital. However, the narrow definition for money limits his findings. He also 
failed to take into account further elements like inflation hedges and government backed 
loans. 
 
6.2.1 Policy Formulations 
In such academic climate, newly-independent developing countries started to opt for 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy and worked towards maintaining low interest rate 
regime. In addition to this, they also formulated broader development policy goals to take into 
account the political concerns along with economic viability. There were optimistic views 
about the role of government in the development, which could be seen from the credibility 
given to the ‘big-push’ argument17. Therefore government was likely to play a vital role in 
                                                          
17
 Developing countries require large amounts of investments to embark on the path of economic development 
from their present state of backwardness. This argument proposes that a 'bit by bit' investment programme will 
not impact the process of growth as much as is required for developing countries. In fact, injections of small 
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fulfilling the developmental goals. These developmental goals were mainly concerned with 
the ‘market failure’ and ‘infant industries’. 
 
The market failure in financial markets was generally resulted from the insufficiency of the 
financial settings to provide long term credit or adequate risk sharing amongst financial 
institutions and industry (Cho and Khatkhate 1989). In addition, banking structures were 
mainly ‘oligopolistic’ which means that even market-determined rates of interest would also 
have an element of rent-seeking. The consequence of the market failures was the gap between 
social rates of return and private returns on investment, which implies to undertake a sub-
optimal level of investment unless government could provide an appropriate subsidy to equate 
those rates of return. The rationale for government subsidy was strengthened by the ‘infant 
industry’ arguments, which permits the developing industries to grow in a coziness of 
protection and subsidy until they are established to compete on their own. Thus, low nominal 
interest rates by putting ceilings on them are provided to such industries in order to equalize 
social and private rates of return. 
 
However, the scope of government intervention was perceived to be much broader and led to 
more direct intervention in the credit market. In order to induce enough investment and 
lending to satisfy their particular goals of their development policy, governments allocated 
credit to favored sectors through the use of controls and incentives to commercial banking 
system (Fry, 1993). Under these controls, the banks were required to allocate a specific 
proportion of their loan portfolio to government’s favored industrial sector. The incentives 
were in the form of implicit or explicit loan guarantees on loans extended to favored sectors 
and also in the form of rediscounting facilities at favorable rates.  As a result of these controls 
and incentives, the policy-favored firms and industries can meet all of their financing 
demands with an elastic supply of credit. The resulting policy structure had an active role of 
government in determining the price and allocation of credit.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the fiscal policy in these developing economies was also expansionary 
which also justifies low nominal interest rates because their governments were always short of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
quantities of investments will merely lead to a wastage of resources. Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, approvingly quotes 
a Massachusetts Institute of Technology study in this regard, "There is a minimum level of resources that must 
be devoted to... a development programme if it is to have any chance of success. Launching a country into self-
sustaining growth is a little like getting an airplane off the ground. There is a critical ground speed which must 
be passed before the craft can become airborne (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943) 
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resources due to their narrow tax base and lack of expertise in tax administration. The 
resultant deficits had to be financed either from the financial markets or the central bank. In 
case they are financed from domestic financial markets, low nominal rates provided the 
government with the availability of cheap finance. On the other hand, financing by central 
bank can take various forms e.g. directly supplying finance i.e. seigniorage, tax incentives for 
financial institutions to hold government debt, use of government liabilities to fulfill liquidity 
and capital requirements etc. The inflationary pressures are inevitable when central bank 
accommodation is combined with credit pressures of development policy. With such broad 
accommodation, the central banks had recourse to direct quantitative limits on private sector 
borrowing and sharp reserve requirements on banks, in order to maintain some monetary 
control (Leite and Sundararajan 1990). As a result, the lending to the sectors outside the scope 
of development policy was squeezed, leading to a large proportion of private sector credit 
demand being rationed. The broad financial policy at that time was the use of direct controls 
by government to determine the price, quantity and allocation of credit.  
 
From here, a broader perspective emerges with the fundamental ideas of McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) which encompass fragmentation in economy at large.  
 
Section 7. Key Ideas of Repression – Developing Country’s Perspective 
The groundbreaking works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) challenged the traditional 
view of economists like Tobin (1965), Johnson (1967), and Levhari and Patinkin (1968) that 
money and capital are perfect substitutes in the portfolios of private asset-holders and in the 
aggregate economy. By discarding this traditional view, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
stipulate that money and capital are likely to be complements, particularly in less developed 
and fragmented economies where the financial sector is severely repressed as result of 
government policies. It is observed by them that policymakers in these countries give 
numerous reasons for ignoring market-determined prices and for intervening directly in 
financial markets in an attempt to improve the allocation of resources. One form of 
intervention is the control on interest rates in order to reduce the rates of return on financial 
assets, which actually depress savings and capital formation along with increasing the demand 
for loans that eventually lead to credit rationing in the allocation among investment projects. 
Thus government intervention is so widespread, yet, generally so unsuccessful. Some of the 
related ideas are as ensued. 
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7.1 Fragmentation in the Economy 
Intervention is usually motivated by the perception that if a particular market is functioning 
badly, it is the duty of government authorities to do something to correct it. For instance, an 
infant textile firm is assisted with a tariff; or the price of an agricultural product is raised to 
allow farmers to use some new technology; or a tax exemption is granted to a foreign firm for 
setting up new industry. The pressure for all such public interventions is the consequence of 
severe fragmentation in the less developed economies (McKinnon, 1973).  
 
There is fragmentation in the economy because firms and households are so remote from each 
other that they get different effective prices for land, labor, capital, and finished commodities. 
Even they don’t have access to similar technologies. So it is not possible for public authorities 
to postulate that private sector will take socially profitable investment opportunities, because 
prevalent prices need not reflect actual economic scarcity, particularly for major segments of 
the population. The historical reasoning for this view can also be found during nineteenth and 
twentieth century in Asia, Latin America, and Africa where export enclaves for primary 
commodities were controlled by foreigners, as a result of which the general population stayed 
out of the market economy. Therefore, local entrepreneurs had restricted and narrow access to 
capital with little skilled labor and no means of procuring new technologies (Levin, 1960).   
 
After the end of colonialism, the newly freed governments of developing countries felt 
themselves bound to play their role in offsetting economic and political colonialism. During 
the last sixty or seventy years, these countries seem to be successful in introducing some new 
industrial activities, especially the manufacturing of goods previously imported as well as the 
mobilization of some domestic factors of production. However, this is achieved by 
manipulating commodity prices in many different ways and by intervening directly to support 
some sectors of the economy at the cost of others. Therefore, fragmentation in this modern 
period can be the outcome of those government interventions. That’s why we see the co-
existence of small household enterprises along with large corporate firms, both producing 
same products with different proportions of factors and different levels of technology. Heavy 
mechanization along with high unemployment, underutilized capacities along with shortage of 
capital etc. are some other types of modern fragmentation that arise as result of development 
policies of government.  
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Heavy government subsidies e.g. tariff protection, import licenses, tax concessions, low-cost 
bank finance etc. is the foundation of indigenous entrepreneurship which create great income 
inequalities. These inequalities couldn’t enable high saving rates in the classical fashion, but 
authorities still refuse to decrease the disposable income of wealthy investors. Rather, these 
investors have exclusive access to investment opportunities guaranteed by the pervasive 
fragmentation. 
 
Uncertainty also fragments the interest rate structure so much as it is not consistent in 
reflecting the community’s collective time preference. “The effect of risk … is to lower the 
rate of interest on safe loans, though at the same time … it will raise the rate of interest on 
unsafe loans…” (Fisher, 1930, p. 218). Moreover, “the necessity of having to offer collateral 
will affect not only the rate which a man has to pay, but the amount he can borrow. It will 
limit therefore the extent to which he can modify his income stream by his means” (Fisher, 
1930, pp. 210-211). Careful monetary and financial policies are needed to moderate 
uncertainty and reduce fragmentation in capital markets along with a benevolent outlook of 
institutions to facilitate borrowing and lending over time. However, governments in 
developing countries generally don’t follow this approach. Organized as well as unorganized 
finance in these countries is deteriorated and severely repressed, and they still use various 
devices to substitute non-operative capital markets. Governments responded financial 
constraints in economy by devising various “second-best” policies that usually turned out to 
have disastrous consequences. The basis of these policies is mainly interventionist, rightly 
called by McKinnon (1973) as “intervention syndrome”.  
 
7.2 The Intervention Syndrome 
Common public policies for circumventing the domestic capital market are first classified in 
seven major categories by McKinnon (1973). 
 
7.2.1 Tariff Protection for Infant Industries 
There is enormous pressure on Ministries of trade and industry to provide protection to new 
industries or firms to enable them to cover initial cost so that they will eventually be viable at 
market prices. In this aim, a “temporary” tariff or quota restriction is applied on competing 
imports which increases the internal prices of domestic output. In this way, the cash flow 
available to the infant industry is increased while in the learning phase. This is a major 
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technique to implement import substitution strategy prevalent in almost all developing 
economies.  
 
7.2.2 Import Licenses and Financial Leverage 
Licensing the import of capital goods and intermediate inputs is a common exercise in 
developing economies. Certain industries or firms have the privilege of importing at a low 
price which raises the cash flow of manufacturers. This exclusivity of import license may also 
facilitate its holders to get external financing more easily. Government authorities 
intentionally use these licenses to influence the leverage of certain firms. Generally, import 
licenses are used along with some other privileges like short-term domestic bank finance at 
subsidized rates and foreign supplier credits. In this manner, the restriction on leverage is 
slightly relaxed by the licensing technique.  
 
7.2.3 Corruption and Monopoly Privilege 
Implicit or explicit state sanctions are used to confer monopoly privilege. Some forms of these 
privileges include, but not limited to, cheap bank credit, tax concessions for key industries or 
firms, access to outputs of state-owned industries such as fuel. This network of privilege is 
difficult to distinguish from corruption. Ultimately, the monopoly pricing become 
counterproductive as a result of its common weaknesses.  
 
7.2.4 Cheapening of Capital Goods 
Restrictions on foreign trade shift the whole structure of relative prices as they are decreased 
in certain broad classes of commodities because it raises them in others. As a result, the costs 
of imported inputs in domestic currency are reduced significantly. Feeling the inadequacy of 
capital accumulation, the authorities reduce the relative prices of the necessary elements of 
capital formation. The financial leverage of the firms buying these cheap imported inputs 
might reduce which endorse this technique. It can be an inexpensive method to deploy the 
economy’s surplus in the process of capital accumulation without using capital market. 
 
7.2.5 Agriculture’s Terms of Trade 
The manipulation of commodity prices for protecting infant industries also put pressure on 
agriculture, indirectly through tariff and protection and directly through policies to decrease 
agricultural prices. Rural incomes in many countries are distressed due to these policies. The 
destitution in agriculture has been overlooked by governments which are convinced to 
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transfer rural economic surplus to the industrial sector to get apparently favorable investment 
opportunities. However, there is absence of operative formal financial mechanisms for 
persuading agricultural savers to give their surplus to industry under the assumption of 
earning high rates of return. Although the transfer took place through the expropriation of 
agriculture, but fragmentation and isolation of capital markets leave the original issue 
unresolved. 
 
7.2.6 Land Reforms 
Land is a tangible and visible form of endowment, but limited leverage raises the significance 
of initial endowments in defining production opportunities. In order to equate current and 
future incomes in agrarian economies, land redistribution is deemed as primary policy.  
Minhas (1970) supports a huge consolidation plan for existing holdings in order to use 
irrigation facilities, new technologies, and rural labor properly. Basically, this would amount 
to publically enforced multilateral land barter with improvements and other gradations in 
quality. Ignoring the crucial issues of externalities and payoffs emphasized by Minhas (1970), 
it is unlikely that the required external finance or internal liquidity be available. The prospects 
of irrigation and green revolution could also motivate land consolidation.  
 
7.2.7 Foreign Direct Investment and Commercial Credits 
Developing countries have a love-hate relationship with foreign capital due to deep economic 
roots. If the domestic capital market is declining, then the use of foreign financial services 
becomes more striking. However, foreigners see greater risk in operating in domestic market 
as compare to the local investors, which make direct investment very expansive. As suggested 
by the fragmentation hypothesis, domestic entrepreneurs have investment opportunities but 
lack external financing to exploit these opportunities. Having access to Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) enables them to cope with external financial constraint at the cost of 
surrendering investment opportunities to foreigners for which they have to bargain.  One of its 
consequences can be the underdevelopment of domestic entrepreneurship. Although 
government tries to manage it with its complicated administrative controls to ensure domestic 
contribution in foreign firms but they are also not without incompetencies.     
 
7.3 Fad for Financial Repression – Popular Philosophies 
Intense financial repression can be observed through much of the twentieth century where 
governments tried to adjust interest rates substantially below market levels and to regulate the 
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allocation of credit, especially in the years after World War II.  A justification behind this 
trend for financial repression is associated with the rise of political philosophies like 
populism, nationalism, and statism etc. in those days.  
 
Populists view controls on interest rate as a way of redistributing income. The typical targets 
of these populists or nationalists were private bank loans to large firms, especially foreign 
ones. Their motivation was the aspiration to evade excessive concentrations of power in a few 
private hands, or to confirm that the domestic financial system was not controlled by 
foreigners as they would be insensitive to long term national goals. According to this 
viewpoint, social goals could be accomplished more easily if the operations of financial 
institutions are not purely profit-seeking. This also results in relaxation in debt collection, 
especially from government-owned banks due to political pressures. 
 
Another major factor in the augmentation of financial repression was ‘Statism’. Particularly in 
mid-century, state intervention was generally seen as a way to improve the allocation of 
resources and enable development. To perform this role, government needed additional 
resources which were hard to mobilize with underdeveloped tax system. Therefore, it 
expanded its role in resource allocation through interventions in the financial sector, along 
with controlling price system, investment decisions, and access to international markets. 
 
Apropos to these philosophies, the governments of many developing countries placed low 
interest ceilings on bank deposits and loans in order to reduce their borrowing costs, and 
directed bank credit to “priority sectors” e.g. agriculture, small-scale industry, exports etc. 
The flow of resources was increased by printing money and by imposing low-yielding reserve 
requirements on banks. New entrants are restricted to avoid competition and limit 
disintermediation in the banking system. To discuss these measures in detail, following 
section would describe the principal instrument of financial repression i.e. interest rate 
controls, along with other instruments.  
 
Section 8. Interest Rate as Basic Repression Instrument – Historical Perspective 
As mentioned in previous sections, the formal banking system in the colonial period mostly 
served foreigners involved in the exports of raw materials. The locals participated in the 
process of bank intermediation as depositors, and not as borrowers.  Funds were directed to 
the banks mainly controlled from overseas, which reinvest funds with borrowers having 
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known reputation and collateral.  The Europeans having overseas banking connections and 
access to finance developed various sectors like tea plantation and rubber estates in the Far 
East, for which non-Europeans also had technical skills but no financing. Therefore, local 
entrepreneurship was suffered due to inadequate financial support.   
 
Although this ‘overseas colonization’ of banks ended with the independence of colonies and 
development of a national banking system in these independent countries, however, it has 
been replaced by almost similar “neo-colonial” banking system. This system favors certain 
private and official borrowers by providing them access to limited funds at low interest rates, 
often far less than the opportunity cost of scarce capital. Despite of having substantial share of 
deposits in these banks, the majority of small agriculturists and industrialists stay financially 
suppressed. As compare to the colonial system, the real interest rates in neocolonial system 
were more out of line, even if unrequired seigniorage is no longer accumulating to some 
foreign financial center (McKinnon, 1973). The term ‘self-finance’ is appropriate to analyze 
this situation in developing countries where operative and organized capital market was non-
existent, particularly for small rural and urban borrowers. Bank credit was allocated to certain 
exclusive enclaves like licensed import activities, specialized large scale exports, high-tech 
manufacturing, large international corporations, certain government agencies etc. Frequent 
government deficits on current account further limit the lending resources of the deposit 
banks. Consequently, financing of the rest of the economy had to be met from the 
unorganized resources of cooperative, moneylenders, and pawnbrokers which were 
inadequate.   
 
Informal moneylending through village stores provide only a fractional substitute for formal 
and organized banking finance.  From a sample survey of traditional credit markets in rural 
Chile, Charles Nisbet (1967) has projected that only 30 percent of the total rural population 
are clients of state financial institutions and private commercial banks whereas the others 
mostly use informal credit markets. The inclusion of organized bank lending into the rural 
economy and small-scale urban industry has been further validated by U Tun Wai (1956) in 
an enormous empirical study of developing countries. However, the informal credit markets 
are fairly insufficient to decrease dispersion in real rates of interest for the major proportion of 
population. According to Nisbet’s survey, any randomly selected farmer generally had access 
to only two sources of credit, moneylender and village store. The exploitative monopoly or 
duopoly is the consequence of this fragmentation which certainly leads to highly 
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differentiated interest rates. “With inflation removed from interest rates on currency loans … 
most commercial lenders emerge with positive rates ranging from 27 percent to 360 percent, 
with an annual mean rate of 82 percent (Nisbet, 1967, p. 76). Worst part is that almost half of 
these loans went for consumption purposes.  
 
The usury ceilings on the interest rates charged on bank credit weaken the ability and 
willingness of banks to serve small rural and urban borrowers. The operating costs and default 
risks of small scale loans cannot be covered with a maximum interest rate of, for example, 10 
percent. So the large population of small firms and households are left with no option but to 
go to moneylenders. Besides narrowing the total size of bank lending, the ceilings on interest 
rates also ensure the flow of available finance to absolutely safe borrowers with known 
reputation and riskless collateral. In worst cases, political influence is used to get allocation of 
additional loans.  The beneficiaries of such loans are regarded as ‘good’ risks as they have 
enormous incomes and asset holdings, therefore, loans granted to them at low interest rates 
have a tendency to further aggravate the already skewed income distribution. 
 
It is ironic but true to assert that cheap credit may not benefit the common man. Rather, it is 
the opposite case because it actually stops him to contend for long term finance from the 
organized banking system, as a result of which he is bound to get credit from village store on 
monthly basis. This perspective gives rise to a basic question that is the provision of cheap 
bank financing to agriculture and small scale industry the right strategy for the government to 
adopt? McKinnon (1973) demonstrated the example of a small farmer who, in the anticipation 
of discrete investment in ‘green revolution’, can significantly improve his position even if he 
has to borrow at the rate that surpasses the marginal rate of return under self-financed 
investments with the old technique. This can be inferred from this example that artificially 
cheap loans or subsidized credit programs may be unnecessary as well as unwise. In case of 
abundant loans, high interest rates to lenders and borrowers present the dynamism, which call 
forth new net saving on one hand and divert investment from inferior uses in order to boost 
technical improvement18. Contrary to this, the popular policy of keeping low or negative 
interest rates on financial assets and limited loan availability may achieve nothing at vast 
level.  
 
                                                          
18
 Policy of raising interest rates is generally criticized by Post-Keynesians, as high interest rates need not result 
in high economic growth (for detailed critique, see Dutt, 1990; Dutt and Amadeo, 1991).  
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8.1 Other Instruments of Financial Repression 
The term “financial repression” refers to interest rate controls, although it is sometimes used 
in the literature to include other forms of government restrictions on financial sector (Fry, 
1995, P. 6).  
 
Generally, (6) types of restraining measures, besides interest ceilings, can be observed which 
are classified in the following categories: restrictions on entry; restrictions on the composition 
of liabilities, particularly minimum capital requirements; high reserve requirements; 
restrictions on the composition of assets; restrictions on the overall size of the risk portfolio; 
and specialized credit agencies. 
 
8.1.1 Restrictions on Entry 
Suspension of new bank licenses, restraints on foreign-owned banks, or on their capacity to 
compete with local banks are some of the common forms of such restrictions. . Regulations in 
order to limit the size of some shareholders’ share may also have a similar effect.  For limited 
entry, banks achieve substantial franchise value, and those controlling this value are more 
cautious to make sure that they maintain the flow of benefits coming from this. The 
advantages of high-yield and high-risk will have to be evaluated against the threat that they 
could cause insolvency and eventually the loss of franchise.  In the same manner, looting a 
fraction of existing balance sheet by the insiders may be significantly less beneficial than the 
continuous flow of franchise benefits which this looting would compromise (Caprio, Honohan 
and Stiglitz, 2001). 
 
8.1.2 Restrictions on Composition of Liabilities 
Minimum capital requirement is the most common kind of restraint on the composition of 
liabilities.  This requirement can take the form of percentage of weighted and unweighted 
assets, or the form of an absolute minimum account. Capital adequacy requirements directly 
protect depositors and deposit insurance agency as it acts like a first line of defense i.e. 
reserves to absorb losses. They can also partially substitute for franchise value by providing a 
bonding effect on shareholders. The shareholder’s future flow of dividends, even less than the 
required return on equity, would likely to be susceptible due to the insolvency or loss of the 
license, so they would be concerned to control the behavior of their managers in order to 
preserve this flow. Although small capital requirements may result in counter-productive 
behavioral responses, however, the higher levels of capital requirement are dominated by the 
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bonding and cushioning effects. Another interesting restraint on liability side is to require a 
minimum issue of subordinated debt to parties unrelated to the shareholders (Calomiris 1998). 
Since the yield on such loans may give an early warning signal to the authorities concerning 
the market’s perception of a bank’s risk, this kind of arrangement provide an extra cushion to 
absorb losses before hitting depositors’ funds. Not only this, it also comes with additional 
watchful eyes to monitor the behavior of banks’ decision makers.  
 
8.1.3 High Reserve Requirement 
There is a required percentage of reserves i.e. deposits that banks must hold at the central 
bank. So by the end of each working day, the bank must ensure to have the required reserves 
on hand. If it doesn’t have, it can borrow from other banks or the central bank’s discount 
window to meet its requirement. Any changes in the required reserves are used to influence 
credit conditions. If reserve requirement is increased, lesser funds would be available for 
lending which results increase in interest rates. McKinnon (1993) cited the example of 
Colombia in 1972 where the commercial banks kept 31 percent on their deposits in non-
interest bearing accounts with the central bank, and another 26 percent of their loan portfolio 
was directly specified by the central authorities. This pattern of high reserve requirements is 
typical in developing economies, but not in the advanced industrial economies. 
 
8.1.4 Restrictions on Composition of Assets 
On the front of composition of assets, the most extreme restraint is the “narrow banking”, 
which limits the banks’ investment in completely safe assets like government treasury bills. 
Lending limits are imposed on those sectors that are assumed to be risky e.g. real estate, or on 
assets denominated in foreign currency. Moreover, there are various requirements regarding 
maturity and currency mismatching which come in this category of restraint. When a ceiling 
is put on a part or whole amount of risk assets of banks, portfolio risk is naturally reduced. In 
addition to limiting identified risky assets, overall portfolio risk is reduced on the asset side 
demanding comparatively larger holdings of safe and liquid assets. It helps to safeguard 
against liquidity shocks along with providing protection against losses elsewhere in the 
portfolio (Chang and Velasco, 1998). 
 
8.1.5 Restrictions on the Size of Loan Portfolio 
Restraints on the total size of the loan portfolio, generally on risk assets, are normally 
imposed on yearly basis. Ceilings on overall size of loan portfolio may lessen the intensity of 
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competition, thereby increasing franchise value. It may also decrease average portfolio risk, as 
discussed earlier. 
 
8.1.6 Specialized Credit Agencies 
Having extensive resource flow at its disposal, the central bank channels cheap credit to 
different specialized banking agencies, which in turn lend at low disequilibrium rates of 
interest for purposes like promotion of exports, loan for small farmers, industrial projects that 
government intended to subsidize etc. Since government has exhaustive credit allocations in 
mind which may change on weekly basis, therefore, such agencies decentralize this enormous 
administrative load.  
 
According to McKinnon (1993), among all of these types of financial repression, three 
characteristics which stand out in most of the developing countries are high reserve 
requirements, specialized credit agencies, and interest ceilings on deposits and loans. 
 
8.2 Costs of Repression for Financial Sector 
The economic performance of many countries gradually worsened under financial repression. 
The industrial as well as financial sectors of many developing countries started showing the 
signs of institutional weaknesses. These institutional fissures were seen as having an adverse 
impact on economic growth (Dooley and Mathieson 1987). Inefficiency of lending and 
borrowing operations along with the contraction of financial system eventually led to 
extensive bank insolvencies.  The suffering of overall development is confirmed by 
econometric analysis showing that countries with sharply negative real interest rates typically 
experienced much lower growth and allocative efficiency than those with positive real rates 
(Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson 1994). The underlying development polices failed to achieve 
their declared goals, however, the beneficiaries of the generated rents nurtured a political 
constituency for their endurance. 
 
Thus, the critical analysis of financial repression was founded on the implicit assumption that 
free market mechanisms always work more efficiently. Consequential to financial repression, 
the inefficiencies in the financial sector and in the economy can be classified in four broad 
categories: 
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8.2.1 Credit Allocation 
On one hand, policies of low, often negative, real interest rates pose problems as they provide 
disincentive to savers, and  on the other hand, the portfolio restrictions on banks leads to 
credit allocation on political and non-economic basis. The elastic supply of cheap credit to 
favored firms and individuals imply lack of discipline to use credit efficiently which 
ultimately leads to the misuse of resources. At below market interest rates, even inefficient 
investments seem feasible. Thus such projects are taken at the cost of projects of those firms 
which are being credit rationed. As a result, projects with higher returns are squeezed out, use 
self-finance, or forgo efficient technology. As in the words of Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz 
(2001), despite being starved for loanable funds, repressed financial systems misallocated 
much of what they had, with credit often flowing to inefficient public enterprises and favored 
private borrowers. Such direction of credit, particularly through state-owned banks, weakens 
the incentive for financial intermediaries to properly examine projects and to select only those 
ones likely to have highest risk-adjusted return. Along with reducing the motivation to 
recover delinquent loans, financial supervision is distracted from prudential concerns to 
verifying compliance with the credit allocation policy. The poor lending decisions and 
worsening repayment discipline show their consequences in the form of bank insolvency and 
large budgetary bailouts.  
 
Directed credit regimes also entail political dynamic which keep on encouraging the 
augmented misallocation. The availability of large subsidies generates incentives for wasteful 
rent-seeking behavior. As government deficits absorbed larger portions of the available funds, 
the pressures for such directed credit raised because government-determined rates diverge 
more from market interest rates and the interest rates on remaining “free lending” eventually 
increased. Since credit from ordinary channels becomes scarcer and comparatively more 
expensive, potential borrowers move towards political channels. This tendency thus increases 
the political pressure for non-market allocation of credit. In short, development goals are 
seldom supported by financial repression. Rather, the wealthier collected most of the rents 
created by repression process.   
 
8.2.2 Banking Activity 
As the result of increased government intervention in the financial markets, the banks rely 
more on state’s policy guidelines. Since government provides loan guarantees, banks don’t 
feel any need to acquire loan appraisal skills for extending credit. They also don’t feel any 
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responsibility to resolve the problems of asymmetric information due to which their portfolios 
are severely weakened by non-performing loans.  
 
The purpose of interest rate restrictions was to regulate the monopoly power of a banking 
system in less developed economies but even a 10 percent interest rate ceiling on loans can 
offer a reasonable margin between zero percent interest rate on demand deposits and, let’s 
say, 5 percent on time deposits.  Thus, when banks fail to get high equilibrium rates of return 
from their favored borrowers, they adjust it through low return offered to depositors. As a 
result of this underpricing of scarce capital, savers reduce their holdings of money and near-
monies far below socially optimal level, which commensurately reduce the outstanding bank 
credit.  Thus the real size of the monetary system is narrowed down due to the inefficiencies 
in bank lending. Despite of limited flow of loans and deposits in real terms, banks, now being 
‘regulated monopolists’, feel it unnecessary to protest against the overall structure of interest 
rate regulations.  
 
8.2.3 Capital Accumulation 
The adverse consequences of financial repression for the quality and quantity of capital 
accumulation as described by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) can be summarized in a 
step-by-step manner (i) the channeling  of loanable funds through the organized banking 
system is reduced due to which potential borrowers are forced to rely on self-finance (ii) in 
the flow of bank lending, the interest rates vary subjectively from one favored or disfavored 
borrower to another (iii) the ‘self-financing’ by firms and households is impaired because they 
cannot easily accumulate liquid assets for making discrete investments if the real return on 
deposits is negative (iv) when firms are severely illiquid and inflation is also high and 
unstable, it is impossible to achieve significant financial deepening outside the repressed 
banking system because monetary stability is required for intermediation by nonbanking 
financial institutions like trusts, insurance companies etc. (v) the disorder in domestic capital 
markets and unpredictable foreign exchange rates cannot take benefit even from inflows of 
foreign financial capital. 
 
8.2.4 Macroeconomic stability 
Negative real interest rates certainly caused severe disintermediation, capital flight, and 
dependence on foreign funds because domestic savers pursue to preserve their capital abroad. 
Although some repressing governments managed, even with shallow finance, to maintain a 
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reasonable stability of the macroeconomy, however, most experienced a cyclical pattern of 
macroeconomic fluctuations related with intense financial repression. Thus, evolving fiscal 
burden directed such governments to gradually extract additional resources from the financial 
sector through an accelerating inflation tax and lower real interest rates, until the resultant 
overvaluation of exchange rate and increased capital flight ultimately triggered an external 
crisis (Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz (2001).  
 
The eventual consequence of all of the above described disorders is the excessive inflation 
which distorts all economic relationships, amplifies uncertainty and depresses overall growth 
and development process (Sikorski, 1996). This is the place where it would be appropriate to 
describe this key consequence of financial repression i.e. inflationary impact of repression.  
 
8.3 Inflationary Impact of Repression 
When the rate of price inflation is interacted with interest ceilings or reserve requirements, it 
reduces the real deposit rates of interest which lead to slow real financial growth. In such 
case, the inflation rate is considered as endogenous variable which central bank always strives 
to minimize due to the fiscal needs of the government. However, some degree of financial 
repression in indispensable if we consider the problem of macroeconomic control where 
uncovered fiscal deficits exist.  Government expenditures like credit subsidies tend to surpass 
revenues. Due to the absence of any reasonable open market for primary securities, the 
government has no choice to sell its treasury bonds or bills directly to the public. Thus, 
government has to extract seigniorage, i.e. implicit tax revenue from the financial system by 
issuing base money.  As a consequence, the reserve requirements and inflation interact to tax 
the money-holders and to tax borrowers of domestic banks through high real rates. 
 
In this context, the seminal analysis by Friedman’s (1971) describes the conventional models 
of the inflation tax and the extraction of non-inflationary seigniorage. These models assume a 
distinct homogenous demand function for non-interest bearing base money, whether it is coin 
and currency or official reserves held by the banking system. Friedman’s analysis doesn’t 
explicitly consider the flow of loanable funds through the commercial banking system. 
Contrary to this, McKinnon (1973) distinguished two kinds of the demand for base money: 
for currency held by households and firms and for bank reserves held with the central bank.  
In comparison to the direct non-bank holdings of coin and currency, official reserve 
requirements are more important in repressed financial system of developing countries. In a 
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study by Brock (1982), it is indicated that official reserve requirements against deposits are 
normally more than 30 percent in Latin America. Beyond holding reserves with central bank, 
the banks in developing countries are further forced to extend low interest loans to several 
public agencies.  Whereas in industrial and developed countries, the same study exhibited the 
prevalence of reserve requirements generally even less than 10 percent, and the other methods 
of forced lending are also comparatively negligible. Consequentially, coin and currency 
constitute a much higher percentage of the monetary base in developed economies.  The same 
study demonstrates that currency as a percentage of the monetary base is usually around 70 
percent in developed countries, whereas it is almost 40 percent in developing countries of 
Latin America. Most importantly, these developing countries normally extract four to five 
times greater seigniorage as a share of gross national product (GNP) from their monetary 
systems than the developed economies and more than half of this originates from the required 
reserve component of the monetary base (Brock, 1984).  
 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) stress on the closeness of the link between financial 
repression and inflation. Since loan and deposit rates are determined in nominal terms, any 
appreciable rate of inflation is very much likely to turn real rate of interest on loans and real 
rate of return on financial assets negative. Two main culprits of inflation in developing 
countries, as identified by Johnson (1967) are as follows: (i) a high inflation rate tend to 
certainly lead to high variable inflation rate which make it impossible for economic agents to 
effectively anticipate an adjustment to inflation (ii) other prices, including interest rates, are 
likely to be controlled, so that inflation leads to distortions in the resource allocation, and 
higher inflation rates further aggravate these distortions.  By explaining the significance of the 
real size of the financial sector for the process of capital accumulation, McKinnon and Shaw 
recognize third adverse effect of inflation on economic development. Since the market for 
primary securities is generally underdeveloped and less-operative in developing countries, it 
makes the contribution of indirect financial assets, particularly the liabilities of the monetary 
system, very much important in encouraging capital formation. Thus, the consequences of 
financial repression amplified by inflation are particularly severe.  
 
Despite of highly concentrated banking sector in most developing countries, banks can be 
organized to stimulate competitive lending and deposit practice. It requires a strong 
willingness and ability of banks to buy primary securities from final investors at an interest 
rate which is reflective of the general scarcity of capital and the unusual administrative costs 
79 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
of serving each class of borrower. The term of loan is equally crucial. Thus, extending loans 
at high interest rates but in larger quantity and for longer terms is a desired strategy, but 
almost impossible in an economy with unstable and high inflation. Due to uncertainty and 
risk-avoiding behavior, the nominal interest rates that incorporate the expected future price 
inflation are taken as very high to borrowers and very low to depositors. In the anticipation of 
low inflation in future, the borrowers tend to avoid high fixed nominal interest rate 
commitments whereas the depositors don’t want to be ‘wiped out’ in case of unexpected 
acceleration of inflation. Consequentially, only short-term commitments can be established. 
An important issue in this scenario arises that if price inflation be accepted and then offset by 
proper adjustments in nominal interest rates. Besides defining a proper numeraire, it is 
difficult and expansive to index the interest rates by the banking authority in order to maintain 
their real value as inflation proceeds.  However, it is better to adjust nominal interest rates to 
reflect movements in some commodity price index, rather than having no protection against 
unexpected price movements. A reasonable stability in the price level is crucial but the tricky 
part is the problem of deflation without aggravating financial repression.  
 
CONCLUSION 
By reviewing extensive literature on finance and growth, it can be concluded that economic 
growth and development are closely related to ‘finance’, although there is difference of views 
on direction of causation as well as on relative significance of various structures. It is also 
established that financial systems exert significantly positive effect on economic growth 
though provisioning of various financial services which facilitate improvement in market 
frictions. The evolution of growth and development approaches had been progressed enough 
to assess the ‘money’ and ‘credit’ views of economy and the transmission mechanisms linking 
money and income. In this aim, Keynes and Tobin share the common goal of economic 
growth through monetary expansion, yet their rationales are different.  
 
This chapter has tried to shed light on the concepts of financial repression and their 
implications particularly for, but not limited to, developing countries. Government 
intervention in almost all facets of financial markets created a policy structure which was 
identified as ‘financial repression’ in the seminal works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973). Since long, the governments have been intervening in the financial sector to ensure 
financial stability and safeguard public from unexpected losses. Along with these objectives, 
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it also tried to narrow down the concentrations of wealth and monopoly power, to generate 
fiscal resources, and to channelize resources toward most favored parties via financial system. 
In this aim, the authorities keep interest rates artificially at low level. Along with it, the 
provision of credit subsidies to favored firms and units in industries and agriculture for 
achieving development goals is also a seductive idea. Thus, the minister of finance in these 
economies is generally pressurized to increase revenue for providing direct subsidy and 
outright grants to certain agriculture or industrial units.  
 
It is difficult to find a country that had never intervened in the financial sector, in one way or 
the other. Much of the twentieth century saw intensified financial repression. Especially in the 
year after World War II, the governments tried to maintain the interest rates well below 
market rates by putting artificial ceiling on them and to control the allocation of credit through 
their guidelines or through directly owning the banks. The economy is termed as financially 
repressed when government tax or otherwise distort their financial markets. Interest rate 
restrictions, heavy reserve requirements on bank deposits, and compulsory credit allocations 
interact with prevalent price inflation in order to reduce the desirability of holding claims on 
the domestic banking system. Real deposit rate of interest on monetary assets is generally 
negative and is hard to forecast when inflation is high and unstable in such repressed financial 
system. Foreign exchange rates also tend to be extremely uncertain. As a result, the demand 
for domestic money i.e. savings and term deposits along with demand deposits and currency 
reduces as a percentage of gross national product (GNP). 
 
Even during 1970s, various development economists were still favoring the ‘forced savings’ 
through inflation and credit subsidies at below market interest rates as means to stimulate 
socially desirable investments.  Financial sector was not regarded as major element in the 
economic growth and development process, unless manipulated and repressed. The resulting 
distortions, erosions and eventual deterioration of the financial system was regarded as 
consequence of financial repression, therefore, ‘government intervention’ is recognized to be 
synonymous with ‘government failure’ due to its associated economic inefficiencies. Thus, 
curing financial repression is inherent its definition.  
 
The review of literature in this chapter has embedded suggestion to maintain positive and 
uniform high interest rates within similar categories of bank loans and deposits by removing 
heavy reserve requirements, interest ceilings, and directed allocations of cheap credit. The 
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stability of price level through appropriate macroeconomic measures is also needed. Only in 
such setting, the domestic savers and investors would be able to realize the true scarcity price 
of capital and therefore decrease the excessive dispersion in the profitability of investment in 
different sectors of the economy. There is also a widespread agreement that flows of saving 
and investment should be voluntary and significantly decentralized in open capital market at 
close to equilibrium interest rates. Subsequent to the adverse consequences of financial 
repression, McKinnon-Shaw presented the case for ‘financial liberalization’ as ‘opposite’ of 
‘financial repression’ which became the core theoretical foundation for financial sector 
analysis and policy over the last four decades which is to be discussed in next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2. FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION – PROPOSITION AND 
OPPOSITION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Based on their classification of financial repression, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) set 
out the case for financial liberalization (FL), a concept founded on blatant faith on market 
clearing forces and complete withdrawal of government from the market economy. The main 
theoretical underpinning in their models was higher interest rates having positive relationship 
with economic growth. In this aim, the complementarity hypothesis by McKinnon and Debt 
intermediation view by Shaw has significant contributions in liberal approach in economics. 
The first section of this chapter elaborates these key theories along with some of its extensions 
which seek to relate the various aspects of FL with the economic growth and development. 
The theoretical foundations of FL and successive refinements transformed the idea of FL into 
a comprehensive process having mix of policy measures consisting of internal and external 
liberalization depending upon individual country’s conditions and preferences, which are 
covered in section 2.  
 
The end of 1980s and 1990s observed the widespread liberalization in emerging and 
developing countries, especially East Asian and Latin American economies. An important 
factor that is regarded responsible for the popularity of FL in these countries is Washington 
Consensus, a mix of ten (10) policy reforms to ease out controls in developing countries’ 
markets. Deregulations, privatization, liberalization of finance, trade and foreign exchange 
etc. were part of this agenda adopted by most of the developing countries in transition towards 
market economy during that period. Another vital force that played primary role in the fad of 
FL buzzed at the turn of 21st century was financial globalization and integration which called 
for further financial opening. The joint impact of Washington Consensus and financial 
globalization provided impetus for the extensive implementation of FL reforms in emerging 
and developing economies which is the subject of the section 3 of this chapter.  
 
While touching most aspect of financial markets in developing countries, the process of FL 
appears have certain effects by changing the central conditions in which their financial sector 
operates. Two of these conditions which are discussed in section 4 are the higher interest rates 
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along with the elimination of other price controls and the entry of new financial firms along 
with the privatization of state-owned intermediaries.  
 
The mixed consequences of FL reforms in developing economies are followed by a protracted 
series of critique, one set of which was based on the inherent evils of the market economy. 
The assumptions on which theory and models of FL are founded are actually non-existent 
which infers that financial markets are imperfect. The incomplete information, stressed by 
Stiglitz-Weiss model, along with the externalities and incompleteness of financial markets are 
regarded as some of the sources of these imperfections. Section 5 of this chapter elaborates all 
these odds intrinsically present in the financial markets.  
 
The critique of FL that emerged as result of financial crashes, chaos and crises in post-FL 
scenario in emerging and developing countries is responded by the proponents of FL in which 
they emphasize its proper implementation to make FL successful. Two key areas in this 
respect are pre-conditions and sequencing. Macroeconomic stability along with efficient 
regulation and supervision are deemed as necessary conditions to be fulfilled before executing 
FL. The simultaneous implementation of internal and external FL i.e. liberalization of capital 
market along with trade liberalization is considered flawed due to which they recommend an 
optimum sequencing of liberalization reforms. However, it gave rise to further criticism on 
the logic of reform and there emerged new debate on big bang versus gradual approach of 
implementing liberalization measures. Section 6 is comprised of all this discussion.  
 
The proponents of FL responded its opposition by focusing on implementation problems, 
however, even the fulfillment of all conditions cannot ensure the success. According the 
critique developed by the New-structuralists and Institutionalists characterized FL as 
inappropriate for developing countries due to their structural and institutional realities and 
settings developed as consequence of protracted financial repression in these economies. The 
wide prevalence of unofficial money market is one of such reality. The final section of this 
chapter thoroughly discusses New-structuralist critique as well as Institutionalist critique.  
 
Section 1. McKinnon-Shaw Proposition for Financial Liberalization 
The ‘anatomy of repression’ was first classified by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) in 
their now seminal works which set out the case for financial liberalization. The theory of FL 
was prophesied on blind faith in markets and government failure was best be contended by 
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eliminating the role of government in economy. The resultant policy prescription called for 
the liberation of financial markets from administrative restraints of government in order to let 
the market-clearing forces work. The most important element in the construction of FL theory 
was the idea that interest rates have a positive relationship with economic growth. It was 
McKinnon and Shaw who provided theory connecting high interest rates with output growth.  
 
1.1 Theoretical Foundation – McKinnon 
McKinnon (1973) founded his theoretical model on the assumption that all economic units are 
confined to self-finance in developing countries due to prevalent financial repression. 
Indivisibilities in investment also play their role in this respect. This assumption in 
McKinnon’s analysis implies that it is foremost for any potential investor to accumulate all 
the money balances necessary for investment before undertaking any project. Unlike Tobin’s 
portfolio approach in which money and capital are being substitutes, McKinnon treated 
money and capital as inherent complements, termed as ‘complementarity hypothesis’. It states 
that in developing economies, money and real capital assets are complements because money 
balances have to be accumulated before undertaking costly and indivisible investment projects 
due to the lack of profound financial markets and broad financial intermediation. It is inferred 
from this hypothesis that the demand for real money balances (M/P) is positively dependant 
on real income (Y), real interest rate on bank deposits (R), and real average return on capital 
(r).  Analytically, the positive link between the demand for money balances and the average 
real return on capital signifies the complementarity between capital and money. This is one 
leg of the complementarity hypothesis. McKinnon also indicates that the investment ratio 
(I/Y) must also be positively related to the real rate of return on money balances. The logic 
behind this idea is simple. If an increase in the real return on bank deposits (R) raises the 
demand for money in a situation where real money balances are complementary to 
investment, it must also augment the investment ratio. This is the second leg of the 
hypothesis. Therefore, the complementarity hypothesis is a united hypothesis whereby the 
demand for real money balances is dependant directly, inter alia, on the average real return on 
capital and the investment ratio increases with the real deposit rate of interest. This 
complementarity is expressed in a demand equation for real balances (M/P): 
 
M/P = L(Y, I/Y, d-π*)   ;   δ(M/P) / δ(I/Y) > 0 
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Where Y is real GNP, I is the investment term, and d-π* is the real interest rate. 
Complementarity between real money balances and investment appears in the positive partial 
derivative.  
 
In this model, the conditions of money supply have a first-order influence on saving and 
investment related decisions. This model retains Tobin’s assumption of a purely fiat money 
stock generated through government debt that is certainly exogenous. McKinnon follows the 
implications of a world without credit money in order to employ purely exogenous fiat 
money, but it changes the primary assumptions regarding the relationship of money and 
income and develops a neoclassical monetarist approach. It is implied in this assumption that 
money and capital are two absolutely distinctive goods which are becoming part of the 
economy via separate production functions. Since there is no borrowing in a purely fiat 
economy, no mechanism is required through which the process of production capital calls 
forth the money necessary to finance its creation. In case of modifying the first assumption by 
introducing credit money, a strange assumption is to be met for the complementarity thesis to 
hold i.e. the business sector must be a net saver than net debtor in any one period. Thus, just 
like Tobin’s model, the nonexistence of credit money characterizes a considerable weakness 
in McKinnon’s hypothesis.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Foundation – Shaw   
The formal theoretical analysis of Shaw (1973) is not based on the tough assumption of a fiat 
money world. Rather, it focuses on the role of financial intermediaries in economic growth 
and development.  According to it, financial liberalization, in terms of high interest rates, is 
resulted primarily from increasing the volume of financial intermediation between savers and 
investors.  The capacity of financial intermediaries to lend is increased by offering high 
returns to savers, due to which banks are enabled to allocate the resultant volume of 
investment funds. The growth in investment funds leads to increase in the quantity of 
investment. As a result, banks can realize the economies of scale in risk diversification, 
lending, operational efficiency, and information costs which eventually reduce the real 
borrowing cost for investors and raise the average efficiency of investment. These arguments 
presented in Shaw’s model are known as ‘debt-intermediation view’ which is expressed in the 
following money demand equation: 
 
M/P = F(Y, γ, d- π*)  ;   δM/P / δd- π*   > 0 
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Where γ is a vector of opportunity costs in real terms of holding money. The view 
fundamentally believes that the yields on all kinds of wealth, particularly money, would have 
a positive effect on the savings rate, and consequently on investment. 
 
Shaw’s model mainly depends on neo-classical market clearing assumption, particularly 
assumption regarding the functioning of interest rate in an equilibrating manner for ensuring 
the equality between the supply and demand of loanable funds in the financial markets19. Due 
to efficient financial markets as assumed in this model, the decision to reduce consumption 
and savings does not decrease demand as it only changes its composition from consumption 
to investment expenditure. Investment is only constrained by the lack of savings entering in 
the financial intermediation process which ultimately limits growth. In this scenario along 
with a constant money supply, it is the objective of the policymakers to raise the demand for 
real money balances and thus increase the supply of loanable funds, investment and economic 
growth. Therefore, holding of real money balances brings investment and growth which infers 
that saving is the main element for investment and growth. 
 
However, the major loophole in Shaw’s model is the deficiency of any behavioral mechanism 
specifying the operation of the banking system.  It is weird that underlying suggested 
approach of FL by Shaw tries to address fragmented, repressed, oligopolistic, rationed credit 
markets, but his primary mechanism is strongly based on the assumptions necessitating 
competitive and efficient markets. As first estimation, however, Shaw’s theory is naturally 
more reasonable and rational than McKinnon’s. 
 
In totality, the principal argument of the McKinnon-Shaw joint thesis is where savings are 
assumed to be positively connected to the real interest rate. According to them, a typical 
situation in developing countries is the prevalence of an administratively determined nominal 
interest rate which holds the real interest rate below its equilibrium level (Arrieta 1988, P. 
589). According to Fry (1995), financial intermediation is repressed and sub-optimal due to 
administrative fixation of interest rates below the equilibrium. With increase in the real 
                                                          
19
 Regarding traditional approach of real interest rate determination, the work of the Swedish economist, Knut 
Wicksell is of particular relevance. According to Wicksell’s (1898, 1907) Theory of Interest, the real rate of 
interest fluctuates around an unobservable equilibrium level, which is called ‘natural’ rate of interest. The natural 
rate equilibrates ex ante savings and investment and equals the marginal product of capital. Thus, if the real rate 
equals the natural rate, prices are stable. Contrarily, if real rate goes above the natural rate, the economy is 
contracted and prices are fallen whereas if real rate goes below the natural rate, the economy is expanded and 
prices are raised.   
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interest rate, savings and total real supply of credit are grown, which bring a higher volume of 
investment (Arestis and Sawyer, 2005).  
 
The graphical representation of McKinnon-Shaw case for financial liberalization is given at 
Annexure III. 
 
1.3 Theoretic Refinements 
Successive extensions of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis strive for discovering thorough 
concepts of financial liberalization and try to clearly describe the transmission mechanisms 
between monetary policy and economic growth and development. 
 
Some of the significant extensions are given below: 
 
1.3.1 Kapur’s Model of liberalization (Principal idea: FL augments growth by improving 
the quantity of investment) Kapur’s (1976) model demonstrates the primary linkage in 
liberalization theory i.e. an increase in interest rates enhances growth because it raises the 
quantity of investment funds and thus, investment.  
  
The rationale for this model is based on Shaw’s debt intermediation view i.e. higher interest 
rates increase the level of savings, which expand the banking sector and hence lead towards 
an increase in the quantity of investment. By looking at various stabilization programs, it is 
argued by Kapur that as compare to the stabilization through an initial decrease in the rate of 
monetary expansion, the stabilization through an initial increase in the average nominal 
interest rate on money holdings has considerably more favorable effects on real output in 
short run. Working capital nexus connecting bank financing and aggregate supply has a vital 
role in transmission mechanism of Kapur’s model. The significance of working capital 
explains two phenomena: one is the initial decline of real output, historically describing 
efforts at price stabilization, and second is the consequent expansion of real output as 
inflationary expectation regress and the real stock of money increases. 
 
1.3.2 Galbis’s Model of Liberalization (Principal idea: FL augments growth by improving 
the quality of investment) Another main ideology of FL is described by Galbis (1977) in his 
model of investment efficiency by theorizing that high interest rates enhances growth as they 
bring an overall improvement in the quality in the capital stock, even if total real savings are 
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interest inelastic. Logically, it is the rationing function of high interest rates on investment 
demand which leads to an improvement in the quality of the capital stock. As established in 
first chapter, financial repression assumes the undertaking of inefficient and low-yielding 
investment projects due to providing subsidy in order to maintain low nominal interest rates. 
This implies that crowding out of efficient and high-yielding investment projects from the 
organized credit markets. Therefore, the policy of raising nominal interest rates by eliminating 
subsidy is encouraged for rationing out the inefficient and low-yielding investment projects 
and thereby, improving the allocation of resources in the financial system. 
 
Galbis also demonstrates that countries with a rigid structure of interest rates should consider 
the institutional credit ceilings as a second-best policy. In case of excess demand, credit 
ceilings permit a degree of price stability which ensures, given the limit on nominal interest 
rates, the maximum ‘possible’ high real interest rates. However, the ‘optimal policy’ remains 
letting the interest rates upsurged to a level where the supply and demand for investibles are 
equal, consequently eliminating the need for rationing controls. The freeing of deposit rates 
and the elimination of quantitative controls give rise to such form of FL where market is 
moving away from a direct monetary control towards more indirect monetary control. 
 
1.3.3 Mathieson Model of Liberalization (Principal idea: Best way to conduct FL is to 
bring simultaneous changes in regulatory regime through a rapid reform program, which 
asks for coordination of internal and external policy changes in order to smoothen the 
adjustment) The policy frameworks of FL usually demands a ‘big bang’ of liberalization in 
which deposit and loan rates undertake enormous and distinct changes as a result of which the 
financial system gets freedom from most of the repressive policies.  
 
Although, the extensive debate on ‘big bang’ versus ‘gradualism’ will be held later in this 
chapter, however, for the purpose of explaining this model, it is crucial to describe that the 
rationale for rapid reform program is that the adjustment period is ended quickly due to which 
political elements do not have time to resist the reform process. Besides political reasoning, it 
also has an economic explanation based on the neo-classical notions related with functioning 
of free markets and of price signals.  
 
The simultaneity of reforms implies that the liberalization program is being conducted in an 
open-economy situation. The extension of FL to an open-economy framework expresses the 
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impact of capital flows on stabilization and financial reform. The Mathieson model is 
demonstrative of the probable interdependency between FL and exchange rate policy within a 
broad stabilization program. This interdependence is logical because FL wants to increase the 
supply of investible funds. The increase in domestic interest rate in an open economy will 
invite capital which, at first, would increase the supply of savings. However, this capital 
inflow will also put upward pressure on exchange rate thereby reducing trade 
competitiveness. With worsening balance of payment, future expectations of depreciation 
would raise thereby stimulating capital outflow and resultant reduction in supply of investible 
funds. The underlying message of this analysis is that the exchange rate policy has to be 
coordinated for offsetting the possibly harmful effects of capital inflows on the balance of 
trade.  
 
Stabilization programs funded by IMF during 1980s took greatly from Mathieson’s theoretical 
credence. From the optimal stabilization policy mix, given at Annexure IV, it can be 
concluded that ‘a phase of gradual changes in policy instruments, including an initial phase 
of discrete and potentially large changes in policy instruments. These discrete changes are a 
vital part of the adjustment program because they create inflation and exchange rate 
expectations consistent with the stabilization program’ (Mathieson 1979, p. 472).  
 
Apropos to the theoretical foundations of financial liberalization by McKinnon-Shaw and 
their successors’ refinements, the philosophy of Financial Liberalization (FL) had been 
transformed into a broad policy framework.  
 
Section 2. Elements of Financial Liberalization 
FL is comprised of many elements as it reveals a range of restrictive measures imposed under 
financial repression. It may include capital market liberalization, banking sector liberalization, 
and stock market liberalization. Depending on individual conditions and priorities, countries 
can choose to go from partial to full liberalization. Full liberalization characterizes six (6) 
dimensions of FL containing elimination of credit controls, deregulation of interest rates, free 
entry into the banking and financial services industry, banking autonomy, private ownership 
of banks, and liberalization of international capital flows (Williamson and Mehar, 1998). FL 
refers to measures directed at diluting or dismantling regulatory control over the institutional 
structures, instruments and activities of agents in different segments of the financial sector. 
These measures can be related to internal or external regulations.  
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2.1 Internal Financial Liberalization 
Internal FL is normally comprised of few or all of the following measure in different degrees 
(Ghosh, 2005): 
 
(i) The complete elimination or reduction of controls on the interest rates charged by financial 
agents. Although the central bank keeps on affecting or managing that rate structure through 
open market operations or through adjustments of its discount rate. However, deregulation 
usually removes interest rate ceilings and encourages competition which attracts potential 
depositors and borrowers.  Consequently, price competition squeezes spreads thereby forcing 
banks and other financial firms to rely on volumes to warrant returns. 
(ii) The exclusion of the state from financial intermediation process along with the 
transformation of the development banks into commercial banks and the privatization of the 
state-owned banks. It is normally supplemented by the decline or removal of directed credit to 
priority sectors. 
(iii) The relaxation of conditions for the participation of firms and investors in the stock 
market by reducing listing conditions, by allowing greater liberty intermediaries like brokers, 
by providing autonomy in pricing of new issues, and by easing conditions related to 
borrowing against shares and investing borrowed funds in the market. 
(iv) The elimination of regulatory walls between banking and non-banking financial sectors 
which leads to the emergence of “universal banks” or financial supermarkets thereby 
increasing the interlinkages between various financial structures. 
(v) The expansion of the sources and instruments to access the funds. 
(vi) The liberalization of the regulations regarding the types of financial instruments that can 
be issued and acquired in the system. With liberalization, such financial assets are started to 
generate that transfer risks to the portfolio of institutions which are willing to hold them. 
(vii) The adoption of regime of voluntary adherence to statutory guidelines related to capital 
adequacy and accounting norms which let the central bank’s role to be limited to supervision 
and monitoring.  
(viii) Another component of FL which remained dominant during 1980s-2010s was the self-
regulation of the market mechanisms. The proponents of free market economics regarded self-
regulation as the best kind of control, even to the extent being able to self-repair the market 
failures.   
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2.2 External Financial Liberalization 
External FL usually encompasses modifications in the exchange control regime. Trade 
liberalization along with full convertibility of current account transactions are complemented 
with varying levels of convertibility on the capital account. The liberalization of capital 
account generally covers the following measures with varying degree of intensity and 
patterns:  
 
(i) Measures regarding permitting foreign residents to hold domestic financial assets in form 
of debt or equity. Such measures allow domestic firms to undertake external commercial 
borrowing, even without government guarantee or supervision. These measures can also be 
accompanied with the reduction or removal of controls on the entry of new financial firms, 
provided they meet certain specified norms related to capital investments.  
(ii) Measures regarding permitting domestic residents to hold foreign financial assets. Such 
measures are regarded as radical liberalization because it increases the probability of capital 
flight in times of crisis, an area to be explored in next chapter. However, these measures are 
used to reduce pressure on exchange rate by those countries which get excessive capital 
inflows that do not enhance the net domestic investment and are mirrored in excessive 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. 
(iii) Measures regarding permitting assets denominated in foreign currency to be held freely 
and traded within the domestic economy, a phenomenon known as the “dollarization” of 
accounts. Such measures have been implemented only in few countries as they are regarded as 
an extreme degree of external FL.  
 
After describing what FL entails from partial to full version, we will now discuss the vital 
paradigms behind advancement and popularity of FL in developing countries. 
 
Section 3. Key Forces stimulating Financial Liberalization 
The easing of controls on the financial sector has not proceeded in a vacuum; it has been 
supplemented both by a general liberalization of the domestic economy and by an opening up 
toward the outside world (Williamson and Mahar 1998). The phenomena of Washington 
Consensus in end-1980s along with financial globalization and integration in end-1990s 
provided further impetus for financial liberalization.  
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3.1 Washington Consensus 
“Washington Consensus” is a term which came into being in 1989 when John Williamson 
prepared a background paper titling “what Washington means by policy reform” for a 
conference that the Institute for International Economics organized for studying the 
magnitude of change in economic policy of Latin America, historically based on traditional 
views of development economics, but now converging towards philosophies that are viewed 
as perfect for Organization for economic and cooperation for Development (OECD). In order 
to deal with mutual set of issues, this background paper presented a list of ten policies that 
almost everybody in Washington (i.e. International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) 
and United States (US) Treasury being their offices in Washington, US) agrees upon, and 
labeled that list as “Washington Consensus”. Here, it is pertinent to identify those ten (10) 
policy instruments, also known as ‘ten commandments’, on which Washington20 showed 
substantial consensus.   
 
3.1.1 Ten Commandments 
Washington consensus was consisting of a set of ten policy reforms needed by emerging and 
developing economies (Williamson, 1989): 
 
(i) Fiscal Discipline: The sufficient fiscal discipline is required so that the budget deficits are 
small enough to be financed without resorting to the inflation tax. 
(ii) Public Expenditure Priorities: Public expenditures must be redirected from politically 
focused areas towards neglected fields with high economic returns and the potential to 
improve income distribution e.g. health, education, infrastructure etc. 
(iii) Tax Reform: Reforming taxation is required in order to broaden the tax base and to cut 
marginal tax rates.  Taking motivation from Bradley-Kemp tax act in the US during 1986, it 
argued for efficient raise in required taxes, without displaying the distorting exemptions that 
force high marginal tax rates on those things that are not exempted21. 
                                                          
20
 The Washington of this paper is both the political Washington of Congress and senior members of the 
administration and the technocratic Washington of the international financial institutions, the economic agencies 
of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the think tanks (Williamson, 2004) 
21
 This is not, one has to acknowledge, the consideration that drove tax reform in most developing countries 
during the 1990s. The dominant form of tax reform was the introduction or extension of VAT, driven by a desire 
for a resilient, broad-based (thus relatively non-distortive) revenue source, in part to offset the loss of revenue 
occasioned by tariff reductions. The main problem with VAT is that it is regressive, and for un-understandable 
reasons the International Financial Institutions have tended to be hostile to correcting this by exempting basic 
necessities like food and medicines. 
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(iv) Interest Rates: Interest rates should be market-determined and positive in order to avoid 
resource misallocation. In this aim, financial liberalization holds the eventual objective to 
converge for attaining market-determined and positive interest rates.  
(v) Competitive Exchange Rate:  A unified exchange rate is required at a level adequately 
competitive for bringing a prompt growth in non-traditional exports, and this export growth is 
vital to accelerate a general growth process.  
(vi) Trade Liberalization:  Quantitative trade restrictions should be promptly replaced by 
tariffs by gradually reducing them until achieving a uniform low rate of 10 to 20 percent.  
(vii) Liberalization of FDI: The abolition of barriers hindering the entry of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in order to have a more stable flow of capital as compare to portfolio capital 
and bank loans22.  
(viii) Privatization: The state-owned enterprises should be privatized in order to increase the 
efficiency and viability of the privatized enterprises along with advancing access to privatized 
utilities.  
(ix) Deregulation: Such regulations must be eradicated which obstruct the entry of new firms 
and thus restrict competition.  
(x) Property Rights: The legal system should provide secure property rights without undue 
costs along with their availability to the informal sector. 
 
Apparently, there seems to be three main notions of Washington Consensus: macroeconomic 
discipline, market economy, and openness to the world economies. These were the 
mainstream ideas in OECD countries, but global apartheid at that time viewed developing 
countries to take advantage from the opposite notions, for example, inflation to get the 
inflation tax and boost investment, prominent role of government to initiate industrialization, 
import substitution etc. The Washington Consensus proposed the end of this era of apartheid, 
as a result of which the term of Washington Consensus has been used to cover a broader 
market fundamentalism and neoliberal agenda. 
 
3.1.2 Introduction of New Economic Order 
Washington Consensus contributed in the termination of segregation between development 
economics and mainstream economics - a segregation particularly heating up since 1970s. 
The policy prescriptions of Washington Consensus, principally based on overall freeing of 
                                                          
22
 Williamson (2004) claimed that his version of the Washington Consensus spoke quite specifically of 
liberalizing the inflow of FDI, and not of general liberalization of capital inflows. 
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economies were apparently odd in those times when it was believed that less developed 
countries could not really take advantage from freer international trade and liberalized 
markets because there was a strong conviction that these countries had to protect their 
economies from an unfair and exploitative international system. This conviction primarily 
came from underlying views of “Dependency theory” which was quite popular in developing 
world in those times.  
 
Dependency theory emerged in 1950s as critique of modernization by holding that conditions 
of underdevelopment are surely the consequence of integration of third world economies into 
the capitalist world system which is dominated by west and North America (Randall and 
Theobald, 1998, P. 120). There were also certain critiques of this theory, like in the late 
1950s, Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal signified the implementation of centralized planning as 
the only option a country had to overcome poverty. According to Myrdal (1956), "What 
amounts to super-planning has to be staged by underdeveloped countries . . . and grand-scale 
national planning is the policy line unanimously endorsed by governments and experts in the 
advanced countries" …  "central planning is the first condition of progress" (cited in Bauer, 
1984, P.19-20). After that, many variations of these ideas were introduced23.  
 
However, the debt crisis and cold war made it impossible and unaffordable for governments 
of developing countries to keep on following the economic policies of aloofness by 
maintaining fiscally expensive public sector.  Such events left no option for developing 
countries but to seek support from welcoming but demanding Washington Consensus which 
asked for adoption of mainstream macroeconomic policies and abolition of protectionist 
structures prevalent in these countries. Particularly highly-indebted countries needed some 
relief from their enormous volume of foreign financial obligations which is provided to them 
in exchange for the implementation of economic reforms prescribed by Washington 
Consensus. 
 
This results in the proliferation of policies of Washington Consensus through the stabilization 
and structural adjustment programs of IMF and World Bank which eventually became a 
principal approach to development (Gore, 2000). Therefore, a reform program actually 
                                                          
23
 Some of  these variations include, but not limited to, Julius Nyerere's "autonomous development", Samir 
Amin's "de-linking", the "basic-needs" approach, Francois Perroux's "development poles", ECLA's 
"comprehensive social development", the UN's "new international economic order” (Naim, 1999). 
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intended to restructure and stabilize crisis-wracked Latin American economies soon became a 
popular ‘panacea’ for developing world. 
 
3.1.3 Critique of Washington Consensus 
The series of crises in emerging and developing countries, starting with one in Mexico by the 
end of 1994, by implementing prescribed policies of Washington Consensus let the world to 
accuse this set of neoliberal policies which acts as most damaging factor to economic growth 
of these economies. In fact, Washington Consensus didn’t consider the ‘crisis avoidance’. No 
warning was given to developing countries which were, as prescribed, opening up their credit 
and financial markets prematurely. Since crisis related issues were not urgent in late 1980s, 
therefore, the consideration of warning was regarded as ‘non-issue’.  
 
An extremely narrow objective of Washington Consensus can also be the reason behind its 
unsatisfactory performance. It suggested a path to improve economic growth without paying 
any heed to its distribution. Equally important is the distribution of income, along with the 
overall level and growth of income. In this aim, Birdsall, Augusto de la Torre and Menezes 
(2001) came up with ‘10 + 1 tools for social equity’ in order to improve income distribution 
without impairing growth. However, they are suggested as complement, not as substitute, to 
Washington Consensus.  
 
In the same fashion, the double standards of developed world are also criticized which impose 
liberalization on developing countries whereas maintained controls like trade restrictions on 
the specific commodities and pressed World Trade Organization (WTO) for intellectual 
property protection. Another crucial criticism on Washington Consensus is that it missed 
globalization. The abandoning of controls that drove economic integration owes a lot to the 
stimulus of Washington Consensus. However, it didn’t suggest any policy set to liberalizing 
economies in order to cope with the consequences of financial globalization.  
 
Financial globalization and integration of financial and credit markets is vital in explaining 
the widespread liberalization taking place during 1980s-1990s and took high speed at the turn 
of the century.  
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3.2 Financial Globalization and Integration 
Globalization, a buzzword of the 21st century, is regarded as problem as well as panacea. The 
debate over globalization resulted in a series of books on the subject (Friedman, 1999; Soros, 
1998; O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999, Davis and Gallman, 2000). 
 
The convergence and reinforcement of certain events gave impetus to the wave of 
globalization in commodities as well as financial and capital markets. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the subsequent opening of the economies of Eastern Europe along with the 
gradual opening of China are two of such events. Then, after various unsuccessful efforts 
during the 1980s, the decade of the 1990s eventually brought significant change in economic 
policies in most emerging economies led by reduction in controls in varying degree as well as 
the opening to international markets. The advent of extraordinary advancement in information 
technology and communication further enabled the process of globalization and integration.  
 
Regarding the evolution of global financial and capital markets, Eichengreen (1996) gather a 
working set of hypotheses that can be regarded as conventional wisdom vis-à-vis the 
evolution of international capital mobility in the post-1870 era. This time span of 19th and 20th 
century can be divided into four distinctive parts:  
 
(i)The first period is started from 1870 and ended in 1914. During this era, most of the world 
economies were following classical gold standard and a global capital market headquartered 
in London. Since this regime of fixed exchange rate was regarded as stable and credible 
functioning as a disciplining device, therefore, interest rates across countries tended to 
converge and resulted in the surge of capital flows.  Many peripheral countries in those times 
took part in a progressively globalized economy in not only the capital market, but also in the 
goods and labor markets (Obsfeld and Taylor, 2003).  
 
There are many elements which could explain the greater persistence of current account 
imbalances in the pre-1913 period. One such factor is the highly credible commitment of 
policymakers’ for stable monetary and fiscal policies because the anchoring with the gold 
standard gave signal that the borrowers followed the same rules as lenders and hence were 
improbable to default on their debts. Bordo and Rockoff (1996) analyzed this hypothesis for 
nine receivers of British capital during 1870-1914 and found robust evidence that adherents of  
gold standard paid lower interest rates on sovereign debt than those with blotchier histories. 
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Flanreau, Le Cacheux, and Zumer (1998) also found similar results for a panel of European 
peripheral countries. Since gold standard was synonymous with fiscal morality where capital 
provider and receiver shares similar set of norms, therefore, the failure of the international 
monetary system to support equally persistent deficits after 1st World War may reflect 
transference to less credible policies. 
 
Another factor behind persistent export of British capital is that most of the British investment 
went to countries with which it shared common language, culture, legal system, and 
accounting system e.g. US, Canada, and Australia or to countries where Britain had robust 
commercial presence and significant political influence e.g. Argentina, Uruguay or to colonies 
under direct British control. The French also led their capital to countries where they had a 
strong political influence and close cultural bonds e.g. Italy, Spain, Russia etc. (Fishlow, 
1985; Flandreau, 1996; Flandreau, 1998). The nature of investment itself also explains 
another element.  Most of this capital was flowing in order to finance railroads and other 
infrastructure in new world. Such type of investments needed long-term commitment and the 
returns accrued only when the project is accomplished, making it costly to dismiss 
prematurely. A final element is the flexibility of 19th century economies which had less 
structured and less institutionalized markets where adjustment was also less constrained by 
policymakers, therefore a shift in capital flows could be easily accommodated. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1996) and Calomiris and Hubbard (1996) provide econometric evidence 
consistent with this explanation.   
 
(ii) The second period is started from 1914 and ended in 1945, during which global economy 
was devastated as result of two World Wars and a Great Depression along with upsurge of 
nationalism and non-cooperative economic policymaking. The gold-standard credibility was 
shattered by World War I, after which monetary policy started to relate with domestic 
political goals in order to support wartime deficits. Later, monetary policy became an 
instrument to devise devaluations under floating regime. Capital controls became extensive 
for guarding against currency crises in order to protect gold.  So just in few decades, the 
global economy turned from globalized to nearly autarkic with minimal capital flows and 
non-synchronized international prices and interest rates. The demonization of global capital 
and finance is regarded as the main reason of the Great Depression of the 1930s (Eichengreen 
1996; Temin 1989).  
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(iii) The third period, commonly known as the “Bretton Woods era” is started from 1945 and 
ended in 1971. During this period, serious efforts were made to rebuild the global economy. 
Although trade flows started to expand outstandingly and economic growth was also surging 
speedily, however, it was tough to dissipate interwar period fears regarding global capital. In 
this aim, IMF firstly sanctioned capital controls for preventing currency crises and runs, 
which advanced some autonomy to governments by giving more authority to activist 
monetary policy. This philosophy sustained for twenty years and capital markets recovered 
slowly. But global capital could not be held back after late 1960s, so its workings ultimately 
terminated the compromise for sustaining the fixed exchange rate regime (Bordo and 
Eichnegreen, 1993).  
 
(iv) The fourth and final period which is known as post-Bretton Woods floating-rate era, 
showed a different trend. Despite of abolishing fixed rate regime hesitantly, the period from 
the 1970s to the 1990s saw reasonable increase in capital flows. The economic reforms in 
peripheral countries reduced the transactions costs and risks of foreign investment due to 
which capital flows raised. However, the crises of the later 1990s prompted the weaknesses of 
fixed rate regime prevalent in the developing economies. Thus, the smaller peripheral 
countries previously desirous for fixed exchange rates gradually found credibility in giving up 
the autonomy of domestic monetary policy through currency boards. 
 
Consequently, the term of ‘globalization’ became synonymous with an integrated and 
interdependent world economy at the turn of 21st century, exhibiting free flow of goods, 
services, and capital. But today, it is hard for this era to assess the early period of remarkable 
global integration and the existence of global capital markets even in the beginning of 20th 
century, that is, almost a hundred years ago. By roughly sketching the implied movements in 
capital mobility, an upswing can be seen from 1880 to 1914, followed by a collapse to 1945, 
then a gradual rise in mobility after 1945, which became faster after the end of Bretton Woods 
in the early 1970s. The empirical evidence on the international integration of credit and 
financial markets from 1880 to the present shows that globalization has followed a U-shaped 
pattern for capital flows (Bordo, Taylor and Williamson, 2005). The U-shaped trend line 
indicated as a stylized view of capital mobility in modern history which is given at Annexure 
V. The U-shaped pattern of global financial integration had been explained by Obsfeld and 
Taylor (1998) in terms of the policy trilemma of open capital markets, pegged exchange rates, 
and independent monetary policy i.e. only two of the three elements hold at the same time.  
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This description of facts regarding global capital and financial markets infers a back to the 
future scenario as international markets may have been at least as integrated before 1914 as 
they are today (Auernheimer, 2003). However, depth of financial markets, shift from debt to 
equity and growth of FDI are some of the key features which strengthen the view that 
international financial markets are much more integrated now than they were before 1914.   
 
So basically, the conceptual victory of FL coincided with the Washington Consensus and 
growing financial globalization and there started a terrible period in which the developing 
world became so indebted with dollar-denominated debt at world interest rates that they 
couldn’t meet their payment obligations anymore. So they have to rely on the IMF and World 
Bank which were confident about their FL-based policy conditions in correcting these 
imbalanced economies because FL, with its focus on market-clearing interest rates and the 
corresponding significance of interest rates in combating inflation, was popular.  
 
Section 4. Process of Financial Liberalization 
The occurrences of liberalization typically portray a complex mix of financial and 
nonfinancial policy reforms which make it extremely challenging to work out the empirical 
approximations of the net economic welfare gains resulting from FL. Some studies show 
some evidence regarding absence of any systematic increase in the overall saving (Bandiera et 
al. 2000), but some econometric studies suggest the increase in the allocation of credit 
(Caprio, Atiyas and Hanson, 1994). However, the process of FL itself seems to impart certain 
effects by altering the fundamental conditions in which the financial sector functioned. Two 
of these elements were (i) removal of interest rate and other price controls along with less 
state-administered direction of credit. It entails a decrease in the implicit taxation and related 
rents of financial intermediation, and also in the higher short-term volatility in nominal 
interest rates (ii) entry of new financial firms, privatization of state-owned intermediaries, 
decline in the business related restrictions on financial intermediaries, and elimination of legal 
protection for cartelized financial markets. All such measures changed the incentives for risk 
management and risk taking thereby altering the governance of financial intermediaries. 
Therefore, despite of the fact that FL touches various aspects of financial markets in 
developing countries, most of the attention is given to the policies of interest rates and of 
privatization and new entrants.   
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4.1 Higher Interest Rates 
Besides exposing existing poor portfolios, FL also threatened existing credit recipients with 
higher costs of credit and reduced rents thereby altering the distribution of credit (Agénor and 
Montiel 1996). Contrary to the secured finance under financial repression, credit recipients 
now had to pay higher market-based price of credit, which sometimes also led heavily-
indebted borrowers toward bankruptcy. With fixed interest rate contract, some borrowers have 
been momentarily shielded from such insolvencies, but those with floating interest rate 
contracts got immediate and heavy hit. Suffering from such contingencies, intermediaries with 
weak supervisory framework retorted these difficulties by rolling over interest as well as 
principal, which later resulted in further problems because intermediaries have to mobilize 
equivalent resources to provide such rollovers. The intermediaries will have instant squeeze if 
they had financed long-term fixed interest contract with short-term borrowing. But even in 
case of floating rate lending, they may not have been fully protected from the increase in 
interest rates because only a fraction of the rate risk will have really been hedged while the 
residue is only converted into credit risk24.  
 
The high leverage of financial intermediaries makes them extraordinarily vulnerable to 
unhedged interest rate changes. A sharp rise in interest rates in post-liberalization scenario is 
tended to disrupt financial and real activities so it was a costly feature of liberalization which 
might have been eased by converging controlled interest rates gradually towards market-
clearing levels. The intermediaries will thus lose partially due to their borrowers’ failing to 
sustain higher interest rates and partially due to the loss of the benefits previously received 
from effective deposit rate ceilings.  
 
FL affects both the level and the dynamics of interest rates. With expectations to augment the 
volatility of interest rates and asset prices, FL was also anticipated to have distributional 
consequences in the shape of reduced or relocated rents, and to have improved competition in 
the financial sector. By examining the existing data on money market and bank interest rates 
to confirm these propositions, Patrick Honohan (2000b) revealed that with more and more 
countries liberalization measures, the level and dynamic behavior of interest rates in 
developing countries converged to the norms of industrial countries.  
 
                                                          
24
 It was witnessed in Korea and other east Asian countries during 1997 
101 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
At the level of government, heavy domestic borrowings have to be refinanced at new higher 
interest rates which have knock-on effects on resort to added taxation or borrowing thereby 
tending to produce macroeconomic fragility and uncertainty. The liberalization process also 
backed macroeconomic instability with a preliminary increase in aggregate credit due to 
financial institutions seeking market share. The resultant overheating had to be reduced down 
by monetary policy which resulted in inflation and nominal depreciation, feeding back onto 
nominal interest rates25. Another possibly disrupting influence of liberalization, as described 
above, was through the public finances when government is unsuccessful in responding to the 
higher interest rates by restricting deficits. When this happened, the deficits were either 
monetized resulting in an inflationary surge, or refinanced at higher interest rates in an 
unsustainable manner that crowd out the private borrowers thereby suckling back onto 
economic growth and stability. 
 
The cross-section empirical studies on the interest elasticity of saving and investment reveal 
contradictory results. Greene and Villanueva (1991) by using 23 developing countries data for 
the period 1975-1987 find a significantly negative effect of real interest rates on investment. 
A weak but positive relationship between aggregate investment and real interest rates is found 
by Alan Gelb (1989). Demetriades and Devereux (1992) by using data of 63 developing 
countries for the 1961-1990 period find that the effect of higher interest rates on the cost of 
capital was stronger than the effect of greater supply of investible funds, so that a higher 
interest rate reduced investment.  By using a sample of 14 Asian developing countries, Fry 
(1995) finds that the gross national savings rate is positively affected by increases in real 
interest rates. However, this result is not robust with variations in the time period or region 
used by Fry (Giovannini, 1983, 1985).  It is also acknowledged by Fry (1995) that the effect is 
small which diminishes in more recent years, and is more widespread in Asia. Various studies 
also contend that in Japan and other East Asian countries, the high level of saving was not the 
result of high interest rates, but of banks’ expansion into rural areas and the accessibility to 
low-yielding yet safe deposit instruments. This evaluation along with the mixed quantitative 
results led to another group of studies to test the nonlinear effects of interest rates on savings. 
Reynoso (1989) finds evidence that saving increases quickly with real interest rates moving 
from sharply negative to just below zero, but this effect levels off at low positive real interest 
rates and becomes negative as real rates become highly positive. Williamson and Mehar 
                                                          
25
 The run up to the 1994 Mexican crisis provides a dramatic example in this regard 
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(1998) questions the positive but low real interest rates showing the great potential for 
increased saving as the result of FL.   
 
4.2 Privatization and New Entrants – Implications for Competition 
Admission of new domestic and foreign entrants in the financial services industry is regarded 
as a part of FL in industrial countries which started to be prevalent in the developing countries 
(Claessens and Jansen, 2000). These new entrants are often free from handicaps of existing 
banks e.g. burden of nonperforming debts, costly labor contracts etc. 
 
Greater competition can harvest direct efficiency gains and innovation in form of improved 
variety of financial services. These benefits are considerable and they also rise over time. But 
new liberties frequently led to a preliminary struggle to retain or gain market share, with 
banks looking for new business in unacquainted zones whose risks are usually underestimated 
(Honohan, 1999). The fear of new entrants could have eroded the prospects of inefficient 
incumbents which lead them into more risk taking. The resulting amplified macro-volatility 
accompanied with liberalization inferred new risks even for established forms of banking 
business like secured lending on property. 
 
The threat of new entry is also responded with efficiency initiatives and restructuring that 
makes the job of new entrants tougher than their anticipation. Even if old players hold most of 
the market share in the new equilibrium, it is a contestable and low-margin equilibrium, 
without rents generated by the directed credit. Thus, banks realized the potential dangers of 
excessive risk taking due to reduced franchise value which made them understand that now 
they had a little room for error.   
 
The increased competition also allowed financial intermediaries for new scopes and trends in 
their activities.  It includes universal banking not only by large commercial banks, but also by 
previously specialized intermediaries e.g. mortgage banks, saving banks etc. The new liberties 
came up with new profit prospects thereby contributing to the franchise value. However, the 
removal of barriers to competition between different institutions and overall liberalization of 
restrictions on activities of banking business also amplified the intensity of competition for 
current activities, often ensued by lower-then-anticipated margins (Sikorski, 1996). 
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It is often argued by the proponents of privatization that great improvements in performance 
would result from the transformation of enterprise ownership that redefines the enterprise’s 
objectives and managers’ incentives (Jackson and Price, 1990). Profits and returns on capital 
are the elements in order to judge the performance of privatized enterprises.  Contrary to this, 
it is argued by the opponents of privatization that change of ownership is insufficient, rather 
unnecessary to improve financial performance.  Instead, the increased competition and 
organizational reforms have been more significant than the change of ownership (Bishop and 
Kay, 1989). 
 
The mixed consequences of FL in emerging and developing economies, to be discussed in 
next chapter, are followed by a long and still never-ending critique which entails the ‘basics’ 
of market economies.  
 
Section 5. Intrinsic Evils of Financial Markets 
One way to criticize FL is to go through its foundations i.e. the assumptions on which the 
theories and models of FL are based, are non-existent in reality in their perfect form. As 
established till now, the aim of FL is to address the problem of ‘government’ failure in the 
‘market’ place. In this aim, it is generally presumed that the eradication of government failure 
will permit the market to efficiently allocate available resources.  In this intellectual setting, 
the ‘government’ and ‘market’ are viewed as two mutually exclusive phenomena. But the 
reason for government interventions in developing countries’ markets was based on the 
perception to resolve the market failures.  Thus, FL assumed the co-existence of market and 
government under financial repression and tried to find policy solutions on basis of this 
presumption. However, this view is based on faulty assessment of the full problem of 
developing countries while concentrating on only one part of the problem. There are certain 
in-built defects in the financial markets which put significant limitation on the functioning of 
markets and imply to limit the market freedom. But liberalization literature gives no space to 
intelligent government intervention to improve the market failures which can be regarded an 
important weakness of FL.  
 
This can be also be inferred that proponents of FL had an overly simple model of the 
economy in their minds, which supposed efficient and perfect markets. FL could enhance 
welfare if financial markets are perfect by allowing all parties to voluntarily engage in trade 
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along with complete insurance markets in order to lessen the costs of volatility associated 
with FL. But FL makes matters worse due to permanently imperfect financial markets.  
 
5.1 Sources of Market Imperfections 
A market imperfection occurs when a market outcome or a market force deviates from a 
standard used by economists to define the economically efficient quantity and allocation of 
goods and services (Sandler, 1992; Stiglitz, 2000). Economic efficiency infers the allocation 
of resources for a combination of production, consumption etc. in such a way where no 
individual can be better off through a reallocation of economic resources without making 
another individual worse off i.e. Pareto-efficient or Pareto-optimal. As per a basic hypothesis 
in welfare economics, the ‘invisible hand’ of market will result in economically efficient i.e. 
Pareto-efficient outcome under well-specified conditions regarding perfect competition and 
perfect information26 (Schinasi, 2006). 
 
In case of a market imperfection, the price of a good determined in the market would not 
equal its marginal social benefit and therefore not equal the marginal social cost of its 
production. Consequently, that good would be consumed and produced in economically 
inefficient quantities. This can occur even if market price equals the marginal private cost and 
marginal private benefit i.e. equilibrium price can also bring deviations from a socially 
optimal outcome. This is a situation in which a sustainable equilibrium is economically 
inefficient and socially suboptimal, thereby known as market failure (Schinasi, 2006). 
 
This section will cover three most important imperfections which are inherent in financial 
markets: externalities, incomplete markets, and incomplete information. These imperfections, 
in one way or the other, make the strong case against FL literature.    
 
5.1.1 Externalities 
Externality refers to a secondary or unintended consequence. When financial activity imparts 
benefits or costs on third parties or uninvolved markets, an externality is said to be occurred. 
In case of benefits, it is positive externality and in case of costs, it is negative externality 
                                                          
26
 Within this context, market imperfections occur because of the existence of five deviations from the definition 
of a perfectly competitive economy; externalities, public goods, incomplete information, incomplete markets, 
and a lack of competition (Schinasi, Chapter 3). 
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which is actually the problem. If a financial activity levies costs on a large number of parties 
or markets, it has potential to become systemic, thus posing systemic risk. In developing 
countries, there are no or very weak insurance markets for managing risk created by 
liberalizing markets which makes matters worse.  
 
Some features of finance are related with the probability for both the positive and negative 
externalities at the same time. Liquidity to potential borrowers along with superior 
opportunities for risk sharing is provided by banks funded with short-term deposits i.e. 
positive externalities.  But these banks can also be exposed to bank runs and panics due to 
imperfect and incomplete information i.e. negative externality, particularly in unregulated 
environment. Although various arrangements and mechanisms, such as deposit insurance, 
have been implemented to counter these negative externalities but they themselves are pricey 
to society, which imply private and public trade-offs. 
 
Externalities can take form of ‘price’ and ‘quantity’ externalities in capital markets. Price 
externalities can take place during capital inflows as well as capital outflows. In case of 
inflows, the exchange rate usually appreciates and harms exporters. In case of outflows, 
interest rates are raised by government to restrict the currency depreciation. Entities holding 
foreign-denominated debt perceive the value of these debts rise in terms of domestic currency. 
Thus, both the exchange rate depreciation and interest increases have potential to put firms 
into bankruptcy. Quantity externalities are particularly observed when capital outflows lead to 
credit rationing as banks are pressurized to limit the credit availability in case of capital 
outflow.  
 
Externalities in finance are also raised when many individual market participants are involved 
in independent actions beneficial to them ‘only if’ a small number is engaged in that activity 
simultaneously. The classic bank run during the global financial panics in 1931 when many 
banking systems remained shut down for some days. Depositors started to withdraw cash 
from some particular banks thinking by some others to have difficulties. Those banks soon ran 
out of cash and closed their doors which led to alarming condition for solvency. In such 
situation, it was rational for third parties, that are, depositors of other banks, to start showing 
their concerns due to which even good banks had to experience runs and solvency problems 
with their dwindling deposit base, a phenomenon known as ‘systemic risk’.  In this example, 
individually rational decisions to withdraw deposits collectively created the negative 
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externality crashing the banking system which imposed costs on everyone (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983).  
 
There are also certain network externalities in financial markets which can capture some 
benefits of scale. A network externality occurs when value of product to a user enhances the 
number of users in case of product growth. Besides deriving private benefits by using that 
product, each new user also bring external benefits i.e. network externalities for existing 
users. Network externalities can cause market failures when a network is failed to arrive at its 
optimal size because users don’t consider external benefits.  
 
Therefore, such discrepancies between the returns to individual market players and returns to 
collective society signify the case for government intervention. This is particularly convincing 
in developing countries with weak financial institutions, governments’ inability to regulate 
them, and fragile safety nets, along with limited ability of individuals and firms to get 
insurance against risk. In these economies, the volatility accompanying with FL have 
potential to impose large costs. It argues for some degree of government intervention which 
may not solve the problem completely, but can at least increase general well-being. For 
example, the economist’s natural ‘intervention of choice’ involves the imposition of a ‘tax’ to 
resolve the externality and reduce the discrepancy between social and private costs and 
benefits27.  
 
5.1.2 Incomplete Markets 
Markets are regarded as incomplete when markets forces are unable to produce a good with 
lesser private cost of production than what individuals are willing to pay. Economists have 
submitted many reasons for this kind of market imperfection, such as adverse selection; high 
transactions costs in operating in markets, in enforcing contracts, and in introducing new 
products; information asymmetries regarding financial risks; and enforcement costs on 
defaulted contracts. This implies that markets are usually incomplete as the result of the 
prevalence of other market imperfections, such as incomplete information or insufficient 
competition. 
 
                                                          
27
 In the mid-1990s, Chile and Colombia instituted taxes on capital inflows to moderate their volatility. These 
types of capital market restrictions reduce the level of activities that generate negative externalities. 
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This kind of market imperfection is widespread particularly in case of loans, insurance 
contracts and capital market instruments. For example, regarding capital markets, the US 
sustained capital account regulations in the 1960s for restricting capital outflows which 
caused attack on the dollar in 1971 thereby forcing to opt fixed exchange rate system. In the 
mid-1990s, the US was concerned about the drop of the dollar in comparison to the yen in 
spite of no apparent alterations in their real economic positions whereas in 2003-4, Europe 
was anxious about the rise of the euro in comparison to the dollar. These concerns emerged 
from the capital movements which were responsible for the fluctuations in exchange rate. 
Although all countries are concerned about capital market instability, however it has greater 
consequences for developing countries where it often results in excessive lending, overheating 
and high volatility along with potential for market manipulation. 
 
The currency mismatches between assets and liabilities in financial sector is another source of 
incomplete markets in developing countries. Most of the external debt in developing countries 
is issued in foreign exchange because international creditors are usually reluctant to take local 
market risks so they prefer to lend developing countries in hard currencies where risk is borne 
by domestic borrowers. The resultant currency mismatches in the balance sheets of domestic 
financial institutions can bring massive costs. 
 
Even the debt denominated in domestic currency is also lent in developing countries only for 
short term, and not long term. This results in maturity mismatches which have the risk that 
creditors may not rollover short term debt in problem times while generating liquidity crunch 
and making borrowers unable to repay. Even if short term liabilities are rolled over, the cost 
of interest rate fluctuations is borne by the domestic borrowers. Moreover, since financial 
institutions in developing countries are weak and unable to completely endure shocks, 
therefore, the volatilities from liberalization can simply lead to systemic difficulties in the 
financial sector.   
 
Insurance can reduce the distress associated with mismatches. But currency risk is difficult to 
insure in developing countries or else, the insurance terms are not reasonable, or the insurance 
provide only short term coverage. Resultantly, it is the developing country which has to bear 
the risk, whereas lenders in developed countries are better off to take currency risk as they can 
diversify their currency portfolios.  
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Perfect market models are mostly irrelevant for developing countries. Therefore, economic 
research since the 1990s has concentrated on recognizing the significant limitations of the 
perfect market models inducing FL.  
 
5.1.3 Incomplete Information 
There are large costs related with assessing firms, managers, and market conditions before 
making any investment decision. The collection and processing of information on investment 
opportunities is not possible for individual savers. Savers are reluctant to invest in projects on 
which they have little or no information therefore capital couldn’t go towards its highest value 
use.  The assumption of most models about the flow of capital toward most profitable project 
presupposes that investors have complete information which is apparently possible only in the 
efficient financial system (Levine and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008). So the job of gathering 
information on the risk and return of investment opportunities, and thus allocation of risk is 
done by financial institutions (Green, Kirkpatrick and Murinde, 2005). The development of 
Credit Registries and advancements in computer technology is playing important role in the 
collection, processing and use of all necessary information related to lending. However, in 
case of developing countries, the counterparts in financial transactions are not completely 
well-informed due to which free-market outcomes have tendency to allocate resources 
inefficiently.  
 
With incomplete information, the problems of adverse selection28 and moral hazard29 can lead 
to situations in which economically undesirable goods drive out the economically desirable 
goods from the market. Adverse selection and moral hazard are widespread in the financial 
markets with significant implications for the effects of FL. The adverse selection tends to lend 
the loans to bad credit risk due to which lender may choose not to make any loan at all even in 
the presence of good credit risks in the market. Whereas moral hazard tends to reduce the 
probability of repayment of loan due to which lender choose to make no loan at all (Mishkin, 
2007). The government regulation is argued to reduce the problems of adverse selection and 
                                                          
28
 A problem created by asymmetric information before the transaction occurs. Adverse selection in financial 
market occurs when two potential borrowers who are the most likely to produce an undesirable (adverse) 
outcome - bad credit risks - are the ones who most actively seek out a loan and are thus most likely to be 
selected. 
 
29
 A problem created by asymmetric information after the transaction occurs. It’s a risk (hazard) that borrower 
might engage in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view, because they make it less likely 
that the loan will be paid back. 
109 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
moral hazard in financial markets thereby enhancing their efficiency by increasing the amount 
of information available to investors. Particularly the developing countries need regulatory 
supervision because they suffer from inherent hindrances in developing the efficient financial 
regulations along with the lack of economies of scale in the banking sector (Murshed and 
Subagjo, 2002).  
 
The effects of imperfect information on investor behavior are crucial for understanding 
arguments against FL. Since the late 1990s, economists have highlighted two main reasons for 
boom and bust periods in capital flows. One is the ‘irrational exuberance’, i.e. heightened 
state of speculative fervor. Shiller (2005) argued that this speculative fervor is not grounded in 
sensible economic fundamentals. Instead, he highlighted various structural, cultural and 
psychological factors which are mainly responsible for such irrational exuberance. Second 
reason, a psychological one, behind boom and bust periods is ‘herd behavior’, i.e. lack of 
individual decision-making which leads everyone doing what everyone else seems to be 
doing. These types of irrational market behaviors may not have tendency to prevail with 
perfect information.  
 
In this regard, herd behavior seems to be more consistent with rational expectations when 
information is imperfect (Stiglitz et al., 2006). Being unaware of the future events, investors 
make decisions on basis of expectations which are founded on information about current 
conditions and this information is inherently incomplete and pricey to process due to the 
extensive data required. As some market players are at a better position for accessing and 
processing information, it is rational for someone to gather information about the desirability 
of a certain project from others’ actions and opinions i.e. herd behavior. Since the major 
market players use the similar sources of information, therefore, they have tendency to 
reinforce each other’s analyses of information. However, this contagion of opinions may lead 
to panics or euphoria and result in boom and bust cycles. In such case, there is a risk of 
‘correlated mistake’ which happens when some unexpected news disputing the general 
opinion is reported, while making all market players ‘simultaneously’ realize about their 
mistake and they take their funds out of the market.  
 
New theoretical developments, such as the implementation of the theories of ‘asymmetric 
information’ and ‘incomplete contracts’ to financial markets, suggests that financial markets 
are different from other markets like commodity markets, and market failures are more 
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persistent in financial markets. A large theoretical literature indicates that financial markets, 
by default, are structurally more imperfect than the other markets. As information has 
characteristics of a strong public good, it naturally leads to inadequate acquisition of 
information even in competitive markets. In financial markets this implies that the managers 
of investments are inadequately monitored, which inspires inappropriate risk taking or fraud 
thereby resulting in insolvency.  
 
Although the imperfections in financial markets have long been argued, the relatively recent 
theory of asymmetric information has put these debates on firm footing. It describes credit 
rationing, and thus explain firm’s acting in risk-averse manner, importance of banks in 
determining the creditworthiness, monitoring and enforcing contracts as well as the 
significance of balance sheet variables, cash flow, and the availability of credit. Policymakers 
often discuss the availability of credit with standard competitive model in mind in which 
credit is always available and the only concern is the price to be set where demand equals 
supply. In such circumstances, the theory of asymmetric information makes sense of 
observations and distinctions that played vital role in policy discussions.  
 
For instance, there exists a distinction between insolvent firms and liquidity constrained firms. 
With perfect information, complete contracts, well-functioning judicial system, and effective 
enforcement, there would be no distinction between these two firms because any firm with a 
positive net worth is able to acquire funds at a price according to its corresponding risk. With 
asymmetric information and other problems in contract enforcement, the lenders would view 
firm to have potential for insolvency with no positive prospects, thus become unwilling to 
lend. The reason behind the illiquidity of firms is the belief of major market players that the 
firm is insolvent (Stiglitz, 1975).     
 
5.2 Stiglitz and Weiss Model of Imperfect Information 
A theoretical framework established by proponents of FL in order to describe the weaknesses 
of FL is embedded in the information theories of financial intermediation linked with Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981). The Stiglitz and Weiss model presents the graphic account of the 
significance of interaction between borrowers and bankers in influencing the monetary policy 
mechanisms thereby transmitting effects to the real economy, that is, economic growth and 
development. The importance of such interactions is amplified in case of developing 
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economies with imperfect and shallow financial markets signified by severe informational 
inefficiencies.  
 
The significance of the Stiglitz and Weiss theory lies in its demonstration of an equilibrium 
market rate being indicated by credit rationing. It has the theoretical logic that interest rate 
charged by the bank has a tendency to categorize potential borrowers i.e. adverse selection, 
along with affecting their actions i.e. moral hazard. Adverse selection and moral hazard are 
the consequences of severe asymmetric informational problems which lead to inability of 
banks to correctly and sufficiently describe the risk related qualities of their borrowers. Being 
unable to classify borrowers on the basis of real risk, the banks raise the lending rate in order 
to compensate which result in unexpected deterioration of borrowers’ creditworthiness 
(Sikorski, 1996). There are two reasons of it. First of all, the borrowers are discouraged from 
borrowing due to high cost of capital may be the actual borrowers to be preferred by banks to 
lend as they are safe borrowers. It is natural to think that borrowers taking loan at interest rate 
well above the critical value are those ones who are least willing to pay back the high charges, 
i.e. adverse selection. But market selects bad borrowers and rejects the good ones due to, as 
noted above, its inability to evaluate risk profile of potential borrower. Secondly, if choice is 
given to borrowers, they will incline to prefer projects with high default probability in case of 
higher interest rates, i.e. moral hazard (Cho, 1986). It is natural to think that riskier project has 
a high return rate in good outcomes, and low return in poor ones.  
 
In order to maximize expected profits, both of these effects will prompt the bank to willingly 
limit the interest rate charged from any one class of borrowers. This may result, in 
equilibrium, in arbitrary credit rationing with unsatisfied potential borrowers who are 
apparently equivalent to borrowers actually getting loan. In their model, Stiglitz and Weiss 
assumed bank to behave in a risk-neutral manner in order to reach at rationing equilibrium. 
The banks in Stiglitz-Weiss model would voluntarily limit the interest rate for credit 
rationing, even in the absence of any outside regulations, in order to avoid undue adverse 
selection and decline in expected net profits (McKinnon, 1993).  
 
But this might not hold true, generally in all developing and developed economies, but 
predominantly in case of developing countries which are characterized by unpredictable and 
unstable fiscal environment. Particularly the large fiscal imbalances are regarded as 
troublesome in counteracting the influence of the adverse inflation emerging from large scale 
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deficits (Dooley and Mathieson 1987; Snowden 1987). In the situation of large fiscal deficit, 
the inflationary environment is inevitable as it provides option to the government to raise 
revenue through the inflation tax. The high and inconsistent inflation rates are problematic for 
FL as they need larger and variable increases in nominal interest rates in order to meet 
objectives of liberalization reforms. These larger and variable increases in interest rates 
further aggravate the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard problems that are 
regarded as principal reasons for failure in developing countries’ financial markets.  
 
In addition to this, the variation in prices of goods and production factors result in 
increasingly high variance in project returns in the periods of macroeconomic instability. 
Suffering from increasingly variable returns, these projects are then adversely affected by the 
uncertainty induced by poor macroeconomic performance. Due to higher variance in project 
returns, the optimal lending rate has to be further decreased which resultantly increase the 
credit rationing. The huge real increase in interest rates followed by liberalization exacerbates 
the moral hazard along with amplifying the deterioration of the borrowing pool (Villanueva 
and Mirakhor, 1990). Therefore, with binding asymmetric informational problems, 
liberalization may actually deteriorate the banks’ portfolios thereby making the financial 
system more vulnerable to economy-wide adverse shocks. This worsening of banks’ 
portfolios in situation of macroeconomic instability is also regarded as convincing theoretical 
cause for the incidence of financial crisis in post-FL scenario, an area to be explored in next 
chapter.  
 
However, the problem with the Stiglitz-Weiss model is that it doesn’t presents the worsening 
of banks’ portfolio as ‘immediate’ in the period of financial distress ensuing FL, because 
considerable time is needed by higher interest rates to nourish through adverse selection and 
thus to deteriorate banks’ portfolio. It implies that for this worsening and corrupt effect, banks 
are required to expose themselves in excessively high interest rates environment for a 
prolonged time period. But this is not the case with banks in developing countries having 
infected portfolios even before liberalization. In post-FL era, the problem firms are those 
which received credit at repressed interest rates in pre-FL era, thus making Stiglitz-Weiss 
model as ‘not clearly applicable’. Yet, it emphasizes the problems related with prolonged 
periods of liberalization and difficulties associated with liberalizing in the environment of 
macroeconomic instability. As stressed by McKinnon (1989, P. 49), ‘full liberalization of 
banks during a high and variable inflation is not warranted … these problems with prudential 
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control over bank loans portfolios become magnified in stressful periods when central bank is 
trying to impose tight monetary control in order to disinflate successfully’. 
 
Section 6. Response of Proponents of FL in Wake of its Discontent  
During 1980s, the FL brought various financial crashes and related chaos (Cho and Khatkhate 
1989; Corbo, de Melo and Tybout 1986; Diaz-Alejandro 1985). The consequential discontent 
with FL was rapid which gave rise to an area of response highlighted by the proponents of FL 
themselves in pursuit of explanations behind failure of FL reforms. While examining the 
implementation of FL reforms, two major areas with regard to pre-conditions and sequencing 
thus emerged to make FL successful.  
 
6.1 Pre-Conditions 
There are certain ‘pre-conditions’ which have to be met before implementing FL reforms. 
One of these most important pre-conditions is macroeconomic stability. Macroeconomic 
instability, signified by severe inflation, turned the domestic financial system too weak and 
vulnerable to breakdown as result of any reform measures at large scale (McKinnon 1989). 
This pre-condition exhibits a dilemma as FL itself was regarded as key element of 
stabilization. Thus, the need to have macroeconomic stability as a precondition to FL actually 
diminished policy choices. Therefore, most of the stabilization process is borne in fiscal 
policy area i.e. true austerity. The capability of government to restrict fiscal deficit before 
liberalization would let it omit the usage of inflation tax and hence not weaken the foundation 
of reforms with rapid inflation. Health and education are normally those fields on which these 
spending cuts are focused, as they cannot mobilize any considerable political opposition. The 
consequential unemployment in the absence of any social security arrangements is tended to 
drop the demand and wages thereby dragging down the inflation. It infers that welfare cost of 
stabilization is tolerated by those who are most dependent on this spending, making 
stabilization very costly as international institutions then had to develop programs to save the 
suffered ones from starvation.   
 
Another angle to view the macroeconomic stability, particularly price stability as an essential 
pre-condition for the implementation of FL reforms is that a stable macroeconomic 
atmosphere would decrease the ensuing increase in interest rates, thus limiting the 
consequential problems of adverse selection and moral hazard for banks’ portfolios. The risk-
sharing bond between bank and borrower is also positively affected with macroeconomic 
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stability because banks require high degree of certainty about future opportunity cost of funds 
in order to maintain risk-sharing relationship with borrowers. The uncertainty in the future 
cost of funds is brought by macroeconomic instability and weakens the willingness of banks 
to involve in risk-sharing contracts for long term (Villanueva and Mirakhor, 1990). The 
crucial for such stability is the fiscal responsibility, which indicates an extensive reduction in 
government spending.  Hence, the reason behind the failure of FL is that the other 
macroeconomic policies are inconsistent with objectives of FL reforms.  
 
Proper regulation and supervision was also regarded as another important pre-condition by the 
proponents of FL as the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard tended to become 
more troublesome when they are interacted with inadequate and inefficient regulatory and 
supervisory framework thereby aggravating the difficulties related with implementation of 
FL. Weak supervision implies insufficient provisioning for delinquent loans and absence of 
deposit insurance which, in liberalizing environment, encourage banks to involve in moral 
hazard. Banks get profit from unfamiliar bet against government by charging high interest rate 
and by providing high risk loans. Due to the government as lender of last resort, banks earn 
high profits by taking undue risks in goods times without paying its full costs in bad times. In 
such risk-taking environment, moral hazard is additionally worsened in case of relationship 
between borrowing firm and bank through a large holding company. The involvement in such 
moral hazard exacerbates the risk characteristics of the financial systems’ assets, due to which 
its stability could easily be threatened when exposed to adverse shocks. 
 
The occurrence of asymmetric information also justified the public sector role in regulation 
and supervision. Maintaining updated information about bank’s solvency is unimaginatively 
high for the depositors who bear most of the cost of bank failure in the absence of deposit 
insurance as banks are highly leveraged with very modest equity base making it very likely 
for depositors to go for run on bank the moment they suspect. Implicit or explicit deposit 
insurance by government is a natural outcome in order to prevent such runs. However, it is 
implied in such insurance plans that once bank’s equity is washed away, the future losses 
would be socialized, while the future profits would be retained by the bank. Facing failure 
risk, the bank gets incentive from such setup in order to “gamble on resurrection” through 
granting highly risky loans (Williamson and Mehar, 1998). But such incentives can be 
deterred by prudential regulation and supervision which try to pressurize banks to maintain an 
adequately high level of capital, sufficient reserves against loan losses, and the appropriate 
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pricing of deposit insurance etc. Proper regulation and supervision also tend to provide 
adequate information for allowing the outsiders to evaluate the financial health of a bank. 
Unlike the absence of bank autonomy, the presence of bank supervision is aimed to confirm 
compliance with principally abstract rules and regulation, rather than making inherently 
discretionary decisions for banks. 
 
Dooley and Mathieson (1987) give caution against the dangers of presupposing the already 
existent supervisory framework, or to develop it very rapidly while implementing FL reforms. 
Actually, such frameworks are evolved with the financial system with at least some extent of 
terrible experiences. Due to the absence of a supervisory framework in the situation where 
non-bank enterprises can be potentially insolvent under market-oriented regime, specific 
subsidies or purchases of shares by the government in such firms may be indispensable 
(Collier and Mayer, 1989). However, the issue of insufficient supervision has deep-rooted 
implications because inadequate regulatory provisions are certainly a fraction of failures for 
which repressed monetary systems were guilty. So even before implementing FL, financial 
systems tend to suffer from the concentrated risks, the risks that are the results of incomplete 
regulations.  Thus, instead of poor supervision, it is insufficient regulations which make FL 
unwarranted. 
 
6.2 Sequencing 
The simultaneous undertaking of internal and external financial liberalization along with trade 
liberalization was considered flawed by proponents of FL. The changes in real exchange rate 
generated by an opening of the capital account make the integration of domestic and foreign 
goods markets much more difficult (Dooley and Mathieson, 1987). The main issue is that the 
trade liberalization encourages the reallocation of production factors from the non-trade and 
import substitution sectors towards the export industries. Consequentially, the imports and 
exports would increase with initially temporary trade deficit as result of production delays due 
to the transfer of resources among different sectors. With the absence of capital flows, this 
will result in currency depreciation which is considered appropriate due to its positive effects 
on export and import of competing commodities. The adjustment process is smoother if trade 
liberalization can precede FL (de Grauwe, 1987). Unfolding lessons taken from liberalization 
process in Korea, Anne O. Krueger (1991) observed that ‘trade liberalization could not 
succeed if authorities don’t simultaneously ensure the continuing maintenance of a realistic 
exchange rate… Financial liberalization may not be as necessary initially if a government 
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starts in a situation where many markets are regulated’ (Krueger, 1991, p. 56). But if both 
financial and trade liberalization are undertaken at the same time, capital inflow in response to 
FL will appreciate the exchange rate that will obstruct the competitiveness of import and 
export sectors, thereby discouraging the liberalization process and aggravating the adjustment 
costs for the economy. If liberalization of domestic financial markets doesn’t precede the 
liberalization of capital market, the large internal or external capital flows, based on real 
interest rate movements, would make the markets destabilize thereby depressing the reform 
process. Improper sequencing would thus have pernicious effects on the economy and lead to 
policy failure and policy reversal (Dooley and Mathieson, 1987). 
 
Blejer and Sagari (1988) argued for some other reasons for sequencing the liberalization of 
capital controls and interest rates. If capital controls are liberalized first or at least at the same 
time, very few borrowers will access international borrowing due to informational problems 
thus excluding most of the potential borrowers. As result of very few banks in competition, 
pricing by one bank will tend to considerably affect the financial flows to the other banks. 
Those having international access can get monopolistic rent seeking, particularly in case of 
large spreads between domestic and foreign interest rates, which lead to excessive 
concentration and monopolistic behavior in the financial markets. This increased 
concentration is more crucial if foreign banks are mainly benefiting from liberalization at the 
cost of the domestic intermediaries. Besides, the monopolistic banking structure has to be 
deteriorated by the internal FL before considering to go for external liberalization. Moreover, 
allowing the domestic interest rates to be determined freely by the market forces is regarded 
as appropriate method for reducing the monopolistic structure of financial markets (Blejer and 
Sagari, 1988), but no identification of exact mechanism is made by which this would work.  
 
Thus the general assumption emerged in liberalization literature that trade and financial 
liberalization is best conducted in autarky, while leaving the opening up of the economy to 
financial flows till last.   
 
6.3 Optimum Sequencing of Liberalization 
The liberalization of financial and credit markets is accompanied by an overall liberalization 
of domestic economy and its opening up to the outside world, which result in various 
dilemmas for policymakers.  There are certain parameters for the comparative speeds of 
liberalization in commodity and capital markets and also for the speed at which controls and 
117 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
interventionist policies can be withdrawn in domestic and foreign trade (Edwards, 1984). It is 
critically important to understand the sequencing of monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange 
policies in relation to the financial polies. It is not possible and rational to undertake all 
liberalizing reforms at the same time. Rather, there is an “optimal” order of economic 
liberalization, a part of which is FL, which may vary for different liberalizing economies 
depending on their initial conditions (McKinnon, 1993). It implies the optimum sequencing to 
move from controlled and repressed economy to a liberalized and market-based economy, that 
is, the ‘ideal’ way to undertake liberalization.  
 
6.3.1 Domestic Liberalization – Fiscal Sector 
Before any liberalizing measure, the first and foremost thing required is to balance the 
government’s finances, which justifies the fiscal controls to precede FL. In this aim, direct 
government spending must be restricted to a small fraction of GNP which could rise only 
modestly with the rise of per capita income. Equally significant is the imposition of broad-
based taxes at low rate on firms and households. It is also indispensable for liberalizing 
government to have an internal revenue service which is enables to collect taxes in a 
decentralized market setting (McKinnon, 1973). After abolishing direct control or ownership 
of business activities, the liberalizing government must rapidly develop a regularized tax 
system in order to regain the revenues lost from surrendering ownership of the resources, a 
vital step that government usually forgot. The broad tax base will provide government the 
sufficient revenues to avoid inflation without resorting to arbitrary confiscations of enterprise 
profits or personal property, which lead to the adverse incentive effects that bedeviled the 
repressed economies (Litwack, 1991; McKinnon, 1990).  
 
Indirect i.e. off-budget government spending is widespread in developing countries. For 
protecting the central bank from forced issue of excessive base money, such off-budget 
subsidies have to be gathered with regular budget or be phased out. Central bank frequently 
suffer from large net losses in supplying foreign exchange, domestic credit, or deposit 
insurance very inexpensively to domestic farms, households, urban enterprises, or commercial 
banks (Blejer and Chu, 1988). In the 1990s, strict budget balance has become more needed 
than it was in the 1960s, when the Keynesian proposition of moderate deficit financing by the 
governments was widespread. The need for tighter fiscal discipline during 1990s was based 
on less favorable expectations from potential domestic and foreign creditors of the 
government.  
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6.3.2 Domestic Liberalization – Domestic Capital Market 
Second in the optimum order of liberalization is the opening of the domestic capital market 
for allowing depositors to receive and borrowers to pay considerable real interest rates. Only 
when the price level is stable and fiscal deficits are removed, free borrowing and lending 
among firms and households can progress reasonably. It implies the freeing of banking 
system from heavy reserve requirements and official directives to set standard interest rates on 
loans and deposits only after placing tight fiscal controls, thereby making it impossible for 
government to rely on the inflation and reserve taxes to generate revenue. 
 
The pace of deregulating banks and other financial institutions must be cautiously geared to 
government’s accomplishment towards macroeconomic stability, in order to minimize the 
likelihood of bank panics and financial collapses in the scenario of exorbitantly high risk 
premiums in real interest rates tending to damage borrowers’ creditworthiness. In the absence 
of price stability, unexpected volatility in real interest rates makes unrestricted domestic 
borrowing and lending very risky. Due to the moral hazard related with private monetary 
intermediaries having insured deposit base, the decentralization of the banking system might 
come near the end of the domestic liberalization process. 
 
Liberalization of the banking sector is incomplete and unfruitful in the presence of large state-
owned enterprise, particularly where banks are still under government moral suasion in their 
lending decisions. The need to develop a deep financial system before introducing reforms in 
state-enterprises is regarded as a condition in order to encourage the success of the latter 
(World Bank, 1995).  It is argued that since state banks are normally less effective than 
private financial intermediaries in providing financial services, therefore, the deregulation and 
privatization of state enterprises can proceed more easily with well-developed private 
financial sector that can meet the requirements of the newly privatized enterprises.  
 
The authorities should proceed carefully perhaps wait for some years, before establishing 
independent banks that are only indirectly regulated by the central bank. The bad loans of the 
existing state-owned banks certainly require a major recapitalization of both banks and 
enterprises before safe undertaking of privatization or decentralization30.  
                                                          
30
 In the 1980s, China, Hungary, the FSU, and Poland undertook premature decentralization of their banking 
systems; the consequent loss of control over the flow of credit contributed to upsurges in inflationary pressure 
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At the outset of liberalization, private capital markets need to operate freely for which 
government should rapidly develop a framework of commercial law that can adjust and 
enforce all private debt contracts. So even before attaining monetary stability, various forms 
of short term money lending (e.g. ordinary commercial credits, urban markets’ commercial 
bills, rural credit cooperatives etc.) are achieved. However, due to uncertain price level which 
makes economy unable to set any standard of deferred payment, the unsubsidized i.e. natural 
development of bond and equities market is almost impossible, albeit the presence of 
contractual enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Therefore the appropriate policy in domestic capital markets is the key to general 
liberalization, and especially to the withdrawal of unwise public intervention from these 
markets. 
 
6.3.3 International Liberalization – Foreign Exchange 
Only after liberalization at domestic front, there comes the turn of international liberalization 
for the foreign exchange. In the international balance of payment, the current account is 
liberalized much faster than capital account.  
 
The liberalization of foreign trade of goods and services should proceed along with the 
decontrol of prices in the domestic trade of goods and services. However, the unification of 
the exchange rate for all current account transactions for allowing importers and exporters to 
have same effective price of foreign exchange should precede the removal of controls over 
‘who’ can import or export. But in a confused regime with hundreds of different exchange 
rates for different goods and services, such decentralized and decontrolled foreign trade 
cannot be efficient in any market mechanism.  It is evidently tough for authorities to get right 
order of liberalization in deregulating the buying and selling of foreign exchange.  
 
In the course of trade liberalization, the commercial policy should be appropriately specified. 
While moving to free conversion on current account i.e. unified exchange rate, the initial 
limits on trade are greatly dependent on the already prevailing protection system. Before 
liberalization, most developing countries have both tariff and quota restrictions with quota 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that seriously undermines their efforts to decontrol prices and liberalize quantitative restrictions in commodity 
markets. 
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restriction being more important. Compared to the tariffs, the quotas along with other direct 
controls on imports and exports usually distort the economy much more. Besides raising 
revenue, tariffs also don’t discriminate among different categories of potential importers and 
exporters. While studying the protectionism in developing countries, Anne Krueger (1978) 
and Jagdish Bhagwati (1978) describe trade liberalization as the replacement of quantitative 
restrictions with reasonable import tariffs or export subsidies. If variance in the unified real 
exchange rate is limited, this tarification of quantitative restrictions could be the optimal first 
step in an ultimate phase to free trade.  It implies conversion of implicit quota restrictions into 
explicit tariffs in the way to optimum order of liberalizing foreign trade. After formally 
codifying, the highest tariffs can then be decreased to zero or near zero during some stipulated 
time period. The free currency convertibility for export and import on current account can be 
maintained only after placing such defined commercial policy.  
 
Such realizations however don’t warrant full foreign exchange convertibility to capital 
account transactions in developing countries. Before authorizing firms and households to 
freely deposit in and borrow from international financial markets, the domestic financial 
markets should be fully liberalized, as mentioned earlier. Otherwise, it would be destructive to 
allow foreign banks or other foreign financial institutions to operate liberally in domestic 
financial markets. Even more stabilizing is to allow “hard” foreign currencies to circulate 
simultaneously with the soft domestic currency. The free undertaking of borrowing and 
lending at equilibrium rates of interest and the restriction of domestic rate of inflation are the 
arbitrage conditions to allow free mobility of capital at international level. Else, the premature 
removal of exchange controls on foreign capital flows could result in unwarranted capital 
flight and accumulation of foreign indebtedness.  
 
6.3.4 International Liberalization - Capital Account 
It is the only dimension in which most of previously financially repressed countries followed 
conventional wisdom on the sequencing of liberalization. Bernhard Fischer and Helmut 
Reisen (1992) categorized capital flows into inward and outward flows, long-term and short 
term flows, and bank and nonbank flows. They argued for the immediate liberalization of 
capital controls on long term trade related inflows as their liberalization can be beneficial 
even in the primary phases of development. They recommend the elimination of controls on 
short and long term outflows only after establishing government finances, resolving bad loan 
problems, and removal of controls on domestic interest rates in order to bring down the 
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differential between domestic and foreign interest rates. After liberalizing domestic financial 
system and the resolution of weaknesses in domestic bank, the removal of barriers to foreign 
banks is recommended. Whereas short term capital inflows should not be liberalized until an 
adequate competition is present in the banking sector along with a sound system of regulation 
and supervision.  
 
Williamson (1993) defines the preconditions for prudent liberalization of capital inflows and 
outflows. The development of nontraditional export industries, fiscal discipline, liberalized 
import regime, and liberalized domestic financial system are key preconditions for the 
elimination of controls on capital inflows. The retention of some controls in short term capital 
flows, such as variable reserve requirements on foreign borrowing, is also suggested for 
protecting against periods of undue capital inflows. On the other hand, the preconditions to 
eliminate the controls on capital outflows are more challenging. They include a permanent 
policy regime, ability to manage demand through fiscal flexibility, and measures to limit 
erosion of the tax base.  
 
So basically, proponents of FL tried to emphasize that carefully sequenced and implemented 
liberalization in all sectors can move forward, not just as a reaction to obvious mistakes of the 
past, rather in ways that alleviate legitimate fears of pure laissez-faire. 
 
6.4 Incompleteness of Response – Ignoring ‘Logic’ of Liberalization 
The response by proponents of FL was stressed on the presence of adverse factors interrupted 
in liberalization process and suggested the preconditions and sequencing, the consideration of 
which might make FL successful. However, their response failed to fundamentally question 
the ‘logic’ of liberalizing reforms. This point of view is briefly illustrated by McKinnon 
(1989) by restating FL paradigm as ‘finance and trade liberalization with borrowing and 
lending at substantial rates of interest made possible by a stable price level, is not easy and is 
full of potential pitfalls. Nevertheless, it remains the only game in town as far as successful 
development is concerned’…. However he emphasized that he is now ‘more inclined to 
emphasize the pitfalls’ (McKinnon, 1989, p. 53). Enthusiasm to go for ‘big bang’ of 
liberalization also started to fade, with some earlier proponents suggesting that financial 
reforms should be phased in gradually to protect the domestic financial system during 
transition (Dooley and Mathieson, 1987). A gradual change process is typically supported by 
a combination of arguments (Greenaway and Morrissey, 1992).  
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One justification for gradualism lies in the ability of gradual change to alleviate the 
adjustment costs tolerated through the growing unemployment of capital and labour as the 
factor specificity of capital and labour would let the gradual reform in attaining socially 
optimal write-off and restraining rates. Another argument in favor of gradualism is based on 
income redistribution which is favoured as gradual changes slows down the rate at which 
rents to factors are decreased, thereby providing a lengthier adjustment time to previously 
favoured sectors to let them diversify their income sources and lessens their dependence on 
rents. The credibility issue is the final argument in favor of gradual approach as the 
government presents various gradual reforms on which it can establish its commitment 
thereby building a reformist status. As per these arguments, the ideal way is an economic 
pragmatic approach which favours small incremental changes whereas the big-bang 
liberalization is viewed with skepticism. However, some neo-classical economists like Leite 
and Sundararajan (1990) argue that a gradual approach to liberalization bring distortions of its 
own and raise the issue of political sustainability of the process.  
 
Despite of proponents’ justifications on viability of FL with pre-conditions and sequencing as 
described above, the opponents of FL remained skeptical. This skepticism can be analyzed 
with two distinct but related set of critiques, based on the structural and institutional settings 
of developing and emerging countries.  
 
Section 7. New-Structuralist and Institutionalist Critique  
The efforts of proponents of FL to respond its opposition shed some light on the problems of 
implementing reforms. However, the question arises is that will FL be successful if it fulfills 
its ‘criteria’ i.e. undertaken by a credible government, in relative autarky following advised 
sequence and pre-conditions, in an atmosphere of macroeconomic stability? In fact, the 
significance of such theory is doubtful to be transformed in a policy prescription.  
 
The indication of preconditions and sequencing is not certainly wrong, but they cannot 
convince the occurrence of financial crisis following from liberalization – an issue to be 
covered in detail in next chapter. The basic failings of FL are not covered in response of its 
proponents because the severity of these failings tends to infer that it is not just the 
sequencing or pre-conditions. Rather FL is basically inappropriate for emerging and 
developing countries due to their current structural and institutional realities and settings, 
developed as result of prolonged periods of financial repression.   
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7.1 New Structuralist School 
The period of rapid FL during 1980s brought a deep cynicism leading to theoretical and 
practical reasons against this orthodoxy. The question of ‘logic of liberalization’ is emerged 
largely enshrined in New Structuralist school. The critique by the new structuralists classified 
the negative effects of liberalization which highlighted the working capital cost-push nexus 
(Buffie, 1984). This component of liberalization along with its effect on the productive sector 
is the most important feature of the critique. However, the formal theoretical critique ignored 
cost-push effects and focused more on informal or unofficial financial markets (Van 
Wijnbergen, 1982). According to this side, the failure of FL liberalization stems from the fact 
that the resulting increase in interest rates in the official market reduces the quantity of 
finance at firms’ disposal as it draws resources out from the unofficial market. The receiver of 
these funds, through household asset substitution, is the formal market that is less efficient in 
intermediation than the curb market due to the existence of high reserve requirements. 
Therefore, New Structuralists (Taylor, 1983; Van Wijnbergen, 1983) suggest that the higher 
interest rates, which come as result of financial liberalization, might leave unchanged or, 
certainly, reduce the total supply of productive investment funds. 
 
The group of New Structuralists like Van Wijnbergen, Taylor and Buffie analyzed the 
particular structures of financial markets and its players in the developing economies which 
resulted in a critique which highlighted two distinct features of these financial systems, as 
described below. 
 
7.1.1 Unofficial Money Market Effect (Principal idea: The curb or unofficial market is 
more efficient than the official market. FL expands the size of official sector at the cost of 
unofficial market shrinking the real quantity of credit which is unfavorable for growth) 
 
 This first feature of the new-structuralist critique highlights the significant role of curb or 
unofficial money market (UMM) co-existent with official market in financially repressed 
economies. Unlike McKinnon and Shaw, the new-structuralists tried to describe this 
characteristic of developing countries’ markets by clearly recognizing the very presence of 
UMM. Basically, the UMM is the informal market where credit demanders and credit 
receivers are involved in free transactions at interest rate not controlled or determined by any 
authority. A framework of credit multiplier is engaged by new-structuralists to explain the 
significance of the UMM in transmission mechanism. The main cognition behind this critique 
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is that the reserve requirements in official markets represent a leakage from the process of 
financial intermediation. Whereas UMM operates without any reserve requirements so all the 
savings allocated to UMM are most efficiently intermediated in investment. This implies the 
UMM having a larger credit multiplier due to its ‘one-to-one’ intermediation as compare to 
official market where intermediation is constrained due to having ‘one-to-(1-k)’ 
intermediation, where k is the required reserve ratio. By withdrawing funds from efficient 
UMM to the constrained official market through FL would reduce the supply of real credit 
due to causing a reducing in the effective credit multiplier of the economy. The decline in net 
financing results a fall in aggregate supply, hence is consistent with a growth-reducing 
adjustment period (Taylor, 1983). 
 
7.1.2 Working Capital Cost-Push Effect (Principal idea: A change in real interest rates 
brought a working-capital cost-push effect which would impose a contractionary adjustment 
period in FL)  
 
The second feature of the new-structuralist critique signifies the working- capital cost-push 
effects in linking the financial and real sectors of the economy. The resort to banks and UMM 
is crucial in developing countries to finance the working capital which is required to make 
input payments before receiving the sales revenues. The permanent need for working capital 
means that the cost of credit i.e. real interest rate is an important part of input cost. The instant 
cost-push effect on prices due to any rise in the interest rate is assumed by ‘Kaleckian mark-
up pricing rule’ (Van Wijnbergen 1982; Lim 1987). In this respect, the new-structuralists 
maintained their emphasis on UMM as the main supplier of funds for working capital. An 
explanation in this regard is that tight monetary policies make credit very expensive, due to 
which the firms are pushed towards UMM that force UMM interest rates to move upward 
thereby leading to rise in input costs. The mark-up pricing effect encourages inflation along 
with decreasing output below the level obtained from the demand-reducing effects of 
restraint. Therefore, monetary restraint or unexpected sudden rise in the interest rate 
originates an additional supply-side shock tending to turn such policies stagflationary in the 
context of developing countries. The working-capital cost-push effect is present during the 
adjustment period but this period is assumed to be pretty short due to short term maturity of 
most of the loans in developing countries. So, the supply shock is normally transitory and 
quickly drawn out of the system. Whereas the demand-restraining effect is regarded as more 
persistent which, in start, reduces the aggregate demand i.e. investment thereby leading to 
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increased unemployment and then progressively eases out real wage pressure and inflation. A 
usual reaction to tight monetary policy would be an inverted U-shaped pattern of inflation 
rate, which accelerates in the start and then gradually narrows down when the aggregate 
demand effect begin to govern (Van Wijnbergen, 1982).  
 
Taylor (1983) introduced the feature of cumulative causality in order to expand the above 
described explanation. Taylor’s approach let the positive saving response to the rise of real 
interest rates via real wealth effect, irrespective of whether the interportfolio substitution 
happens at the cost of UMM loans. But the inflation will upsurge if the initial effect reduces 
the total supply of funds because aggregate supply will fall more than the aggregate demand. 
International competitiveness will be declined due to high inflation which further reduce 
profits and investment and result in deterioration of economic growth rate due to which 
smaller quantity of wealth is produced. The fall in net wealth would decrease the aggregate 
demand in the medium term, which will lessen the inflation and cause real wages to upsurge, 
assuming a lagged wage response. The growth of real wages will lead to reduced 
unemployment, hence dropping economic growth as entrepreneurs hurt from the squeezed 
revenues. 
 
7.1.3 Weaknesses in the New-Structuralist Critique  
The criticism by new-structuralist school reveals certain flaws in its theoretical basis. The 
depiction of UMM as perfectly efficient market to achieve complete intermediation of high-
powered money is criticized by Owen and Solis-Fallas (1989). The assumption that this 
efficiency deteriorates the quantity of credit in reaction of portfolio movements at the cost of 
UMM loans rather than other unproductive assets, is put to doubt by these critics drawing 
mainly from descriptive literature on the UMM. This gives rise to such picture of UMM 
which illustrate it as highly segmented and localized market able to provide only short-term 
credit while suffering from intermediation inefficiencies. The lenders in the UMM are also 
quasi-monopolistic with only small-scale markets which restrict extensive opportunities for 
providing maturity transformation of funds or attaining economies of scale in risk-sharing and 
administrative activities. However, UMM is able to resolve the problems of asymmetric 
information at local level and to recourse to supra-legal ways of loan recovery. Consequently, 
an average UMM loan has low informal and transaction cost as compare to an average bank 
126 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
loan, but the system-wide efficiency of informal and fragmented markets remain substantially 
low (Llanto, 1990). 
 
Hence, the new-structuralist critique is not reasonable due to the fragmentation and 
inefficiency of the UMM (Burkett, 1989; Owen and Solis-Fallas, 1989). UMM may not be 
vital in macroeconomic adjustment to policy changes, because this curb market serves those 
firms which add very little in aggregate investment. Therefore, the UMM cannot convincingly 
explain the financial instability or large investment drops in post-FL environment (Greenaway 
and Morrissey 1992). New-structuralist critique is sidelined due to this unconvincing nature of 
new structuralists’ theoretical models.  
 
The criticism moves further on the idea related to UMM effect on the size of multiplier. In 
banking system, the bank liabilities act as means of payment, due to which there exist a 
multiplier effect on deposit intermediaries. In such payment system, the liquidity creating 
ability of formal market takes benefit from having funds re-deposited from where it was 
extended, and they can further be re-lended to new borrowers. Such benefit is not possible in 
case of UMM due to its inability to re-deposit and re-lend (Bhaduri, 1989). This inability 
makes the status of UMM to be even impaired as a real ‘money market’ because the role of 
UMM is restricted in money creation process. The capability of UMM to create liquidity is 
only limited to the initial quantity of deposits. This makes credit multiplier of UMM as 
unitary which is not the case in a banking system working with reserve requirements. 
Therefore, any substitution that increase the deposit money ratio would increase the multiplier 
size and hence the total size of credit in the economy.  
 
Kapur (1990) also criticized new-structuralists for their treatment of reserves requirement. It 
is argued by him that reserves perform a productive function as they enable banks to meet 
cash demands in excess of concurrent cash flows. Such liquidity as a feature of a financial 
asset is desirable for letting asset holders to meet unanticipated contingencies. Therefore, as 
compare to the UMM, the banking sector is able to mobilize greater quantity of resources by 
allowing asset holders to curtail their holdings of money balances for transactions. Greater 
amount of savings is used productively with the expansion of the formal banking sector 
whereas UMM is beneficial in providing higher yielding but illiquid deposits.  
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Absence of specifications regarding credit demand and its impact on money creation is 
another flaw in new structuralist critique. The resulting ‘black box’ exposes an inflationary 
period enabled to accompany a fall in net size of the bank credit. The high interest rate having 
negative credit response presents no source in which rise in inflation due to cost-push could 
be accommodated. According to new structuralists, reason for high inflation is the reduction 
in aggregate demand. But this doesn’t justify an immediate rise in inflation consistent with 
previous assumption of mark-up pricing. Mark-up pricing does not infer a fall in aggregate 
supply. In addition, a brief decline in real wages implied by the inflation should facilitate to 
offset the contractionary impact of interest rate increase, and thus mitigate the aggregate 
supply response. Here, the intrinsic problem is related with the exogenous nature of high 
powered money which has to be divided amongst competing assets to define the amount of 
credit in the whole system.  This exogeneity doesn’t present any possibility for changes in 
credit demand to stimulate the money supply, and thus provide a source to accommodate 
higher prices. By not predicting a positive credit response to high interest rates, the 
significance of cost-push effects on the adjustment process turns devalued. 
 
The ambiguities and weaknesses, some of which are explained above, of new structuralists’ 
critique fundamentally diluted those crucial issues which this critique wanted to address. But 
in case of developing countries’ financial markets, one cannot deny the significance of 
accounting for UMM and of the interest rate cost-push effects. However, UMM is not the 
only frail characteristic of developing countries’ institutional structure. In this respect, it was 
the “Institutionalist critique” which demonstrated weak institutional characteristics of 
developing countries to be a convincing reason to stay abstain from FL. 
 
7.2 Institutionalist Critique 
The principal tenet of this critique is that the “institutions” of a country have to be primarily 
taken into consideration while designing and implementing FL reforms. Without paying 
attention to the institutional realities and settings, FL cannot bring desirable results. Following 
North (1990, P. 3), institutions can be defined as a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors 
generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons, and organizations as 
durable entities with formally recognized members, whose rules also contribute to the 
institutions of the political economy. From this perspective, markets are institutions that 
support interactions of particular types, manifested by arms’s length relations and high levels 
of competition. These markets are affiliated with a legal system that supports formal 
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contracting and encourages quite complete contracts. All capitalist economies also have the 
hierarchies that firms build to resolve the problems that cannot be addressed by markets. In 
liberal market economies, these are the principal institutions on which firms rely to coordinate 
their endeavors (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
 
Despite of having certain caveats in IMF charter regarding the need to develop sufficiently 
strong and stable institutions before implementing FL, most of the developing countries were 
forced to implement FL agenda without fulfilling this institutions-related condition. The 
significance of such caveats has been increasingly acknowledged today. It is even tough for 
developed countries to establish and maintain adequately strong financial institutions with 
effective regulatory and supervisory structure in order to avoid instabilities and crises, as 
demonstrated by the financial crises in Scandinavia during early 1990s and subprime crisis of 
2008 in the US that transformed in global financial crisis and economic meltdown. This issue 
will be discussed in detail in final chapter. In such scenario, the position of developing 
economies becomes more grave and fragile.  
 
7.2.1 Institutional Characteristics of Developing Countries 
The interaction of banks and industry during period of financial repression creates a highly 
leveraged structure because firms having access to official credit market are those that are 
linked with development programs of government. Such firms are dominated in aggregate 
economy while they rely on bank credit and related subsidies for most of their financial 
requirements (Villanueva and Mirakor, 1990). The result is thus severely high debt-equity 
ratios. The exclusive dependence on debt finance is a distinctive feature of firms in 
developing countries under financial repression as debt is used as an alternative for equity 
financing, even in case of foreign flow of funds that are also debt based (Sundararajan, 1985). 
By developing a debt-equity choice model, Sundararajan (1985) argues that cost of equity is 
higher than that of debt, partly due to its risk premium that is overstated in developing 
countries having repressed interest rates. Optimally acting firms thus raise the debt-equity 
ratio to equalize the advantages of additional credit at subsidized rates and its related costs of 
augmented risks of additional investment. Other reasons behind greater reliance on debt 
financing in developing countries are the fragility of equity markets, the lack of appropriate 
accounting practices and the entrepreneurs’ wish to keep corporate secrecy (Snowden, 1987). 
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The indispensability to bring significant increase in interest rates while implementing FL also 
causes the problem of high debt-equity ratio as high interest rates put already leveraged firms 
into Ponzi-game. A Ponzi-game is a situation in which a firm is forced to borrow to fulfill 
increase in payments on outstanding debt. However, the added borrowing brings growth of 
total debt burden, worsening the firm’s financial position. The firm actually borrows to 
survive but makes its position even riskier in this aim (Minsky, 1986). In Ponzi-game, the rise 
in interest cost on outstanding debt comes as an exogenous shock to the firm because past 
borrowing was not based on this expectation. Firm has to borrow additionally to meet this 
new cost for which it has to enter into another debt contract that becomes another source of 
increase in cost. Such borrowing by firms for their survival put banks into a vicious circle as 
their loan portfolios are severely exposed towards these firms the failure of which will 
threaten banks’ own viability. So despite of increasing non-performing loans, banks have to 
continue lending to these firms in order to protect banks’ own solvency. The capacity of 
banks to satisfy Ponzi-boom is reliant on authorities’ monetary policy stance in post-FL 
scenario. In case of complete accommodation of Ponzi-boom needs by the monetary 
authorities, the system would remain solvent in short run. But in the long run, the doubling of 
rising costs would continue to deteriorate the financial position of firms and banks. Stiglitz 
(1989) called this ‘road to hell’ as continuation of such accommodation is unsustainable due 
to huge build-up of non-performing debt in the system. As a supplementary observation, it 
might be interesting to note that Minsky’s own work on this subject focused on fully 
industrialized economies with highly developed financial markets and institutions. However, 
it also has implications for developing and emerging economies because financial positions 
become highly indebted during prosperity. Both lenders and borrowers become easy-going to 
high debt-to-equity ratios. This fragility of the financial system to financial crisis poses 
problem for central bank to pursue tight monetary policy and high interest rates. The ultimate 
consequence could be financial crisis when central bank is actually trying to avert it. As noted 
by Foley (2003), ‘in this repeated pattern of events (series of emerging economies’ crises 
during 1990s), we can see the outlines of Minskian crisis based on increasing financial 
fragility’ (Foley, 2003, p. 157). 
 
Therefore, the high debt-equity ratios and banks’ overly exposed to highly leveraged firms 
during financial repression weakens the implementation of FL policies. Despite of 
macroeconomic stability and proper sequencing, FL leads to prompt upward change in the 
price of credit that may not be feasibly for a developing economy with such institutional 
130 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
structure. But this conclusion is weakened with only one precondition i.e. complete industrial 
restructuring and full overhaul of banks’ portfolios. It implies that these countries must stop 
exhibiting the problematic features as the barriers to development.  In other words, developing 
countries should stop being developing countries – the practicality of such implication is non-
existent.  
 
7.2.2 Institutional Structure of Developing Countries 
The existence of ‘financial dualism’ is widespread in the financial systems of developing 
countries. The partition between organized and unorganized money market (UMM) is 
characterized by various financial intermediaries with varying access to financial markets. On 
one side of this dualistic divide lie the financial markets under government regulation with 
large and middle sized private and state owned enterprises as their participants. Appropriated 
to get most of the credit, these enterprises dominate the macroeconomic response of the 
economy to monetary policy changes. On the other side of the dualistic divide lies UMM 
under almost no government regulations with small intermediaries e.g. pawn brokers, loan 
houses, suppliers’ credit etc. This source of funding is mostly exploited by small and 
financially unsophisticated firms.  
 
The existence of such financial dualism exert significant influence on the mobilization of 
resources, creation and allocation of credit money, the nature of money and the way financial 
system responds to demand (Sikorski, 1996). In order to make a case for liberalization, 
McKinnon (1973) also assumed this dualism existent in a repressive economy, as described 
earlier in first chapter. Since highly repressed financial systems tend to be weak and suffered 
with severe credit rationing, therefore, greater portion of economic activity has to be financed 
from UMM, thus signify financial dualism (Cole and Patrick, 1986). The borrowings in UMM 
are determined by demand, independent of any direct control or manipulation of monetary 
authorities. Country-specific features of its informal institutions determine the degree of 
success that UMM gets in supplying the unmet credit demands of the economy. UMM is 
emphasized to be heterogeneous between and within countries.  
 
Therefore, theory taking the institutional realities into consideration can be advantageous in 
determining the limits to change and possibilities for advancement. The failings of FL in neo-
classical as well as new-structuralist versions to sufficiently define various roles of 
government and of market are based on the faulty understanding of institutional structures. 
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The worth of theory and its derived policy would improve if these institutional structures are 
taken into account (Sikorski, 1996).   
 
Until now, most of the discussion only takes formal banks as credit-supplying institutions and 
private firms and households as credit demanding institutions. Besides them, there are two 
other significant participants in financial sectors of developing countries: government on 
credit demand side and central banks of credit supply side.  
 
7.2.2.1 Government on Credit-Demand Side 
A pervasive borrower in developing economies is the government sector usually defined by 
variety of publically-owned enterprises. In accordance with the political priorities in 
developing countries, the government spending takes place in three major areas. The first area 
of government expenditure is the free flow of public services to business and household 
which includes public goods, transfer payments and goods carrying ethical justification e.g. 
education, health etc. The second area of government expenditure is infrastructure, mostly 
large-scale projects, e.g. building roads, pipelines, irrigation facilities etc. The last area of 
government expenditure is public investments that are near alternatives for potential private 
projects.  
 
All these areas of government spending share one feature, that is, all of them require 
financing. Governments’ effort to balance tax and non-tax revenues would reveals various 
financing options and constraints. The dependency of government on tax revenues lies on its 
ability to exploit the taxable capacity of the economy, a capacity reflected by the ability of 
individuals to pay and ability of government to collect. While exploiting the tax base, the 
governments of developing countries often face practical problems e.g. bad administration, 
large enforcement costs etc. as well as social problems e.g. tax avoidance, black economy etc. 
(Alm, Bahl and Murray, 1991). So these countries think that there are “too few sources of 
revenues and too many demands for expenditure” (Ahmed and Stern, 1989, p. 1010). This 
results in only partial financing of expenditures through taxation.  
 
For non-tax sources, government can go for debt financing by borrowing from the non-bank 
domestic private sector, foreign sources, the monetary authority or the commercial banks. 
Debt finance has marginally different consequences for the macroeconomy than taxation 
because it is not likely that two revenue instruments exhibit Ricardian equivalent 
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characteristics. Any fiscal expansion through ‘debt’ would encourage more effective 
aggregate demand as compare to an equivalent expansion through ‘taxation’. It infers that 
debt finance would create non-Ricardian solutions (Ahmed and Stern, 1989) because being 
unable to foresee future tax burden, the individuals in developing countries are not likely to 
view future tax liabilities in the same relations as a current tax liability. By deficit financing 
through this debt, the government can attain an inter-generational resource transfer from a 
presumed wealthier future generation to the present. However, governments are severely 
constrained to realize the non-Ricardian gains of debt finance due to the unsophistication and 
shallowness of domestic financial markets (de Haan and Zelhorst, 1990). The absence or 
under-development of secondary market for government bonds makes the debt finance 
relatively expensive and unattractive financing method in relation to alternatives (Hutchison, 
1986). 
 
Foreign financing, especially in form of aid or concessionary loans, may become attractive to 
the extent it brings non-Ricardian gains in terms of aggregate demand, but it is usually  
although it is tempered to be used only to buy foreign goods (Hutchison, 1986). In this 
manner, foreign financing has no direct inflationary consequences which may allow the 
conduct of monetary policy independent of the government’s financing needs. The possibility 
of financing with a reduced counterpart of money creation is an attractive and unusual feature 
of foreign financing. However, international interest rates can be prohibitive for some 
developing countries, especially if they include individual country risk premiums, which may 
make the foreign financing prohibitive.  
 
The residual credit demand of government, that is, demand not met from abroad or domestic 
non-bank sources, has to be fulfilled by resorting to the central and commercial banks. This 
residue is usually large in developing countries and its financing have a great influence on the 
dynamic behavior of monetary aggregates. The inevitability of the central bank and the 
capacity of commercial banks to meet government’s credit demand is, thus, at the heart of the 
money-creation process. The willingness and the ability of these two intermediaries to fulfill 
the credit demands would define the size and speed of money creation in the economy. 
 
7.2.2.2 Central Bank on Credit-Supply Side 
In the developing countries, central bank has a complicated role by virtue of its position as 
supplier of financial resources to the economy as well as the custodian of monetary policy. 
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The central bank in these countries is not very independent from the government (de Haan 
and Zelhorst, 1990), so the reconciliation of two functions is not easy. The central bank is 
burdened by the government to achieve fiscal and other development policy goals. The policy 
trade-offs are resulted from political pressure versus monetary stability concern present a 
most challenging job for the central bank. The attainment of some middle ground is not 
always probable, especially when strong political forces overpower the central bank’s 
monetary concerns to their fiscal and development concerns.  
 
To fulfill development concerns, the central bank has to accommodate the credit requirements 
of private priority sector, mostly through commercial bank financing and opening access of 
commercial banks to its discount window to get necessary funds to meet their lending 
requirements. In such situation, the central bank has to follow accommodation policy and 
monetize the debt liabilities of the government and the commercial banks. Since the economy 
is dominated by fiscal and development policies, therefore, the monetary management of the 
economy is dominated by the obligations to supply required financial resources. An 
implication of such policy dominance is the endogenous supply of money under this regime in 
response to the credit requirements for development policy expenditures of the government. 
Another implication is that any change in discount policy can disturb the economy by altering 
the available quantity of bank lending (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993). 
 
To fulfill fiscal concerns, the government earns capital gain through seigniorage and the 
inflation tax in an inflationary environment. By taking inflation rate as tax rate and stock of 
outside money as tax base, the idea of ‘inflation tax’ can best be understood. Whereas 
seigniorage is the advantage that government gets in financing its budget due to its ability to 
issue fiat money. Additional seigniorage is collected by giving inflationary surprise to the 
economy by the central bank. With the issuance of the currency beyond expectations, the 
prices and the real money holdings of individuals will not adjust immediately to new 
equilibrium levels (Osband and Villanueva, 1993). Therefore, the government can collect 
additional real tax revenues in the short-term adjustment period. However, the benefits of 
seigniorage are limited as individuals will adjust their expectations in case of persistent 
inflation and will decrease their cash holdings (de Haan and Zelhorst, 1990). The revenues 
from inflation tax are small when agents are economizing on money holdings, therefore, the 
central bank has to generate high inflation rate in order to get a certain amount of revenue. 
This high and increasing inflation will dampen the real activity by diminishing domestic 
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competitiveness, distorting relative prices and boosting capital flight, thus lessening the 
income and revenue (Modigliani, 1987). Hence, inflationary financing is discouraged as the 
excessive use of the inflation tax will raise uncertainty in the economy. Unstable inflation also 
encourages labour to demand indexing, which brings more inflationary pressure as the inertial 
inflationary impulses are hard to stop after indexation (Dornbusch and Reynoso, 1989). 
However the government, despite all these adverse effects of inflation, may depend on the 
central bank to monetize a part of their debt in case of severe constraints on the other 
financing options. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The beginning of worldwide recession and the high world interest rates during early 1980s 
caused debt accumulation problems for emerging and developing countries which were 
unable to raise capital from international equity markets. The neoliberal agenda initiated 
during 1980s by Washington Consensus along with increasing financial globalization and 
integration started the case for FL in emerging economies of Asia and Latin America. This 
agenda was pursued by international financial institutions to force these countries to adopt FL 
as conditionality to access concessional loans. Even countries not accessing these reform 
programs also tended to get policy advice emphasizing liberalization reforms, due to 
technocratic environment recognizing McKinnon-Shaw ideas as orthodoxy. While recalling 
1990s by developing countries to experience market oriented liberalization reforms, the same 
period also bring to mind the periodic financial crashes that spread in quick and unpredictable 
manner. For example, from 1994 to 1999, ten middle-income developing countries had major 
financial crises. These crashes and crises resulted in confusions and dilemmas on logic and 
implementation of liberalization reforms.     
 
In this aim, certain preconditions as well as optimum sequencing to start with domestic 
liberalization of interest rates and leaving capital market liberalization till end has been 
recommended by the proponents of FL to be fulfilled before implementing reforms. However, 
compliance with these conditions cannot guarantee success of FL due to the flaws inherent in 
financial markets which make perfect market models and theories irrelevant. The 
demonstration of various bottlenecks in the developing economies e.g. negative externalities, 
asymmetric information, high debt-equity ratio, weak regulatory system etc. implies that 
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theories and ensuing policies of FL are based on inaccurate and incomplete representation of 
the institutional and structural realities prevailing in these economies.  
 
It may be inferred that development economics should be more concerned with what it can do 
in the presence of existing limitations. A policy that requires substantial change in structure 
and institutions before implementation is of little validity and worth. A crucial question which 
arises in this respect is that what role is left for the theory in such circumstances. In fact, 
theory which considers the structural and institutional actualities can contribute in recognizing 
the limitations to change as well as the possibilities for progress. Unfortunately, all varieties 
of FL discussed in his chapter failed due to their weak and flawed understanding of these 
structural and institutional realities, resulted in episodes of crashes and crises. In order to 
strengthen opposition against FL, the crashes and crises in East Asia and Latin America 
during 1990s accompanied by instability in financial system are used as principal argument.  
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CHAPTER 3. CRISES AND INSTABILITY IN LIBERALIZED 
FINANCIAL MARKETS OF EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Globalization and liberalization of financial markets led to a wave of financial crises which 
made the decade of 1990s extremely distressing for the emerging economies of Asia and 
Latin America. Since 1960s, the Asian economies had been outperforming with high growth 
rates, accompanied with gradual and sustained expansion of physical capital accumulation 
which made others terming them ‘Asian Tigers’. But pressurized by neoliberal agenda, the 
commencement of liberalizing reform process during 1980s and 1990s with the opening of 
capital markets stimulated the occurrence of financial crises in these economies. Despite of 
being less distortive from previous repression and following policy prescription with all 
necessary caution, the Asian countries particularly the East Asian countries suffered crisis 
from which they could not recuperated for next many years. What started in September 1997 
in Thailand as currency crisis travelled to Indonesia, Korea and Hong Kong, alleged known as 
‘Asian flu’, descended on Russian in August 1998 which led to Russian announcement of 
moratorium on its external liabilities. It then spilled over to Brazil for generating financial 
crisis in Latin America by 1999. The first section of this chapter is focusing on unpredictable 
event of Asian financial crises, its association with ‘emerging market disease’ and its eventual 
advancement into financial crisis of Latin American crises during 1990s.   
 
This devastation intensified the discussions and debates among theorists and policymakers in 
order to find out the possible reasons and rationales of these events. One key area in this 
regard focuses on the inevitability of sequence from liberalization to crises by taking evidence 
from historical crises of financial and capital markets, which is presented in second section of 
this chapter. The previous environment of repression introduces such distortions in market 
economy due to which liberalization reforms are flopped. In other words, the flaws of pre-FL 
setting are accused for post-FL crises to which it is crucial to pay attention because it is easy 
and quick to deregulate interest rates, privatize state-owned firms and banks, and liberalize 
capital flows but it is difficult and slow to develop institutional infrastructure, acquire 
supervisory and administrative skills, and manage infected portfolios. These considerations 
are also emphasized in the second section of this chapter.   
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Alongside relatively new phenomenon of liberalization, age-old globalization and integration 
has also been associated with the free mobility of capital flows and resultant crises which has 
the topic under analysis in third section which also described some of the key historical crises 
following golden age of globalization. Since incidence of financial crises during 1990s is 
more closely related with the free flow of financial capital, thus fourth section is particularly 
concentrating on sequence of financial crises and liberalization of capital markets.  
 
Contrary to its loud claims to bring stability, FL in emerging countries did the opposite by 
introducing instability in their financial systems. Thus the adverse consequences of Asian and 
Latin American crises of 1990s magnify the issue of financial stability which became focus of 
policy discussion in order to attain sustainable economic growth. This area has been discussed 
in fifth section along with analyzing various mechanisms such as contagion, derivatives 
market, manipulation, speculation, short term booms etc. Moreover, this section also goes 
deep to look into the challenge of maintaining financial stability without inhibiting economic 
efficiency as overly protective structure of financial system can actually hamper economic 
growth.  
 
However, some degree and form of protection is desirable, given the incidence of crises in 
open and liberalized capital and financial markets. In order to further justify the need for 
capital controls, third generation models of speculative attack are explored in sixth section of 
this chapter. The final section has given the detailed analysis of various forms and design of 
capital controls, especially to control short term capital flows, as well as their relative costs, 
benefits and limitations.  
 
Section 1. Case of Financial Crises in Asia and Latin America  
The decade of 1990s was devastating for the emerging economies of Asia and Latin America 
due to experiencing financial crises as result of liberalizing and globalizing their financial 
markets, especially the capital markets.  Opposed to the conventional wisdom, the overall 
liberalization process in these economies started with the liberalization of capital markets, 
mostly due to the pressure of neo-liberal agenda.  
 
The research in this area often use various metaphors which certainly cannot be compared 
with economic analysis, but prove helpful in understanding the contending views on 
liberalization induced instability and crises. Stiglitz et al (2006) described a transportation 
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metaphor. It is described by the critics of liberalization that problem may lies with the driver 
if there is one accident on a road but in case of repeated problems at the same road, the 
problem would be with the design of the road. It is countered by the proponents of 
liberalization to repair the road and train the drivers instead of abolishing cars and bringing 
horse carts. That is, financial markets which are not liberalized are assumed as old-fashioned 
and inefficient. The critics of liberalization counter it by arguing that with incomplete road 
signs, ordinary drivers cannot follow experienced racetrack drivers who can survive even a 
rocky road.  
 
The decade of 1990s during which most of the Asian and Latin American economies 
experienced instability and resulting financial crises was usually the reference case in such 
metaphor-based debates. 
 
1.1 Asian Crisis 
After a decade of outstanding and unprecedented growth, the Asian economies, especially 
East Asian ones, unexpectedly and crushingly stopped in 1997 by suffering from a chronic 
crisis which then took many years for recovery. This crisis acutely affected Indonesia, South 
Korea and Thailand along with hurting Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Philippines. Although 
China, Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam were least affected but they also faced the loss of 
demand and confidence in the region.  
 
A series of currency crises transformed into Asian crisis which started from Thailand when its 
central bank decided to go for floating exchange rate regime in July 1997 after getting 
disappointed from its anxious efforts to keep its currency Baht from depreciating. Then, after 
losing foreign reserves worth almost US$ 1 billion due to capital outflow, the central bank of 
Philippines also let its currency Peso to float. After few days, the Central bank of Malaysia 
took the same step by putting its currency Ringgit on free float after losing foreign reserves of 
more than US$ 10 billion. It was followed by central bank of Indonesia which also couldn’t 
prevent its currency Rupiah from floating after facing huge capital outflows. Although the 
Korean currency Won remained relatively stable following active interventions of central 
Bank of Korea but the pressures from massive capital outflows became unsustainable by the 
end of 1997, which allowed depreciation of Korean Won against dollar. The tide of capital 
outflows in these Asian economies was the founding factor of ensuing currency and then 
financial crisis.  
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Interestingly, this crisis was not predicted even by the pundits of emerging markets. Rather 
before mid-1997, these economies were regarded as ‘Asian tigers’ and ‘miracle economies’ 
with exemplary policies. For example, World Bank Report in 1993 noted that in Asian 
countries, ‘fundamentally sound development policy was a major ingredient in achieving 
rapid growth. Macroeconomic management was unusually good and macroeconomic 
performance unusually stable, providing the essential framework for private investment’ 
(World Bank, 1993, p. 5). The international investors were encouraged by economic and 
financial experts to rush for the emerging markets. For example, an article by Clemente 
(1994) wrote that ‘the Asian stock markets have been hot and there are no signs of cooling 
off. Attracted by solid economies, credible reform and a trend of liberalization, global 
investors continue investing on a grand scale in these countries … the rates of economic 
growth in East Asia will continue at the highest levels in the world during the next decade’ 
(Clemente, 1994, p. 92). The future economic growth of Asian economies was somewhat 
foresaw by few like Paul Krugman who cautioned about East Asia’s slowdown. He argued 
that Asia’s growth is largely attributable to the accumulation of physical and human capital, 
and not to the technological change, thus the diminishing returns certainly infer a slowdown 
of growth. But he couldn’t predict the total collapse of growth by concluding that growth in 
East Asia would continue to outpace growth in the West (Krugman, 1994, p. 78). 
 
Since 1960s, this region was exhibiting positive fundamental indicators of economic 
performance due to which no clue to the crisis could be found. Just few weeks before 
occurrence of crisis, the World Economic Forum in Geneva released its ranking of most 
competitive economies with growth potential on 21 May 1997. It is ironic that out of 53 
industrialized, emerging and transition economies, Indonesia was ranked as the fifth and 
Thailand as the tenth economy with great growth potential whereas Malaysia was ranked as 
the ninth most competitive economy in the world. The crisis emerged in 1997 was a sudden 
and complete reversal of the situation which is characterized by the positive patterns of long 
term growth in Asia.  
 
1.1.1 Growth Patterns in Asia 
Except Philippines, all East Asian economies surpassed the US average growth rate of per 
capita income during the period from 1960 to 1995 (Barro and Lee, 1994; World Bank, 1998). 
Even compared to all industrial economies, the Asian countries outperformed unlike other 
developing countries which grew slower (Barro and Sala-i-martin, 1995). This economic 
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growth was accompanied by their gradual and sustained expansion in physical and human 
capital accumulation. During 1960-1990, the investment rates of almost all Asian countries 
grew more than double.  
 
Although inflation was high as per the standards of industrialized countries, but much lower 
with declining trend as compare to other developing countries. The annual average inflation 
rate in East Asia was 9.1 percent during 1980s which dropped to 7.9 percent during 1990-95 
and it went down further to 7 percent by 1996 (IMF, 1998).  
 
Government authorities in these economies intervened actively in the foreign exchange 
markets in order to stabilize their currency values. This stability worked in the context of 
enormously increasing capital inflows. The types of foreign capital entering in Asia were 
various in which the leading type was Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) having volume of US$ 
78.5 billion during 1990-1996 along with exploding flows of portfolio equity. A sudden and 
prolonged halt in this prosperous and flourishing scenario was a surprise in itself. 
 
1.1.2 Spill Over to Latin America 
By 1998, the Asian financial crisis also spilled over to Brazil and quickly spread to all 
economies of Latin America. During next two years, they experienced severe economic 
recession which forced firms into bankruptcy and closing down. The fall of banking system 
and enormous lay-offs resulted in increased unemployment and loss of purchasing power.  
Most of the analysts attribute the massive flow of short-term capital, encouraged by IMF via 
the opening of capital account, as the main trigger for this crisis. Joseph Stiglitz, then Chief 
Economist of the World Bank, stated that ‘the drive toward liberalization of the capital and 
financial markets, without the necessary attention to the design and execution of regulatory 
structures appropriate to the circumstances, was based more in ideology than in economic 
science’ (Stiglitz, 1999).   
 
Thus the short-term capital inflows to emerging markets tripled during 1990-1995. Till these 
flows were positive, emerging economies grew as these inflows were used to finance imports, 
private sector credit, external debt payments etc. But due to the speculative and volatile nature 
of these flows, they declined abruptly in 1996, continued in1997 with the Asian crisis and 
worsened with Latin American crisis in 1998 and afterwards. Almost US$ 9 billion left Latin 
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American economies during 1997-98. As written by Furman and Stiglitz (1998) ‘the ability of 
this variable i.e. short-term capital, by itself, to predict the crises of 1997, is remarkable’. 
 
Hence, the Asian crisis spread rapidly to Latin American economies as a result of which 
billions of dollars left the region in just few weeks thereby hampering their trade transactions 
with the US which resulted in one of the worst economic recessions of Latin America. The 
foreign capital dried up when crisis is compounded with persisting macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities and slowing growth which undermined investors’ confidence, triggering crises 
in a wide range of countries. The consequences of the crisis were severe for Argentina, 
Colombia and Chile but they were especially intense for small economies of Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Uruguay.  
 
1.2 Emerging Market Disease 
While  considering the causes of the Asian and Latin American crises, researchers considered 
various factors like currency overvaluation, moral hazard, excessive risk-taking, growth of 
short-term foreign currency debt, domestic bank fragility, speculative lending bubbles, 
financial panic, herd effects, contagion etc. All these factors are significant and are discussed 
throughout this chapter, but there is one fundamental economic phenomenon according to 
which crisis is a reflection of a basic problem facing all emerging markets, not just Asia or 
Latin America. The economic boom and investment which categorize these economies as 
emerging markets also bring the kernels of an ultimate slowdown that reverses some 
economic growth. This phenomenon is referred as ‘emerging market disease’. Unlike virus or 
flu, terms sometimes used with reference to Asian crisis, disease implies the long-term nature 
of involved forces.   
 
In nutshell, the high economic growth in emerging economies is achieved through extensive 
expansion of investment along with international liberalization which invites flood of capital 
inflows letting economies to boom. But at the same time, these capital inflows appreciate 
domestic currency which ultimately slows down export growth and worsens the balance of 
current account. The reduction in output growth as result of decreased exports is damaging for 
investors’ confidence. The deterioration of current account balance leads to the accumulation 
of external debt that raises the default risk. The appreciation of currency may cause expansion 
of domestic credit that result in inflation (Ito and Krueger, 1996). All of such negative 
developments ultimately result in the withdrawal of funds from the country and the 
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consequent credit crunch drops the economy into recession. In the presence of a fragile 
banking system, the capital flight is aggravated by policymakers who persistently refuse to 
devalue, and the end result is a crisis (Rivera-Batiz, 2001). Although this mechanism is 
introduced with a newer term, however, the economic forces behind emerging market disease 
have been recognized since long time. For instance, the problem of capital inflows in Latin 
America has been studied even before crisis of 1998 (e.g. Diaz-Alejandro, 1985).  
 
Some of the indicators of emerging market disease are similar to the ‘Dutch disease’. The 
Dutch disease refers to the case of countries where a boom is based on the exploitation of 
natural resources and it eventually results in a catastrophic de-industrialization of the 
economy. In emerging market disease, the inflow of capital is not related with the exploitation 
of natural resources but with the rising domestic investment, financial liberalization, 
especially liberalization of the capital markets. 
 
Besides short-term capital, the emerging markets also became popular destinations for direct 
and portfolio investment. For instance, net capital flows from industrial countries to emerging 
countries are estimated to grow from less than US$ 15 billion in 1990 to more than US$ 100 
billion in 1993 (Ito and Krueger, 1996). McKinnon and Pill (1996) regarded the ‘excessive’ 
capital inflows in ‘overborrowing syndrome’ and linked it to reform process. That is, the 
credible policy reforms encourage people to instantly increase their consumption in 
expectation of higher future real incomes. Its outcome is a severe deterioration in the saving-
investment balance, financed by huge increase in capital flows. According to them, it is the 
failure of financial market that cannot restrict such inflows which provide financing even for 
risky projects and result in weakening of banks’ balance sheets. This mechanism suggests 
curbing the deregulation at an early stage of policy reform. But this is paradoxical to note that 
reform process in Asia was gradual (Williamson and Mehar, 1996).  
 
The presence of deposit insurance intensifies the situation by creating moral hazard. Although 
basic goal of deposit insurance is to reverse the psychology of bank runs by assuring 
depositors that their funds would be protected (up to a certain limit) if their bank fails for any 
reason (McCoy, 2006). Even economists like Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz asserted 
public deposit insurance to be the most important structural change in the banking system that 
emerged from the Great Panic of 1933 (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). But generally, explicit 
or implicit public deposit insurance is often accused for bringing moral hazard (Demirgüç-
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Kunt and Kane, 2002). Moral hazard is created because deposit insurance would provide 
incentive to banks to take more risks for capturing any profits thereby increasing the 
government’s exposure to losses. It is pointed out by William Lowett that “If governments 
and modern nations do not allow most banks to fail, how can the leaders and managements of 
banking institutions be disciplined and avoid unduly risky, negligent, or adventurous lending 
policies or poor asset-liability management” (Lowett, 1989).  
 
However, it must also be noted that deposit insurance does not necessarily create moral 
hazard for the bank management which is responsible for taking lending decisions. Only 
depositors are protected with insurance, and not the management. Thus, existence of deposit 
insurance might not be a sufficient incentive for bank management for making imprudent 
decisions (Chang, 2000). Kindleberger’s remarks in this regard also support the view that 
deposit insurance in itself does not necessarily create moral hazard on the part of the bank 
management. “Depositors may not lose, but stockholders suffer and risk-prone banks may 
have trouble raising capital …. Reputations generally suffer. Not always, however 
(Kindleberger, 1989, p. 196). Unlike general perception, the ability of deposit insurance to 
create moral hazard is limited. Thus, it cannot be ascertained strongly that deposit insurance 
in itself could have generated over-borrowing and over-lending that led Asian economies into 
crisis during 1990s.  
 
1.2.1 Clues of Asian Crisis before its Emergence 
Due to long-term patterns of economic growth as described in previous section, the Asian 
crisis was unanticipated in most circles. But there were some danger signs long before it 
exploded in July 1997. 
 
Regarding investment in stock markets, the prices were stagnant in the year before crisis. 
Although market capitalization continued to grow until the crisis emerged as domestic and 
foreign investors continued to invest, but the boom in prices was over much earlier. There are 
various economic and political forces which can explain deflation in stock market prices but 
one primary force was growing perception that the Asian currencies would be severely 
devalued in the near future which will accompany economic distress. These expectations of 
devaluation eventually lead to massive capital flight.  
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Now the question arises about the stimulator of the devaluation expectations. Before the 
crisis, the value of Asian currencies remained exceptionally stable but the prices had been 
increasing at a moderate rate in the region. There was a declining trend in inflation but it was 
around 8 percent during 1990-1996. As a result of fixed exchange rate and increasing 
domestic prices, the price of goods produced in this region increased in relation to the price of 
goods produced in other countries, which is translated into the loss of competitiveness in 
international markets and reflected in declining foreign exchange rate in Asian economies 
prior to the eruption of crisis.  
 
The tenacious decrease in real exchange rate and the consequent loss of competitiveness 
caused a fall in the exports compared to imports in these economies due to which trade deficit 
as well as current account deficit grew. For example, the current account balance of all East 
Asian economies deteriorated and moved from surplus to deficit during 1985-1997. There are 
usually two ways to finance this deficit i.e. loss of foreign reserves or external borrowing 
(Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz, 1994). The joint deficit of current account of five East Asian 
economies was US$ 53.9 billion in 1996 which is financed completely through external 
borrowing. Thus, the external borrowing of these countries amounted to US$ 74.4 billion in 
1997. 
 
The growth of current account deficits and their entire financing through external borrowing 
made the Asian economies the biggest debtors in the world by the end of 1996. During same 
period, external debt to GDP ratio revealed that three of the Asian economies, Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Thailand, were the world’s most indebted countries (World Bank, 1998).  
 
The growth of short-term debt is regarded as a major warning signal of potential distresses in 
future. The nonexistence of this type of debt had helped East Asian economies to survive 
through the debt crisis of 1980s. This is concluded by Woo and Nasution (1989) that “there is 
a trade-off in external debt management between generally lower interest payments and 
predictability of debt-service payments. Short-term liabilities pay lower interest rates most of 
the time, but it is risky to rely on a strategy which rolls over a large amount of short-term debt 
every period. An unforeseen credit crunch would force the country to increase borrowing in 
order to cover its interest payments. If this credit squeeze were to persist … the extra 
borrowing would be difficult to sustain as the situation increasingly smacked of a Ponzi-
game” (Woo and Nasution, 1989, p. 115). 
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Despite of incredible economic growth, the high level of indebtedness caused issues regarding 
the servicing of this debt. Moreover, this debt was mainly private debt, most part of which 
was not backed by government guarantee. The growth of private debt reduced the significance 
of current public sector budgets for financing external debt payments. The health of the 
economy, especially of its financial sector, became more important. Both of these factors 
were crucial in the transformation of external debt into productive investment. The 
mismanagement of investment funds by investing in low-return and high-risk projects, 
accompanied by an economic downturn could trigger loss of investors’ confidence, leading to 
capital outflow and a probable crisis which happened in Asia and then Latin America.  
 
Mismanagement is also observed when part of the capital funds goes to consumption, instead 
of investment for economic development. This trend tends to increase aggregate demand and 
create inflationary pressure. As a result, real exchange rates are appreciated due to capital 
inflows thereby generating current account deficit. It increased vulnerability of the economy 
to variations in international capital flows. This vulnerability become even greater when 
further short-term foreign funds are borrowed. Foreign investors, being cautious of such 
unfavorable developments, quickly withdraw their funds. This is what exactly happened in 
case of Korea (Jeon, 2010). In this manner, capital funds which have otherwise been crucial 
for economic development became troublesome due to their mismanagement, rather their 
misuse. The vulnerability is even multiplied several times when domestic financial system is 
weak enough to being unable to endure this reversal of capital flows. 
 
This mismanagement of funds was even deeper when it comes to maturity and currency 
mismatches. The maturity mismatch of debt is an important phenomenon in Asian crisis. 
Short-term borrowing to finance long-term projects became significant, particularly in Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand, causing a mismatch in the maturity of assets and liabilities. The 
currency mismatch also occurred when domestic banks were lending to domestic firms in 
local currency whereas borrowing in foreign currency. This made them particularly 
susceptible to exchange rate fluctuations.   
 
Another issue regarding external borrowing was the bank lending which is troublesome 
because of the weak and imperfect banking systems of these economies. Despite the positive 
image of Asian economies till mid-1990s, their financial systems were underdeveloped 
leading up to the crisis (Delhaise, 1998). In retrospect, the World Bank reported that ‘the 
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Asian countries had some weaknesses in their banking systems including low capital 
adequacy ratios of banks, inadequately designed and weakly-enforced legal lending limits on 
single borrowers or group of related borrowers, asset classification systems and provisioning 
rules for possible losses, which fell short of international standards, poor disclosure and 
transparency of bank operations, lack of provisions for an exit policy of troubled financial 
institutions, and weak supervision’ (World Bank, 1998, p. 20).  
 
Another view attributes the two decades of high growth rate, high savings and investment 
rates and high rates of capital accumulation to the significant distortions in the financial sector 
of emerging countries. It propagates that the performance of the Asian economies was caused 
by growth-oriented strategies founded on centralized coordination of production activities, 
resource allocation, protection of domestic industry, government guarantees on private 
investment projects etc. Such projects let the firms to undertake risky projects by depending 
heavily on bank credit. The dominant practice of relationship banking also provided 
incentives to develop strong informal ties between creditors and debtors which gave the 
resources to the economy needed to finance objectives of high growth (Pesenti, 2001).  
 
The role of derivatives is also not negligible as the unhedged currency and interest rate 
exposures were main elements in the scope and severity of the Asian crises. The exposure was 
unhedged because domestic interest rates were higher than foreign interest rates. In addition, 
the pegged exchange rates were generally supposed as stable. Moreover, domestic hedging 
products were underdeveloped whereas offshore hedges were expensive. Due to these factors, 
foreign banks were keen to lend Asian banks that strive to get profits from interest rate 
differentials. However, the volume of profitable arbitrage was limited due to local regulations 
like limits on net open foreign exchange exposures, risk to capital ratios etc. This situation 
forced Asian banks and other financial institutions to take derivatives in order to ‘avoid 
prudential regulations by taking their carry positions off balance sheet’ (Dodd, 2001, P. 10). 
Most of the losses by US and European banks in Asian lending were listed as due to ‘return 
swaps’ and ‘currency swaps’ (Kregel 1998). Derivatives trading, especially ‘future contracts’ 
exerted a de-stabilizing influence during Asian crash (Ghysels and Seon, 2005). Highlighting 
the role of these innovations, particularly over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives in Asian 
financial crisis, Kregel (1998) argued that they are structured to clients’ specific needs by 
banks which themselves accept little risk, thereby impede efficient capital allocation and 
prudent risk assessment.  
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Each of the forces discussed may not have had the power to generate a crisis in Asia or Latin 
America by itself, but all of them together were potentially explosive. In the light of all these 
considerations, it cannot be argued that Asian and Latin American crisis of 1990s was 
different from anything else seen before due to not displaying the usual symptoms such as 
chronic inflation, huge budget deficits, and high unemployment. 
 
In the presence of limits to foreign borrowing, these forces and distortions cannot translate 
domestic vulnerability to external shocks, which is why the crisis of this level happened in the 
1990s and not before. The process of domestic financial liberalization altered this main 
feature due to which international capital markets became more accessible in 1990s with 
deregulated and liberalized domestic markets. However, financial liberalization is not the 
exclusive feature of the Asian and Latin American crises. In this regard, the work of Carlos 
Diaz-Alejandro is very relevant who worked on the financial crisis in Chile during its 
deregulation and liberalization process during 1980s. It is argued by him that in case of bad 
economic situation, governments are expected to intervene to save financial institutions i.e. 
expectation of future bailout, irrespective of the presence or absence of government 
guarantees. As put by Diaz-Alejandro (1985, P. 18), “agents expect to be bailed out 
regardless of the ‘laissez-faire’ commitments which a misguided minister of finance or central 
bank president may occasionally utter in a moment of dogmatic exaltation”. So basically, 
investors know that in case of a crisis, government would not stay calm doing nothing and 
letting the system to get worse.  
 
Thus, it is a serious mistake to think Asian financial crisis as a ‘solo event’. Due to the 
relatedness of weaknesses, problems and difficulties described above in this sub-section, it is 
generally referred as ‘crises within crises’ by then-Director of IMF, Michael Camdessus (cited 
in Eichengreen, 1998). Particularly the combination of macroeconomic imbalances, banking 
sector weaknesses, mismanagement of funds and resultant exchange rate problems gave rise 
to a self-fulfilling crisis in Asia in which countries got into such a vulnerable position where 
governments became failed to withstand a credible protection of their currencies.  
 
Section 2. Unavoidable sequence from Liberalization to Crisis  
Although financial liberalization is not the exclusive feature of Asian and Latin American 
crisis of 1990s, but it has been often observed that liberalizing countries have encountered 
quite strong crisis after liberalizing their capital and financial markets.  
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A considerable body of evidence has been gathered during last decade which confirms the 
social benefits of FL (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; and 
Williamson and Mahar, 1998). However, the series of crises engulfing the developing 
countries after FL are reflective of its dangers due to which it faced criticism like Stiglitz 
(2001) criticized it as “all too often, the dogma of liberalization became an end in itself not a 
means to a better financial system"... FL may actually have had a perverse effect, 
contributing to macro-instability through weakening the financial sector” (Stiglitz, 2001, p. 
31). The FL to crisis sequence is often explained by the liberalized environment that does not 
take into account the previous inefficiencies and weaknesses of the initial conditions and the 
failure to promptly develop robust legal, regulatory and supervisory frameworks. Thus, it is 
cautioned that “unless the economy is competitive, the benefits of free trade and privatization 
will be dissipated in rent-seeking, not directed towards wealth creation. And if public 
investments in human capital and technology transfers are insufficient, the market will not fill 
in the gap” (Stiglitz, 2001, p. 49). For instance, proponents of privatization overvalued the 
benefits of privatization and undervalued the costs, especially the political costs. However, 
privatization demands first the creation of institutional infrastructure like competitive markets 
and regulatory framework. Government no longer holds the right to intervene as it does under 
public ownership. Private owners have only one objective, the profit maximization. So the 
conditions under which privatization can attain the public objectives of efficiency and equity 
are very limited. These conditions are much similar to those conditions under which 
competitive markets attain Pareto-efficient outcomes, as explicated in the fundamental 
theorem of privatization by Sappington and Stiglitz (1987).  
 
Thus, the gap created by inefficient and noncompetitive market conditions set the path which 
goes from liberalization to crisis – an area for which some empirical evidence is discussed 
below. 
 
2.1 Some Empirical Evidence 
The title of Carlos Diaz-Alejandro’s 1995 paper “Good-bye financial repression, Hello 
financial crash” is considered vital in ascertaining the inevitability of FL to lead to crises. 
Almost all countries in his survey suffered from financial crisis in one way or the other during 
1980-1997 most of which were associated with FL including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Turkey, Venezuela etc.  This survey recorded 25 crises following FL but all of them might not 
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be the direct consequence of liberalization but it was a direct or indirect factor that contributed 
in most of the cases.  
 
The positive correlation between FL and crises has also been confirmed with an econometric 
study of fifty-three countries during 1980-1995 by Asli Demirguç-Kunt and Enrica 
Detragiache (1998) which revealed that the probability of crisis occurrence is high in 
liberalized financial systems but strong institutional environment prevents them. Cross-
country estimations are used by Carmen Reinhart and Graciela Kaminsky (1999) to identify 
causality between FL, banking crises, and balance of payment crises. This study exhibits that 
FL is positively and significantly correlated with ensuing banking crises. This study does not 
establish the precipitation of balance of payment crises from banking crises but this 
observation would not hold if experience of Asian crisis of 1997 is also taken into account.  
 
In the survey of Williamson and Mehar (1996), no visible pattern of pace or sequencing is 
observed. Out of nine countries in that survey which suffered from severe crises after 
liberalization (Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey, and Venezuela), six liberalized rapidly and three gradually. In these nine countries, 
five liberalized their financial systems in a stable macroeconomic environment whereas other 
three stabilized during the process of liberalization. Trade regimes were liberalized before or 
during FL in seven countries while two countries had quite closed regimes throughout 
liberalization process.  
 
Real interest rate, share of credit in private sector, and growth of credit are three variables 
related with FL that are used by Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache (1997) in a 
study covering 65 countries from 1980-1994 in order to find probability of banking crisis. All 
of these variables are found to have positive and significant probability for banking crisis. 
However, no macroeconomic model is laid down to exhibit interaction of these variables to 
exert this probability or to include the degree of regulation and supervision in the financial 
sectors under study. Moreover, these variables are also affected by factors others than FL.  
 
According to Michael Gavin and Ricardo Hausmann (1996), the root of the banking crises 
resides in credit boom which permits every borrower to service its debt by taking debt from 
another source due to which lenders are unable to have information to distinguish sound and 
risky borrowers. An evidence is presented by Gerard Caprio, Berry Wilson, and Anthony 
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Saunders (1997) that rapid credit expansion was a principal reason of the collapse of Mexican 
banks in 1994. It is observed in this study that lending boom was the reaction of curbed 
demand in previous financial repression. Insufficient supervision, deficiency of proper 
incentives, and presence of broad deposit insurance are also cited as elements that limit banks’ 
need to diversify risks in the newly liberalized environment. Williamson and Drabek (1999) 
also provide evidence to put forward that countries which did or did not have crisis can be 
distinguished on the basis of whether or not they opted for liberalization. This made them to 
suggest that premature financial liberalization without adequate prudential regulation played a 
key role in the occurrence and depth of Asian crisis.  
 
It might be interesting to note here that many researchers, in the wake of Asian crisis, also 
tried to extend Minsky’s analysis (1972) to developing economies. For instance, it is argued 
by Gary Dymski (1999) that huge capital inflows in open developing economies create 
‘imbalances’ if there are no institutional mechanisms to channel these funds towards 
investment projects. Instead of productive investment, they will channel towards speculative 
investment which would create asset bubble to become a new source of Minskian crisis. 
Yilmaz Akyüz (1998) also mentions the lack of proper institutional mechanisms as 
exacerbating a Minskian process within an open developing economy.  
 
All these studies suggest that vulnerabilities in financial sector often develops after 
liberalization, but it can also be argued that core source was the preceding financial repression 
which indirectly leads to crises.  
 
2.2 Indirect Forces from Previous Repression 
Even if FL doesn’t necessarily lead to crisis, it nevertheless works to reduce the franchise 
value which indirectly and adversely affects the banks’ performance. That’s why the need for 
some form of bonding had always been recognized to take proper care of depositors’ money. 
It was a usual practice of senior bank staff even in nineteenth century to post a significant 
bond that could be forfeited in case of mismanagement of funds31. In today’s period, the 
connection between low franchise value and high risk of failure is observed. Under Basel II, 
the capital requirement set at 8 percent of risk weighted assets also signifies to maintain 
certain level of franchise value. The decline of capital below this threshold gives warning 
                                                          
31
 Gibbons, J. S (1859), “The banks of New York, their dealers, clearing house and the panic of 1857”, New 
York: Appleton 
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signal to regulators for timely intervention but it is hard to assess the real value of capital. 
Besides that, the shareholders’ and insiders’ incentives may diverge which also diminish the 
effectiveness of capital requirements, particularly in case of reduced bank profitability 
(Caprio and Honohan 1999). 
 
FL during 1970s and 1980s resulting in unchecked competition has often been blamed for 
subsequent banking fragility in many developing (and developed) countries. Sometimes FL 
brings strong competition which pressurizes banks to offer such deposit rates that turn 
prudential lending practices unprofitable. The presence of implicit or explicit deposit 
insurance put a gap between portfolio risk taken by banks and risk perceived by depositors. 
Deregulation and privatization becomes dangerous when banks take excessive risk under fear 
of insolvency. In addition to excessive risk taking and earlier weaknesses in portfolios, 
outright managerial failure by underestimating risk in liberalized environment is also an 
important source of weakness (Honohan 2000a).  
 
In order to have some detailed analysis on competition, we can refer to Beck (2008b) who 
presented competition-stability versus competition-fragility views. Some theoretical models 
predict less competition and more concentration to be more stable as profits provide cushion 
against fragility and give incentive against excessive risk taking. On the other hand, more 
competition put pressure on banks to earn more profits due to which they have to take 
excessive risk thereby leading to more fragility (e.g. Marcus, 1984; Chan, Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 1986). Keeley (1990) presented empirical evidence that increased competition 
reduces banks’ capital buffer and increases risk premiums which are then shown in increased 
interest rates. Thus, Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) proposed anti-liberalization 
measure like deposit interest rate ceilings and other restrictive measures to prevent extreme 
and unhealthy competition to avoid excessive risk taking and resulting fragility. However, it is 
hard to make any clear conclusion whether increased bank competition as result of FL 
increased stability or fragility. Theory makes uncertain and equivocal predictions about the 
results of competition whereas empirical research finds it difficult to have proper measures of 
competition.  
 
Another handicap in newly liberalized setting is the existence of legal, regulatory and 
supervisory system ill-suited for a market-based environment. Under repression, the risk 
assessment of credit is considered unimportant by supervisors as credit allocation is 
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performed by the government itself. Supervision is directed to enforce government orders to 
meet development policy goals rather than ensuring prudent risk taking. Legal systems 
favoring debtors are also difficult to quickly understand and implement new laws in 
deregulated and liberalized environment. In short, the deficiencies in legal, regulatory and 
supervisory system hamper efficient market decisions. Thus, the shortcomings of pre-FL 
environment are usually blamed for post-FL crises. Deregulating interest rates, privatizing 
state-owned banks and financial institutions, opening up financial and capital markets etc. is 
easy, quick and cheap whereas institutional infrastructure development, portfolio 
management, skill development etc. is difficult, time taking and expensive. The last two 
decades of financial crises present convincing case to require more of the latter.  
 
Banking crises had been categorized by Patrick Honohan (2000a) in three classes of 
syndromes namely macroeconomic epidemics, microeconomic deficiencies, and endemic 
crises in a government-permeated system under financial repression. Instead of accusing 
repression or liberalization, he blamed the change of regime as main cause of crises by stating 
that “change in regimes altered the nature, scale, frequency, and correlation pattern of shocks 
to the economic and financial system, increasing the riskiness of traditional behavior, or 
introducing new and inexperienced players” (Honohan, 2000, p. 99). The study of numerous 
developing countries provided him various types of regime changes such as financial 
repression, financial liberalization, financial globalization, privatization, structural 
transformation, technological innovation etc. which usually result from the reform process. 
 
The increased integration of financial markets as part of financial globalization also took its 
toll in form of crises. The international integration of financial markets was stressed due to its 
benefits such as optimal resource allocation, intertemporal optimization, and international 
portfolio diversification (Obstfeld, 1995). However, the series of crises in Latin America and 
Asia during 1990s has led some to argue that the costs of complete integration of financial 
markets for developing and emerging countries may outweigh its benefits (Rodrik, 1998; 
Cooper, 1998). It may lead one to infer that Integration and globalization were not without 
mounting pains.  
 
Section 3. Financial Globalization and Crises  
The aftermath of what happened in emerging economies during 1990s raised doubts to move 
forward or take back steps from integrating with international financial and capital markets. A 
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more general debate on globalization is whether or not its benefits outweigh its disruptive 
effects. A comprehensive historical description on this issue is provided by O’Rourke and 
Williamson (1999) by analyzing the earlier ‘golden age’ of globalization before World War I.  
 
3.1 Golden Age of Globalization 
Unprecedentedly massive flow of capital contributed in rapid economic growth in golden age 
during third quarter of the 19th century which found capital moving from the capital-rich 
nations of Western Europe to take advantage of the higher returns in the resource-rich regions. 
Free flow of capital along with the mobility of goods and labour contributed in the 
convergence of real wages and incomes per capita between the core countries of Western 
Europe and much of the periphery.  
 
It had effects on the distribution of income because the massive migrations during 1870-1914 
reduced the returns to land-owners in land-scarce and labor-abundant regions of Europe along 
with worsening the income distribution in New world of US, Canada, Australia as unskilled 
immigrants had to compete with more skilled labor force. The landowners in old world 
lobbied for more tariff protection of agriculture in last two decades of the nineteenth century 
whereas as new world also closed its doors to migrants by the second decade of twentieth 
century. This backlash to globalization is held responsible to give rise to nationalism and lead 
to World War I. In the interwar period between first and second World War, there seemed 
almost complete cessation of capital mobility as nations were determined to protect their 
monetary sovereignty in Great Depression.  
 
The present golden age of globalization can also have similar backlash which terminated the 
last one. As compare to the pre-1914 era, the present golden age of globalization regards 
capital and trade flows as more important than labour mobility.  
 
3.2 Historical Crises following Globalization 
Financial crises in Asia and Latin America during 1990s generally give impression that these 
crises are phenomena of current period of globalized financial markets. However, this 
impression is wrong and misleading. Since the advent of capitalism and during the previous 
golden age of globalization in pre-1914 period, various waves of crises related with massive 
capital flows are experienced. 
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The classic case with today’s reverberation is Latin America’s experience with lending booms 
and busts before 1914 (Marichal 1989). The first wave of British capital flows to the new 
states of this region for financing infrastructure and gold and silver mines. This wave 
terminated with the crisis of 1825. The second wave of foreign lending to this region during 
1850s and 1860s was used to finance railroads and ended with the crisis of 1873. The third 
wave that started in the 1880s involved enormous capital flows from Britain and Europe to 
finance the interior  development of this region and ended with the crash of 1890s leading to 
the insolvency of Baring’s, a well-known merchant bank of London.  
 
The Latin experience is classic, but lending booms and busts were also experienced by US 
due to British capital flows (DeLong, 1999). A number of crises also emerged in Europe 
during 1837, 1847, 1857 which forced Bank of England to raise its discount rate in reaction of 
external drain of gold reserves that led to serious consequences for capital flows 
(Auernheimer, 2003). The shifting of international financial setup from London to New York 
during 1920s also caused a new wave of capital flows to the emerging markets which 
terminated with the Great Depression (Bordo, Edelstein and Rockoff, 2002).  
 
The interwar crises were linked with the weaknesses of the gold exchange standard. Due to 
weak credibility of gold convertibility, the capital flows were not stabilizing. So in the face of 
Great Depression, banking panics spread through the gold exchange standard. The adverse 
consequences of this depression were avoided only when countries delinked from gold 
standard by devaluing their currencies. The era of Bretton Woods responded to the problems 
of interwar crises by putting limits on capital flows along with developing systems of deposit 
insurance and lender of last resort. So the crises in this era were purely currency crises in 
which speculators attacked countries that tried to protect exchange rates regardless of their 
macroeconomic and financial policies.  
 
Regarding the incidence and severity of crises of 1990s with the earlier ones, Bordo and 
Eichengreen (1999) exhibited the behavior of real GDP growth during five years before a 
crisis and during five years after a crisis in fifteen emerging and six advanced economies in 
the period of free capital flow from 1880 to 1913. It is then compared with similar behavior 
for ten emerging countries suffered crises during last quarter of twentieth century. They 
encompassed twenty-two crises in emerging economies and seven in advanced economies 
prior to 1914 whereas thirty crises are observed in ten emerging economies for the period 
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since1972. The incidence of emerging market crises today is noted to be substantially higher 
than in the earlier period, i.e. 11.5 percent per country versus 4.3 percent. This study also 
revealed the output effects of emerging market crises to be more severe in recent period as 
compared to the pre-1914 period. The recent crises in emerging economies declined growth 
by 3 percent as compared to the decline of 2 percent in pre-1914 crises.  
 
The measures in this study implied that recent crises of emerging economies are more severe 
with dramatic recession as compared to the emerging market crises before 1914. However the 
recovery was quicker in the crises before 1914 as compared to the recent ones because growth 
rate rose by 2-3 percent during crises before 1914 whereas it didn’t rise at all in recent crises. 
This faster recovery is attributed to adherence to the gold standard before 1914 as countries 
intended to restore convertibility at the former exchange rate once the assets suffered losses 
when the exchange rate collapsed and gains are anticipated as the currency recovered to its 
traditional parity (Miller, 1998).  In simple words, as long as authorities are committed to re-
establish previous exchange rate, they don’t see any fear of unleashing wild inflation by 
abandoning currency peg. Due to this adherence, persistent capital flight is not provoked from 
devaluation. Rather, capital is flown back quite early thereby recovering and stabilizing the 
economy (DeLargy and Goodhart, 1999). 
 
If these two periods i.e. pre-1914 and recent ones are compared with the interwar period, it is 
revealed that interwar period was prone to crises with the incidence of crisis at 10 percent per 
year per country. The severity of Great Depression in US is attributed by Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) to the failure of the FED to act as lender of last resort. Bernanke and James 
(1991) explained this severity as the exceptional depth of the global collapse. But it is 
important to reiterate that crises during interwar period were not linked with the globalization, 
rather they were associated with lending boom and bust experienced as result of global macro 
instability and flawed exchange rate.  
 
The detailed account of historical crises of emerging economies signifies the core importance 
of capital market liberalization in the international free flow of capital. 
 
Section 4. Capital Account Liberalization and Crises  
It is usually argued that financial liberalization, particularly the opening of capital account 
played a key role in the propagation of East Asian crisis in 1997 while South Asian 
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economies escaped it to a large extent by putting control on their capital markets. Since then, 
capital market liberalization is recognized as a main conflict in the debate on globalization 
and integration.  
 
As result of free market agenda, the final decade of twentieth century witnessed the 
development of free trade areas, creation of world trade organization, introduction of 
intellectual property rights, privatizations and deregulations. But liberalization of capital 
markets i.e. free flow of financial capital had always remained a point of contention. IMF as 
major party in international financial architecture made amendment in its charter in Sep 1997 
in its annual meeting in Hong Kong for encouraging capital market liberalization. This was 
exactly the time when Asian crisis was swelling up which grown within a year into a global 
economic recession demanding rescue packages of more than US$ 200 billion. Today, it has 
been well recognized that short-term capital flows i.e. hot speculative funds played a central 
role in the dissemination of this crisis. An IMF paper by Prasad et al. (2003) openly accepted 
the risks inherent in liberalization of capital markets. It initiated critical policy debates on the 
suitability of capital market liberalization for developing and emerging economies.  
 
Now, we would shed some light on the most often observed behavior of international capital 
flows and its implications in bringing crisis. Lending and borrowing as well as sale and 
purchase of financial assets among resident or governments of different countries is regarded 
as capital movements which have two related but distinctive functions. Letting the borrowers 
to consume today and lenders to postpone consumption is one form of it. The other form 
permits borrowers to buy investment instead of consumption which then allows division 
between those who wish to save and those who wish to invest. In case of different countries, 
lending can take form of portfolio capital such as deposits with banks and other financial 
institutions, private or public bonds etc. whereas the borrowers are ‘consumers’ acquiring 
consumption goods or mostly the ‘firms’ acquiring investment goods.  
 
A ‘standard portfolio balance approach’ is usually used to study the behavior of international 
capital in which investors assess the relative return on competing assets by weighing them up 
and make allocation decisions on basis of it (Sikorski, 1996). The movement in international 
capital is receptive of and sensitive to the interest rate differentials between domestic and 
foreign rates that are adjusted according to capital movements in domestic currency and the 
expected rate of domestic inflation. Thus capital inflows are discouraged and capital outflows 
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are encourage when domestic economy is putting ceilings on domestic interest rates in order 
to keep them well below world interest rate (Snowden, 1987). The resulting net outflows 
would eat away domestic as well as foreign deposits of domestic banks due to which they 
have to depend on the central bank for the supply of primary reserves. It implies that the role 
of central bank as net supplier of financial resources becomes more important in case of 
capital flight.   
 
Regarding sensitivity of international capital flows to the expected movements of domestic 
currency, it is argued that devaluation expectations involve capital loss which discourages 
inflow of pure financial capital. The expected rate of currency depreciation is responsive to 
the performance of current account and the form of exchange rate regime. Regarding 
sensitivity of international capital flows to the expected domestic inflation, it is argued that 
assets denominated in foreign currencies provide an inflation hedge in economies with high 
and unstable inflation. Thus, these assets are regarded as stable store of value by domestic 
investors which encourage capital outflow.  
 
Here, it would be relevant to distinguish the exchange rate crisis from the banking crisis, 
although one generally results other, also known as ‘twin crises’. The devaluation 
expectations motivate the exchange rate crisis stimulating holders of domestic currency or 
assets denominated in domestic currency to convert in foreign exchange thereby reducing 
foreign reserves of central bank and eventually the domestic monetary base. It forces banks to 
recall loans which lead to banking crisis. In the anticipation of bank insolvency or 
devaluations, depositors hastily withdraw their deposits in domestic currency to exchange 
them in foreign currency due to which banks are again pressed to recall loans. In this manner, 
exchange rate crisis and banking crisis reinforce each other. 
  
The standard portfolio analysis is applicable to capital flows entering in country to buy 
domestic equity and bonds. But in developing countries, most of the capital is entering as debt 
i.e. direct borrowing from foreign financial institutions or as FDI. Such forms of capital flow 
are not responsive of portfolio based decisions. Instead, debt-based flows may be based on the 
desired foreign borrowing of domestic private or public borrowers and on their perceived 
creditworthiness. The FDI flows may be based on the desire of foreign investor to take 
advantage of certain resource of country e.g. low labor costs.  
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It is generally believed that massive, sudden, and quick capital outflows play key role in 
propagating financial crisis. One reason of such outflows can be attributed to currency 
mismatches i.e. banks borrowing in foreign currency and lending in domestic currency or 
maturity mismatches i.e. firms borrowing short-term to finance long-term projects. Shifting 
from short-term to long-term borrowing is not easy as countries differ immensely in their 
financial structures in terms of institutions, financial technology, and rules of the game that 
specify how financial activity is organized at a given time. Countries with weak financial 
structures usually do not support long-term debt contracts. There is clear evidence that long-
term debt is more widespread in countries that score high on a legal efficiency index 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).  These mismatches often create liquidity problems. 
In case of sudden capital outflows to instigate crisis, it is crucial to distinguish solvency 
problems from liquidity problems. Unlike liquidity, solvency is generally associated with 
inconsistent government policies reflected in budget constraint that is caused by high level of 
government expenditure thereby requiring relatively high inflation tax i.e. financing through 
money creation. In such circumstances, crisis is almost inescapable.  
 
There is another situation known as ‘multiple equilibria’ which can instigate crisis despite of 
maintaining solvency but having liquidity problem. These equilibria are present in a situation 
when negative expectations are self-fulfilled as market reaction to these expectations is 
enough to alter the fundamentals to make solvent condition into insolvent condition. Here 
comes the analogy between exchange rate crisis and banking crisis. The liquidity problem of 
banks will force them to recall loans due to which firms have to liquidate their assets thereby 
jeopardizing their solvency. A classic example in case of exchange rate problem is the 
expectation of government debt default which promptly increase the interest rate at which 
government can refinance its liabilities that would increase their financing costs and result in 
an unsustainable situation thus confirming an originally unjustified expectation. At least at 
theoretical level, cases of multiple equilibria are recognized for bringing banking and 
exchange rate crises. However empirically, ample evidence does not exist. The issues of herd 
behavior and contagion are also associated with the case of multiple equilibria. It infers that 
lenders, particularly foreign lenders base their expectations on behavior of other lenders i.e. 
herd behavior, or crisis one country may spread even to other countries which were initially 
having no solvency problems i.e. contagion. Herd behavior and contagion are quite possible 
even in the environment of perfectly rational economic behavior. These two phenomena will 
be discussed in detail in following sections.  
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The analysis of crises till now clearly reveals the inducement of financial instability following 
financial liberalization and globalization as these trends by the end of 20th century augmented 
the possibility of gigantic adverse consequences of financial instability on economic 
performance. 
 
Section 5.  Liberalization and Instability  
During and after Asian and Latin American crises of 1990s, the subject of financial stability 
has become overwhelming in policy discussions, which can be demonstrated from periodic 
reports on this subject by dozens of central banks and international financial institutions. 
Along with policy discussions, the academic literature also continues to grow in this area 
(Allen and Gale, 2004; Bernardo and Welch, 2004). Consequent upon negative experiences 
and lessons, financial stability is broadly acknowledged as significant to maintain 
macroeconomic and monetary stability for achieving sustainable economic growth. 
 
5.1 Growing Significance of Stability 
The scenario which intensified the significance of financial stability has been elaborated by 
Schinasi (2006) by indicating four key prevailing conditions. One is the expansion of 
financial systems at much high pace as compared to the growth of real economy. Another 
condition that accompanied this financial deepening is the change in the composition of the 
financial system with decreasing share of monetary assets and increasing share of non-
monetary assets which amplifies the leverage of the monetary base. Third condition is the 
cross-industry and cross-border integration of financial systems resulting in their greater 
international orientation which is reflected in the growing size of international transactions in 
bond and equity relative to GDP. Final condition is the increased complexity of financial 
systems in terms of sophisticated financial instruments, diverse activities and related risk 
transfers, all of which are encouraged by financial innovation stemmed from liberalization. 
This complexity has made it very hard and challenging for market participants, supervisors, 
and policymakers to trail the development of risks over time. All of such developments have 
made the task of safeguarding the financial stability difficult more than ever, in all 
financialized economies, developing as well as developed ones.  
 
Despite of all the intellectual and practical advancements in financial stability analysis during 
last two decades, it is yet in a preliminary stage as compared to the macroeconomic and 
monetary analysis. Even entire body of analysis on this subject is failed to provide a 
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meaningful and comprehensive framework to monitor and evaluate financial stability in real 
time in order to prevent problems before their occurrence or resolving them after their 
occurrence. That’s why no unified definition exists for the term of ‘financial stability’, may be 
because modern finance does not view private financial activities in the collective or 
government purview. However, the private benefits that are widespread and enormous are 
resulted from the existence of modern financial systems which are recognized as ‘public 
good’. This does not necessarily justify the public policy involvement in private finance as all 
people does not have equal access or take equal private benefits but social benefits do exist in 
liberalized economies. Due to inherent market imperfections discussed in last chapter, private 
incentives and actions alone cannot lead to efficient pricing and allocation of capital and 
financial risks. This encourages some arrangement of collective action and public policy 
involvement in order to provide incentives to inspire the private sector for obtaining desirable 
outcome. Since such involvement includes various cost-benefit, inter-temporal, social and 
political considerations, therefore, it is difficult to develop and implement an all-inclusive and 
integrated framework for financial stability.  
 
In this aim, Schinasi (2006) defined financial stability as the ability of the financial system to 
facilitate and enhance economic processes, manage risks, and absorb shocks. He considered 
financial stability as a continuum that is changeable over time and consistent with multiple 
combinations of constituent elements of finance. But no consensus exists as yet on what 
financial stability exactly means (Oosterloo and de Haan, 2003). Some defined it in terms of 
absence of a situation in which financial imbalances weaken the real economy (Davis, 2002), 
for instance, information problems depressing the ability of financial system to allocate funds 
to productive investment opportunities (Mishkin, 1999), or financial problems stemming from 
relations between financial institutions or markets which have potential to adversely affect the 
real economy (Summer, 2003). Allen and Wood (2006) and Padoa-Schioppa (2003) defined 
financial stability in terms of the robustness of the financial system to external shocks. 
Financial stability is defined by Haldane (2004) by using a simple model in which asset prices 
function to ensure the optimal level of savings and investment. Some others like Borio (2003) 
specify financial stability as restricting risks of significant real output losses accompanying 
with incidents of system-wide financial distress. 
 
In this aim, the concept of financial stability can also be discussed in terms of systemic risk. 
De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) and De Bandt et al. (2009) did an extensive literature survey 
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on this subject but failed to find any agreed definition. De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) 
defined systemic risk as risk of being affected by systemic events as result of initial shocks 
which later affect institutions that have been profoundly solvent ex ante. Perotti and Suarez 
(2009) took systemic risk as propogation risk, where shocks spread beyond the extent of their 
direct economic impact and result in diffused distress and disruption of the real economy. 
Another view to analyze systemic risk with respect to (in)stability is given by Borio (2003) 
which is connected with the business cycle i.e. risk is fundamentally endogenous and reveals 
the interaction between the financial system and the real economy that results in 
overextension in booms, resulting in subsequent downturn and financial strains. In this 
context, endogenous cycle view of financial instability in the spirit of Minsky (1982) and 
Kindleberger (1989) are very relevant. Management of financial (in)stability is an area which 
will be explored in detail in final chapter. At this point, the objective of briefly discussing this 
notion is to initiate the critique on the claim of FL to enhance the stability of financial system.    
 
IMF study by Prasad et al. (2003) repeatedly emphasizes that theory predicts that 
liberalization and opening of financial markets should enhance stability, even though it didn’t, 
which characterizes the misguidance of theory. Thus, some of the principal reforms in 
financial and capital markets during 1990s, whatever their virtue might have been, subjected 
developing and emerging countries to increased exposure to risks and vulnerabilities causing 
financial instability. Allowing free capital mobility also has potential to increase equity 
volatility which aggravates financial instability. As expressed by Dornbusch and Park (1995), 
“there is ample evidence that financial market opening is likely to increase the volatility in 
asset prices” (p. 39).  
 
Although previous sections have elaborated various linkages, the following section would 
specifically describe the mechanisms which lead FL to financial instability by taking insights 
from Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz (2006).  
 
5.2 Liberalization to Instability Mechanisms 
FL increases instability, particularly short-term flows of funds most widespread in case of 
emerging economies. There are various different but related reasons why financial, more 
notably capital liberalization leads to increased instability which are ensued below. 
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5.2.1 Speculation 
Ideas presented in Keynes’ General Theory impose ‘rationality’ as the decisive criterion. In 
this regard, Winslow (2003) asserted that Keynes’ rational speculation meant “rationally 
forecasting the irrational behavior of others” (Winslow, 2003, p. 151). Theoretically, 
‘rational’ speculation is stabilizing because investors buy a currency when exchange rate is 
weak and sell when exchange rate is strong, thereby reducing the exchange rate fluctuations. 
For instance, Milton Friedman eminently argued that speculation in financial markets cannot 
be destabilizing because if destabilizing speculators drive asset values away from equilibrium 
levels, they will loose money and eventually be driven out of the market (Friedman and 
Schwartz, 1963). However, market can continue to get it wrong for a very long time (Minsky, 
1972; Kindleberger, 1973). Thus, rationality is not often exhibited by markets and 
liberalization has potential to expose economies to irrational exuberance. Particularly the 
emerging and developing economies with relatively small or shallow markets are more prone 
to such fluctuations and resulting bubbles having devastating effects. Since liberalization of 
capital markets allows speculative capital to deluge in a country which appreciates currency. 
Although these inflows support short-term growth, but they also lead to an abrupt increase in 
consumption that resultantly alter the production structure. Moreover, these short-term flows 
of capital tend to go in real estate and equity markets, instead of long-term investments. This 
behavior shoots up market prices that resultantly generate wealth effects increasing 
consumption expenditure. This combination of appreciated currency and demand boom is 
growth-inducing for non-tradable sectors like services and construction but export-threating 
as it is difficult for domestic producers to compete with foreign goods.  
 
These capital inflows frequently turn into outflows e.g. speculative inflows in Thailand during 
mid-1990s lead to real estate bubble which is then burst in 1997 undermining high return 
expectation thereby stopping capital inflows and turning them into outflows.  The same 
situation happened in Latin America during late-1990s that accumulated high debt, high 
current account deficit and currency overvaluation during period of flooding inflows. These 
accumulated vulnerabilities turned off international sentiment towards emerging markets 
leading to capital outflows. 
 
Just like capital inflows briefly lift an economy, capital outflows are also tended to dampen 
the economy as they deprive banks of required resources that put pressure for credit 
contraction which monetary authorities usually fail to offset. Abrupt outflows also depreciate 
163 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
the currency which escalates the domestic value of debt denominated in foreign currency. 
Anxious about the effects of this depreciation on inflation, central banks are forced to increase 
the interest rates in order to safeguard the economy thereby further depressing the economy. 
Governments are also pressurized to cut back expenditures due to falling tax revenues and 
drying up foreign credit thereby further aggravating the downturn of the economy.  
 
It is ironic that such destabilizing capital flows generally upset countries with good economic 
policies more than the countries with not-so-good economic policies. Countries with good 
economies policies are encouraged to borrow more and that also on favorable terms and this 
high debt level makes them vulnerable thus changing investors’ sentiments about these 
countries initially with good policies. An interesting example in this regard is of Argentina 
which is publicized by IMF in its annual meeting in 1998 as a ‘model of developing nations’ 
but soon reprimanded its corrupt politicians and incompetent policies after realizing 
Argentina’s critical state in upcoming crisis.   
 
5.2.2 Financial Derivatives 
The growing use of derivative products is another source of instability related with the 
liberalization of capital markets. Derivatives provide substantial benefits by permitting 
financial risks to be precisely customized according to risk preferences and risk appetites 
which play a key role in completing financial markets, improving market liquidity, and 
increasing the risk taking capacity of the financial system. Although micro-instability has 
been reduced with the development of derivatives market as new hedging instruments permit 
individuals to cover their microeconomic risks. But the resultant reduced transparency creates 
large off-balance sheet positions that are tough to regulate and it also quickens markets’ 
response to abrupt changes in expectations.  
 
Particularly the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives driven by advances in information and 
computer technologies are used heavily by international financial institutions. The series of 
crises during last two decades demonstrates the role of OTC derivatives in producing fragility, 
accumulating vulnerabilities, and threatening stability. The near collapse of long-term capital 
management (LTCM) in 1998 due to large buildup in derivatives credit exposures left then 
Chairman of US  Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan (Greenspan, 1998) and former Bundesbank 
President Hans Teitmeyer (Teitmeyer 1999) acknowledging their failure to understand the 
rapidly changing structure and dynamics of global financial markets. But despite of 
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acknowledging risky aspects of derivative market, FED Chairman continued to encourage and 
praise ‘self-regulation’ for these financial innovations. “Key regulators, like Alan Greenspan, 
didn’t really believe in regulation; when the excesses of the financial system were noted, they 
called for self-regulation – an oxymoron” (Stiglitz, 2008b). 
 
Absence of regulation and supervision along with the lack of disclosure and limited 
transparency is threatening for stability of financial systems. The widespread involvement of 
banks in derivative business implies that its risk exposure can change on hourly basis. By 
realizing this fact, a new idea is emerged that supervisors should inspect the risk-assessment 
framework designed by bank itself to ensure that bank has implemented policies to 
appropriately limit its risk exposure and then monitor bank’s compliance with these declared 
policies. 
 
5.2.3 Market Manipulation 
Market manipulation is the intentional effort to interfere with free and fair market operations 
in order to create artificial, false or misleading trends in market prices. Particularly the thin 
markets in developing countries expose them to market manipulation if they are liberalized.  
For example, central bank of Malaysia accused international hedge funds for manipulating 
Malaysian financial markets in the 1990s. Another example is of Hong Kong which was 
criticized for being dangerously interventionist despite of widespread reports of market 
manipulation done by international banks and hedge funds. Although Hong Kong’s credit 
rating was downgraded, yet it managed to stabilize its economy by making use of its large 
reserves which most developing countries often does not have. Besides, holding so much 
wealth in reserves has high opportunity costs. 
 
5.2.4 Contagion 
Liberalized financial and capital markets expose countries to irrational exuberance and 
pessimism of ‘foreign’ investments. Various empirical studies also show that most of the 
shocks experienced by developing countries were generated by ‘external’ factors which 
demonstrate the role of ‘contagion’ i.e. problems or crisis in one country leading elsewhere. 
For example, during optimism boom in emerging markets in 1990s, capital even rushed to 
countries having considerable macroeconomic problems but after 1997 crisis, it even flew 
away from countries having good macroeconomic fundamentals.  
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Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000), by surveying extensive literature on contagion, 
established that the ways in which shocks are transmitted during a crisis seem to differ and 
these differences seem to be significant. For instance, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) have 
emphasized on bank channel for contagion. In case of loss in a country, bank has lesser funds 
to lend even in other countries due to declined capital which make other countries to suffer 
from ‘non-fundamental’ contagion. But for this channel to lead to such contagion, other banks 
are supposed to not to offset this reduced lending of a bank. In case of domestic crisis, Panetti 
(2011) extended the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of financial intermediation to study the 
effect of liquidity provision by market-based channels on contagion in liberalized 
environment. Instead of putting pressure solely on intermediaries, market-based channels (i.e. 
hidden or unobservable markets) allow agents to take benefit from autarkic interbank markets. 
But this benefit disappears in integrated and liberalized interbank markets because unexpected 
liquidity shocks lead to bankruptcy and contagion.  
 
Various studies have tried to estimate contagion by evaluating changes in correlations across 
countries between periods of crisis and non-crisis. Correlations generally increase during 
crisis period which can infer that since crises make market move closer, there must be 
contagion. But such analysis is suffered from problem i.e. high absolute returns during crisis 
period. The correlation conditioned on the presence of large absolute returns has to be higher 
than the unconditional correlation even in case of constant unconditional correlation. 
Resultantly, it would be misleading to believe that there is contagion when actually there is 
none because returns conditioned on crisis periods will automatically give the presence of 
contagion. Empirical research fails to show the existence of a contagion if it accounts for the 
statistical problems in isolating contagion effects. For example, Baig and Goldfajn (1999) 
controlled number of economic variables and found difficulty in viewing any strong evidence 
of increase in correlations in equity markets during East Asian crisis. However, Bae, Karolyi, 
and Stulz (2000) measured the extent of contagion along with characterizing its economic 
significance and its determinants in emerging markets during 1990s. They argued on basis of 
their finding that contagion is predictable if measured by the co-incidence within and across 
regions of extreme return shocks. It is established by them that contagion depends on regional 
interest rates, exchange rate changes, and stock return volatility.  
 
Broadly speaking, three channels of contagion can be identified in the existing body of 
research: real links (i.e. spillover across countries through trade and FDI), financial links (i.e. 
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international trading of financial assets and liabilities), and herd behavior (as result of 
asymmetric information). It is hard to conclude the relative significance of these channels. But 
general agreement exists on the existence of certain degree of vulnerability in a given country 
in order to get affected from contagion. Presence of strong economic fundamentals 
substantially reduces the chances of getting hit from an external shock32.  
 
5.2.5 Balance Sheet Effects, Short-term Booms and Productivity Shocks 
There are three other sources of instability through which capital flow volatility is 
transformed into broad macroeconomic instability. One is the ‘balance sheet effects’ i.e. 
capital flows affect macroeconomic prices e.g. interest rate, exchange rate etc. which have 
impact on balance sheets as well as on investment, saving, and consumption decisions. 
Changes in balance sheet not only generate significant wealth effects but also lead to 
bankruptcy and financial disruption. For instance, getting foreign debt denominated in foreign 
currencies and investing it in domestic assets denominated in domestic currency can result in 
bankruptcies in the event of domestic currency devaluation as foreign liabilities would 
increase in relation to the domestic assets. When these adverse effects are large, the short-
term dynamics may also prove fierce and not self-correcting. 
 
Another source is ‘short-term booms’ i.e. positive effects of capital inflows in short run and 
negative effects in long run. Capital inflows in a country having idle factors of production can 
stimulate a recovery but growing output and productivity that is based on the utilization of 
previously unutilized factors must not be confused with the structural increase in the speed of 
productivity improvements or with improving long-term performance of the economy. People 
may assume the income growth as a permanent feature and increase their consumption due to 
which most of the capital would go to finance consumption instead of investment. This may 
result in increased indebtedness without corresponding increase in ability to service debt 
thereby leading to destabilization.  
 
There is one more source of instability related with medium-term fluctuations in the economy 
that can arise even with rational expectations. An economy experiencing abnormally high 
productivity i.e. productivity shock enhances its capacity and desire to borrow. It leads to 
capital inflows and increased incomes due to productivity shock and capital inflow. However, 
                                                          
32
 This remark seems to be weak in the wake of current crisis of 2007/08, a topic to be dealt with in next chapter. 
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when this bubble bursts and productivity level returns to normal, incomes will shrink due to 
capital flowing out of the country in search of higher returns. The effects of productivity 
fluctuations in domestic economy are aggravates in liberalized capital markets.  
 
5.2.6 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Unlike short-term capital flows, FDI is interested in long-term performance of the domestic 
economy. The example of China is very relevant in this respect which encourage FDI while 
maintain restrictions on short-term capital flows. FDI enters in an economy for expected 
advantages in terms of getting future income benefit as well as producing at minimum cost.  
Since FDI enters for purely productive reasons, it is accompanied by new investments in 
physical capital like plant and equipment, resulting in employment generation and real 
growth.  
 
However, FDI can also move pro-cyclically giving rise to instability. One of its reasons is FDI 
is sometimes only ‘finance’ e.g. mergers, acquisitions and privatizations are classified as FDI 
whereas it is actually a mere transfer of ownership instead of a new investment, signifying the 
importance of separating new ‘greenfield’ investments from privatizations, mergers and 
acquisitions. Another reason is the nature of FDI which makes it to respond to a decline in 
domestic economy in the same manner as domestic investment does. Moreover, foreign direct 
investors find it tough to sell their assets in case of a crisis due to which they frequently use 
derivatives like options and forwards in order to sell domestic currency as a hedge of their 
investment which lead to run on the economy.  
 
5.3 Challenging Tradeoff between Financial Stability and Economic Growth 
The challenge of achieving and maintaining financial stability is characterized as sustaining 
smooth functioning of the financial system for ensuring its ability to support the performance 
of the economy and placing preventive mechanisms to avoid systemic problems “without 
undermining the economy’ ability to grow” which is the hardest part of the challenge.  
 
Maintaining overly protective or restraining mechanisms of stability is undesirable as it can 
undermine risk-taking to a level where economic efficiency is inhibited. The objective of 
financial stability needs to be balanced with high priority objective of economic efficiency. 
The nation which is revealed from this balance is that finance itself is not an end rather it 
plays facilitative role in improving economic system’s ability to perform its main function. 
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The probability of systemic problems can be curtailed through such rules and regulations 
which can control financial activities in such a manner that that likelihood of destabilizing 
price volatility, asset market turmoil, bank failures etc. can at least be reduced if not 
completely removed. But this level of stability tends to be attained at the expense of financial 
and economic efficiency. This tendency leads to a perceived tradeoff between growth and 
stability i.e. stability may be attained and maintained by trading off some economic efficiency 
and eventually economic growth. 
  
An important aspect of liberalization, as we have discussed, is its accompanying instability 
but it can be acceptable if it fosters growth. It can be regarded as a fundamental argument in 
favor of FL. Liberalized markets stimulates growth by improving economic efficiency and 
increasing investment. Domestic savings and investment would thus further improve with the 
expansion of aggregate income resulting in a ‘virtuous cycle’ of sustained economic growth – 
a cycle that contributes in converging levels of economic development among countries. 
However, there is a condition for liberalization to promote growth which is that capital 
inflows must go into investment instead of going into consumption. During 1970s and during 
1990-97, capital went into developing countries but did not meet this condition because it 
mostly went to investment in domestic non-tradable sector unable to generate foreign 
exchange due to which balance of payment crises eventually occurred as mounting foreign 
debt is unmatched by ability to meet debt obligations.  
 
Some analysis of trends over time and across countries revealed that liberalization is not 
necessarily associated the higher levels of investment and economic growth. For instance, 
after World War II, the global growth of GDP per capita was high despite of the fact the 
financial and capital markets were not very liberalized. On the contrary, pace of global 
economic growth fell with increasingly pervasive liberalized markets e.g. GDP per capita rose 
1.8 percent during 1970s, 1.4 percent during 1980s, and simply 1.1 percent from 1990 to 
2003. Moreover, the fact that China attracted more FDI than any other developing countries 
despite of retaining capital controls weakens the claim that liberalization is indispensable to 
attract foreign investment. Another similar example is of Hungary which during early-to-mid 
1990s attracted the greatest amount of FDI in Eastern Europe regardless of maintaining short-
term capital restrictions. 
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This must be recognized that financial stability and economic growth are ‘inseparable’. One 
way to analyze this notion is the ‘complementary’ nature of stability and growth. Policies 
which are prone to instability or lower incomes today are likely to hinder growth and output 
in future. Economic fluctuations and volatility in general and crises in particular have massive 
costs in achieving dual objectives of growth and stability. Even the exceptional cases of fast 
recovery i.e. v-shaped recovery are not exempted from these costs because crisis has tendency 
to put economy on low growth path even after recovery because an economy that had, for 
instance, growth rate of 8 percent and then suffered a 5 percent drop in it due to crisis actually 
experienced 13 percent decline in real terms.  
 
Another way to see the stability and growth relationship is the existence of ‘tradeoff’ between 
the two. As noted in IMF Global Financial Stability Report of 2012, a system that is too safe 
may limit the funds available for lending (e.g. minimum capital requirement that is too high) 
and hinder growth. It implies that maintaining more capital is a simple, direct and effective 
approach to stability, but it limits growth prospects. Thus, it is conflicting and hard for 
financial institutions to strengthen their balance sheets and capital reserves in order to satisfy 
stability-ensuring regulators along with increasing their lending to businesses in order to 
enhance economic growth.  
 
A consensus has been developed that developing and emerging countries do not have 
prerequisites for FL to be successful, but no consensus exists on whether they should take FL 
as their ultimate goal. Even sound financial systems with improved regulatory framework 
might withstand some of instability. Impediment of economic growth is also another issue to 
be cautious about. Thus, liberalization of financial and capital markets may not necessarily be 
a long term goal of all developing and emerging economies. Particularly the smaller countries 
may never be able to sufficiently safeguard themselves from instability accompanying 
liberalization. This implies the need for some form and degree of capital controls to provide 
tools to manage risks associated with free capital movements, especially short-term flows.   
 
The analysis of third generation models of speculative attack followed from first and second 
generation models is particularly relevant in this respect. 
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Section 6. Capital Controls and Third Generation Models  
Although this dissertation took the case of Asian and Latin American crises of 1997-98, the 
currency crisis of 1992-93 in Europe and 1994 crisis in Mexico motivated the modeling of 
speculative attacks on government controlled exchange rates. Since then, it has been a usual 
practice to group various analytical treatments of crises in first, second and third generation 
models.  
 
Introduced by Paul Krugman (1979) in his seminal paper ‘A model of balance of payment 
crisis’, the first generation models consider a passive government and central banks with 
incompatible policies to deal with fiscal deficit by engaging rate of monetary expansion 
inconsistent with the stability level of prices and exchange rate. The problem lies in the 
passive and transparent behavior of monetary authority which is perfectly known to the 
speculators. So a sudden speculative attack on fixed exchange rate apparently emerging from 
irrational change in expectations of investors is actually emerging from their rational 
behavior, as they foresee monetary authority’s foreign reserves drying out as result of 
excessive deficit up to a level where it is not possible to continue maintaining fixed exchange 
rate. Consequently, investors hold currency as long as fixed exchange rate is maintained but 
get rid of these holdings when they anticipate that fixed regime is near to its end. On the other 
side, monetary authority does not have any perfect information about speculators’ behavior 
which demands a challenging task of modeling the mutual interface between speculators and 
monetary authority.     
 
The second generation models are introduced by Obstfeld (1986) in his paper on ‘Rational 
and self-fulfilling balance of payment crises’ which argue that reservations about central 
bank’s willingness to maintain fixed exchange rate lead to multiple equilibria. It suggests the 
existence of self-fulfilling prophecies i.e. investors attack the currency in the expectation of 
other investors’ attack on the currency. Contrary to the first generation, the second generation 
models do not accuse policy inconsistency before crisis, rather crisis itself prompts a policy 
change that makes the crisis self-validating. That is, the expectation of fundamentals 
expansion ex post pulls the economy into crisis.  
 
Third generation' models explored the interaction between currency crises and financial 
system. For instance, the over-borrowing by banks to finance moral hazard is a form of 
hidden government debt as governments have to bail out insolvent banks (McKinnon and Pill, 
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1996; Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1998) or currency crisis leading to banking crisis in case 
of large holdings of debt denominated in foreign currency, particularly in the face of 
government guarantees (Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2004). Third generation models 
predict the possibility of good and bad equilibria with more focus on private financial 
intermediaries.  
 
The evaluation of capital controls is most useful and relevant in context of such multiple-
equilibrium financial structure models. Some fundamental models of financial market 
structure are as follows: 
 
6.1 Bank and Country Runs 
The classical Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of bank runs provides a defined environment 
with demand for liquidity allowing banks to perform maturity transformation function which 
is welfare enhancing in equilibrium. But there is also a second equilibrium which leads to 
bank run in which all depositors try to withdraw their funds leaving bank to liquidate its assets 
for meeting these withdrawal demands.  
 
There are two main factors in Diamond-Dybvig model: First is that higher returns on 
investments require funds to be committed for some periods of time as assets held to maturity 
offer higher returns than assets sold before maturity.  Second factor is the uncertainty as when 
funds would be needed because it is probable that an investor may require to liquidate his 
assets before maturity. Bank can offer liquidity risk insurance to individuals by accepting 
their deposits to invest in long-term assets by specifying in the deposit contract the amount of 
withdrawal prior to maturity which would enable bank to maintain the level of reserves 
needed to meet withdrawal demands by ‘impatient’ depositors. In this environment, ‘patient’ 
depositors will be better off if they hold their assets till maturity but if they expect 
withdrawals by other patient depositors, it will be individually rational for them to do the 
same which would lead to bank run. Despite of liquidating its assets, bank would have 
insufficient funds to meet withdrawal demands by all patient depositors thereby resulting in 
bank failure. This idea of patient and impatient international investors is vital in the analysis 
of capital flows. 
 
The Diamond-Dybvig model is also used by Chang and Velasco (2001) for the analysis of 
international capital flows. If domestic depositors believe that foreign lenders will not prolong 
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short-term credit may also trigger a bank run resulting forced closure of domestic banks. Thus 
the presence of short-term foreign borrowing increases the domestic financial sector more 
vulnerable and fragile. Therefore the nature of financial instruments traded exhibits investors’ 
behavior as impatient investors having high probability of country run are more likely to 
prefer short term debt instruments.  
 
There are three principal solutions regarding international capital flows which emphasize on 
the nature of the deposit contract have been studied: 
 
6.1.1 Narrow Banking 
Narrow banking characterizes what is earlier termed as ‘required reserves’ which may reduce 
the possibility of run by maintaining certain level of reserves to meet withdrawal demands, 
but they do so by reducing bank’s ability of maturity transformation. This implies the 
economy’s return to the autarkic equilibrium.  
 
Capital control regime under narrow banking requires the maturity structure of a country’s 
foreign liabilities to match the maturity structure of its foreign assets. This solution to country 
run is relevant in the context of international financial markets. For instance, emerging 
economies usually borrow short term for investing in domestic capital stock and for building 
foreign exchange reserves. But the necessity of liquidity transformation as welfare-improving 
aspect of international lending is not clear.  
 
6.1.2 Suspension 
Suspension of convertibility implies that bank can maintain reserves sufficient to meet 
withdrawal demands of impatient depositors but it can simply suspend convertibility in case 
of additional withdrawals. As its result, bank will have ample funds because it suspends 
convertibility when deposit withdrawals are threatening its reserves. Consequently, impatient 
depositors can withdraw their funds whereas patient ones have no incentive to withdraw when 
they know that bank can meet their demands with its ample funds. Without affecting maturity 
transformation ability of the bank, suspension acts like an equilibrium device by ensuring 
good equilibrium in economy without creating runs.  
 
This suspension clearly advocates capital controls as policy to avoid crisis. Even before the 
creation of the FED, it was customary for US bank to suspend convertibility during banking 
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crises. Another example is the proposal for IMF sanctioned suspension of debt service 
payment.  
 
6.1.3 Equity Investment 
Another solution involves the alteration of deposit contract by replacing it with equity stake. 
Under this arrangement, impatient depositors are enabled to sell their shares at market price 
while patient depositors can buy additional shares. While eradicating the likelihood of a run, 
equity contracts may prove worse than deposit contracts as a means to provide liquidity 
insurance. 
 
However, this potential incompetence is less relevant in case of international capital flows 
where stability of domestic financial sector is more important than liquidity provision. 
Although equity contract solve problems of bank and country run, these contracts become less 
attractive when other imperfections of credit market are recognized e.g. imperfect information 
leading to agency costs and collateral demands etc. In this setting, bank’s ability to raise funds 
is inhibited by the fluctuations in bank’s share price.  
 
In addition to these three main solutions, options of explicit ‘deposit insurance’ and 
‘international lender of last resort’ to provide implicit insurance are also considered to be 
useful. These options might work as alternatives to capital controls for avoiding bank runs. 
But again, one may think these choices have moral hazard implications, as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. Besides these options, regulations may take form of prudential regulations to 
limit riskiness of underlying asset portfolio or the form of capital controls to change the 
incentive to run. In this aim, it is of utmost importance to evaluate the core reasons for 
investor runs and panics which make financial markets fragile. 
 
6.2 Herding 
One such reason is associated with ‘herd behavior’ i.e. founding one’s actions to a large 
extent on others’ actions. Individuals exhibit herd behavior when they tend to mimic rational 
or irrational actions of a larger group. A key reference on this subject is the classic paper of 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) which exhibited the information aggregation in financial 
markets. Plott (2000) and Hey and Morone (2004) studied herd behavior in financial markets 
with particular focus on stock market. Beine, Benassy-Quéré and Colas (2003) also found 
empirical evidence on herding in the foreign exchange market.  
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Instead of relying on their own information about fundamental conditions, investors base their 
actions on what others are doing. Actions of others speak louder especially in event of a crisis 
when investors tend to disregard and ignore their private information while following and 
copying others’ behaviors and actions of early movers. Now it is interesting to note that when 
few investors who are early movers liquidate their holdings in a country, other investors think 
that there must be good reasons for this action whereas actually there may not be any reason 
for this action. But this inference also leads other investors to liquidate and to stimulate a run. 
In this respect, there are two important aspects: one is the quality of investors’ own 
information i.e. if it is of good quality, investor may ignore others’ actions while relying on 
his private information. The other element is the belief about the quality of information 
possessed by other investors, i.e. belief that other investors who are liquidating have better 
information leads to herd behavior. It infers that actual problem is the information and the 
lack of information. In this regard, public information can be of some help but it entails 
credibility problem. Government may try to provide some information on the condition of the 
economy, but it would probably release only that information which can curtail the panic.  
 
The ability to respond to others’ actions generates the information cascades that my lead to 
panic outflows. However, capital controls can stop such outflows during crisis by making it 
expansive and difficult through limiting the actions available to foreign investors which could 
be copied by other investors. Information cascades also have implications for contagion 
because information from observing others’ actions is not perfect or precise. For instance, it 
does matter that international investors during currency crisis expect fall in return due to 
country specific factors or due to the general factors. In latter case, they would conclude the 
lower expected returns not only in country facing crisis but in all countries. However, herd 
behavior often results in case of poor information so it is not very probable for investors to 
draw clear inference regarding crisis spurring either from country specific factors or from 
factors affecting all countries in similar manner. Thus any sign of crisis spread may promptly 
lead to outbreaks in other countries. Incorrect information leads to information cascades 
which result in runs generating inefficient outcomes. The provision of better information is 
not possible, as described earlier, due to credibility problem which exists with domestic 
government as well as international agencies as they do not have any incentive to provide 
release correct information unless it is good.  
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6.3 Rational Information-Based Runs 
The Diamond-Dybvig model of runs as well as herd behavior arising from information 
cascades are basically reflective of bubble phenomena, i.e. there is no key reason of the runs. 
But contrary approach is the occurrence of runs on the basis of fundamental and rational 
information. Bank portfolios as subject to risk and depositors having imperfect information 
about value of these portfolios leads to inference that any new information about returns on 
one category assets would inter alia affect prices of other assets with correlated returns 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Especially in case of bad news about returns in one country, 
investors might sell off their holdings in other countries. Such type of contagion is resulted 
from a rational response to any new information. Regarding the role of information on bank 
runs, the work of Gorton (1985), Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), Jacklin and Bjattacharya 
(1988), and Chari and Jagannathan (1988) holds a seminal position.  
 
Suspension of convertibility can be an efficient response of banks to information based bank 
runs in order to give signal to depositors about its health. However, those individuals who 
actually need to withdraw for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post. As noted by Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963), restrictions on payments ensured that ‘panic(s) had a reasonable small 
effect on the banking structure … and gave time for the immediate panic to wear off … 
(nevertheless) they are regarded as anything but a satisfactory solution by those who 
experienced them, which is why they produced such strong pressure for monetary and 
financial reform’ (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 329). Diamond-Dybvig (1983) also 
contend suspension of convertibility as an optimal mechanism for preventing runs unless real 
expenditure needs for a given period are definitely known.  
 
6.4 Insurance Attacks 
There are certain distortions created by lender of last resort solution to runs and resulting 
panics. It provides incentives to investors to acquire insured claims on residents and then 
acquire government’s assets due to optimal yield differentials (Dooley 2000). These 
incentives of private investors and timing of investment decisions are determined by the credit 
constraints of developing countries’ governments.  
 
This type of free insurance increases the market yield on certain liabilities for certain time 
period. This yield differential results in private gross capital inflow which lasts till speculative 
attack. The private inflow is inevitably accompanied with increase in the government’s 
176 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
international reserves, current account deficit, and gross private capital outflow. When the 
government’s reserves are matched with its contingent insurance liabilities, it would drop the 
expected yield on domestic liabilities below market rates. It leads investors to sell their 
insured assets to the government thereby exhausting government’s reserves. In this case, the 
speculative attack is completely anticipated and nothing extraordinary happens to the 
fundamentals or fundamentals expectations. 
 
The conditions under which insurance is credible differentiate developed countries from 
developing countries. It is rational for developed countries to assume that governments can 
always borrow for fulfill its insurance commitments, thus they have to constantly monitor 
private sector to discourage any efforts to misuse insurance. On the other side, it is rational for 
developing countries to assume that government will face market interest rate in the face of 
crisis making it unviable to borrow while insurance commitments are credible only in the 
presence of assets with pre-determined interest rates that can be liquidated to facilitate the 
insurance. It must be noted that insurance related distortions emerge only when government 
has acquired assets and these distortions are not long lasting as private sector would instantly 
set out to apprehend these government’s acquired assets.  
 
In this connection, capital controls can prove useful. For instance, regulation of capital 
inflows can be effective in starving an insurance crisis by limiting the fuel that can endure it. 
Since insurance exploiting investors usually hold assets for shorter time period as compared to 
honest investors, therefore, the sequence of capital flow and crisis has predictable spell. A 
transaction tax may also be levied on such capital flows if spell is short and this tax would 
remove the reason to exploit the insurance.  
 
Section 7. Capital Management and Re-imposition of Controls  
Interest in capital controls has been highly cyclical as observed by Tobin (1996) “the interest 
that occasionally arose came from journalists and financial pundits. It was usually triggered 
by currency crises and died out when the crisis passed from the headlines” (Tobin, 1996, P. 
ix-xviii). Financial crises being a frequent phenomenon in recent years have led to the 
recognition of obvious welfare costs of crises and to a general reassessment of strategies for 
liberalizing repressed financial systems. Most of the developing countries maintain 
restrictions and controls through post-World War II till 1970s after which general push for 
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deregulation and liberalization forced them to dismantle these controls. Most of the debate on 
liberalization is referred to the series of crises during 1990s hitting emerging market 
economies of developing countries in Asia and Latin America most of which have more 
developed financial and capital markets and better administrative capability than the least 
developed countries. However, there were still some countries in Asia including India, China, 
Vietnam, Taiwan etc. which despite of IMF’s push for liberalization maintained capital 
market regulations during much of the 1990s which helped to insulate these countries from 
contagion during the crisis of 1990s.  
 
Notwithstanding general skepticism regarding capital controls, growing number of 
economists are now starting to agree that emerging markets should think about adopting 
policies inclined to limit the volatility of capital flows. So much so that IMF which at one 
point was considering to make free flow of capital as one of its primary goals has now 
become more flexible on this issue during recent years. Michael Camdessus, Managing 
Director of IMF, encouraged East Asian countries to consider imposing temporary controls 
“because of the greatest threat to instability is posed by more volatile short-term inflows…the 
adoption of prudential requirements vis-à-vis short-term inflows has played a useful role” 
(Camdessus, 1997). An argument in favor of controls is the failure of individuals’ ability to 
internalize the effect of their indebtedness on the interest rate for the rest of country’s 
residents and government. High stock of debt held by some individuals increased their default 
risk which makes international lenders to impose ‘risk-adjusted interest rate’ on whole 
country’s debt. This distortion theoretically asks to levy tax on foreign debt holdings. But this 
argument is not very popular in the proponents of capital controls. A body of evidence exist 
on the effectiveness of the controls in successfully switching capital inflows away from short-
term flows (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).  
 
But a general argument against imposition of controls is that they inhibit the optimal 
allocation of resources, prevent optimal portfolio diversification, stimulate irresponsible 
macropolicy, and lead to corruption (Cooper, 1998). Case of Latin America is presented by 
Edwards (1999) to establish the ineffectiveness of preventive controls on capital outflows as 
they can be easily evaded thereby leading to corruption and bad policies. According to him, 
although controls succeeded in stretching the maturity structure for foreign indebtedness 
which reduces vulnerabilities to unexpected reversals, however this is attained at the expense 
of higher cost of capital. Glick and Hutchison (2005) find evidence that capital controls may 
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actually make a country more vulnerable to currency crises. Another argument against capital 
controls is the possibility of circumvention and evasion which can make these controls 
ineffective. But controls can perform its function just like a dam that stabilizes the flow of 
water even through making some flood whereas one rush of water in the absence of dam can 
cause complete destruction. The aggregate amounts can be significant in long run but flows 
are still moderated in the short run. 
 
In order to manage the surge of capital flows, carefully designed capital controls can be 
appropriate. In this regard, it is explained by Veronese (2010) that K-controls in emerging and 
developing economies are justified by IMF, in post-Washington consensus era, on basis of 
following conditions: flows are likely to be transitory; exchange rate is not undervalued; there 
is adequate reserve level, and economy is close to potential. However, he argued that it is not 
simple and objective to judge the presence of these conditions. By reviewing literature 
produced during 1990s, we found that contemporary view of capital controls seemed to be 
relevant only for developing and emerging countries. That view is driven by the experience of 
the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and ensuing tequila effect that affected Latin American; the 
1997 East Asian financial crisis, the 1998 Russian ruble crisis; the 1999 Brazilian crisis; and 
the 2000 Brazilian and Argentine crises. It would be interesting to refer to Mundell’s33 
‘impossible trinity’, also known as ‘trilemma’, which opened a new point of discussion on 
capital controls. A major inconsistency between the trinity of fixed exchange rates, monetary 
policy that determine domestic interest rates, and free international capital mobility. 
Impossibility of trinity can let a country to have any two out of these three. Exchange rate and 
interest rate are considered as more important as a country is not likely to grow if it gets these 
prices wrong. It implies that policymakers have every reason to control these two variables. 
However, there is no comparable reason to want free capital flows, which made convincing 
case for capital controls.  
 
Apropos to the problems related with fluctuations and volatility of capital flows, some 
analysts also argue for options other than capital controls. One such option is ‘full 
dollarization’, i.e. replacing the domestic currency with the dollar. The shift between assets 
and liabilities denominated in domestic currency and assets and liabilities denominated in 
foreign currency is ‘pro-cyclical’, the best way to completely remove the short-term and 
                                                          
33
 MUNDELL, Robert A. (1999), “The Prize in Economics”, Press Release. 
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speculative movements is the ‘abandonment of domestic currency’. However, it is 
accompanied with the surrender of monetary policy and exchange rate as policy instruments. 
Thus it would be better to use improved regulations and controls for stabilizing the domestic 
currency. Although these regulations and controls entail various costs but these costs are still 
lower than the costs associated with complete abandonment of domestic currency (Caprio, 
Honohan and Stiglitz, 2006).  
 
Thus, there are contending views for and against capital controls. The conventional wisdom 
that developing countries should use capital restrictions but gradually dismantle them with 
development of institutional framework is too simplistic to have practicality. Such 
‘monotonicity’ in controls i.e. steady decrease in magnitude of controls is irrelevant and 
undesirable. Rather, it is more realistic to determine the optimal mix of controls as per 
country’s development phase and its economic and institutional capabilities. In this aim, most 
fundamental is the ability to adjust controls according to changes in economic conditions.  
This implies that governments of emerging and developing economies must have sufficient 
autonomy for imposing and re-imposing capital controls according to their own circumstances 
instead of taking dictation from IMF34. In this regard, a fundamental issue is whether 
interventions for controlling capital flows can remain effective in liberalized and integrated 
financial markets, which makes the appropriateness and suitability of capital management 
tools greater than ever.   
 
The growth of derivatives market has made the capital management and the proper 
formulation and implementation of regulations more complicated. This has made some 
economists and policymakers to even argue to give up traditional capital management 
techniques due to their ineffectiveness in modern times. This sophistication of financial and 
capital markets has also made it easier to circumvent restrictions. Even some researchers 
suggest the inability of capital controls to effectively stop massive capital flight and balance 
of payment crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). But despite of losing potency over time, 
the improved techniques to strengthen the effectiveness of traditional regulations can still help 
in moderating capital flows and their volatility. 
 
                                                          
34
 Again, there are issues related with political economy of capital mobility and controls. But here, our objective 
is to solely focus on financial and macroeconomic aspects. 
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An important classification in this regard lies between direct and indirect controls. Direct 
capital controls are either price-based or quantity-based regulations, as discussed in sub-
section 7.1. Indirect capital controls, as discussed in sub-section 7.2, are generally prudential 
regulations imposed on financial institutions in order to indirectly affect capital flows.  
 
7.1 Design of Interventions – Direct 
How the government designs its intervention is of primary importance. In this respect, the real 
variables e.g. unemployment, growth, incomes etc. are of direct concern as compared to the 
financial variables e.g. interest rate, inflation, exchange rate etc. which are of concern only to 
the extent that they affect the real variables. However, governments are better able to monitor 
and control these financial variables then real variables.  
 
In this aim, interventions can be price-based e.g. taxes, subsidies etc. or quantity-based e.g. 
controls, administrative restrictions etc. Price-based interventions are flexible, in accordance 
with market incentives and with lesser opportunities for administrative manipulation. For 
instance, in 1998, Malaysian authorities designed ‘exit tax’ which implies that money can be 
taken out of the country at a cost. Similar tax can also be imposed on capital inflows because 
if there is less short-term money in the country, there is less that can leave the country. Direct 
regulations or taxes are among the most controversial forms of capital market interventions. 
However, such tax can be reduced over time to phase out intervention gradually to avoid 
abrupt disturbance due to its elimination. But theoretical research shows that at times, 
quantity-based restraints can reduce risk more successfully than price interventions by arguing 
that controls are better than fines and penalties. Practically speaking, the choice between price 
controls or quantity restrictions depends on the specific situation confronted by a particular 
country and on its administrative capability. They can also complement one another under 
various circumstances.  
 
Regulating inflows versus regulating outflows is also an important aspect of capital market 
interventions. Most economies prefer putting more regulations on inflows as compared to 
outflows because it helps in preventing cries which is considered the ultimate objective. 
Moreover, regulating inflows involves more transparency and less uncertainty due to which 
investors are aware of the cost of their decisions before making investment. 
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Regarding controls on outflows, it is written in an article ‘A place for capital controls’ of the 
Economist magazine on May 2003 that ‘experience suggests some rules. One rule is refrain 
from blocking capital outflows which is tempting at times of crisis. Such measures are usually 
oppressive, and deter future inflows of all kinds’ (Economist, 2003). But empirical support for 
this assertion is limited. A very relevant example in this respect is of Malaysia which put 
restrictions on capital outflows i.e. exit tax during Asian crisis. This step is criticized by 
analysts who claimed that it would hamper Malaysia’s capability to attract capital in future 
and also predict massive capital outflows once restrictions were removed. What happened in 
reality was contrary to these claims and predictions when tax is lifted in 2001. The expected 
return on investment was increased as a result of forward looking investors and Malaysia’s 
positive fundamentals such as high saving rate, current account surplus, moderate external 
liabilities, and large international reserves. 
 
Market failure in terms of collective or coordination problem can be solved by restricting 
outflows. Herd behavior is exhibited by creditors as well as investors during crisis as they all 
together want to pull their funds out of the country which tends to weaken the exchange rate 
and interest rate leading to overshoot of sustainability and market collapse. Since the markets 
often rebound subsequently, investors and creditors would have been better off collectively if 
they had left their funds in the country. Thus, imposition of controls on outflows may solve 
the collective action problems thereby stopping overshooting and rebounding markets. 
Despite of being cliché, such kind of control seems to implicate the ‘fallacy of composition’ 
by putting controls on individual actions in order to prevent the hazards of collective action.  
 
Regulations on capital outflows are criticized for being unfair as they alter the parameters of 
original investment after investment has been made. The high probability of imposition of 
such regulations might increase investors’ risk which leads to an overall reduction in 
investment. But again, this argument can either be served in favor of or against restrictions. If 
authorities are targeting to reduce short-term inflows during a boom, the fear of potential 
controls on outflows might have the anticipated effect by decreased inflows. Particularly in 
the event of a crisis which limits the available options, targeting outflows might be a suitable 
policy.  
 
An important feature in design of direct market interventions is that they generally segment 
the domestic capital markets from international capital markets. For instance, regulations 
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restricting individuals and firms to borrow in foreign currency, regulations restricting foreign 
individuals and firms to hold domestic currency assets and/or liabilities, and regulations 
restricting domestic banks to hold foreign currency assets or to lend in foreign currency.  
 
7.1.1 Market Segmentation 
The basic aim of segmentation is safeguarding the domestic economy from volatility stemmed 
from liberalization of capital flows, without affecting current account or trade flows. In the 
scenario where most of the developing countries do not have well-established capital markets, 
the best solution is to create the long-term foreign demand for domestic currency assets and to 
develop strong insurance markets for protecting exchange rate and interest rate fluctuations. 
Since such optimal solution is normally impossible in near term, thus the second best solution 
is to segment domestic flows from external flows. Although domestic capital markets of 
developing countries already have such segmentation due to the absence of any stable source 
of foreign demand for domestic currency securities, however, more segmentation can be 
induced through imposing controls and regulations. Segmentation is particularly evident with 
traditional quantity based regulations imposed to forbid or discourage the use of foreign 
current for domestic transactions.  
 
Soft control is a form of direct intervention which plays an important role in segmenting 
domestic markets from international markets. Soft controls restrict those sectors of economy 
which tend to affect foreign exchange market in order to prohibit them from generating pro-
cyclical disturbance e.g. requiring domestic pension funds to invest only in domestic market. 
Such measures also facilitate the development of domestic capital market by creating demand 
for domestic securities and building domestic capital base. Soft controls are also criticized as 
they limit the ability of domestic funds to diversify. However, this is a trade-off because the 
growth of domestic capital market and expansion of domestic capital base would improve the 
value of returns for all in long run.    
 
The analysis of research by Ocampo and Stiglitz (2008) found three reasons for positive 
macroeconomic effects of segmentation: 
 
7.1.1.1 Stabilizing the Demand for Assets Denominated in Domestic Currency 
Most of the domestic currency assets are held by domestic investors. It is logical to improve 
long term international demand for these assets because foreign holdings of domestic assets 
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are usually speculative and short term determined by currency expectations. Changes in 
international expectations and sentiments can be destabilizing for the foreign exchange market 
making it crucial to use regulations to reduce the speculative attractiveness of domestic 
currency assets for foreign investors and to inhibit the expansion of premature offshore 
market for the domestic currency.  
 
Currency expectations along with interest rate differentials also lead domestic investors to 
transfer their investments between foreign currency and domestic currency assets but their 
demand for domestic currency assets is often long terms. Interventions and regulations in 
capital market segment the market thereby reducing the capacity of domestic investors to shift 
the domestic currency assets into the foreign currency assets and eventually stabilizing the 
domestic demand for domestic currency assets which play key role in the growth of country’s 
capital market.  
 
7.1.1.2 Protecting Economy from Pro-cyclical Foreign Borrowing 
Most of the assets and revenues of domestic investors are denominated in domestic currency 
but they are tempted to take foreign currency liabilities when debt is available at lower 
interest rate. Such currency mismatch between assets and liabilities entails sizeable risk 
associated with depreciation which causes increase in the value of foreign currency debt and 
may hamper ability of borrowers to service and repay these loans. Moreover, foreign loans are 
mostly available during a boom, so they can be demanded to be returned when boom is over. 
Such supply of funds intensifies the economic fluctuations.  
 
In case of domestic currency appreciation expectations, domestic investors borrow more in 
foreign currency in the hope that currency appreciation would reduce the value of their 
foreign loans. But the use of these external funds to purchase domestic currency assets 
actually increases the demand for the domestic currency and thereby appreciation. However, 
in case of domestic currency depreciation expectations, domestic investors are inclined to 
shift their foreign liabilities with domestic currency debts for which they need to buy foreign 
currency in order to pay back their foreign debts.  In this aim, they have to sell domestic 
currency assets for buying foreign currency thereby leading to large devaluation. In short, the 
foreign currency borrowing fuels the currency fluctuations and multiplies the destabilizing 
effects of such pro-cyclical foreign funds. These fluctuations can be controlled by imposing 
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regulations to restrict the domestic investor having limited foreign currency assets to borrow 
in foreign currency.  
 
7.1.1.3 Improving Government’s Capacity to Control the Macroeconomy 
Government gets more control on exchange rate due to segmentation. The monetary 
autonomy i.e. using restrictive monetary policy during euphoria and avoiding excessive 
contraction during crisis is dependent of limited capital flows that can be ensured with extent 
of market segmentation. In the same way, exchange rate as an essential tool for 
macroeconomic management can be made more effective with the use of market 
segmentation. Particularly when country has huge volume of foreign currency debts, the 
currency devaluation has balance sheet effects leading to decline in aggregate demand which 
would offset the positive effect of devaluation i.e. increase in exports. This situation can be 
avoided by making exchange rate adjustments through market segmentation in order to avoid 
currency fluctuations and resulting financial instability of domestic financial system. 
 
7.1.2 Costs of Direct Interventions 
The imposition of direct taxes on short-term capital inflows have been among the policies 
proposed by various economists. However Michael Camdessus, Managing Director of IMF 
states that “in our experience, direct quantitative controls on capital inflows rarely work for 
any sustained period” (Camdessus, 1997). Although economists have criticized the different 
types of intervention in capital market, however, empirical work on the costs of each type is 
limited.  
 
7.1.2.1 Corruption and Cronyism 
Direct controls, especially the quantity-based, are often criticized for encouraging corruption 
and cronyism. Although the costs associated with corruption are hard to quantify, the benefits 
of such regulations can be assumed to outweigh the related costs on the basis of effectiveness 
of these regulations in several countries like Chile, Colombia, and Malaysia. The foremost 
requirement in this respect is the presence of administrative capacity in terms of regulatory 
frameworks, efficiency and effectiveness in implementation and the speed with regulatory 
framework is adapted to changing circumvention techniques. Particularly during crisis, this 
capacity becomes more relevant as the absence of it can generate serious credibility issues. 
Instead of shifting from one kind of regulations to another type of restriction, it is better to 
build a permanent regulatory regime which can be tightened or loosened through economic 
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cycles. The most important thing is the autonomy needed to impose or reimpose controls 
whenever required.  
 
7.1.2.2 Hindering Domestic Financial Development 
Capital controls are criticized for obstructing the development of domestic financial 
institutions by giving examples of quantity-based control in India and China. It is argued that 
China would have faster restructuring of its financial system with open capital markets. 
However this argument can work equally well in favor of controls because most of the 
countries restructured their financial institutions through ‘shock therapy’ which often led to 
collapse of their financial systems and resulting protracted recession while China with 
‘gradual’ restructuring by maintaining capital restrictions managed its transition with high 
growth.    
 
7.1.2.3 Hurting Small and Medium enterprises (SMEs) 
Direct controls, particularly price-based restrictions may be aimed to provide room to 
government to increase the interest rates during economic expansion. The purpose of such 
restrictions is to discourage short-term capital inflows in order to prevent increase in 
consumption and its resulting creation of financial bubbles. Although government wants to 
burst this bubble by increasing interest rates, but it also needs to encourage long-term 
investment, FDI and development of SMEs while higher interest rates during economic 
expansion are tended to undermine lending to SMEs. Particularly in the event of crisis, SMEs 
suffer even harder and severer than large domestic and foreign firms. But then, governments 
being anxious of inflationary pressures from cutting back government expenditure or raising 
taxes do not have choices other than capital restrictions. In this aim, governments can design 
policies to mitigate adverse effects of capital restrictions, for instance, measures to encourage 
FDI which eventually set up incentives to stimulate domestic lending to SMEs.  
 
7.2 Design of Interventions – Indirect 
In addition to the direct quantity-based and price-based regulations, interventions can also be 
taken in indirect forms, like prudential regulations, in order to control capital flows. For 
instance, putting limit on banks’ short-term foreign borrowing or demanding them to match 
their foreign currency liabilities with foreign currency assets. Numerous countries have also 
controlled the impact of exchange rate volatility through such regulations. These indirect 
restrictions are criticized for their potential to discourage borrowing due to elevated cost. But 
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this is actually the purpose i.e. to raise cost of borrowing during external financing boom to 
avoid the ensuing bust. 
 
Another type of these regulations is requiring banks to maintain high liquidity or reserves 
which act like tax on foreign currency liabilities.  High reserve requirements on short-term 
borrowing encourage long-term liabilities. In addition, domestic financial institutions may 
also be forbidden to hold deposits in foreign currency in order to avoid domestic financial 
dollarization. Risk-adjusted capital adequacy requirements can also be imposed to take the 
mounting risk into account. In countries with deposit insurance, higher insurance premiums 
can be demanded from banks involved in riskier practices in order to indirectly discourage 
them taking great foreign exchange exposure. The costs of prudential regulations, higher 
reserve requirements, high deposit insurance premiums etc. basically reveal the higher risks 
involved in certain kinds of activities – the risks for which society bears the costs. Thus, such 
regulations are also aimed to meet the gap between social costs and private benefits. Since 
these are usually the large firms and corporations which are involved in foreign borrowing 
and foreign exchange exposures, it is imperative to pass on its costs to these firms. This may 
also discourage banks from lending to these large firms thereby increasing available funds for 
small and medium firms.   
 
Prudential regulations to take into consideration the foreign exchange exposure of firms 
borrowing from domestic banks also have systemic perspective. Since most of the capital 
flows in an economy are mediated by banks, the regulations targeting financial sector have 
major economic impact. Unless regulations concentrate their attention on the exposure of non-
financial firms, the impact of the financial sector can be vitiated. For instance, if regulations 
only restrict banks from holding foreign currency liabilities, firms may borrow directly from 
abroad. Thus it is crucial for banks to scrutinize the entire balance sheet of the firms to which 
they are lending. The detailed analysis of prudential regulatory framework, bifurcated into 
micro-prudential regulations (aimed at the safety of individual financial institutions) and 
macro-prudential regulations (aimed at the safety of financial system as a whole), will be 
undertaken in the final chapter, for their implications on systemic risk and stability. The 
objective of studying prudential regulations at this point is only to understand their 
applicability for indirectly controlling capital flows. 
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Regulations can also take form of rules, ratios, and public disclosures regarding foreign 
borrowing for non-financial firms as well as form of limitations on terms of corporate debt 
that is contracted abroad, e.g. minimum maturities, maximum spreads etc. Moreover, 
regulations may also require full disclosure of derivative positions because foreign currency 
liabilities can be subordinated to domestic currency liabilities in bankruptcy proceedings 
which would discourage foreign borrowing and raise its costs. But again, this may actually the 
purpose i.e. limiting costs borne by the society at large.  Another approach is the creation of 
adverse tax treatment for short-term foreign currency borrowings which may enable countries 
with corporate income tax having tax deductible interest payments to exclude foreign 
currency debt from tax deduction or make interest payments just partially tax deductible.  
 
Regarding limitations of indirect forms, most of the indirect regulations are aimed at non-
financial firms which seem more complicated to administer as compared to the direct capital 
account regulations. Additionally, even well-regulated banking system may face periodic 
euphoria. For instance, the 2001 crisis in Argentina exemplifies the failure of one of the best 
systems of prudential bank regulations in preventing the effects of macroeconomic shocks to 
the domestic financial system. Moreover, the traditional prudential regulations like the ones 
under Basle accord exhibit ‘pro-cyclical bias’. Lending is restricted during economic 
slowdown due to high reserve requirements to counterbalance risky positions. Loan 
delinquencies during crisis further reduce the capital base and eventually the lending capacity 
of the financial institutions. This, in combination with greater risk perception encourages 
squeeze in credit and reinforces downsizing of economic activities along with weakening the 
portfolio quality of financial institutions. Whereas lesser loan delinquencies during economic 
expansion tend to make risk-adjusted capital requirements rather ineffective due to which 
preventive regulatory signals also become ineffective and fail to inhibit credit growth.  
 
Summing up capital management, the presence of externalities with capital flows makes it 
desirable for governments to make some form and extent of intervention keeping in view its 
associated costs and adverse effects. The relative costs and benefits of interventions change as 
countries develop. There is a range of tools available to economic managers for intervening in 
capital markets. Some affect the risk properties of the economy whereas some affect the scope 
of macroeconomic management. Direct capital regulations may work better as they aim the 
actual source of the disturbance i.e. pro-cyclical capital flows. But developed countries with 
188 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
stronger administrative capacities may choose combination of direct and indirect measures for 
restricting capital flows along with limiting circumvention of these measures.  
 
CONCLUSION 
McKinnon-Show theory for FL and its adoption as neoliberal agenda by policymakers led 
several countries of Asia and Latin America to embark on liberalization of financial and 
capital markets with varying intensity. This embarkation left them with negative experiences 
taken from series of financial crises.  Restrain towards the process of liberalization is resulted 
in order to alleviate this financial distress, often referred as ‘mild repression’. Although there 
exists considerable arguments in favor of financial globalization and integration, the repeated 
episodes of crises demands rethinking on financial stability issue, an area still immature as 
compared to monetary and macroeconomic analysis.   
 
In this connection, the most important is the fragility of capital flows which is exhibited as a 
primary risk associated with the liberalization of capital markets. This infers that liberalization 
should not be pushed on countries and it is duty of economists and policymakers to present 
their analysis and research in an accessible and convincing manner in order to protect 
developing and emerging countries from undue pressures for capital market liberalization. In 
fact, the interaction between domestic and international liberalization might result in a 
scenario where international capital flows feed the growth of welfare-reducing financial 
intermediation of domestic financial sector. Benefits from liberalization of capital markets can 
be sizeable only if countries have their ‘house in order’ i.e. liberalization in the absence of 
adequate regulation and effective supervision can easily and quickly lead to vulnerabilities 
which magnify the existing distortions. Thus the caveat for the presence of adequate 
institutional infrastructure implies that liberalization is still a long way off for developing and 
emerging countries. 
 
The benefits of liberalization to economic welfare and growth may not be worth the costs of 
the crises. This implies the demand for ‘restraint’, a key offshoot of which is the reimposition 
of capital controls on international capital flows. New theoretical developments also submit 
that financial and capital markets are different from other markets e.g. commodities markets, 
because ‘market failures’ are more prevalent and widespread in financial and capital markets 
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as compared to other markets in the economy which suggest the need for some degree and 
form of government intervention. 
 
However, there have been certain developments in international capital and financial markets 
e.g. growing use of derivatives, which are making the management of financial and capital 
markets complicated and difficult than ever, even for developed economies of Europe and US, 
as evident for 2007-2008 financial crisis which eventually turned into global recession despite 
of the presence of macroeconomic tools to combat boom and bust cycles along with 
sophisticated regulatory and supervisory framework. Before 2007, this volume of crisis of 
was not remotely imagined by economists and policymakers even in their worst nightmares, 
as they were confident about the strength of financial systems of developed economies due to 
their grand size.  
 
While comparing developing countries as small boats on tempestuous sea of international 
finance, Paul Volcker, former Governor of Federal Reserve System, stated that a ‘big ocean 
liner like the USS United States can safely navigate through a storm, but even the sturdiest 
vessel… (i.e. any developing or emerging country) is likely to capsize’ (Volcker, 1998). The 
possibility of occurrence of crisis in US like the ones occurred in Asia and Latin America is 
also sturdily rejected by him by stating that ‘the entire banking systems of Indonesia or 
Thailand or Malaysia are comparable to one good-sized regional bank in the United States. 
Their entire Gross National Products are smaller than the funds controlled by our largest 
financial institutions’ (Volcker, 1998).  
 
It was only few years after this proclamation that world saw ‘USS United States’ sinking like 
a vessel.  
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CHAPTER 4. CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS OF DEVELOPED 
WORLD - NEW DEBATE ON NEOLIBERAL FORM OF 
FINANCIALIZED CAPITALISM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A financial crisis began in 2007 in US and rapidly spread to Europe. The genesis of this crisis 
of developed world was defaults on subprime mortgage loans and debt instruments backed by 
those kinds of loans. The realization that huge volume of defaults on subprime mortgages are 
going to spread to other sectors of financial industry started in July 2007 when Bear Stearns 
announced the worthlessness of assets held by two of its subprime hedge funds. It followed by 
collapse of securities market and bankruptcy of Bear Stearns in March 2008. From here 
started the series of bankruptcies, bursts, crashes, crisis and an economic recession, which 
most analysts compare with Great Depression of 1930s. The first section is closely focused on 
the occurrence of current financial crisis by briefly describing the mechanisms through which 
the global financial system collapsed.   
 
Reckless risk taking through complex innovations like financial derivatives along with 
inefficient regulatory measures and irresponsible credit ratings are considered to be main 
explanations behind such huge crisis. But its actual roots are even far deeper. Current crisis 
happened despite of various measures on international front e.g. shifting from rules-based to 
risk-based capital requirements, international bodies like G-7 and G-10 collaborating with 
BIS and IMF etc. But these efforts were not sufficient to ensure more disclosure and 
transparency in the face of more integrated and sophisticated financial environment 
developing since last two decades, thanks to financial liberalization and globalization. It is 
also accompanied by technological advancements and more focus on non-bank financial 
institutions like hedge funds, equity funds etc. This trend enhanced efficiency of private 
finance in various terms but suitability and efficiency of regulatory and supervisory 
approaches were lagged. This led to new and unmeasured risks contributing to the potential 
for volatility, instability, and crises having tendency to spread beyond any virtual or 
geographical boundaries.  
 
In this aim, the second section of this chapter has discussed in detail the weak foundations of 
global financial structure. Implicit or explicit safety nets acted as moral hazard for banks and 
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other financial institutions covered under this net because presence of unconditional 
assurances provide impetus for mindless risk taking. The resulting bailouts are distortionary 
as they put pressure on all citizens in form of increased taxation to be given to affluent risk 
takers and speculators. Another weakness is the failure to distinguish ‘risk’ from ‘uncertainty’ 
while ignoring Keynes’s idea of uncertainty which also played important role to weaken the 
financial systems. In addition, banks took advantage of financial derivatives and other 
innovations and became more involved in speculative and risky treasury operation. But they 
forgot, in their enthusiasm of increasing profitability, to distinguish risk from uncertainty. 
Crises have more to do with uncertainty which follows from irrational risk taking. This also 
made market discipline inept to play any significant role in early detection and prevention of 
any imbalance to grow beyond certain limits. Moreover, various dynamics of financial 
markets have also changed significantly to become more conducive for ‘feast and famine’ 
phenomenon of magnifying the scale and frequency of crises. In addition to this, nature of 
systemic risk is also changed which demands transformation of preventive measures. 
Conventional tools based on assumption that  systemic risk involves the flow of problems in 
one institution via interbank relations, payment system, deposit run etc. thereby threatening 
whole financial system. But this assumption narrows down the real threats because it ignores 
the extended opportunities for risk-taking.  
 
The failure to completely and accurately realize these weaknesses in foundations of financial 
systems played key role in current crisis. And now, the measures to cope with this crisis are 
mainly based on ‘financial repression’ – a notion long rejected by developed economies and 
also made prohibitive for emerging and developing world. Developed economies are doing 
exactly the opposite of what they lectured emerging and developing economies in case of 
crises in those economies. Third section of this chapter has thoroughly discussed various 
repressionary measures of developed economies to prove that they are now following 
financial repression as part of their ‘macroprudential’ framework to safeguard their 
economies. It would be pertinent to mention here the difference between micro and macro 
prudential regulations. Micro-prudential regulations address those factors which affect the 
stability of individual institutions whereas macro-prudential regulations address those factors 
which affect the stability of the financial system as a whole. Upcoming reforms for the 
stability of the financial system are increasingly focused on macro-prudential framework 
which we will discuss in the final sector of this chapter. For the sake of rescue and recovery, 
government of affected economies are directly intervening to nationalize various big banks 
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and injecting equity in banks. Suffering from huge volume of private and public debt, 
governments are forced to lower the cost of debt by artificially maintaining low interest rates. 
These lower rates become even negative in scenario of steady inflation. Unlike direct taxes or 
spending cuts, this kind of financial repression acts as indirect tax. Financial repression in the 
aftermath of crisis has historical evidence because termination of laissez-faire was also 
followed even after Great Depression and 2nd World War. Modern financial repression also 
has various implications, even for emerging and developing economies, which are discussed 
in the same section.  
 
The final section has an elaborated debate by relating current crisis with prevalent neo-liberal 
form of capitalism. As this crisis is occurred in the headquarters of capitalism, various voices 
are rising on the inherently unstable nature of capitalism. However, the actual problem lies 
with ‘neo-liberalism’ which motivated financial globalization and liberalization and led to 
‘finance-lead capitalism’ as opposed to ‘golden era of capitalism’ from 1940s to 1970s 
characterized by regulations and state-capitalism. The creation of fictitious wealth 
inconsistent with creation of real wealth is the key feature of this financialized capitalism 
which was destined to be collapsed one day. Irresponsible and dishonest attitude of financial 
institutions is also vital in this regard with have brought the ‘political economy’ to the fore. 
Despite of large body of suggestions to transform regulation and supervision, no concrete step 
has been taken to suppress the hegemony of financialized capitalism and chances for such 
suppression also seem opaque at this moment. The only clear stance at this point of time is 
increasing focus on macro-prudential framework for ensuring stability of the financial 
systems. 
 
Section 1. Incidence of Financial Crisis 2007-2008  
The financial crisis of 2007 - 2008, also known as the global financial crisis, is considered by 
many economists to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Just 
like Asian crisis, this crisis was not generally anticipated by mainstream economists, who 
were rather talking about ‘great moderation’ i.e. reduction in the volatility of business cycle 
fluctuations due to structural and institutional advancements in developed markets. For 
instance, in US since mid-1980s, the standard deviation of quarterly real GDP declined by 
half, and the standard deviation of inflation declined by two-thirds (Blanchard and Simon, 
2001). Even Robert Lucas (2003) declared his confidence on great moderation by stating that 
“central problem of depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical reasons” (Lucas, 
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2003, p. 1). Economists like him clearly ignored Minsky’s warnings that great moderation 
enabled a classic period of financial instability, with stable growth encouraging greater 
financial risk taking (Minsky, 1982). Inability of economists and central bankers to anticipate 
current crisis can be clearly observed when FED Chairman Ben Bernanke, despite of being 
‘Depression economists’, stated in FED’s meeting during December 11, 2007 that “I don’t 
expect insolvency or near insolvency among major financial institutions” (Bernanke, 2007, p. 
89), whereas the economy was heading towards the Great Recession of modern times.  
 
The collapse of various large financial institutions, bailout packages by national governments 
and downturn in stock and bond markets were experienced during current crisis. The crisis 
played a major role in the failure of vital businesses, drop in consumer wealth by trillions of 
US dollars, and a slump in economic activity leading to the 2008–2012 global recession and 
European sovereign-debt crisis. This crisis also gave rise to critical analysis of 
‘financialization’, i.e. development and expansion of financial and capital markets to override 
real sectors’ growth and development. 
 
It all triggered with the US housing bubble that was fully blown in 2006 and started to burst in 
2007 while dropping the values of securities connected to US real estate pricing thereby 
damaging financial institutions universally. In fact, the Russian debt crisis and Asian financial 
crisis during late 1990s accompanied large inflows of foreign funds in the US which made 
credit very easily and amply available. Therefore, the debt-financed consumer spending and 
housing boom were natural outcomes. Consumers were taking an extraordinary debt burden 
with various types of loans, especially mortgage loans. As banks started to extend more and 
more loans to potential home owners, the escalation of housing prices was also likely 
consequence.  
 
This housing and credit boom was supplemented by growth of various financial contracts 
such as collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which 
derived their worth from housing and mortgage prices. This financial innovation along with 
liberalization enabled investors and institutions worldwide to invest in the US housing market. 
Financial innovation depends greatly on securities and derivatives, all of which related closely 
with subprime mortgages i.e. extending housing loans and ownerships to risky borrowers 
without paying any attention to three C’s: collateral, credit history and character.  
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Banks were involved in this malpractice because of the confidence that they can sell these 
mortgages to an underwriter or else, perform the function of an underwriter in order to sell 
these mortgages backed by securities of low quality. This exceptional development of 
subprime market also spurred the growth of Structural Investment Vehicles (SIVs), which 
generally took form of limited liability companies requiring trifling capital base thereby 
generating ‘parallel banking’ outside regulatory ambit and sowing the seed for current 
financial crisis.  
 
The extremely illiquid nature and complicated structure of subprime market also misguided 
credit rating agencies which assigned AAA ratings to various low quality and even worthless 
securities. Stiglitz (2008) viewed rating agencies as main culprit by stating that “they were the 
party that performed the alchemy that converted the securities from F-rated to A-rated. The 
banks could not have done what they did without the complicity of the rating agencies” (Cited 
in Smith, 2008). Since large liquidity injections through CDOs and MBSs were not reflecting 
in monetary aggregates, and therefore their implications for financial systems and economy 
were impossible to monitor.  
 
The local housing bubble of US became global when these securities are sold to international 
investors and served as contagion especially for Europe. Since banks were so avaricious in 
this off-balance sheet activity that when signs of credit crisis started to appear with declining 
housing prices, most of banks had more than desired accumulation of these worthless 
securities which intensified the losses of banks and related financial institutions (Arestis, 
Baltar and Cavalcante, 2009). Housing prices declined more than the mortgage loan which 
provided incentive for foreclosures. Such foreclosures which started in late 2006 eroded the 
financial strength of banks and other financial institutions leading to estimated global losses 
of trillions of US dollars.    
 
A number of reports and studies were commissioned by US government to inquire the reason 
of this deep-rooted crisis. One of such report is ‘US Senate financial crisis report’ by Carl 
Levin and Tom Coburn published in Apr 2011 that asserted this crisis to be the consequence 
of highly risky and complex financial products along with undisclosed conflicts of interests on 
part of credit rating agencies (CRAs). CRAs are widely alleged for their immoral behavior 
because they get paid by the issuers of securities, due to which CRAs tend to give them their 
desired ratings. Another conflict of interest arises for CRAs for being in the advisory 
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business. The advisory arms of CRAs assist potential issuers to structure their offers in such a 
way that they can get desired rating. Thus, the ‘rating arm’ and ‘advisory arm’ of CRAs have 
conflicting interests from each other. Consequently, CRAs lost their credibility in the wake of 
current crisis as they had initially assigned high ratings to weak securities. 
 
Failure of regulators also came to the fore with this crisis as reported by US Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission (FCIC). “The crisis was caused by widespread failures in financial 
regulation, including the FED’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; dramatic 
breakdowns in corporate governance, including too many financial firms acting recklessly 
and taking on too much risk; explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households 
and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision course with crisis; key policy 
makers ill-prepared for the crisis, lacking a full understanding of the financial system they 
oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels” (FCIC Report, 
2011). Economists like Paul Krugman (2010) criticized the regulatory framework for not 
keeping pace with financial innovation, e.g. shadow or parallel banking, off-balance sheet 
financing, derivatives etc. Moreover, banking regulations based on Basel accords are also 
criticized in an OECD Report published in Dec 2011 for allowing unconventional business 
practices and resultantly reinforcing this financial crisis.  
 
In this regard, the role of FED Chairman Alan Greenspan is also contentious who had been 
striving hard since late 1990s for keeping the derivatives market unregulated (Greenspan, 
1997). Due to these efforts, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market was permitted to be 
‘self-regulated’ in the legislation of Commodity Futures Modernization Act of US in 2000. 
Resultantly, the value of total OTC derivatives reached at US$ 683 Trillion by June 2008 
(Figlewski, 2009). May be, derivatives were rightly said as ‘financial weapons of mass 
destruction’ by Warren Buffet as early as in 2003 (Buffet, 2003). It was already too late when 
Alan Greenspan testified in front of “Congressional Committee of government oversight and 
reform” on October 23, 2008 for admitting his blatant faith on self-correcting power of free 
markets and his failure to anticipate the self-destructive power of …deregulation (Greenspan, 
2008).  
 
In the aftermath of this crisis, institutional bailouts, fiscal stimulus, and monetary policy 
expansion were natural responses of central banks and governments for lessening the shock to 
the economy. US congress enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. In 
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July, 2010, the Dodd-Frank regulatory reforms were enacted to minimize the chance of 
recurrence. However, it must be noted that this crisis has deep roots which have seeped into 
the weak foundations of global financial architecture.  
 
Section 2. Weak Foundations of Global Financial System 
This unmatched wave of financial collapse with shocking losses incurred by financial 
institutions has produced a body of literature which gives variety of explanations related with 
weak foundations of international financial structure.  
 
2.1 Financial Bailouts 
There are enormous social costs of financial bailouts offered to insolvent banks. These 
bailouts, generally supported by IMF, are considered to be damaging as they involve bulky 
increases in taxation of all citizens to assist affluent risk takers. Such taxation often proved 
distortionary as it encourages unequal distribution of wealth. Bailouts also motivate risk 
takers to keep on taking risks i.e. moral hazard which encourages banks to involve in 
excessive risk taking – risk which they would not take if they are not unconditionally 
safeguarded by governments, central banks or IMF.  
 
Calomiris (1998) described risk taking as two-step process in which first, the macroeconomic 
shocks diminish bank’s capital base thereby increasing the devaluation probability. Due to 
these changes, bank’s incentives and opportunities to take risk also augment. However, if 
there are no safety nets, macroeconomic shocks are tended to discourage excessive risk taking 
because bank needs to assure and calm its debtors and creditors. But when banks know that 
their probable losses would be borne by taxpayers through bailouts, they feel free to take any 
kind and amount of risk. That’s why bank risk and fiscal risk nurture together that highlights 
the concurrence of banking and exchange rate failures. In addition to the banks and other 
financial institutions, large corporates also get government’s protection on their loans, as we 
observed during current crisis.  
 
Besides direct and instant costs in form of tax increases and moral hazard, a rather indirect 
and long term cost is related with the international political economy of IMF bailouts. Such 
bailouts allow US treasury to offer subsidies in form of liquidity assistance to foreign 
governments and international lenders. In order to finance these bailouts, IMF ensures 
increase in domestic taxation by putting it as a conditionality of bailout package. Moreover, 
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IMF funds are released in tranches which actually make this assistance ineffective in 
resolving liquidity problems.  
 
Thus, all the expensive consequences of financial crises are not only the unavoidable results 
of moral hazard of bailouts. If the cost of a crisis is only the amount of wealth directly lost by 
activities of protected banks and corporates, Schwartz, Whalen and Todd (1998) suggestion to 
abolish IMF in order to protect international financial system from its safety net might be the 
best solution. But this is not the case because there are various indirect costs related with 
liquidity issue which amplifies the direct costs. This liquidity issue is further divided into four 
sub-issues including asymmetric information about the occurrence of noticeable shocks, 
speculators’ expectations to overstate the effects of these shocks and to incur self-fulfilling 
financial collapse, contagion across countries, and the inclination of government’s debt 
management towards short termism.    
 
2.2 Failure to Distinguish Risk and Uncertainty 
Revolution in information technology (IT) played a key role in not only speeding up financial 
transactions but also in calculating complicated risks. Market players continued to have to 
have illusion that their operations were prudent and virtually risk-free, as these players 
(mis)conceived risk calculations done by sophisticated IT as fool-proof. This trend changed 
the size and operations of the financial markets significantly. However, despite of all of its 
sophistication, IT is unable to evade the uncertainty that is intrinsic in future events. But 
market players were just unable or unwilling to understand this core different between risk 
and uncertainty. Frank Hyneman Knight’s (1921) dissertation on ‘Risk, Uncertainty and 
Profits’ made a clear distinction between risk and uncertainty. It defined ‘risk’ as randomness 
with knowable probabilities and ‘uncertainty’ as randomness with unknowable probabilities. 
In the following passages, we will explain a commonly observed mechanism through which 
the inability to distinguish risk from uncertainty led to the weakening of global financial 
system. 
 
It might be supplementary to note here that besides IT revolution, modification in the size and 
modus operandi of the financial system is also related with the decline of commercial banks’ 
participation in financial operations and drop in their profit rates (Kregel, 1998). As a matter 
of fact, profitability of commercial banks was classically based on their ability to have non-
interest short-term deposits. But after 2nd World War, FED’s decision to directly manage 
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monetary policy for controlling inflation resulted in average increase in interest rates in US. 
FED kept on giving importance to monetary policy, despite of its limited ability in controlling 
inflation or stimulating economy. This trend resulted in reduction of non-interest deposits due 
to which banks’ share in total financing declined. Commercial banks’ share of the total assets 
held by all financial institutions declined from almost 50 percent in the 1950s to less than 30 
percent in the 1990s (Bresser-Pereira, 2010). In this scenario, banks found them in dire need 
to find other sources of profit. So they started to invest in some of the interest earning deposits 
that they were inhibited to remunerate either in speculative and risky treasury operations or in 
the issue of even riskier financial innovations like derivative instruments that replaced 
classical bank loans. Especially new wave of financial innovations further facilitated banks in 
paying them off for their loss of a big portion of the financial business.  
 
As a result of these two key forces, banks became more involved in classical tradeoff between 
risk and profit i.e. high risk-high return phenomenon. But they failed to distinguish 
‘uncertainty’ from ‘risk’ because uncertainty cannot be determined on the basis of risk 
calculation. They just ignored Keynes’s idea of uncertainty and his related critique to exactly 
estimate the future probabilities. However, it must also be noted that bubbles and crises are 
not only the results of irrationality in neo-classical sense or of the ‘animal spirits’ in Keynes 
sense. Financial bubbles and ensuing crises have more to do with that financial environment 
which is mainly characterized by uncertainty. Traditional economists believe that this 
uncertainty always results from irrationality or the inadequate information to act rationally. 
However, uncertainty is associated more closely with the impossibility to predict the future. 
Thus, the failure to recognize this phenomenon i.e. existence of uncertainty despite of 
calculating risk, also played a key role in weakening the foundations of global financial 
system. 
 
2.3 Transparency and Market Discipline 
The determination of risks is difficult when well-integrated banks and other financial 
institutions are involved in diverse instruments, markets and countries. For instance, a global 
bank in US can buy shares of a Japanese company and resell them in form of some derivative 
to global investors in different geographical areas and legal domains. This global distribution 
of financial risks has also made financial and capital markets very complex. Due to such 
liberalization and integration, the informational nature of balance sheets has become flawed 
thereby reducing the transparency of international financial transactions. Valuation of 
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different risks and their concentration is becoming harder for public and private stakeholders 
due to lessened transparency about the ownership of risk. This infers that rules and regulation 
of financial disclosure, especially for non-banking financial institutions such as hedge or 
equity funds have failed to keep themselves abreast with liberalization and integration of 
financial and capital markets.  
 
Market discipline i.e. external incentives for all stakeholders to avoid insolvency, is 
considered to be the fundamental mechanism to limit leverage and risk taking beyond certain 
limits. Market discipline makes possible the timely detection of increasing financial 
imbalances and punishing the guilty party before these imbalances grow further to threaten 
entire firm, financial institution or market(s). This mechanism is based on presumption that 
any unjustifiable risk by a financial institution will be reflected in its share price or will 
hamper its ability to get deposits or raise capital which is not possible in real life due to 
incomplete information. In the absence of timely and complete information, it is not likely for 
market disciplining mechanisms to address imbalances before they turn into threats.  
 
Besides diminishing the usefulness of market discipline, reduced transparency is also likely to 
weaken the effectiveness of financial supervision. Supervisory frameworks are traditionally 
based on customary intermediation activity of banks with more domestic orientation. But 
today, banks are involved in a wide array of financial services with more international 
orientation along with non-bank financial institutions engaged in banking-type activities that 
are not supervised. Resultantly, risk exposures now reside with those market participants 
which do not come under traditional regulatory and supervisory umbrella. In the perspective 
of current financial crisis, we observed banks selling off their credit risk to insurance 
companies, pension funds, hedge funds etc. for regulatory arbitrage because changes for credit 
risk are much lower or even non-existent for these non-banking institutions. The crux of this 
matter is that without timely and appropriate disclosures, it is almost impossible for those 
responsible for market surveillance to recognize the place and volume of risk and its 
concentration inside international financial system.   
 
2.4 Configuration of Market Dynamics 
The structure of market dynamics has been greatly transformed with the growing financial 
securitization and integration which can be observed from size of changes in financial asset 
prices and transaction flows. Electronic connections between variety of markets have not only 
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reduced the transaction costs, but also allow huge volume of transaction in short time duration 
making it possible to rebalance portfolio and to reallocate bulk of capital globally in literally 
no time. These structural changes in international markets have given rise to the phenomenon 
of ‘feast and famine’ i.e. enlarging the scale and frequency of financial cycles.  
 
Four key features of financial modernization are changing structure of market dynamics as 
well as enhancing market efficiency. These features are considered to be efficiency-enhancing 
in neo-liberal view of markets. These features include greater reliance on actively traded 
securities as compared to banks’ loans to obtain funds, increasing confidence on modern and 
sophisticated risk management and control systems e.g. mark-to-market risk management, 
stop loss orders, collateral calls, dynamic hedging etc., undertaking functions of market 
making as well as position taking at the same time, and hunger for liquidity due to which 
positions are liquidated very quickly. As result of all these features, market dynamics have 
altered in two manners: firstly, large volumes of risks are traded and priced actively which 
allows continuous rebalancing and reevaluating of risk leading to feedback to market prices. 
These frequent changes in asset prices and financial flows imply greater efficiencies along 
with grander complexities in market dynamics. Secondly, market makers providing market 
liquidity also act as investors. This phenomenon leads large price shocks to withdraw capital 
from market making, deteriorating the market liquidity, and resulting abrupt price decline. 
 
These features of modern finance are efficiency enhancing if used in moderation. But real 
market players pushed these feature beyond their limits which lead to tempestuous market 
dynamics as experienced during current financial crisis. The frequency of abrupt price 
movements in mature markets along with quick changes in market liquidity and increased 
ability to shift capital posed challenges for market participants who were struggling to sustain 
stable profits and to manage financial risks. These features also challenge the capability of 
domestic and global authorities to avoid, cope, and resolve financial system problems.  
 
2.5 Changed Nature of Threats 
As discussed in previous chapter, the evolving nature of financial systems has aggravated the 
difficulties in managing systemic risk and maintaining financial stability. In this aim, variety 
of efforts have been made which depend on mix of private market discipline and safety nets 
financed by taxpayers along with financial supervision and surveillance. Such efforts are 
basically founded on the assumption that systemic risk only encompasses problems in one 
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institution that flow via interbank relations, payment system, deposit run etc. while posing 
risk for financial system. This assumption narrows down the real threats as it ignores the 
extended opportunities for risk-taking.  
 
Although the transformation of financial systems from domestic bank based to global market-
based system entails reform in financial infrastructures to curtail systemic risk e.g. national 
payment systems. But greater dependence on securitized finance in these market-based 
financial systems tends to generate market-oriented forms of systemic risk, affecting variety 
of markets and their infrastructures, mostly possessed and operated by private entities. 
Consequently, systemic risk is now highly concentrated in derivatives markets involving 
private payment systems and pseudo-private clearing houses.  
 
As discussed earlier, regulatory frameworks often provide financial safety nets along with 
requiring banks to keep appropriate capital and adhering to reporting and accounting 
standards. The capital requirement ensures that financial institutions have adequate funds to 
internally absorb any losses for minimizing taxpayer costs of safety nets whereas adherence to 
accounting standards assists to confirm that losses are promptly and amply exhibited in 
financial statements for allowing private stakeholders to use market discipline on financial 
institutions for preventing potential losses in future. But this tactic is easy said than done as it 
may generate conflict between the aims of regulators and those which are regulated. By 
providing insurance, regulators endorse risk taking beyond cautious limits whereas those 
which are being regulated have incentives to take greater risks within the limits of market 
discipline and approved rules of the game, including regulatory capital restrictions. Although 
it might be counter-argued, as we did in previous chapter, that the existence of deposit 
insurance might not be a sufficient incentive for bank management for making imprudent 
decisions. This can be explained a bit further by using the metaphor of health insurance. That 
is, the availability of health insurance doesn’t provide any incentive to individuals to become 
careless about their health and fall ill, just because they have health insurance.  
 
Thus, one peril in imposition of further restraining regulations is that the regulatory 
atmosphere might tend to inhibit even efficiency-enhancing risk taking. On the other hand, 
threat in not sufficiently enforcing current regulations and not possibly reforming them is that 
financial institution will take risks not typically considered worth taking. Maintain a balance 
between these two extremes is not simple and direct. The differences in incentives between 
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the regulator and those being regulated further complicate this situation. Those being 
regulated adapt to structural changes following financial modernization more enthusiastically 
and promptly than regulators adapt their frameworks to monitor them. Due to differences in 
their incentives and resources, regulated ones are more capable to learn and attain profits from 
financial sophistication as compared to regulators which are slow in comprehending and 
keeping pace with these sophistications for managing systemic risk.  
 
This discussion implies that transformation of the modern financial system is altering the 
nature of systemic risk, which requires regulatory and supervisory frameworks to be 
constantly adapted to the varying nature of financial risk and systemic risk. But this adaption 
was not made by regulators, the result of which emerged in form of current financial crisis.  
 
Section 3. End of Liberalization and Resumption of Repression in the wake of 
current crisis 
Policies of FL and integration followed more enthusiastically since the 1990s generated 
excessive liquidity in the system. The excessive liquidity which became apparent in early 
2000s was not only the outcome of FL and ensued financial innovation, but it also came from 
the kind of monetary policy maintained in these years which emphasized the regular 
manipulation of interest rates. Subsequent to Asian, Latin American and Russian crises during 
late 1990s, FED chairman, Alan Greenspan injected liquidity which was only partly drained 
afterwards. Following the burst of internet bubble, famously known as dot-com bubble in 
2000, Alan Greenspan felt compelled, due to deflation threat, to successively reduce interest 
rates from 6.5% to 1.0% and to inject enormous liquidity into the economy. This time again, 
he acted passively to drain that liquidity and retreating the cuts in interest rates. The next FED 
chairman, Ben Bernanke who took charge in the beginning of 2006 also continued on path of 
his predecessor by injecting more liquidity in the aftermath of credit crisis that started to occur 
in mid-2007.   
 
3.1 Equity Injection - Tendency for Nationalization 
After teaching developing and emerging countries to go for privatization as part of FL 
process, governments in the developed countries have now reversed their teachings by 
nationalizing a significant part of their own banking systems.  Before finally nationalizing 
banks, governments of crisis-torn developed countries engaged in a series of interventions in 
two ways. First type of interventions were founded on governments’ belief that financial 
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sector, in the wake of crisis, is facing problems of inadequate liquidity due to uncertainty and 
did not realize the general insolvency problem. Second type of interventions was based on 
resolving problems of individual firms through pertinent measures like mergers, closures, or 
public takeovers.  
 
However, these steps are only focusing on banks. These measures were not enough in an 
environment where non-banking financial institutions have more important role in terms of 
their deep-rooted connections with overall financial system.  Recognizing this, FED had 
offered to take enormous volumes of worthless and impaired assets of financial firms as 
collateral and even provided credit facilities to entities that were outside the regulated banking 
system at considerably low interest rates. Since all these measures were based on 
governments’ belief that problem is of liquidity and not of insolvency, no expected results 
were yielded. After failure of all such interventions, governments started to partially realize 
and consider the issue of insolvency.  
 
But government’s attitude was different for different entities and they got treatment on case to 
case bases. For instance, JP Morgan Chase was paid off to take over Bear Stearns at very low 
price. Lehman was permitted to go, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were nationalized, and 
American International Group (AIG) got rescue package with enormous injection of public 
funds. But financial collapse intensified with increasing number of failures making lack of a 
clear plan to cope crisis more evident. Recognizing clearly the actual problem of general 
insolvency, TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program) was enacted in end of 2008 by pressing 
congress to authorize bailout package of US$ 700 million (reduced afterwards to US$475 
million by Dodd-Frank wall street reform and consumer protection act) in order to buy almost 
worthless or impaired mortgage-related assets from financial institutions, as well as any other 
damaged assets from any other financial entity to cleanse their balance sheets.  However, this 
program too did not completely identify the general insolvency problem. TARP was using 
market-based mechanisms to take impaired assets when market price of these assets was 
almost zero, which means that entities selling them would show huge losses in their balance 
sheets. This leads to damage of their sustainability and potential performance which asked for 
recapitalization of these institutions by injection of fresh funds.  
 
Thus, even before US, it was UK which opted for this option of recapitalization i.e. equity 
injection and partial nationalization by buying purchasing ordinary and preference shares 
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valuing £37 billion of UK’s three largest banks: HBOS, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Lloyds 
TSB. The nationalization decision was based on the condition of credit market which was 
frozen as entities in dire need of liquidity were the most insolvent ones so funds were almost 
impossible to get attracted to these entities. Therefore, it was unavoidable for the government 
to step in as stated by UK chancellor Alistair Darling, “this is the only way, when markets are 
not open to certain banks, they can get the capitalization they need” (cited in Chanrasekhar, 
2009, p. 10). In addition to the recapitalization and nationalization, UK government also 
provided guarantee to all bank deposits, with no upper or lower limit, in order to prevent run 
on banks.  
 
UK proved to be first drop of rain as other crisis-affected European countries’ governments 
also started to follow this radical path of banks’ recapitalization with equity injections along 
with guaranteeing deposits and interbank lending. US, despite of all its efforts to avoid state 
takeover, had to join this flock with significant influence of Wall Street on US Treasury. 
Besides acquiring stake in large number of banks such as Bank of America, Citigroup, and 
Morgan Stanley, US also guaranteed, through Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
all deposits in non-interest bearing accounts and FDIC-insured debt issued by banks. But as 
mentioned earlier, US government intervention was fundamentally influenced by Wall Street 
by focusing only on ‘big finance’ with government having no voting rights whereas banks 
having all rights to pay dividends with some initial limitations, and to mobilize private capital 
for buying government’s stake. Resultantly, government’s takeover was virtually welcomed 
in US. One implication of these state takeovers is the implicit freedom allowed to private 
financial players to chase profits at the cost of all others, especially taxpayers. Moreover, 
takeovers are only limited to banks which left many other institutions such as hedge funds, 
mutual funds, pension funds etc. which have suffered massive losses from the subprime 
failure and stock market crash leading to wealth erosion with its adverse effects on investment 
and consumption demand.  
 
These equity injections and direct takeovers by state are considered as part of rescue package 
for these institutions to recover. This cannot, at this moment, can be explicitly categorized as 
a policy shift, like the policy shift from repression to liberalization. However, these rescue and 
recovery measures are sufficient to explain the dichotomy between market and government.  
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The above narrative reflects that banking system of developed world was being saved through 
State takeover and not merely with state support, which has once again refreshed the 
dichotomy between government and market – a dichotomy we focused in first two chapters. 
One inference in current perspective might be the misleading nature of this dichotomy. 
Assuming the negative relationship between government and market actually entails the 
failure to understand this sophisticated relationship. This relationship tends to become 
positive when definition of market is moved from narrow scope i.e. insignificant and minimal 
rules, to a broader scope i.e. significant and extensive laws, norms and practices. Moreover, in 
market economies, government plays multiple roles e.g. consumer, employer, debtor, creditor, 
insurer etc. instead of merely the role of an ‘umpire’, so it can influence market competition.  
Thus, it might be useful to distinguish government’s role to create and sustain markets from 
its role to hinder and crowd out market. On similar lines, the distinction can be made between 
government’s passive regulation versus active intervention or establishing the rules versus 
determining the outcomes etc. (Vogel, 2007). However, since government plays multiple roles 
of market participant as well as of umpire, it is unavoidable to have government performing 
dual character i.e. passive regulations with some active intervention, setting rules with some 
influence on outcomes and so on.  
 
3.2 Modern Financial Repression 
The term of financial repression first used by McKinnon (1973) entails policies of compulsory 
lending to governments, specialized financial institutions, state-owned enterprises, interest-
rate caps, capital controls, and the like. Mix of these repressed policies had been used by 
government to reduce debt levels but they usually work only for domestic debt. Today, we 
can again observe financial regulations to keep international capital ‘out’ of the emerging 
economies to discourage hot money whereas regulations in developed countries tend to keep 
capital ‘in’ to have captive audience for domestic debt. Such tighter restrictions in regulated 
domestic financial environment can be witnessed globally, reflecting resort to once-rejected 
notion of financial repression. 
 
Besides these controls, indirect taxations are also widespread. Even historically, governments 
and central banks, in the aftermath of crises or wars, found it helpful to resort to some form of 
taxation in order to liquidate enormous debt overhang and to ease the burden of debt-
servicing. Extremely high magnitude of public debt in US and other developed countries of 
Europe is the most significant feature of current financial crisis which did not reach at this 
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level since 2nd World War. A recent study by Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) has 
exhibited the public debt to GDP ratio of 22 developed economies from 1900-2011 which 
demonstrates serious policy challenge these countries are facing (Figure 4.1). This challenge 
becomes more severe if private debt is also incorporated – private debt which acts as principal 
contingent liability of governments. Unlike the period after 2nd World War when debt was 
only concentrated in public sector, this time has significantly high leverage in private sector.  
Today, this debt overhang and resultant financial fragility along with high unemployment 
level is the prominent characteristic of most developed countries. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Public Debt - to – GDP Ratio (Source: Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2012) 
 
 
Since the current crisis has international orientation, it might be relevant to see financial 
repression under heading of ‘macroprudential regulation’.  In fact, the interaction between 
high volume of debt in developed economies and the perceived threat of currency 
misalignments and overvaluation in emerging economies facing capital inflows leading to 
pressures for currency intervention and capital controls generates ‘home bias’ in finance i.e. 
financial de-globalization and revival of financial repression – although it is mostly discussed 
under heading of macroprudential regulation instead of financial repression. This implies that 
macroprudential regulations tend to act in financially repressive manner. Unlike ‘micro-
prudential regulations’ which emphasize the safety and soundness of individual financial 
institutions, the ‘macroprudential regulations’ focus on risk mitigation of the whole financial 
system. The differences in these two approaches are clearly described by Borio (2003) in a 
table which is given at Annexure VI.  
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Besides financial repression, governments traditionally strive to reduce debt to GDP ratio 
through different ways such as fiscal adjustment or austerity plans, economic growth, debt 
restructuring, sudden escalation of inflation etc. Economic growth is very long term 
phenomenon which needs stable financial system. Fiscal adjustments are politically hard and 
often hurting in the short run whereas debt restructuring attaches with it an upsetting stigma 
and may entail deep recession.   
 
Declining growth rates tend to counterbalance much of the improvement which justifies the 
rapprochement to financial repression. This is accompanied by the absence of any coherent 
fiscal consolidation plan to help governments bring down budget deficits. Thus, the basic 
motive of modern financial repression is to recover country’s ability to finance public and 
private debt without opting for fiscal adjustment (Kirkegaard, Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2011). 
As noted by HSBC Chief Economist Stephen King (cited in Oprita, 2012), this financial 
repression aims to rig the financial system in favor of developed countries and results the 
policies which allow governments to fund their borrowing by imposing costs on others. May 
be that is the reason why repression is considered to accompany widespread lack of 
transparency. 
 
Repression policies are aimed to alter the pricing of debt or currency either directly through 
intervention or indirectly through changing the amount of debt and currency. Artificial 
reduction in the cost of debt below the level that free market forces might set enables 
government to decrease borrowing cost and debt accumulation. Apparently seems a kind of 
“stealthy default”, such repression allows developed countries with fiat currencies to stiff their 
creditors while still presumably paying interest and principal (Mather, 2011). Financial 
repression is considered as a tricky form of taxation or fiscal austerity. Since rise in direct 
taxes or spending cuts are politically precarious, therefore, the taxation through repression 
appears more subtle. In this regard, financial repression, in combination with steady inflation, 
reduces debt burden in two ways. Firstly, low nominal interest rate cuts the debt servicing 
costs and secondly, negative real interest rate erodes the debt to GDP ratio as it is a tax on 
savers (Kirkegaard and Reinhart, 2012). It must be noted that inflation may not benefit 
repression if government needs to borrow in the near future which produce another key 
feature of repression i.e. pushing the maturity of debt further. This is evident from example of 
UK which is planning to issue bonds with maturities of 100 or more years.  
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The tactics to use financial repression have been transformed over the years. Today, 
governments have large number of repressive tools to decrease costs of debt and transfer risk 
and return profile from investor to government.  In this respect, Carmen Reinhart and M. 
Belen Sbrancia (2011) have outlined the broad set of policy areas in which financial 
repression is featured. They include new bank and capital regulations favoring government 
debt e.g. Basel III bank rules providing favorable preferential treatment to government debt in 
bank balance sheets through substantial differentiation in capital requirements; Solvency II 
insurance rules; U.K. bank liquidity requirements; increasing the amount of sovereign issues 
on domestic bank balance sheets; regulations and suasion regarding pension fund; growing 
capital controls and currency interventions; explicit or implicit caps and ceilings in interest 
rate e.g. recent trend of putting caps to keep interest rate below equilibrium free market level; 
establishment of captive domestic entities for directing credit to government at artificially low 
rates e.g. quantitative easing or asset purchase programs; direct ownership of banks etc.  
 
Jackson (2012) have described the suasion regarding pension fund in detail by giving example 
of UK government that pushed pension fund of Royal Mail to invest in those infrastructure 
projects for which government is lacking funds. UK government took over a fund of assets 
worth £28 billion assets and liabilities worth £32 billion. The assets are going to be used to 
pay government debt giving rise to debate that whether these funds ought to be used for 
capital building i.e. infrastructure or current spending i.e. debt payment. This debate might 
vanish after few years because the only question that matters is who paid debt, borrower or 
lender. This is the lack of transparency which this modern repression entails.  
 
3.2.1 Low and Negative Interest Rate 
Exceptionally low interest rate is the most important aspect of modern financial repression 
where it is maintained even below inflation rate so that inflation-adjusted borrowing cost is 
negative in real terms. It is not strictly necessary for interest rates to be negative but they need 
to be lower than a country’s growth rate. FED has recently announced that it will keep interest 
rates at these extremely low levels through mid-2015. The basic objective of maintaining low 
interest rate is to cut back government’s debt servicing cost on enormous stock of debt which 
may lead to deficit reduction. Not just the crisis-affected developed countries, even emerging 
countries are also maintaining interest rates at very low level as compared to inflation and 
growth. Global trend in this regard is shown in Figure 4.2.  
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These repressed rates may infect global financial markets by affecting asset prices. 
Government has central bank’s assurance to borrow at low interest rates but investors and 
savers find it hard to earn any return on assets with this low interest rate after inflation 
adjustment. But the major implication of artificially low interest rate is embedded in its nature 
of being a ‘tax’. Unlike income tax or sales tax, the ‘repression tax’ is quite opaque and less-
noticeable because it is generally determined by inflation performance or financial regulation. 
Unlike painful spending cuts or extra taxation, the indirect repression tax is much easier to 
swallow.   
 
 
Figure 4.2 Global Real short rates (Source: ISI and PIMCO) 
 
Heavy interventions by central bank and aggressive monetary policy stance of developed 
countries are also critical features of current crisis which raise the question about 
determination of such low interest rate. Whether this interest level is determined by market 
forces or by few official big players i.e. non-market forces is of significant importance. 
Reinhart (2011) has exhibited, in a graph at Annexure VII, the decreasing role of outside 
market players as compared to official players in determination of interest rate in US treasury 
market. Even FED quantitative easing along with heavy purchases of US Treasury by foreign 
banks could not increase the proportion of outside marketable Treasury securities more than 
50 percent. This is the lowest proportion since breakdown of Bretton Woods in early 1970s 
which was also the era of increasing prices for oil, gold and commodities, negative real 
interest rates, unstable currency, and high inflation. The similar trend of considerably reduced 
share of outside market gilts can be observed in Europe. This implies that central banks of US 
and Europe have turned into biggest official players to buy government debt for the 
unspecified timeframe. Besides, the central banks of emerging countries are also buying US 
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and European government bonds on big scale, in order to protect them against potential 
currency appreciation. Such heavy purchases by non-market players make the pricing of 
government debt doubtful in relation to its risk that is a widespread feature of financial 
repression.  
 
It may be relevant to mention here that such kind of artificially negative interest rates in 
developed countries is not a new phenomenon. Following the Great Depression and 2nd World 
War, the laissez-faire banking was almost terminated with advent of Bretton Woods which 
was founded on fixed exchange rates and controlled capital markets. This leaded to extremely 
low nominal interest rates and inflationary emissions across developed countries resulting in 
negative real interest rates. This trend persisted almost till 1980 when the wave of financial 
liberalization and openness started to increase interest rates that prevailed till current era of 
financial repression. Figure by Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) at Annexure VIII demonstrates 
these trends from 1945 to 2011.   
 
The re-emergence of highly negative interest rates since the occurrence of current crisis seems 
to be motivated from the repressive era of 1950s and 1960s during which government debt 
declined rapidly. But this could be a coincidence because debt reduction during that period 
can also be attributed to mega growth that brought in tax money (Oprita, 2012). Fiscal 
balances during those years also reversed very speedily in order to reverse the debt stock ever 
more speedily. However, that debt reduction was misunderstood to be spurred from financial 
repression alone. It can also be noted that today, debt levels still on rising trend despite of low 
interest rates, not only because of crisis itself, but also because of slowdown in economic 
growth. This implies that despite of shifting adjustment burden from debtors to creditors 
through unusually low interest rates, it might be unlikely for repression to bring any major 
reduction in government debt in relation to economic growth.  
 
3.2.2 Other Implications of Modern Repression 
Apropos to the historically high levels of public and private debt, it seems likely for 
policymakers in developed countries to remain involve in debt management even during near 
future. Financial repression acts as a cheap way for government to fund its heavy debt burden 
through twofold manner of keeping low interest rates and maintaining captive domestic 
audience. In addition to this, the persistently high levels of unemployment in the developed 
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economies in the aftermath of current crisis also pressurize central banks to maintain very low 
interest rates.  
 
Moreover, repression permits governments to postpone austerity and to finance excessive 
borrowing at much reduced cost. This infers that repression is a way to coerce economy to 
create room for government excess. In this regard, it is pertinent to question the ability of 
repression as a way to live with government debt, rather than reducing it in long run. Though 
at this moment, repression seems to an approach to rescue and recover crisis-torn financial 
markets. However, we are unable to see any clear future agenda to either go back to those 
heights of liberalization that had been experienced since 1980s. It is significant to mention 
here that the use of financial repression to bring temporary stabilization may not be sufficient 
to contain debt dynamics even in medium term. Repression does not seem to liquidate 
government debt as fast as it accumulated leading to failure in stabilizing debt to GDP ratio. 
Without changes in fiscal and government spending policies and stronger growth, repression 
alone is unlikely to reap any benefit. But this is paradoxical that such level of debt is tended to 
stunt the prospects of economic growth. Although repressive measures by governments of 
developed countries are somewhat trying to slow down the accumulation of debt, the enduring 
fiscal deficits are so huge that repression cannot offset the entire debt.  
 
Other than negative real returns suffered by savers and investors, financial repression also has 
other costs. Inefficient capital allocation and crowding out of productive investment tend to 
hinder medium to long term growth. Various market distortions are also resulted including 
asset booms and busts, sudden stops due to loss of confidence, intense spells of inflation etc. 
Modern repression involves reinforcing tactics due to which the risks it entails are difficult to 
recognize. This demands more caution on part of investors to analyze these development as 
approaches that worked in past may not prove equally beneficial in this modern era of 
repression.  
 
Modern repression also contains various investment implications. Sovereign debt is 
considered to be the most risk free asset all around the world but current crisis has made even 
this class of asset to entail credit risk due to developed countries debt overhang. The situation 
is worsened due to governments’ ability to tax and exercise other forms of financial 
repression which is affecting other asset classes as well. However, ignoring sovereign debt is 
not any solution for investors because repression and debt dynamics have turned other asset 
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classes even more risky as compared to the sovereign debt. Due to spillover effects, this has 
tendency to destabilize the global markets and economies for next several years.    
 
3.2.3 Modern Repression in Emerging Economies 
Where developed countries are using repression to reduce cost of financing their huge stock 
of debt, many emerging countries are using repression for gaining bigger share of global 
growth. In this aim, they have adopted measures to control currency appreciation and keeping 
capital out in order to maintain external competitiveness. The result is massive foreign 
currency reserves these emerging countries have accumulated and then invested in 
government bonds of highly-indebted developed countries. This, in turn, is generating ‘self-
reinforcing’ repression sequence. Because when developed countries keep their interest rates 
low, currencies of emerging countries incline to appreciate which is hindered by emerging 
countries through intervention. This leads to re-accumulation of reserves and their re-
investment in government bonds of developed countries which puts further downward 
pressure on interest rate. In this manner, the repression cycle goes on. This implies that 
instead of market-oriented risk and return objectives, heavily-indebted crisis-torn developed 
countries and relatively sound emerging countries are united in their repressive stance in order 
to preserve growth today without paying much attention to costs and risks it may bring 
tomorrow.   
 
Moreover, financial globalization and integration, once considered as ‘panacea’ for emerging 
countries, is now becoming ‘culprit’ as financial crisis of US and Europe also affected 
stability of stock markets in emerging economies. But the international transmission of 
turmoil through integrated markets is only one of the means by which current crisis can affect 
emerging and developing countries. A medium-term implication is reduction of private capital 
inflows due to investors’ limited risk appetite. Since earlier capital inflows proved ‘costly’ as 
they were generally used to build external reserves instead of productive investment, 
therefore, the reduction in capital inflows is to be considered ‘blessing in disguise’.   
 
Another implication is reduction in foreign remittances which developing and emerging 
countries have as major portion in their balance of payment. In the similar manner, exports to 
US and Europe are also reduced due to decline in demand which inevitably follows from 
recession and downturn in these countries. Besides ending the commodity boom, current 
crisis is also probable to cancel or delay big investment projects due to their now uncertain 
213 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
profitability. The sectors which are more likely to get this hit include construction, aviation, 
tourism and hospitality. This halt will have negative multiplier effects as lost jobs would 
reduce demand even further.  
 
An interesting feature to note is that the effect an emerging country may suffer from the 
current crisis depends at what extreme it has gone for liberalization and deregulation. For 
instance, China and India are relatively safe and sound because they have kept most of their 
banking system under state control and have not permitted most of the financial innovations 
that played a key role in current crisis.  
 
Section 4. Current Crisis and Neo-Liberal Capitalism 
Another analysis, different from the mainstream explanation given in previous sections, is that 
the financial crisis is simply a symptom of another deeper crisis, which is a systemic crisis of 
capitalism itself (McMurty, 1999). Current crisis has come up with many complications 
mainly because it occurred in the US that is considered to be the ‘headquarter of capitalism’. 
A country recognized as ‘global hegemon’ with power and influence to impose its economic 
agenda of neoliberalism on rest of the world is now itself captured in a crisis having severe 
ramifications. The underlying notions of neoliberal agenda like ‘invisible hand of market’; 
‘markets know best’; ‘self-regulation is best regulation’ etc. seem unrealistic, rather deceitful 
in this scenario.  
 
However, it would not be easy for US, or even for Europe, to accept this reality. They 
consider the prescriptions and medicines of liberal models and open markets they used to give 
to developing world as ‘unviable’ for themselves. Resultantly, developed world is now doing 
just the opposite of what it had always been orated in case of crises in developing and 
emerging world. This is evident from government’s direct interventions and Keynesian 
countercyclical macroeconomic policies which US and Europe are adopting. In this context, 
the term ‘golden age of capitalism’ is challenged as that ear should be called the ‘age of state 
capitalism’. In this respect, it is relevant to see economic historian Niall Ferguson saying that 
“the lesson of economic history is very clear. “Economic growth …comes from technological 
innovation and gains in productivity that came from private sector, not from the state” (cited 
in Chomsky, 2009).  
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However, the opposite is claimed by intellectuals like Noam Chomksy (2009) by emphasizing 
the crucial role of state in development and innovation throughout history. According to him, 
the current crisis is stemmed from the private management of the financial system which has 
driven into an unusually severe crisis harming not only the poor but also the rich, so it 
qualifies for special attention. Massive government intervention is not just a phenomenon of 
post-World War II. Rather, state had always been a fundamental element in economic 
development of US. That’s why economic historian Paul Bairoch (1993, p. 30) refers US as 
the mother country and bastion of modern protectionism with the highest tariffs in the world. 
These protectionist policies continued till mid-twentieth century and even afterwards 
whenever US needed to rescue its corporate management by putting more protectionist 
barriers. Not only US, but Britain and other develop countries of Europe were also pursuing 
protectionism while pushing developing and emerging countries towards orthodox approach. 
Orthodox economic principles were implemented discriminately on weak developing 
economies and violated at will by strong developed economies. This actually created the 
foundation of harsh North-South divide. On basis of a broad survey, it was concluded by 
Bairoch (1993) that “it is difficult to find another case where the facts so contradict the 
dominant theory than the one concerning the negative impact of protectionism”.  
 
In one way, this widespread crisis of developed world has provided opportunity to theorists 
and policymakers of capitalist world to question the prevailing economic paradigm and to 
think about its possible alternatives. However, the chances to exploit this opportunity seems 
remote as predicted by head of a law firm Sullivan & Cromwell that “Wall Street, after 
getting billions of taxpayer dollars, will emerge from the financial crisis looking much the 
same as before markets collapsed” (cited in Chomsky, 2009). The reason for such behavior is 
pointed out by Simon Johnson, a former chief economist at IMF, by stating that “throughout 
the crisis, the government has taken extreme care not to upset the interests of the financial 
institutions, or to question the basic outlines of the system that got us here”. It is further 
elaborated by him that “elite business interests that played a central role in creating the 
crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the 
inevitable collapse . . . are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms 
that are needed to pull the economy out of its nosedive…the government seems helpless or 
unwilling to act against them” (cited in Wilson, 2009).  
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Therefore, current global crisis of this magnitude that capitalist world is facing today perhaps 
represent a turning point in the history of capitalism. The pertinent question in this respect is 
whether this crisis the consequence of unstable nature of capitalism or the result of tenacious 
neoliberal ideologies developed since 1980s. Mostly the capitalism itself is considered as key 
culprit. This might not be completely true when we see the transition from golden age of 
capitalism during end-1940s to end-1970s towards finance-led capitalism, commonly known a 
neoliberal era. The general characteristics of golden era of capitalism were regulated and 
stable financial markets and high growth rates. Contrarily, the common features of finance-led 
neoliberal era of capitalism were open and unstable financial markets and declining growth 
rates. It may imply that finance-led capitalism of neoliberal form is intrinsically unstable. This 
must be borne in mind that financialization is not a new concept. Finance-led capital was first 
termed by Rudolf Hilferding (1919) in his seminal book ‘Finance capital’ which analyzed the 
transformation of pluralist and competitive ‘liberal capitalism’ into monopolistic ‘finance 
capital’.  
 
The increased incidence of financial instability since 1970s is documented by Boyer, Dehove 
and Plihon (2005) by indicating that “this succession of national banking crises could be 
regarded as a unique global crisis originating in the developed countries and spreading out 
to developing countries, the recently financialized countries, and the transitional countries”. 
This can be inferred that crises that neoliberal and financialized form of capitalism is facing 
are not merely cyclical crises rather they are perpetual crises which would always persist.  It is 
an inconvenient truth about this particular form of capitalism that stability and efficiency 
cannot be achieved simultaneously, an area discussed in detail in previous chapter. The 
intrinsic instability principally stems from speculation which is inescapable in capitalistic 
economies. Thus, there exists no ideal or optimum state to be achieved. So, the efforts always 
direct towards achieving ‘second-best’.  
 
Another way to focus this topic is to describe that it was the decline of growth rates and 
profits during 1970s in US and UK along with stagflation which mounted to cause the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods and to originate financialization and the accompanying 
neoliberalism agenda.  It was not coincidental that these two developed countries that were 
showing the worst economic performance during 1970s initiated this new economic 
arrangement (Bresser-Pereira, 2010). This leaded to Neoclassical macroeconomics replacing 
Keynesian macroeconomics and growth models replacing development economics. Key 
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neoclassical economists of those times such as Milton Friedman and Robert Lucas, along with 
other like-minded scholars and academicians, influenced the creation of neoliberal ideology 
based on laissez-faire concepts. Thus ideology was based on reduced government role and 
deregulated markets, particularly financial and capital markets. The reasoning for this 
ideology was instituted on the argument that only most efficient would be rewarded. State 
protection for ‘public’ interest is repudiated by considering market players as ‘individuals’.   
 
4.1 Factitious Wealth 
The finance-led capitalism, based largely on excessive speculation, brought the mushroom 
growth of ‘factitious’ financial wealth which disconnected the real economy from the 
financial economy. Moreover, profits of financial institution also augmented significantly 
which enabled them to pay huge bonuses to financial traders due to their role in increasing 
capitalist rents. Another important feature of finance-led capitalism was the cessation of credit 
to be based mainly on loans from banks. Rather, it was now started to rely more on security 
involving hedge funds, mutual funds etc. as financial investors. Henri Bourguinat and Eric 
Brys (2009, p. 45) called this tendency as a ‘general malfunction of the genome of finance’, 
primarily due to the unclear nature of risks it entails.  
 
The condition became even more complex when creation of factitious capital is combined 
with speculation process. Robert Guttmann (2008, p. 11) focused this trend by stating that 
“the phenomenal expansion of fictitious capital has thus been sustained by banks directing a 
lot of credit towards asset buyers to finance their speculative trading with a high degree of 
leverage and thus on a much enlarged scale”. In this process, it was very natural for profit-
seeking commercial banks to use the financial innovations to cleanse their balance sheets by 
transferring their risks to financial investors of securities (Cintra, Macedo and Farhi, 2008). 
Coming back to factitious capital, it must be noted that real wealth based on production was 
long ago distinguished from factitious wealth by Adam Smith. Karl Marx also emphasized 
this distinction where fictitious wealth is created by artificial increase in asset prices as result 
of increase in leverage. It is stated by Marx (1894, p. 601), “with the development of interest-
bearing capital and credit system, all capital seems to be duplicated, and at some points 
triplicated, by various ways in which the same capital, or even the same claim, appears in 
various hands in different guises. The greater part of this ‘money capital’ is purely fictitious”. 
This multiplication is even much bigger today because modern financial system is comprised 
of banks and financial investors, that can collaborate through financial innovations, in order to 
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generate fictitious wealth and to capture bigger portion of real wealth i.e. national income.  As 
indicated by an UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Report (2009), “too 
many agents … trying to squeeze double-digit returns from an economic system that grows 
only in the lower single-digit range”.  
 
Financial wealth gained autonomy from production (Bresser-Pereira, 2010). Figure 4.3 
exhibits that financial assets grew around four times more than real wealth i.e. GDP during 
1980-2007. Thus, it can be established that finance-led capitalism was actually ‘legitimized’ 
under neoliberalism which allows financial system to act as capitalist as well as a professional 
creating fictitious wealth. The creation of artificial wealth under guise of neoliberalism also 
enables ‘rentiers’ associated with capitalists-cum-professionals to capture an ample share of 
economic surplus produced by society. The natural result of this tendency is the concentration 
of wealth within a small segment of society – the richest.   
 
 
Figure 4.3 Financial and Real Wealth (Source: McKinsey Global Institute) 
 
The creation of fictitious wealth leads us to consider the distinctive nature of financial 
markets which are entirely different from other markets. Financial markets deal with a unique 
commodity of money and other financial assets which depend on confidence and convention 
unlike operations of other markets for real commodities. Calling financial assets ‘products’ or 
new type of financial contracts ‘innovations’ cannot alter their nature. Unlike profit seeking in 
production and services, the drive for easy and huge capital gains in financial trading is very 
robust. This drive makes finance and speculation ‘fast friends’ as financial agents are always 
engaged in self-fulfilling prophecies, also termed as ‘self-referential rationality’, motivated by 
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short-term gains to increase bonuses, stocks or bonds. Here, we can also try to implicate the 
idea of ‘cognitive dissonance’35  which can lead to irrational decision making as person tries 
to reconcile his conflicting beliefs. Financial agents, particularly in the most developed part of 
the world, were legitimate to prefer treasury operations to gain short-term profits, as 
compared to real production or trading. Such behavior is clearly in dissonance with the 
mainstream beliefs of macroeconomics. In this setting, finance becomes distorted because it is 
not oriented to finance real production or trading. Instead, it is only financing treasury 
operations which are synonymic with speculation without credit. This speculation is very 
risky in developing great indebtedness of financial investors and leverage of financial 
institutions leading to loss of confidence, panics and crises.  
 
4.2 Minsky’s Approach 
Now, we will turn to seminal works on crises came into being after Great Depression.  During 
1930s, new economic theories were developed when Keynes wrote ‘the general theory of 
employment, interest and money’ in 1936 and Kalecki published his ‘Essays on the theory of 
economic fluctuations’ in 1939. On similar lines, Galbraith came up with his classical work 
‘The great crash’ in 1954 whereas Kindleberger published ‘The world in depression’ in 1973 
and ‘Manias, panics and crashes’ in 1989. On basis of these foundations, certain institutions 
like central banks are established along with regulatory systems under Bretton Woods for 
controlling credit and avoiding crises. All these works discussed economic cycles by focusing 
on real or production side and the inconsistency between supply and demand.  
 
It was Hyman Minsky who first linked economic cycles or economic crises with uncertainty 
and finance during early 1970s. Arruda (2008, p. 71) put it as “when Minsky discusses 
economic stagnation and identifies financial fragility as the engine of the crisis, he transforms 
the financial question in the subject instead of the object of analysis”. Minsky considered 
unstable financial system as the result of increasing autonomy of credit and financial contracts 
from the real economy. Minsky established in ‘Financial instability revisited’ (1972) that 
besides economic crises, financial crises are also endogenous to the capitalist system. 
Although endogeneity of economic crises was already established, however Minsky 
determined the association of economic crises with financial crises which are also 
endogenous. According to Minsky (1972, p. 120 and p. 128), “the essential difference 
                                                          
35
 Cognitive Dissonance, a subject of social psychology, refers to the unpleasant emotions that result from 
believing two contradictory things at the same time.  
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between Keynesian and both classical and neoclassical economics is the importance attached 
to uncertainty….thus, the intrinsically irrational fact of uncertainty is needed if financial 
instability is to be understood”.  
 
Although Minsky’s model developed in 1970s expressed direct causes of crises as poor credit 
evaluation, uninhabited use of leverage, scanty understanding of financial innovations, weak 
system of credit rating, aggressive compensation, and resulting excessive risk taking and 
short-term profits etc. However, these direct causes are to be viewed as emerging from 
deregulation and self-regulation of financial system under guise of regulatory ‘reforms’ 
sanctioned in 1980s by neoliberal dogmas. The consequent stream of financial instability 
emerged from deregulation and elimination of welfare state and intelligent government role. It 
implies that crises are inherent in the logic of the current financial system. Thus, after ‘thirty 
glorious years of capitalism’ from 1940s-1970s, there began ‘thirty dark years of neoliberal 
capitalism’ from 1980-2010s. 
 
Making financial system accommodative is now being called ‘recklessness’ and 
‘irresponsibility’ that triggers booms in neoliberal capitalism. In other words, development in 
conditions of modern capitalism is caused by financial bubbles and ensued crises occurring 
from bursting of these bubbles. Thus, what Stiglitz (2011) calls ‘system failure’ is actually the 
‘system itself’. Quite insightful to find substitute of this bubble-led growth, Keynes (1936) 
recommended ‘socialization of investment’ by emphasizing the role of capitalist state to 
control the ‘euthanasia of the rentiers’. Despite of defending capitalism, these suggestions of 
Keynes were rejected as they were distasteful for financialized capitalism. Therefore, one 
class of analysis viewed that capitalist world came out of Great Depression not because of 
Keynesian ideas but because of military spending in the run up to the 2nd World War (Patnaik, 
2009). The temporary obstruction created by financialized capital after World War permitted 
the acceptance of Keynesian measures of demand management by capitalist state. This 
acceptance prevented crises during glorious years of capitalism. But then resurgence of 
financialized capitalism pushed neoliberal agenda which rejected Keynesian ideas and 
restarted bubble-led growth. Thus the current crisis which has revived the Great Depression is 
the natural product of this progression.  
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4.3 Politics of Finance 
Although it has been implied throughout this chapter, however, it is crucial to exclusively 
mention the dishonesty of financial institutions and incompetence of policy makers, as 
mentioned by Stiglitz (2008a). This dishonesty and incompetence is probable to prevail even 
after crash of this grandeur that is compared with Great Depression of 1930s. Particularly 
banks always tend to reject strict anti-trust measure but they demand for state intervention to 
bail them out as they are too big to be allowed to fail. Policy makers at governments and 
central banks, facing the threat of systemic risk, have no policy but to intervene with their 
unlimited safety net.  
 
Financial markets are based on trust and current crisis has eroded that trust. Particularly, US 
policy makers are under severe criticism as they did not accept that ‘any’ crisis is going to 
happen till end of 2008. For instance, US delivered assurances that things are going to be fine 
in G8 meeting in July 2008. In addition, US exported its toxic mortgages and deadly practices 
to global financial system in the name of ‘innovation’. Any effort to regulate these 
innovations is rejected by claiming that it would subdue this innovation. The worst part of the 
story is that this innovation was not making economies stronger as they were based on 
artificial wealth, which did not actually exist. Krugman (2012) also stressed the intellectual 
clarity and political ‘will’ to end this current depression and to prevent this intense state of 
pain in future.  
 
The interconnection among economic systems make them more prone to system-wide failures 
with enormous costs because failure in one part of system can lead to system-wide failure 
(Stiglitz, 2012). It is logical to design and implement circuit breakers or checks to prevent 
contagion i.e. a complete ‘shut down’.  The absenteeism or deficiency of such checks permits 
the contagion to blowout unimpeded throughout the global economy. However, these checks 
are generally discouraged. One of its reasons, described by Stiglitz (2012), is inequality as one 
percent of Americans control forty percent of US wealth leading to ‘divided and sick society’. 
This inequity in US market arises because economy is astounded by ‘politically engineered 
market advantages’ i.e. rent-seeking.  
 
Stiglitz (2012) cautioned that revolts that stroke in Middle East during last few years might 
also appear in US and other developed world. He wrote that “our own country has become 
like one of these disturbed places, serving the interests of a tiny elite. We have a big 
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advantage - we live in a democracy - but it’s a democracy that has increasingly not reflected 
the interests of large fractions of the population” (Stiglitz, 2012, p. 27). It is not a coincidence 
that two key books published in 2012 by two Nobel Laureates, Paul Krugman’s (2012) ‘End 
this depression now’ and Joseph Stiglitz’s (2012) ‘The price of inequality’ emphasized 
exclusively on politics of finance. These radical pieces of work are actually reorienting 
economic to its earliest conception as the ‘science of political economy’. We can infer that 
politics hold a significant, rather main, position in the field of global economy and finance. 
Current crises have brought the political economy of finance to the fore. This has provided 
impetus even to mainstream economists to turn their attention to the political economy 
dimension.    
 
4.4 New Capitalism 
Financialized capitalism dismantled the institutions and overlooked the economic theories 
learned after the Great Depression of the1930s by irresponsibly deregulating financial markets 
and banishing Keynesian and developmental economics. Current crisis has taught severe 
lesson due to which developed economies are now increasingly engaged in re-regulating 
financial markets. Lesson learned from this crisis must not be forgotten as there is no point to 
repeat same mistakes indefinitely. However, inducement to go back to ‘business as usual’ is 
strong as we can observe the delaying tactics to avoid re-regulation. For instance, G-20 signed 
re-regulation commitment in Nov 2008, reiterated each year till now, but they are still facing 
great resistance.  
 
The regime coming out from the learnings of current crisis must also take backward steps as 
far as financialized capital is concerned. Since neoliberalism and finance-led capitalism is 
often associated with financial globalization, it is relevant to shed light on a view which 
considers financial globalization as unnecessary. It implies that globalization could have been 
only limited to commercial globalization and sidestepped the financial globalization. If 
financial globalization had been restricted, the capitalist system would have been more stable 
and efficient. Thus, upcoming era of capitalism need to concentrate more on globalization in 
commercial and productive sector, instead of financial globalization. This is the reason why 
many fast growing emerging countries of Asia are now involved aggressively in commercial 
globalization but strictly limiting financial globalization. For instance, China is completely 
integrated commercially with global economy while remaining quite closed on financial 
footings.  
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The creation and consolidation of G-20 may have some possibility of even enhanced 
commercial globalization. However, it is easier said than done because global financial and 
commercial system has been entirely determined by ‘super-powers’ i.e. few developed 
countries of western world, since ages. These countries overpower all key global institutions. 
For instance, G-7 presumes itself to be key designer of new financial architecture, despite of 
the fact that this forum does not include largest emerging economies like Russia, China, India, 
Brazil etc. The Financial Stability Forum of the BIS also ignores any representation from 
developing countries. Even the small countries of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg, 
with a total population of less than 28 million, have more votes in the IMF than China, Brazil 
or India (Ghosh, 2008).  
 
Certain analysts like Geoff Mulgan are very positive about change in capitalism as he states 
that “the lesson of capitalism itself is that nothing is permanent. Within capitalism there are 
as many forces that undermine it as there are forces that carry it forward” (Mulgan, 2009). 
Being optimistic that global capitalism would no longer be the financialized and neoliberal 
capitalism, Mulgan (2009) claimed that “just as monarchy moved from center stage to become 
more peripheral, so capitalism will no longer dominate society and culture as much as it does 
today. Capitalism may, in short, become a servant rather than a master, and the slump will 
accelerate this change”. However, it seems little audacious claim given the resistance 
capitalist world is facing in even reregulating financial markets, let alone subsiding the whole 
system. And then there was ‘democracy’ which replaced monarchy. Thus the pertinent 
question is the availability of any alternative system to replace capitalism. It implies that till 
the emergence of any new system, one must learn to ‘live with the existing system’.  
 
And it is in this aim that more voices are gathering against financialized and neoliberal 
capitalism. Now the measures that capitalist economies would take significantly depend upon 
the extent to which they are ready to confront the hegemony of financialized capitalism. New 
capitalism demands the reinstatement of regulatory power of state for permitting markets to 
execute economic coordinating. Various financial innovations or type of contracts must be 
barred forthrightly. All transactions need to be more transparent and risks being 
systematically limited.  
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4.5 Probable Measures 
The current crisis in developed markets has exposed serious flaws in the structure of financial 
markets and in the ways they are regulated. Today, International economic policymakers are 
challenged by the critical issue of reforming the institutions, structures, and policies through 
which crises can be prevented and predicted. Although financial markets do not work 
perfectly, but as mentioned by Winston Churchill, they are the worst way of allocating 
resources except for all other forms that have been tried (cited in Eichengreen, 1999). And 
given the widespread and ever-enhancing technology, it is impossible to put lid on financial 
globalization and liberalization to reverse these trends.  Various proposals offer a conclusive 
break from the deregulatory agenda of the past generation, with some suggesting 
transformation of prevailing set of political and regulatory institutions. Debates have been 
going on seriously within mainstream policy making circles because the globally integrated 
environment tends to complicate any regulatory system.  
 
Financial liberalization followed from finance-led neoliberal capitalism clearly played a key 
role against safe and sound financial system for developed as well as developing and 
emerging countries. Current crisis has presented the economic case for a robust approach 
towards financial restraint. By robustness, we mean the ability to cope with a variety of 
failure-inducing circumstances and behavior. Restoring the complete array of controls and 
restraints is impossible due to information technology and communication revolution which 
has made the evasion very easy. But it is worthwhile to seek those mechanisms which can 
restore financial system and shift it from failure-prone to safe zone without strangling the 
social contribution of banks’ financing of economic growth (Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz, 
2001). In other words, only those measures should be used to achieve the plateau of safety 
and soundness which don’t hamper efficiency and growth-inducing abilities of financial 
market. In order to ensure, stable and efficient system, it is crucial to closely consider 
‘speculative’ angle, which is intrinsic in capitalistic systems. Appropriate use of government 
regulations against (mis)use of liberal markets seems important for curbing excessive 
speculation and resultant instability.  
 
In this regard, minimal regulation may not be sufficient to shift the financial system into safe 
zone. Accordingly, it is important to consider the relevance of theoretical models. For 
instance, many models of bank behavior exhibit discontinuities at level of an individual bank 
or at level of the whole system, whereby even minor changes in exogenous factors can shift 
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equilibrium behavior into another regime having significantly higher failure risk. Or, some 
models also provide caution about counterintuitive equilibrium effects of certain policies e.g. 
a slight change in capital adequacy requirement could actually enhance the failure risk. Thus, 
regulation fine tuned to a model that imperfectly captures the real world may miss its mark 
(Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz, 2001). Putting it another way, intelligent regulations based on 
a specific model of bank or financial system behavior might be counterproductive if that 
model does not relate to reality. 
 
Futuristic reforms need to cater whole financial market trading because conversion of 
investments into money is simplified by financial markets but actually, trading has little to do 
with raising funds for investment. For instance, financial market players traded during 2007 
the bonds and stocks valuing US$300 for each dollar which is raised by nonfinancial 
corporations for investment in plant and equipment. Thus, one key proposal can be the 
taxation on trading of financial assets by all financial institutions which come under country’s 
legal rule e.g. banks, hedge funds, equity funds, holding companies etc. (Pollin, 2009). Just 
like sales tax, a small tax on all trading of financial market would increase the costs for short-
term speculators whereas it would have negligible effect on infrequent actual traders. 
Consequently, it would discourage speculation and direct funds toward productive 
investments. This proposal also entails the suggestion to raise the tax rate until that point 
where speculative traders see little incentive to engage in trading. It is also appropriate to 
mention here that taxing the trading of securities is not a new idea. Proposal for such taxation 
have been introduced in US Congress during Bush administration after crash of 1987. Even 
during Clinton administration, the proposal of this tax is argued persuasively by Joseph 
Stiglitz and Lawrence Summers, but never transformed into law.   
 
In addition to this tax, asset-based reserve requirements can also prove helpful to channel 
funds to high priority and less risky areas. This requirement demands financial institutions to 
maintain cash reserves in proportion to their risky assets. In this respect, it is equally crucial to 
ascertain those priority sectors of economy that should be favored in getting credit. Domestic 
investments have clear risks so they should be encouraged whereas speculative investments 
have somewhat unclear risks so they should be discouraged. Housing is also a priority area 
but this sector should be subsidized directly through public policy provisions and not through 
risky gambling, as happened during last decade. On the other hand, businesses should have all 
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the freedom and control to even pursue non-preferential areas for new investments and 
financial institutions should also be free to finance them.  
 
Government may also use direct lending and loan guarantees to ensure credit channeling to 
priority area. At present, sectors of the US economy getting considerable funding though 
these programs include education, agriculture, housing, small business, and rural 
development. However, influence of such programs on overall financial market risk is often 
not considered seriously because these programs are difficult to be integrated with FED’s 
monetary policy and interest rate management. 
 
Another proposal is the establishment of public credit rating agency to contend with private 
agencies because they have played a key role in housing bubble and consequent crisis. Rating 
agencies are supposed to do accurate and objective assessment of risks engaged in sale or 
purchase of a financial instrument. But even big agencies like Fitch, Moody, and Standard & 
Poor etc. provided exaggeratedly confident evaluations of extremely risky financial projects, 
particularly in securitized asset markets. An important aspect of this behavior of rating 
agencies, as discussed earlier in this Chapter, is related with the market incentives and 
conflicting interests of ‘advisory’ and ‘rating’ arms of CRAs which pressed the agencies to 
provide unreasonably favorable assessments. Providing favorable appraisal was worthy for 
these rating agencies’ bottom lines (Pollin, 2009). Moreover, CRAs are ‘hired’ and ‘paid’ by 
companies they evaluate, which is also a reason behind this favorable bias. Thus, companies 
choose only those rating agencies which they consider would give them favorable ratings 
because companies’ ability to earn high profits on their financial instruments depends on 
favorable ratings.  
 
Such tenacious incentive system can be combated with a public rating agency with efficient 
compensation system. Although the deepening of securities markets has made the accurate 
risk appraisals very complicated task. However, public rating agency would be open about 
difficulties in rating certain instrument by classifying it ‘non-ratable’. This would allow 
market participant to decide more cautiously if they want to gamble on such instrument. 
Public rating is likely to bring more transparency in financial markets and may also provide 
foundation to institute asset-based reserve requirements for financial institutions.  More 
cautious assessment of risks by public rating agency is also likely to inhibit over-zealous 
behavior for financial innovations. However, that doesn’t mean to turn the overall economy 
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less innovative or less dynamic. With public rating agency, the dynamism of a leashed 
financial market would develop in a manner that credit channels into productive areas (Pollin, 
2009). Besides establishing public rating agency, another possibility can be the legal 
separation of the rating service from the advisory service of CRAs. Another significant 
proposal is to remove the CRAs rating from the structure of formal regulation. This implies 
that investors need to take responsibility of their decisions and regulators need not to hide 
behind CRAs’ forecasts and play blame-game which they did in the wake of current crisis 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2009). 
 
4.6 Macro-Prudential Framework 
The current crisis has highlighted the need to opt for macro-prudential regulation and 
supervision. Today, policy debates are largely focused on the design, implementation and 
effectiveness of macro-prudential apparatus. Before incidence of current crisis, only limited 
literature and research was conducted on this subject. However today, macro-prudential 
framework has gained attention of all policymakers who talk about reforms in post-crisis 
scenario (e.g. Shirakawa, 2009; Nijathaworn, 2009; Tumpel-Gugerell, 2009; Bini-Smaghi, 
2009; Kohn, 2009; Brouwer, 2010).  
 
Although there exist various disagreements, the objective of macro-prudential policy is 
generally aimed to bring financial stability by limiting the risks and costs of systemic crises. 
Borio and Drehmann (2009) specify these risks as the risks of episodes of system-wide 
distress that have significant macroeconomic costs. Caruana (2010) postulates the objective of 
macro-prudential policy as “to reduce systemic risk by explicitly addressing the interlinkages 
between, and common exposures of, all financial institutions, and the procyclicality of the 
financial system” (Caruana, 2010). Perotti and Suarez (2009) regard macro-prudential policy 
as targeting to discourage individual bank strategies which result in systemic risk, i.e. a 
negative externality on the financial system. 
 
Just like the goals and objectives, there also exist no agreement on tools and instruments of 
macro-prudential framework. A range of possible macro-prudential measures have been 
investigated without ascertaining some principal instrument or some standard nomenclature of 
instruments. Single key distinction on this issue is present between ‘macro-prudential tools’ 
that are defined as prudential tools set up with a macro perspective i.e. system-wide or 
systemic and ‘other macroeconomic tools’ that can support financial stability such as fiscal 
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policy (Blanchard et al., 2010; Borio, 2009). In this regard, Hannoun (2010) exhibited the 
overview of alternative sets of tools geared towards financial stability, given at Annexure IX.  
 
In order to specify tools and instruments of macro-prudential framework, it is of utmost 
importance to study their respective effectiveness. It includes quantifying the effect of macro-
prudential policy instruments on leverage, credit growth, asset prices and bubbles. Moreover, 
relevant date should be collected and assessed for an evocative analysis of macro-prudential 
policy. Likewise, empirical analysis also needs to be undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness 
of macro-prudential tools in evading financial instability. It would also be significant to study 
the interaction and coordination between monetary policy and macro-prudential policy. 
 
Financial and banking crises are not new phenomena. The quite-frequent recurrence of these 
crises implies that when a regulatory mechanism failed to mitigate boom-bust cycles, it is not 
a successful strategy to keep on reinforcing basic regulatory structure (Brunnermeier et al. 
2009). Thus, it is most important for macro-prudential regulation to act as a countervailing 
force to the natural decline in measured risks during boom and to the subsequent rise in 
measured risks during subsequent collapse. This countervailing force need to be maximally 
rule-based and focused because discretion is hard to use during booms and euphoric times.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Finance-growth theories and models with which this dissertation is started were embedded in 
the neoliberal approach that has been implemented in countries around the world. This 
resulted in the portrayal of financial liberalization as a panacea for economic growth. Series of 
crises occurred in emerging economies of Asia and Latin America during 1990s following 
from FL were taken as pure problems of those economies. Policy makers in developed 
economies prescribed even more FL to these crisis-prone countries. Some even considered FL 
as an ‘irreversible’ phenomenon. However, current crisis of developed economies and their 
ensued response in form of state intervention and repression has not only exposed double-
standard of global managers, but also regained the role of state in financial markets.  
 
Faced with debt overhang of historic volumes, policy makers are obsessed with debt 
reduction, debt management, and other efforts to keep cost of debt at manageable levels. With 
the dual aim to maintain low interest rates and to maintain captive domestic audience, 
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financial repression is renewing favor and prospering in its many guises. This new era of 
financial repression has not only trimmed the savings and investments of investors but this 
repression is also hard to avoid as it is occurring in various forms over much of the investing 
world.  Moreover, government is also injecting capital in financial institutions and intervening 
directly in financial markets.  
 
This infers that it is not rational to simply get the government out of the way and expect 
‘invisible hand’ to take over and correct every imbalance before it become systemic. Current 
crisis has not only rejected the idea of ‘complete dismantling of government’s role’, but also 
proved the necessity for appropriate state intervention and ownership in financial markets. 
Along with it comes the need to regulate financial innovations which are so complex that 
central banks are facing gigantic challenge to measure, monitor and control the total liquidity 
in the economy. In this regard, policy makers in US and Europe are suggesting new tools and 
regulations for better prudential oversight, accounting disclosures and more transparency. As 
markets evolve and become complex, regulatory and supervisory frameworks need to be 
continuously reassess and adapt to the varying nature of financial risk and systemic risk. The 
mutual challenge for banking supervision, market surveillance, and financial policymaking is 
to balance efforts for maintaining financial stability and manage systemic risks against efforts 
to ensure that market participants bear the cost of imprudent risk-taking and consequently 
have right incentives to avoid imprudence. In this regard, reforming the systemic risk 
management systems is very important. Growing focus on macro-prudential regulation and 
supervision is a significant reform process in this respect. The role of credit agencies also 
need to be revisited with improved public scrutiny. In addition to this, fiscal expansion in 
order to cope with recession must also be based on controls over mobility of global financial 
flows. Because otherwise, large-scale and speculative shifts of finance from one country to 
another leading to destabilize the fiscal policy. Emerging economies have already felt this fear 
and put capital controls.  
 
Capitalism is inherently unstable and crises are intrinsic to it but it is not rational to justify the 
cyclical nature of financial crises, especially when the size and consequences of a crisis are as 
great as this one. This particular crisis is not embedded in simple capitalistic system, rather it 
is most fragile form of capitalism. It is financialized capitalism that emerged from neo-liberal 
agenda and resulted in deregulation and the creation of fictitious wealth that was inconsistent 
with real wealth. Especially in developed countries, total financial assets represent a multiple 
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of annual economic production, accompanied by phenomenal growth of assets in bond and 
equity markets. Thus, the potential measures by capitalist economies in the face of this crisis 
today depend upon the extent to which they can confront the hegemony of neoliberal 
capitalism – hegemony which became widespread since 1980s due to fear of socialism and 
transformation of neoclassical economics into mainstream economics.  
 
With neoliberal capitalism entering a period of crisis, previously dominant ideology of ‘free 
market’ and ‘laissez faire’ has quickly lost its legitimacy. This is analogous to the rapid 
demise of the once dominant Keynesian ideology of ‘regulated’ capitalism during 1970s. Now 
once again, neoliberal capitalism is going to be restructured during coming years in US and 
resultantly throughout world. However, the end-product of this restructuring process is yet 
opaque and unclear. One suggestion in this respect is to move away from traditional 
orthodoxy that is widespread in economic research and to work out alternatives models 
because standard theories that contributed to liberalizing and deregulating policies led us to 
this crisis and have provided apparently no guidance on how to respond. But this is bitter truth 
that series of crises in emerging and developing economies of Asia, Latin America and Russia 
during late 1990s couldn’t bring this realization to global policy makers because they might 
not be considered as significant as crisis in developed economies of US and Europe during 
late 2000s.    
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
The triptych of liberalization, globalization and financialization has not only came up with 
distressing consequences for developing and emerging economies during 1990s, but also 
devastating results for developed economies during 2000s – economies with ‘apparently’ 
well-developed financial sectors. This broad conclusion is derived from multi-pronged themes 
analyzed throughout this thesis. 
 
By reviewing extensive literature on finance and growth, it can be determined that economic 
growth and development are closely related to ‘finance’, although there is difference of views 
on direction of causation as well as on relative significance of various structures of financial 
systems. It can also established that financial systems exert significantly positive effect on 
economic growth though provisioning of various financial services which facilitate in 
improving market frictions. The evolution of growth and development theories progressed 
enough to bifurcate the ‘money’ and ‘credit’ views of economy and the transmission 
mechanisms linking money and income. This gave rise to recognition of restrictive financial 
policies characterized by government intervention which was identified as ‘financial 
repression’.  As a matter of fact, governments of developing and emerging economies, since 
long, had been intervening in the financial markets to fulfill their development policy 
objectives. Along with these objectives, governments also try to narrow down the 
concentration of wealth and monopoly power, to generate fiscal resources, and to channelize 
resources toward most favored parties via financial system. In this aim, the authorities keep 
interest rates artificially at low level. In addition to this, the provision of credit subsidies to 
favored firms and units in industries and agriculture for achieving development goals is also a 
seductive idea. Thus, governments generally pursue the provisioning of direct subsidies and 
outright grants to agriculture or industrial units.  
 
It is difficult to find a country that had never intervened in the financial sector, in one way or 
the other. Much of the twentieth century saw intensified financial repression. Especially in the 
years after Great Depression and World War II, the governments tried to maintain the interest 
rates well below market rates by putting artificial ceiling on them and to control the allocation 
of credit through their directives or through directly owning the banks and financial 
institutions. Interest rate restrictions, heavy reserve requirements on bank deposits, and 
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compulsory credit allocations interact with prevalent price inflation in order to reduce the 
desirability of holding claims on the domestic banking system as the real deposit rate of 
interest on monetary assets generally become negative. However, various development 
economists were still favoring the ‘forced savings’ through inflation and credit subsidies at 
below market interest rates as means to stimulate socially desirable investments.  Financial 
sector was not regarded as major element in the economic growth and development process, 
unless manipulated and repressed. The resulting distortions, erosions and eventual 
deterioration of the financial system was considered as consequence of financial repression, 
therefore, ‘government intervention’ is recognized to be synonymous with ‘government 
failure’ due to its associated economic inefficiencies. Particularly the seminal works of 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and subsequent policy frameworks attributed financial 
repression as one of the key culprits hindering economic growth in developing and emerging 
countries. Thus, curing financial repression was inherent its definition.  
 
Opposition of financial repression has embedded suggestion to maintain positive and 
uniformly high interest rates by removing interest rate ceilings, heavy reserve requirements, 
and other forms of controlled allocations of credit. Only in such setting, the domestic savers 
and investors might be able to realize the true scarcity price of capital and therefore decrease 
the excessive dispersion in the profitability of investment in different sectors of the economy. 
In this regard, McKinnon-Shaw presentation of the case for ‘financial liberalization’ as 
‘opposite’ of ‘financial repression’ became the core theoretical foundation for financial sector 
analysis in end of 1970s.   
 
In the perspective of this theoretical advancement, neoliberal agenda is initiated during 1980s, 
known as ‘Washington Consensus’. It amalgamated with growing financial globalization and 
integration which set up the case for FL in developing and emerging countries, particularly of 
Asian and Latin American economies. This agenda was pursued by international financial 
institutions, mainly under control of US and other developed economies, to force developing 
and emerging countries to adopt FL as conditionality to access concessional loans. Even 
countries not accessing these reform programs also tended to get policy advice emphasizing 
liberalization reforms, due to technocratic environment recognizing McKinnon-Shaw ideas as 
orthodoxy.  
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While recalling 1990s by developing countries to experience market oriented liberalization 
reforms, the same period also bring to mind the periodic financial crashes that spread in quick 
and unpredictable manner. These crashes and subsequent crises resulted in confusions and 
dilemmas on logic and implementation of liberalization reforms. In this aim, certain 
preconditions as well as optimum sequencing to start with domestic liberalization of interest 
rates and leaving capital market liberalization till end has been recommended by the 
proponents of FL to be fulfilled before implementing reforms. However, compliance with 
these conditions cannot guarantee success of FL due to the flaws inherent in financial markets 
which make perfect market models and theories irrelevant. The demonstration of various 
bottlenecks in the developing economies e.g. negative externalities, asymmetric information, 
high debt-equity ratio, weak regulatory system etc. implies that theories and ensuing policies 
of FL are based an inaccurate and incomplete representation of the institutional and structural 
realities prevailing in these economies.  
 
It may be inferred that development economics should be more concerned with what it can do 
in the presence of existing limitations. A policy that requires substantial change in structure 
and institutions before implementation is of little validity and worth. A crucial question which 
arises in this respect is that what role is left for the theory in such circumstances. In fact, 
theory which considers the structural and institutional actualities can contribute in recognizing 
the limitation to change as well as the possibilities for progress. Unfortunately, all varieties of 
FL failed due to weak and flawed understanding of these structural and institutional realities, 
resulted in episodes of crashes and crises. In order to strengthen opposition against FL, the 
crashes and crises in East Asia and Latin America during 1990s accompanied by instability in 
financial system are used as principal argument. Although there exists considerable arguments 
in favor of financial globalization and integration, the repeated episodes of crises demands 
rethinking on financial stability issue, an area still immature as compared to monetary and 
macroeconomic analysis.   
 
Particularly when it comes to capital flows, their fragility is exhibited as a primary risk 
associated with the liberalization of capital markets. This infers that liberalization should not 
be pushed on countries and it is duty of economists and policymakers to present their analysis 
and research in an accessible and convincing manner in order to protect developing and 
emerging countries from undue pressures for financial liberalization. In fact, the interaction 
between domestic and international liberalization might result in a scenario where 
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international capital flows feed the growth of welfare-reducing financial intermediation of 
domestic financial sector. Benefits from liberalization of capital markets can be sizeable only 
if countries have their ‘house in order’ i.e. liberalization in the absence of adequate regulation 
and effective supervision can easily and quickly lead to vulnerabilities which magnify the 
existing distortions. Thus the caveat for the presence of adequate institutional infrastructure 
implies that liberalization is still a long way off for developing and emerging countries. The 
benefits of liberalization to economic growth and development may not be worth the costs of 
the crises which imply the demand for ‘restraint’, especially reimposition of capital controls 
on international capital flows. New theoretical developments also submit that financial are 
different from other markets e.g. commodities markets, because ‘market failures’ are more 
prevalent and widespread in financial as compared to other markets in the economy which 
suggest the need for some degree and form of ‘intelligent’ government intervention.  
 
However, there have been certain developments and innovations in international financial 
markets like the growing use of derivatives, which made the management of financial markets 
more complicated and difficult than ever, even for developed economies of Europe and US, as 
evident for 2008 financial crisis which eventually turned into global recession despite of the 
presence of macroeconomic tools to combat boom and bust cycles along with sophisticated 
regulatory and supervisory framework. Before 2007, crisis of this grandeur was not remotely 
imagined by economists and policymakers even in their worst nightmares because they were 
confident about the strength of financial systems of developed economies due to their grand 
size. While comparing developing countries as small boats on tempestuous sea of 
international finance, Paul Volcker, former Governor of Federal Reserve System, stated that a 
‘big ocean liner like the USS united states can safely navigate through a storm, but even the 
sturdiest vessel is likely to capsize (Volcker, 1998). The possibility of occurrence of crisis in 
US like the ones occurred in Asia and Latin America is also strongly rejected by him by 
comparing the entire banking systems of Indonesia or Thailand or Malaysia to one good-sized 
regional bank in the US. However, it was only few years after this proclamation that world 
saw ‘USS United States’ sinking like a vessel.  
 
As a matter of fact, the series of crises occurred in emerging economies of Asia and Latin 
America during 1990s following from FL were taken as pure problems of those economies. 
Policy makers in developed economies prescribed even more FL and deregulation to these 
crisis-prone countries. Some even considered FL as an ‘irreversible’ phenomenon. However, 
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current financial crisis of US and Europe and ensued response in form of state intervention 
and repressive measures has not only exposed double-standards of global managers, but also 
regained the role of government intervention in financial markets. Faced with debt overhang 
of historic volumes, policy makers of these developed economies are obsessed with debt 
reduction, debt management, and other efforts to keep cost of debt at manageable levels. With 
the dual aim to maintain low interest rates and to maintain captive domestic audience, 
financial repression is renewing favor and prospering in its many guises. Governments of 
crisis-torn countries are heavily injecting capital in financial institutions and intervening 
directly in financial markets.  
 
This infers that it is not rational to simply get the government out of the way and expect 
‘invisible hand’ to take over and correct every imbalance before it become systemic. Current 
crises has not only rejected the idea of ‘complete dismantling of government’s role’, but also 
proved the necessity for appropriate state intervention and ownership in financial markets. 
Along with comes the need to regulate financial innovations which are so complex that 
central banks are facing gigantic challenge to measure, monitor and control the total liquidity 
in the economy. In this regard, policy makers in US and Europe are suggesting new tools and 
regulations for better prudential oversight, accounting disclosures and more transparency. As 
markets evolve and become complex, regulatory and supervisory frameworks need to be 
continuously reassess and adapt to the varying nature of financial risk and systemic risk.  
 
The mutual challenge for banking supervision, market surveillance, and financial 
policymaking is to balance efforts for maintaining financial stability and manage systemic 
risks against efforts to ensure that market participants bear the cost of imprudent risk-taking 
and consequently have right incentives to avoid imprudence. And this challenge has to be met 
without impairing economic efficiency and long-term growth. The role of credit agencies also 
need to be revisited with improved public scrutiny. In addition to this, fiscal expansion in 
order to cope with recession must also be based on controls over mobility of global financial 
flows. Because otherwise, large-scale and speculative shifts of finance from one country to 
another lead to destabilizing the fiscal policy. Emerging economies have already felt this fear 
and put capital controls.  
 
Following the current crisis, the debate on inherently unstable nature of capitalism has once 
again re-surfaced.  Although crises are considered to be intrinsic in capitalistic economies, 
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however, it is not rational to justify the cyclical nature of financial crises, especially when the 
magnitude, topography and consequences of a crisis are as great as this one. This particular 
crisis is not embedded in simple capitalistic system, rather it is most fragile form of 
capitalism. It is financialized capitalism that emerged from neo-liberal agenda and resulted in 
deregulation and self-regulation, and the creation of fictitious wealth that was inconsistent 
with real wealth. Especially in most developed countries, total financial assets represent a 
multiple of annual economic production, accompanied by phenomenal growth of assets in 
bond and equity markets. Thus the potential measures by capitalist economies in the face of 
this crisis today depend upon the extent to which they can confront the hegemony of 
neoliberal capitalism – hegemony which became widespread since 1980s due to fear of 
socialism and transformation of neoclassical economics as mainstream economics.  
 
But this is bitter truth that series of crises in emerging and developing economies of Asia, 
Latin America and Russia during late 1990s couldn’t bring this realization to global policy 
makers because they might not be considered as significant as crisis in developed economies 
of US and Europe during late 2000s. Moreover, crises of 1990s were often considered to be 
embryonic in the ‘underdeveloped’ nature of developing and emerging economies, whereas 
the ‘fragile’ nature of financial markets under neoliberal capitalism was ignored till 
occurrence of current crisis.  
 
With neoliberal capitalism entering a period of chronic crisis, previously dominant notions of 
‘free market’ and ‘laissez faire’ have quickly lost their legitimacy. This seems analogous to 
the rapid demise of the once prevailing Keynesian ideology of ‘regulated’ capitalism during 
1970s. Now once again, capitalism might be restructured in coming years in US and 
resultantly throughout world economy. But the end-product of this restructuring process is yet 
opaque and unclear. One suggestion which can a topic for the future research agenda, is to 
move away from widespread and traditional economic orthodoxy and to work out alternatives 
models because standard theories that contributed to liberalizing policies led us to this crisis 
and apparently provided no guidance on how to respond. However, developing and 
implementing such alternatives is still the major challenge which theorists and policymakers 
are facing right now.  
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ANNEXURE I 
 
A Theoretical Approach to Finance and Growth 
 
 
 
 
(Source: LEVINE, Ross (1997), Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and 
Agenda) 
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ANNEXURE II 
 
Components of a ‘Good’ Financial System 
 
While observing financial systems of highly developed economies, Pater L. Rousseau and 
Richard Sylla (2001) provide a list of key components of a good financial system. These 
components are: 
(a) Sound public finances and public debt management: Sound public finance includes 
setting and controlling public expenditures priorities, raising revenues adequate to find them 
efficiently, and if – as is often the case – that involves issuing public debt, then provision must 
be made for servicing the debt to gain and keep the confidence of the investors who purchase 
it. 
(b) Stable monetary arrangements: stable money is desirable for the usual textbook reasons. 
Money is useful as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a standard of deferred 
payments. All three uses, but especially the latter two, are harmed if money fluctuates and 
depreciates in value in unpredictable ways. 
(c) Variety of banks, some with domestic and others with international orientations, and 
perhaps some with both orientations. 
(d) Central bank to stabilize domestic finances by preventing and alleviating problems in 
financial system by acting as lender of last resort; and manage international financial 
relations. 
(e) Well-functioning Securities markets: Once securities are issued, trading markets provide 
them with transferability and liquidity that enhance their appeal to investors, be they domestic 
or foreign. 
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ANNEXURE III 
 
McKinnon-Shaw Thesis: Savings, Interest rate, and Investment 
 
 
McKinnon-Shaw Thesis is explained graphically in above figure, where the real interest rate 
is very low 1 r as it is administered rather than market determined, and so generates only 
relatively small savings 1 S ( at the intersection point A). Investment is savings constrained in 
a financially repressed regime, and investors generally depend on self-financing. With 
financial liberalization, 1 r will be pushed up to 2 r. The savings curve shifts to 2 S and both 
savings and investment rise to the point 2 S from the origin (at the intersection point B). When 
market is fully liberalized, the rate of interest is 3 r and savings and investment are at 
equilibrium (Se=Ie). Unless interest rate r= 3 r, there is a disequilibrium between savings and 
investment. As interest rate rise, allocation of resources will be better and growth rate of 
output will be stimulated (Cited in Fry, 1995, p. 24)  
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ANNEXURE IV 
 
Optimal Stabilization Policy Mix 
The optimal policy mix is implemented in two phases. During the initial phase, the program 
consists of increases in the loan and deposit rates, a depreciation of the exchange rate below 
its long-run equilibrium level, and a decline in the rate of growth of the domestic component 
of base money. The working mechanism of the policy mix begins by removing the initial 
shortage of real working capital through an increase in the deposit rate, so that the deposit-
income ratio can rise to equal its long-run equilibrium level. The increase in deposits allows 
an expansion of loans through which alleviates the shortage of working capital finance. Since 
the deposit-income ratio is sensitive to expected real yields on domestic and foreign assets, 
the interest rate and exchange rate must be coordinated from the outset. An initial over-
depreciation of exchange rate will lower the expected rate of depreciation in the near future, 
thereby reducing the yield on foreign assets and stimulating a substitution towards domestic 
assets. The increase in foreign savings implies that although the increase in deposit rate may 
well establish a nominal deposit rate above its long-run value, the real deposit rate may be 
below its steady-state value. The real deposit rate will be kept below its long-run value 
because foreign savings will replace some of the domestic savings which would need to be 
mobilized to maintain the deposit-income ratio in equilibrium. Although current-period 
inflation is higher due to the cost-push effect of the devaluation, the increase in nominal 
interest rates and the lower rate of expected depreciation will also allow a lower real rate of 
interest to persist. 
 
The over-depreciation of the exchange rate will also improve the trade balance by improving 
domestic competitiveness, thereby leading to an increase in the domestic money supply. If the 
increase in demand for nominal money, due to increase in deposit rates, falls short of the 
increment in the supply of money from the open-economy sources, an initial discrete decrease 
in the domestic component of base money will be required to maintain price stability. 
Regardless of the size of initial reduction in the money supply, the rate of growth of the 
domestic component must decline sharply if any improvements in the balance of payments are 
to be sustained. The model demonstrates a logical inconsistency at this point. The problem is 
that for the liberalization to be successful, the amount of demand deposits held must increase. 
However, for the liberalization to be sustainable, the amount of domestic money must 
decrease. The two goals are incompatible. If the amount of domestic deposits increases, the 
supply of money, by definition, must increase as well. Mathieson is arguing that the central 
bank should essentially be sterilizing all capital inflows.  
 
The second phase of the liberalization program involves a gradual appreciation of the 
exchange rate, gradual reductions in the nominal loan and deposit rates and a gradual increase 
in the rate of growth of the domestic component of money. The trade surplus and the 
expansion of output in the initial phase will then put upward pressure on the exchange rate, 
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pushing it back to its long-run equilibrium level. The initial increase in aggregate supply 
responding to competitive advantages, and the subsequent reduction in demand for foreign 
goods (inputs), begin to reduce domestic inflation. Falling inflation further reduces 
inflationary expectations and allows a reduction in nominal deposit and loan rates. Real 
deposit rates will rise, provided the fall in inflation is greater than the fall in nominal rates. 
Once portfolio equilibrium is reached, capital inflow will cease, implying that real interest 
rates will need to rise to their long-run values to maintain the steady-state deposit-income 
ratio. As foreign savings are no longer entering the economy, the domestic component of the 
money supply can be allowed to increase gradually to maintain the equilibrium deposit-
income ratio. The higher real deposit rates will ensure increased demand for domestic money 
matches the increased supply. The economy then comes to test its newer, higher steady-state 
level of growth.  
 
(Source: MATHIESON, Donald J. (1979), “Financial Reform and Capital Flows in a Developing 
Economy”, IMF Staff Papers, 26 (3), September, pp. 450-489, Washington DC: IMF) 
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ANNEXURE V 
 
A Stylized View of Capital Mobility in Modern History 
 
 
 
(Source: OBSTFELD, Maurice and TAYLOR, Alan M. (2003), “Globalization and Capital 
Markets” in Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor and Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds.) ‘Globalization 
in Historical Perspective’, University of Chicago Press) 
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ANNEXURE VI 
 
The Macro- and Micro-Prudential Perspectives Compared 
 
(Source: BORIO, Claudio (2003), “Towards a macroprudential framework for financial 
supervision and regulation?” CESifo Economic Studies, 49(2), pp. 181–216) 
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ANNEXURE VII 
 
Share of “Outside” Marketable U.S. Treasury Securities plus Government Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSEs) Securities during 1945-2010 
 
 
 
(Source: REINHART, Carmen M. (2010), Financial repression: back to stay) 
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ANNEXURE VIII 
 
Real Interest Rates Frequency Distributions: Advanced Economies (1945-2011) 
 
 
 
(Source: REINHART, Carmen M. and SBRANCIA Belen M. (2011), Liquidation of 
Government Debt) 
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ANNEXURE IX 
 
Alternative Sets of Tools to Foster Financial Stability 
 
 
Source: Hannoun (2010) 
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SYNTHESE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Contexte et cadre théorique   
La croissance économique et le développement représentent un sujet majeur de l'économie du 
développement. Lors de l'examen des facteurs qui l'affectent, la «finance» a toujours été 
retenue comme ayant un rôle crucial à jouer. Par la finance, nous entendons les processus de 
création et de gestion de la liquidité, les mécanismes bancaires et de crédit, les mouvements 
de création, de circulation et d’annulation des créances-dettes liés aux actifs et passifs privés 
et publics sur les marchés financiers. Certains économistes, tels que Walter Bagehot (1873), 
ont principalement lié la révolution industrielle en Angleterre à son système financier. De 
Joseph Schumpeter à Edward Shaw et Ronald McKinnon, en passant par les économistes 
modernes, la relation entre finance et croissance a été analysée de différentes manières. Un 
système financier agit comme un « modérateur » pour permettre la compensation entre les 
capacités de financement et les besoins de financement. Cette modération peut être effectuée 
soit par contact direct, fondé sur le marché du financement, soit par contact indirecte, par le 
biais du financement bancaire, généralement connu sous le nom d’« intermédiation ». En 
termes simples, il est habituellement supposé que le système financier canalise l'épargne des 
ménages vers les entreprises, et alloue les fonds en faveur de l’investissement. Ceci est 
considéré comme le mécanisme le plus simple et commun qui relie la finance et la croissance. 
En dépit de la reconnaissance de ce lien finance-croissance depuis plus d'un siècle, l'analyse 
globale et systématique des liens entre les facteurs financiers et la croissance date de quelques 
décennies seulement, avec l'avènement des théories et modèles modernes de croissance 
endogène. Ces théories et modèles mettent l’accent sur l'épargne et l'intermédiation 
financière, alors vues comme les principaux canaux de la croissance endogène. 
En outre, l’amélioration des taux de croissance économique dans les pays 
industrialisés, ayant des secteurs financiers développés, a également motivé les économistes à 
étudier en profondeur la relation entre le développement financier et le développement 
économique. Théoriquement et empiriquement, il semble y avoir des liens étroits entre ces 
deux sphères. Cependant, le consensus est fragile sur la définition et la mesure du 
développement financier. Ainsi, dans cette thèse, le développement financier est défini 
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comme « les facteurs, les politiques et les institutions qui mènent à une intermédiation 
financière et à des marchés efficaces, ainsi qu’à un accès large et profond aux capitaux et aux 
services financiers » (Rapport sur le développement financier, 2008). À cet égard, la direction 
de la causalité entre finance et croissance est d'une importance critique. Parallèlement aux 
structures de base de la banque et du marché, l'infrastructure juridique joue également un rôle 
majeur. Cependant, une autre option consiste à se concentrer exclusivement sur la gamme de 
services financiers ou de fonctions offertes par un secteur financier en particulier, afin de 
réduire les frictions du marché. Quelles que soient les raisons, de nombreuses analyses 
théoriques et empiriques supposent que des systèmes financiers bien développés exercent une 
influence positive sur la croissance économique et le développement. 
Les nouveaux apports des théories de la croissance laissent souvent supposer que les 
pays qui épargnent et investissent davantage tendent à enregistrer des taux de croissance 
supérieurs à long terme. Est notamment soulignée l'importance des mesures de restriction sur 
le contrôle des prix et de l'allocation du capital. À cet égard, Keynes (1936) et Tobin (1965) 
ont fourni le principal cadre théorique à la « répression financière » et aux politiques liées qui 
remplacent le marché dans la détermination des prix et de l'allocation. Les cadres théoriques 
afférents font généralement l'hypothèse que les mécanismes de transmission de la politique 
monétaire, tels que le canal des taux d'intérêt, influencent les investissements qui, à leur tour, 
influent sur le niveau de revenu, ainsi que sur la croissance économique et le développement. 
Cela a fourni une justification raisonnable et logique de l'intervention gouvernementale sur les 
marchés financiers. Par marchés financiers, nous entendons les marchés nationaux et 
internationaux de transactions d'instruments financiers, comme, par exemple, les actions, les 
obligations, les lettres de change, les devises, les contrats à terme et les options, lesquels 
fonctionnent en termes de transactions entre monnaies et crédits, et incluent donc aussi bien 
les marchés monétaires que les marchés de capitaux. Ainsi, au moins jusqu'à la fin des années 
1970, les restrictions financières ont souvent été imposées spécifiquement dans les pays en 
voie de développement, et l'intervention du gouvernement était une caractéristique obligatoire 
des politiques financières. C'est l'ouvrage précurseur de McKinnon (1973) qui a fourni un 
point de vue tout à fait différent sur l'intervention du gouvernement au sein des marchés 
financiers. Selon lui, la fragmentation de l'économie fournit une justification au syndrome de 
l'intervention, qui prévaut généralement dans tous les pays, mais particulièrement dans les 
économies en développement. Toutefois, c’est le plafonnement des taux d'intérêt et d’autres 
mesures restrictives, menant à des conséquences négatives, qui ont motivé McKinnon (1973) 
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et Shaw (1973) à exposer le cas inverse de la répression financière : la libéralisation 
financière. 
Les théories et les modèles résultant de la libéralisation financière (LF) ont été fondés 
sur la foi flagrante dans les forces d'équilibre du marché, et ont alors demandé un retrait 
conséquent du gouvernement des mécanismes de marché. Le principal fondement théorique 
de ces modèles est constitué par des taux d'intérêt supérieurs, ayant des relations positives 
avec la croissance économique. Dans ce but, l'hypothèse de complémentarité de McKinnon et 
celle d'intermédiation de la dette de Shaw ont représenté une contribution importante à l'ordre 
du jour néolibéral, qui s'est développé par la suite. Les fondements théoriques de la LF et ses 
raffinements successifs ont fait dévier l'idée de LF vers un processus complet composé de 
mélange de mesures politiques en fonction de la situation du pays et des préférences 
individuelles. Ceci a donné lieu à une nouvelle phase du capitalisme, marquée par la « 
financiarisation », laquelle est également connue sous le nom de « capitalisme financier » aux 
États-Unis, puis en Europe où le secteur financier joue également un rôle central. À la fin des 
années 1980 et 1990, la LF a commencé à se répandre dans le monde en développement, 
notamment dans les pays émergents d'Asie et d'Amérique latine, dont les économies ont été 
restructurées et réformées selon les conditions d’une économie de marché. L’un de puissants 
moteurs de la popularité de la LF dans ces économies était le Consensus de Washington, un 
mélange de réformes visant à alléger les contrôles sur les marchés financiers. La 
déréglementation, la privatisation, la libéralisation du secteur financier, la libéralisation du 
commerce et de change faisaient, entre autres, partie de ce programme adopté par la plupart 
des pays en développement, en transition vers l'économie de marché. Une autre force vitale, 
qui a joué le rôle principal dans le modèle de LF, et qui bourdonnait au tournant du XXIe 
siècle, a été représenté par la mondialisation et l’intégration financières, qui ont appelé à une 
ouverture financière supplémentaire. Cela a fourni un nouvel élan à la mise en œuvre des 
réformes de LF dans ces économies. 
Toutefois, la libéralisation et la mondialisation des marchés financiers ont conduit à 
une série de crises financières, qui ont rendu la décennie 1990 extrêmement douloureuse pour 
les économies émergentes d'Asie et d'Amérique latine. Depuis les années 1960, les économies 
asiatiques avait surperformé avec des taux de croissance élevés, accompagnés de l'expansion 
progressive et soutenue de l'accumulation de capital physique, qui leur avaient valu 
l’appellation de « Tigres asiatiques ». Mais, sous la pression du programme néolibéral, les 
débuts du processus de libéralisation au cours des années 1980 et 1990, avec l'ouverture des 
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marchés de capitaux, ont stimulé l'apparition de crises financières dans ces pays. Malgré une 
moindre répression et le respect des prescriptions politiques avec toute la prudence nécessaire, 
les pays asiatiques, en particulier les pays d'Asie de l’Est, ont connu une crise dont ils n’ont 
pu se relever pendant des années. Ce qui a commencé en Septembre 1997 en Thaïlande en 
tant que crise de la monnaie, puis qui a contaminé l’Indonésie, la Corée et Hong Kong, est 
connu sous le nom de « grippe asiatique », laquelle est descendue en Russie en août 1998, et a 
alors conduit à l’annonce de son moratoire sur ses dettes extérieures. Elle s'est ensuite étendue 
au Brésil pour finir par générer la crise financière latino-américaine en 1999. 
Cela a amorcé une longue série de critiques à l’égard de la LF, dont une partie était 
davantage fondée sur les maux inhérents à l'économie de marché en général. Selon ces 
critiques, les hypothèses sur lesquelles la théorie et les modèles de LF étaient fondées étaient 
en fait peu pertinentes, ce qui laissait supposer que les marchés financiers étaient alors 
imparfaits. Notamment, l’incomplétude de l’information, comme soulignée par le modèle de 
Stiglitz-Weiss, ainsi que les externalités et l'incomplétude des marchés financiers étaient 
considérées par certains comme les sources de ces imperfections. Cette critique, qui a émergé 
à la suite de crises financières dans les pays émergents, a trouvé réponse chez les partisans de 
la LF, qui insistaient alors sur l’importance des modalités de mise en œuvre pour parvenir au 
succès. Deux domaines clés à cet égard sont représentés par les conditions préalables et le 
séquençage. Ainsi, la stabilité macroéconomique, ainsi que la régulation et la supervision 
efficaces, sont considérées comme des conditions nécessaires au passage vers la LF. La mise 
en œuvre simultanée des libéralisations internes et externes, à savoir la libéralisation du 
marché des capitaux et celle du commerce, est considérée comme dangereuse en raison de la 
nécessité d’un ordonnancement optimal des réformes de libéralisation. En ce qui concerne le 
séquençage, le débat a porté sur les concepts de « big bang », alors opposé aux approches 
graduelles, et a accentué les critiques sur les modalités de LF. Un flux important de critiques a 
été introduit par les nouveaux structuralistes et les écoles institutionnalistes. Les deux 
considéraient la LF inappropriée dans les pays émergents et en développement en raison de 
leurs réalités structurelles et institutionnelles, ainsi que de l’inaptitude de leurs paramètres, 
laquelle justifierait une répression financière prolongée. Par exemple, l’étendue de marchés 
monétaires non-officiels (ou parallèles) est l’une de ces réalités. 
La dévastation de la plupart des économies d'Asie et d'Amérique latine au cours des années 
1990 a intensifié les discussions et les débats entre théoriciens et décideurs politiques afin de 
déceler les racines potentielles du problème. À cet égard, les crises sont étudiées dans une 
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perspective historique afin de déterminer si le lien entre la libéralisation et les crises est 
profond. Une fois de plus, les défauts de préréglage de la LF sont accusés après coup, car s’il 
est facile et rapide de déréglementer les taux d'intérêt, de privatiser les banques et certaines 
entreprises d'État, ou encore de libéraliser les flux de capitaux, il demeure laborieux de 
développer l'infrastructure institutionnelle, d’acquérir certaines compétences administratives 
et de supervision, ou encore de gérer les portefeuilles infectés. En outre, la libre circulation 
des capitaux a également contribué à la volatilité des marchés financiers, remettant alors en 
cause la stabilité des marchés financiers. Ainsi, contrairement à ses affirmations en termes 
d’apport de stabilité, la LF dans les pays émergents a agi en sens inverse, en introduisant 
l'instabilité dans les marchés financiers. De fait, les conséquences néfastes des crises asiatique 
et latino-américaine des années 1990 ont magnifié la question de la stabilité financière, qui est 
alors devenue un axe central, avec une attention particulière accordée à certains mécanismes, 
comme la contagion, le marché des produits dérivés, la manipulation, la spéculation à court 
terme, etc. À cet égard, le principal défi consiste à maintenir la stabilité financière, sans 
inhibition de l'efficacité économique, sachant qu’une structure excessivement protectrice du 
système financier peut réellement nuire à la croissance économique. Cependant, un certain 
degré de protection est souhaitable étant donnée la fréquence des crises sur les marchés 
financiers libéralisés. Les modèles de troisième génération d'attaques spéculatives justifient 
davantage la nécessité de contrôles de capitaux. À cet égard, il est fondamental d’analyser les 
différentes formes et conceptions des contrôles de capitaux, en particulier pour contrôler les 
flux de capitaux à court terme, ainsi que leurs coûts, en termes d’avantages et de limites. 
Ainsi, le triptyque libéralisation-mondialisation-financiarisation (néolibérale) a 
modifié la structure du capitalisme sur les trois dernières décennies. Les marchés financiers 
deviennent plus intégrés, plus ouverts et la gravité de l'activité économique est déplacée de la 
production de biens et de services vers la finance. Cela conduit à une croissance des profits 
dans le secteur financier des pays développés, à savoir aux États-Unis et en Europe. Mais ce 
qui suit peut être mieux présenté dans le graphique ci-dessous, qui montre la part du secteur 
financier dans le PIB des États-Unis. Il est apparu dans les années 1860 et montait 
régulièrement à près de 6 pour cent jusqu'à la Grande Dépression des années 1930 et la 2ème 
guerre mondiale, où il est descendu à près de 2 pour cent. Il a ensuite grimpé à nouveau 
progressivement jusqu'aux années 1980 pour atteindre moins 6 pour cent, puis a poursuivi sa 
tendance à la hausse, progressant d'environ 8 pour cent jusqu'au milieu des années 2000. On 
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observe enfin une lourde chute, du fait de la crise actuelle et de la récession inhérente, 
relativement comparable à celle enregistrée durant la Grande Dépression : 
 
Cette crise financière a débuté en 2007 aux Etats-Unis et s'est rapidement propagée à 
l'Europe. La genèse de cette crise du monde développé était le défaut sur les prêts 
hypothécaires à risque et des titres de créance adossés à ces types de prêts. La prise de 
conscience sur le fait que cet important volume de défauts de paiement sur les prêts 
hypothécaires subprime va se propager à d'autres secteurs de l'industrie financière a 
commencé en juillet 2007, lorsque Bear Stearns a annoncé la dévalorisation des actifs détenus 
par deux de ses fonds spéculatifs à risque. S’en suit d'effondrement du marché des valeurs 
mobilières et la faillite de Bear Stearns en Mars 2008. De là s’est amorcée la série de faillites, 
les crashs, la crise, et la récession qui en résulte. Les prises de risques inconsidérées, permises 
par des innovations complexes, comme les instruments financiers dérivés, ainsi que 
l'inefficacité des mesures réglementaires et l’irresponsabilité des évaluations effectuées par les 
agences de notation sur ces crédits sont considérées comme les causes principales de la crise 
financière de 2007/2008. 
Mais les racines réelles de cette crise sont bien plus profondes. La crise actuelle s'est 
produite en dépit des diverses mesures proposées par les entités internationales, telles que la 
BRI, FMI, etc., notamment parce que ces recommandations ne sont pas suffisantes pour 
assurer une plus grande divulgation et de transparence face à un environnement financier 
toujours plus intégré et sophistiqué depuis les trois dernières décennies. Cet environnement 
est également accompagné par les progrès technologiques et un succès croissant des 
institutions financières non bancaires, comme les hedge funds, les fonds participatifs, entre 
autres. Cette tendance a accru l’efficacité du financement privé en termes variés, mais la 
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pertinence et l'efficacité des approches de réglementation et de surveillance ont été 
minimisées. Cela a conduit à de nouveaux risques, démesurés, qui contribuent à la volatilité 
potentielle, à l'instabilité et aux crises qui ont tendance à se propager au-delà des frontières 
virtuelles ou géographique. 
La crise actuelle a mis en lumière la fragilité des bases de l'architecture financière 
mondiale. Les filets de sécurité implicites ou explicites ont agi à titre d'aléa moral pour les 
banques et autres institutions financières couvertes par ce réseau, parce que la présence des 
assurances inconditionnelles a en fait donné un nouvel élan aux prises de risques insensées. 
Les plans de sauvetage qui en résultent sont finalement contre-productifs, puisqu’ils mettent 
la pression sur tous les citoyens sous forme de taxation accrue, redistribuée aux riches 
preneurs de risques et aux spéculateurs. L'absence de distinction entre le risque et « 
l'incertitude » a également joué un rôle important pour affaiblir les systèmes financiers. Les 
banques, en tirant parti des instruments financiers dérivés et d'autres innovations, sont 
devenues plus impliquées dans la spéculation et les prises de risques. Mais elles ont oublié, 
dans leur course à la rentabilité, de distinguer le risque de l'incertitude. Les crises ont trait à 
l'incertitude qui découle de la prise de risque irrationnelle. Cela a également rendu la 
discipline de marché inapte à jouer un rôle significatif dans la détection précoce et dans la 
prévention des déséquilibres susceptibles de se développer au-delà de certaines limites. En 
outre, diverses dynamiques de marchés financiers ont aussi beaucoup changé pour devenir 
plus propices au phénomène récurrent « d’abondance et de rareté » magnifiant l'ampleur et la 
fréquence des crises. En plus de cela, la nature du risque systémique est également modifiée, 
ce qui exige la transformation des mesures de prévention. Les outils classiques se retrouvent 
inadaptés car ils sont fondés sur l'hypothèse que le risque systémique peut être évalué et 
couvert par des mesures microéconomiques, fondées sur la protection unilatérale des 
participants alors qu’au fond, il implique la propagation des problèmes d’un établissement à 
d'autres institutions, notamment par le biais des relations interbancaires et du système de 
paiement, la course à la liquidité menaçant par là même l'ensemble du système financier. Par 
conséquent, cette hypothèse réduit l’importance des menaces réelles parce qu'elle ignore les 
possibilités étendues pour la prise de risque. L'approche actuelle de la réglementation 
systémique, la réglementation micro-prudentielle, est généralement victime d’un « sophisme 
de composition », car ce qui est vrai pour les parties prises individuellement ne l’est pas 
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nécessairement pour l'ensemble. Keynes (1936), avec son « paradoxe de l'épargne »36, et 
Fisher (1933), avec son concept de « ruée vers la liquidité »37, ont exposé cette erreur. Ainsi, 
il n'est pas possible de garantir la sécurité de l'ensemble du système en se contentant d'assurer 
la sécurité de chaque banque. En découle la nécessité d'étudier l'importance croissante du 
cadre macro-prudentielle. 
Le fait de ne pas prendre pleinement conscience et avec précision de ces faiblesses 
dans les fondations des systèmes financiers a joué un rôle clé dans la crise actuelle. Et à 
l’heure actuelle, les mesures pour faire face à cette crise sont principalement basées sur la « 
répression financière », une notion longtemps rejetée par les économies développées et 
également prohibée dans les pays émergents et en développement. Les économies 
développées font exactement le contraire de ce qu’elles ont préconisé aux économies 
émergentes et en développement en cas de crise. Lauréat du prix Nobel, Paul R. Krugman 
(2002) l’a exprimé dans le cas des États-Unis en particulier, et de l'Occident en général, en 
disant qu’ils devraient se sentir un peu embarrassés à propos de tous les conseils qu'ils ont 
donnés en la matière au Tiers-Monde38. Les pays développés qui souffrent de la crise actuelle 
sont en train de prendre diverses mesures répressives dans le cadre de nouvelles structures à 
caractère plus macro-prudentiel pour guérir leurs économies. Les gouvernements sont 
directement intervenus pour quasiment nationaliser les diverses grandes banques en injectant 
des liquidités. Souffrant d'énormes volumes de dettes, privées et publiques, les gouvernements 
sont alors contraints d'abaisser le coût de la dette en maintenant artificiellement des taux 
d'intérêt bas. Ces taux plus faibles deviennent même négatifs dans un scénario d'inflation 
stable. Contrairement aux impôts directs ou à des coupes dans les dépenses, ce genre de 
répression financière agit comme un impôt indirect. La répression financière à la suite de la 
crise a des parallèles historiques, car la fin du laissez-faire a également suivi la Grande 
Dépression et la 2ème guerre mondiale. La répression financière moderne a également des 
implications différentes, même pour les économies émergentes et en développement, qui ont 
dû imposer des contrôles de capitaux et autres restrictions. Cette tendance pourrait favoriser 
                                                          
36
 Si tout le monde économise plus d'argent pendant les périodes de récession, la demande globale va baisser et à 
son tour, diminuer l'épargne totale de la population. Ainsi, si tout le monde épargne, il y a diminution de la 
consommation, laquelle conduit à une baisse de la demande globale et donc à une baisse de la croissance 
économique. 
37
 Si un grand nombre d'investisseurs tentent de sortir de la spirale de la dette en vendant des actifs, les 
investisseurs bradent leurs titres à n’importe quel prix susceptible d’être accepté, désespérés qu’ils sont de 
pouvoir rembourser leurs dettes avant qu'ils ne soient entraînés dans la faillite. Ce qui est bon pour chaque 
investisseur individuel s'avère être mauvais pour l'économie dans son ensemble. Les prix des actifs chutent, 
entraînant une baisse des ventes et la hausse du chômage. 
38
 Bien que Paul Krugman ait fait ces remarques au sujet de la mondialisation lors d’une réunion de 2002 du 
Forum économique mondial, elles restent toujours d’actualité par rapport aux évolutions actuelles. 
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une « dé-mondialisation », mais les chances d'une telle tendance semblent maigres à court 
terme. 
La crise actuelle a fait émerger un nouveau débat qui met l'accent sur la nature « 
parasitaire » du capitalisme. Dans la mesure où cette crise est survenue dans le quartier 
général du capitalisme, diverses voix se sont par conséquent levées contre le caractère 
intrinsèquement instable de ce système. Cependant, le vrai problème réside dans le « 
néolibéralisme », qui a motivé la mondialisation et la libéralisation financière et a conduit au 
« capitalisme financier », par opposition à « l'âge d'or du capitalisme » des années 1940 aux 
années 1970, lequel est caractérisé par des réglementations et un certain capitalisme d'Etat. La 
création de richesses fictives, incompatible avec la création de richesses réelles, est la 
caractéristique fondamentale de ce « capitalisme financiarisé néolibérale », qui était destiné à 
s’effondrer un jour. L’attitude irresponsable et malhonnête des institutions financières est 
également essentielle à cet égard, car c’est elle qui porte « l'économie politique » au premier 
plan. En dépit d’un nombre important de suggestions pour transformer la réglementation, la 
surveillance, et adopter une approche macroéconomique, aucune mesure concrète n'a encore 
été prise pour supprimer l'hégémonie du capitalisme financiarisé. Et les chances d'une telle 
suppression semblent très minces actuellement. 
 
La problématique de recherche  
 
Dans le cadre décrit ci-dessus, cette thèse cherche à trouver des réponses à trois 
questions clés : 
1) La première consiste à savoir comment le rôle de la finance dans la croissance économique 
et le développement donne lieu à une nouvelle phase du capitalisme, lequel est dirigé par la 
finance et repose sur le programme néolibéral.  
2) La deuxième question vise à savoir, au cours de ce voyage vers le néo-libéralisme et le 
capitalisme financier, s’il existe une relation entre la crise des économies émergentes des 
années 1990 et la crise des économies avancées des années 2000.  
3) Dans cette quête, la troisième question qui se pose est de savoir quelles sont les inférences 
de la crise financière de 2007/2008 sur le triptyque « libéralisation-mondialisation- 
financiarisation », qui caractérise la phase actuelle du capitalisme. 
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Objectif, méthodologie et limites   
 
La crise actuelle a suscité un courant de recherche mettant principalement l'accent sur 
les défaillances existantes et les remèdes à venir. Cependant, cette recherche vise à contribuer 
au débat nouveau et unificateur faisant état d’une connexion entre les crises des pays 
émergents au cours des années 1990 et la crise que connaissent les économies développées 
dans les années 2007- ?. A cet effet, de nombreuses recherches théoriques et empiriques ont 
été menées, synthétisées et analysées afin de construire des arguments pour la réforme de la 
phase actuelle du capitalisme à l’égard de ses faibles fondations et des instabilités de sa 
structure. 
La principale limite de cette thèse est qu'en raison de la largeur de sa problématique, il 
n'était pas possible de tenir une recherche empirique exhaustive. Par conséquent, nous avons 
choisi d'explorer un large éventail de littérature, aussi bien théorique qu'empirique. De plus, il 
existe divers domaines, en particulier lorsque nous analysons l’agenda néolibéral, où le rôle 
de «  l'économie politique  » semble plus important que celui de «  l'économie internationale » 
ou de « l’économie du développement ». Toutefois, étant donné que la portée de cette thèse 
est principalement confinée dans les limites du cadre économique dominant, il ne serait pas 
approprié ici de discuter en détail des implications en termes d’économie politique. En tant 
que futur programme de recherche néanmoins, ce domaine peut se présenter comme une 
orientation pertinente et intéressante à explorer. 
 
Plan de la thèse  
 
Cette thèse est divisée en quatre chapitres. 
Le premier chapitre traite de la relation entre le développement financier et le 
développement économique. À cet égard, l'évolution des idées et des théories clés est 
présentée pour arriver à la théorie de la répression financière et ses implications pour les pays 
en développement et les économies émergentes. 
Le deuxième chapitre analyse les propositions de la libéralisation financière en mettant 
l'accent sur le consensus de Washington et la mondialisation financière. Ce chapitre traite 
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également du courant d'opposition à la libéralisation financière en mettant l'accent sur la 
critique de nouveaux structuralistes et des institutionnalistes. 
 
Le troisième chapitre se concentre sur les implications de la série de crises et de 
l'instabilité dans la libéralisation financière des économies émergentes d'Asie et d'Amérique 
latine au cours des années 1990. 
Le dernier chapitre met en évidence l'incidence de la crise actuelle dans les pays 
développés pour explorer les faibles fondations de la structure financière internationale et ses 
implications pour la forme néolibérale du capitalisme financier. 
Exposons alors plus en détail le contenu des chapitres qui composent ce travail. 
 
CHAPITRE 1. DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIERE - POINT DE 
VUE DE LA REPRESSION FINANCIERE 
 
La croissance économique et les facteurs agissant sur elle ont été l'un des sujets 
majeurs de l'économie du développement partout dans le monde depuis longtemps. De Joseph 
Schumpeter (1911), John Gurley et Edward Shaw (1955), Raymond Goldsmith (1969) et 
Ronald McKinnon (1973) jusqu'aux économistes modernes, le lien entre finance et croissance 
a été considéré comme pertinent, d'une manière ou d’une autre. Les économistes comme 
Walter Bagehot (1873) et John Hicks (1969) attribuent la révolution industrielle au système 
financier britannique : « En Angleterre, .... le capital va aussi sûrement et instantanément où il 
est le plus recherché, et où il est le plus aisément fabriqué, comme l'eau qui coule pour 
retrouver son niveau » (Bagehot, 1873, p. 12). 
Bien avant que Bagehot le reconnaisse, en 1858, William Gladstone, alors Premier 
ministre britannique, a exprimé l'importance du financement de l'économie, en déclarant que « 
La finance est, pour ainsi dire, l'estomac du pays, à partir duquel tous les autres organes 
doivent prendre le ton » (cité dans le discours de Duisenberg, 2001). Toutefois, plusieurs 
chercheurs éminents, dont le prix Nobel, Robert Lucas (1988), considèrent le rôle de la 
finance dans la croissance comme un sujet qui est « exagéré » ou même tout simplement 
ignoré par Nicholas Stern (1989) dans son l'examen de l'économie du développement. 
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Le système financier est censé diriger l'épargne des ménages vers les entreprises et 
allouer des fonds d'investissement. C'est le mécanisme le plus commun qui relie la finance à 
la croissance économique. En dépit de la reconnaissance de cette relation par Schumpeter il y 
a plus d'un siècle (1911), l'analyse complète et systématique des liens entre les facteurs 
financiers et la croissance a commencé il y a seulement quelques décennies, en particulier 
dans le contexte de la nouvelle génération de théories et modèles de croissance endogène, qui 
considèrent l'épargne et l'intermédiation financière comme les canaux primaires permettant 
une croissance endogène et stable (Agénor et Montiel, 1996).  
Dans cette optique, la section 1 du présent chapitre analyse l'évolution des idées clés 
sur le financement, la croissance et le développement. Elle fait d'abord la lumière sur le travail 
séminal de Schumpeter en 1911, qui a vu dans le crédit le fondement du développement 
économique. Toutefois, cette idéé n'a pas reçu beaucoup d'attention, même dans les théories 
néoclassiques de croissance présentées par la suite. La première génération de modèles 
néoclassiques de croissance, développée par Robert Solow (1956 ; 1957) et Trevor Swan 
(1956), communément appelée « modèles de croissance de Solow-Swan », a attribué la 
croissance économique au changement technique exogène et à l'expansion démographique. 
Les modèles de croissance néoclassiques, aussi connus comme les modèles de croissance 
exogène, ont tenté d'expliquer la croissance économique à long terme via la productivité, le 
progrès dans l’accumulation du capital, la croissance démographique et technologique. Les 
limites des théories néoclassiques ont conduit à l'élaboration des théories de la croissance 
endogène, qui endogénéisent le progrès technologique et l'accumulation des connaissances. 
L’avancement des travaux sur la croissance aborde les limites des précédents modèles 
néoclassiques en proposant une variété de canaux par lesquels l'état d'équilibre de croissance 
endogène est enclenché (Agénor et Montiel, 1996). Les canaux de l'épargne et de 
l'intermédiation financière jouent alors un rôle important. 
Ainsi, les théories modernes de la croissance impliquent généralement que les pays qui 
épargnent et investissent davantage sont censés croître plus rapidement dans le long terme. Ils 
mettent en avant l'importance du rôle des politiques, notamment les politiques visant à 
encourager l'épargne, et en particulier celles qui visent à améliorer l'efficacité de 
l'intermédiation financière, qui peuvent avoir un effet durable sur le revenu par habitant. Ici, il 
est pertinent de souligner la tendance commune dans ce domaine d'étude qui est de supposer 
que le développement financier entraîne automatiquement la croissance économique. 
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Toutefois, ce point de vue est ambigu et quelque peu controversé, car il n'existe pas de 
consensus dans la littérature et la recherche empirique sur le sens de la causalité.  
Le sens de la causalité dans le lien finance-croissance est exploré dans la section 2 du 
présent chapitre. À cet égard, l'approche par la demande est comparée à l’approche par l’offre. 
En dépit d’un corpus théorique et empirique important sur les deux approches, le sens de la 
causalité est toujours ambigu. Un large pan de la recherche reste sceptique quant à l'évolution 
des marchés financiers et des institutions comme éléments essentiels du processus de 
croissance, considérant le développement du système financier comme une conséquence 
indirecte, qui répond alors passivement à la croissance économique et à l'industrialisation. 
Toutefois, les preuves persistent également sur le fait que le niveau de développement 
financier est un bon indicateur des futurs taux de croissance économique et de 
développement. 
Dans cette perspective, la question se pose de savoir quel type de structure financière 
est le meilleur ou quelle est la dosage optimal entre les intermédiaires financiers et les 
marchés afin de promouvoir à long terme la croissance économique et le développement 
global. La section 3 du présent chapitre analyse l'importance relative des différentes structures 
financières, lesquelles incluent les analyses fondées sur la banque, sur le marché, ainsi que les 
analyses juridiques et financières des services offerts. Dans l'ensemble, il existe une diversité 
d'opinions dans la littérature existante sur la relation entre la structure financière et la 
croissance, et il n'y a finalement pas de conclusion claire. Cependant, la littérature existante 
met davantage l’accent sur les services financiers et les infrastructures institutionnelles, telles 
que le cadre juridique, pour mener à bien ces fonctions. Après avoir déterminé que les 
intermédiaires financiers et les marchés sont censés être complémentaires dans la croissance 
des services financiers, il est important d'avoir une analyse détaillée de ces services financiers 
qui sont censés être fournis par le système financier afin d’assurer la croissance économique. 
Dans ce but, la section 4 présente une gamme de services financiers supposés réduire 
les frictions sur le marché. Ces services comprennent: la production des informations sur les 
investissements potentiels, les investissements de surveillance et la gouvernance d'entreprise, 
la facilitation de la gestion des risques, la mobilisation et l’accroissement de l'épargne, et 
l’abolition des restrictions à l'échange de biens et de services. En dépit de certaines questions 
discutables, la majeure partie de la littérature suggère que les coûts d'information et de 
transaction incitent les systèmes financiers à fournir des services financiers à l'économie qui 
facilitent la sélection des entreprises avant qu'elles ne soient financées, la surveillance des 
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entreprises après financement, la gestion des projets intrinsèquement risqués et le risque de 
liquidité, ainsi que l'échange de biens, de services, et d’informations financières. Cette 
description renforce l'argument en faveur du « développement financier » en tant que moteur 
de croissance. La recherche empirique dans ce domaine est alors passée en revue dans la 
section 5. 
Puisque la littérature et les données empiriques semblent supposer que des systèmes 
financiers bien développés exercent une influence de premier ordre sur la croissance 
économique, les décideurs politiques sont alors incités à exercer un « contrôle » sur les forces 
du marché. Keynes (1936) et Tobin (1965) ont fourni le cadre théorique majeur pour « la 
répression financière » et contexte politique afférent. Basée sur une vision complémentaire de 
la monnaie et du capital, ils ont émis l'hypothèse que les mécanismes de transmission de la 
politique monétaire, comme le canal des taux d'intérêt, influent sur les investissements, qui, à 
leur tour, influent sur le niveau des revenus et sur la croissance économique, puis, à terme, sur 
le développement. Cela a fourni une justification logique à l'intervention de l’Etat sur les 
marchés financiers. Ainsi, historiquement, et avant les années 1970, les restrictions 
financières ont souvent été imposées spécifiquement dans les pays pauvres en capital, et 
l'intervention du gouvernement a constitué un facteur contraignant dans les politiques 
financières. En bref, les systèmes financiers, comme l'a dit McKinnon (1973), ont été 
« réprimés ». Les différentes approches théoriques et politiques liées dans ce contexte sont 
traitées dans la section 6 du présent chapitre. 
Cependant, les recherches novatrices de McKinnon (1973) et Shaw (1973) ont donné 
un point de vue tout à fait différent de l'intervention du gouvernement sur les marchés 
financiers dans le cadre du contrôle des prix et de la répartition du capital. Selon eux, la 
fragmentation de l'économie fournit une justification au syndrome de l'intervention, qui est 
très répandue dans les pays en développement. La section 7 explore cette dimension du sujet. 
Les gouvernements de nombreux pays en développement ont instauré des plafonds d'intérêt 
faibles sur les dépôts bancaires et les prêts afin de réduire leurs coûts d'emprunt. Mais, ce 
faisant, ils ont fait baisser l'épargne et la formation de capital, du fait de l’augmentation de la 
demande de prêts qui finit par entraîner un rationnement du crédit dans le cadre de la 
répartition entre projets d'investissement. Une autre forme d'interventions prenait la forme de 
crédit bancaire dirigé vers les « secteurs prioritaires », comme, par exemple, l'agriculture, la 
petite industrie, les exportations, etc. Le flux des ressources a augmenté du fait de l’utilisation 
de la « planche à billets » et de l’imposition de réserves obligatoires à faible rendement sur les 
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banques. Les nouveaux entrants sont alors jugulés pour éviter la concurrence et pour limiter la 
désintermédiation dans le système bancaire. 
Le raisonnement à l’origine de ce plafonnement des taux d'intérêt, et de l'exercice 
d'autres mesures restrictives de contrôle des marchés financiers et de capitaux, sont discutés 
dans la section 8. Outre les taux d'intérêt, diverses mesures restrictives peuvent être observées. 
Elles comprennent: les restrictions à l'entrée, les restrictions sur la composition des actifs et 
des passifs, les restrictions sur la taille du portefeuille de prêts, les réserves obligatoires 
élevées, les organismes de crédit spécialisés, etc. Cette section couvre enfin les conséquences 
néfastes de la répression financière pour les marchés financiers, en termes d'allocation de 
capital et d’activités bancaires, ainsi qu’en termes macroéconomiques, notamment d'inflation. 
Suite aux conséquences négatives de la répression financière, McKinnon et Shaw ont présenté 
le cas de la « libéralisation financière » en tant « qu’opposée » de la « répression financière », 
ce qui est devenu le fondement de base théorique pour l'analyse du secteur financier et de la 
politique au cours des quatre dernières décennies, dont il est question dans le chapitre 2. 
 
CHAPITRE 2. LA LIBERALISATION FINANCIERE - PROPOSITIONS ET 
OPPOSITIONS 
 
Sur la base de leur classification de la répression financière, McKinnon (1973) et 
Shaw (1973) exposent le cas de la libéralisation financière (LF), un concept fondé sur la foi 
flagrante dans les forces d'équilibre du marché et le retrait complet du gouvernement des 
mécanismes de marché. Le fondement théorique principal de leurs modèles est que des taux 
d'intérêt plus élevés ont une influence positive sur la croissance économique. Dans ce but, 
l'hypothèse de complémentarité de McKinnon et celle d'intermédiation de la dette de Shaw 
représente une contribution importante à l'approche libérale.  
La première section de ce chapitre examine ces théories ainsi que certaines de leurs 
extensions, lesquelles visent à relier les divers aspects de la LF à la croissance économique et 
au développement. Les fondements théoriques de la LF et leurs raffinements successifs ont 
modifié l'idée de la LF en la faisant apparaître comme un processus global dosant certaines 
mesures, comme la libéralisation interne et externe, en fonction de la situation du pays et les 
préférences individuelles. Cet aspect est couvert par la section 2. 
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La fin des années 1980 et 1990 correspond à la libéralisation généralisée dans les pays 
émergents et en développement, en particulier dans les économies de l’Asie de l’Est et celles 
d’Amérique Latine. Un facteur important qui est considéré responsable de la popularité de la 
LF dans ces pays est le Consensus de Washington, un mélange de dix réformes politiques 
pour faciliter les contrôles dans le développement des marchés de ces pays. La 
déréglementation, la privatisation, la libéralisation de la finance, du commerce et des changes 
faisaient, entre autres, partie de ce programme adopté par la plupart des pays en 
développement, en transition vers l'économie de marché au cours de cette période. Une autre 
force vitale qui a joué un rôle fondamental dans le mode de LF et qui bourdonnait au tournant 
du XXIe siècle a été la mondialisation financière et l'intégration inhérente des économies, qui 
a appelé à un ouverture financière supplémentaire. L'impact conjoint du Consensus de 
Washington et de la mondialisation financière a donné une impulsion pour la mise en œuvre 
complète des réformes de LF dans les pays émergents et en développement. Ce point est 
abordé dans la section 3 du présent chapitre. 
Tout en affectant la majeure partie des fondements des marchés financiers dans les 
pays en développement, le processus de LF semble avoir certains effets en modifiant les 
conditions centrales dans lesquelles leur secteur financier opère. Deux de ces conditions, qui 
sont discutées dans la section 4, sont les taux d'intérêt plus élevés, avec l'élimination du 
contrôle des prix, et l'entrée de nouvelles institutions financières, dans le cadre des 
privatisations des entreprises d'État. 
Les conséquences globales des réformes de LF dans les économies en développement 
sont suivies par une longue série de critiques, dont une grande partie est fondée sur les maux 
inhérents à l'économie de marché. Les hypothèses sur lesquelles la théorie et les modèles de 
LF sont fondées sont en fait peu pertinentes, ce qui laisse supposer que les marchés financiers 
sont imparfaits. Le fait que les informations soient incomplètes, ce qui a été mis en exergue 
par le modèle de Stiglitz et Weiss, ainsi que les externalités et l'incomplétude des marchés 
financiers sont considérés comme les sources de ces imperfections. La section 5 du présent 
chapitre approfondit ces biais intrinsèquement présents sur les marchés financiers. 
La critique de la LF, qui a émergé à la suite des crashs financiers, le chaos et les crises 
de l'après-LF dans les pays émergents et en développement, trouve réponse chez les partisans 
de la LF dans l’importance accordée à la bonne mise en œuvre des réformes dans la réussite 
de la LF. Deux domaines clés à cet égard sont les conditions préalables et l’aspect séquentiel. 
La stabilité macroéconomique ainsi qu’une régulation et une supervision efficaces sont alors 
288 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
considérées comme des conditions nécessaires à remplir avant l'exécution de la LF. La mise 
en œuvre simultanée des libéralisations internes et externes, à savoir du marché des capitaux 
ainsi que du commerce, ne peut réussir, en raison de l’absence d’un ordonnancement optimal 
des réformes de libéralisation. Cependant, ce point a donné lieu à de nouvelles critiques sur la 
logique de la réforme, et il a fait émerger de nouveaux débats opposant l’approche dit du « big 
bang » et l’approche progressive de la mise en œuvre des mesures de libéralisation. La section 
6 porte sur ce débat. 
Les partisans de la LF ont répondu à leurs détracteurs en se concentrant sur les 
problèmes de mise en œuvre. Cependant, même le respect de toutes les conditions ne peut 
assurer le succès. La prise en compte des conditions initiales et le séquençage ne sont 
certainement pas erronés comme arguments, mais ils ne peuvent pas éviter la survenance de 
crises financières à la suite de la libéralisation, une question qui doit être traitée en détail dans 
le chapitre suivant. Les bases de l’échec de la LF ne sont pas reprises par ses partisans parce 
que la gravité de ces manquements a tendance à laisser penser que ce n'est pas seulement une 
question de séquençage ou de pré-conditions. 
En fait, la LF est fondamentalement inappropriée pour les pays émergents et en 
développement en raison, au moins, des paramètres structurels et institutionnels qui leur sont 
spécifiques, datant des longues périodes de répression financière, selon la critique développée 
par les nouveaux structuralistes et les institutionnalistes. La prépondérance du marché 
monétaire informel est l'une de ces spécificités. La dernière section de ce chapitre examine 
soigneusement les critiques des nouveaux structuralistes, ainsi que la critique 
institutionnaliste. 
 
CHAPITRE 3. LES CRISES ET L'INSTABILITE DANS LA LIBERALISATION 
FINANCIERE DES ECONOMIES EMERGENTES 
 
La mondialisation et la libéralisation des marchés financiers a conduit à une vague de 
crises financières qui a rendu la décennie des années 1990 extrêmement pénible pour les 
économies émergentes d'Asie et d'Amérique latine. Depuis les années 1960, les économies 
asiatiques avait connu un rattrapage exponentiel, avec des taux de croissance élevés, 
accompagnés de l'expansion progressive et soutenue de l'accumulation du capital physique 
qui ont fait d’eux des « tigres asiatiques ». Mais sous la pression du programme néolibéral, 
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l’instauration des réformes de libéralisation au cours des années 1980 et 1990, avec 
l'ouverture des marchés de capitaux, a stimulé l'apparition de crises financières dans ces pays. 
Malgré moins de distorsions préalables liées à la répression, et malgré le respect des 
prescriptions politiques avec toute la prudence nécessaire, les pays asiatiques, en particulier 
les pays d'Asie de l’Est, ont connu une crise dont ils n’ont pu se relever pendant de 
nombreuses années. Ce qui a commencé en Septembre 1997 en Thaïlande en tant que crise de 
la monnaie est arrivé en Indonésie, en Corée et à Hong Kong, et est connu sous le nom de la « 
grippe asiatique ». Elle est ensuite descendue sur la Russie en août 1998, ce qui a conduit à 
l'annonce russe du moratoire sur ses paiements. Elle s'est ensuite étendue jusqu’au Brésil pour 
générer la crise financière en Amérique latine en 1999. La première section de ce chapitre se 
concentre sur l'événement imprévisible de la crise financière asiatique, son association avec 
« la maladie des marchés émergents » et ses éventuelles ramifications avec les crises 
financières latino-américaines des années 1990. 
Cette dévastation a intensifié les discussions et les débats entre théoriciens et décideurs 
politiques afin de trouver les raisons et les justifications possibles de ces événements. Bien 
que la libéralisation financière n’ait pas été la source exclusive des crises asiatique et latino-
américaine des années 1990, il a souvent été observé que les pays instaurant la LF ont connu 
une crise assez forte par la suite de leurs marchés boursiers et financiers. Ainsi, un domaine-
clé à cet égard se concentre sur le cheminement depuis la libéralisation jusqu’aux crises, dans 
une optique historique, lequel est abordé dans la section 2 du présent chapitre. En outre, 
l'environnement antérieur de répression introduit des distorsions dans l'économie de marché 
en réduisant les effets bénéfiques attendus des réformes de libéralisation. En d'autres termes, 
les défauts de préréglage de la LF sont incriminés lors des crises post-LF, et sont d’une 
importance cruciale. Car s’il est aisé et rapide de déréglementer les taux d'intérêt, de privatiser 
les entreprises d'État et les banques, ou encore de libéraliser les flux de capitaux, il demeure 
laborieux de développer l'infrastructure institutionnelle, d'acquérir des compétences 
administratives et de supervision, et de gérer des portefeuilles infectés. Ces considérations 
sont également soulignées dans la section 2 du présent chapitre. 
Les conséquences de ce qui s'est passé dans les pays émergents au cours des années 
1990 ont soulevé des doutes sur la question d’aller de l'avant ou de reprendre les étapes de 
l'intégration avec les institutions financières et les marchés financiers. Parallèlement, le 
phénomène relativement nouveau de la libéralisation, la mondialisation et l'intégration 
séculaires est également associé à la libre circulation des flux de capitaux et aux crises 
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consécutives. C’est l’objet de l'analyse de la section 3, qui décrit également certaines des 
crises historiques clés suivant l’âge d'or de la mondialisation. Il est généralement affirmé que 
la libéralisation financière, en particulier l'ouverture du compte de capital, a joué un rôle clé 
dans la propagation de la crise asiatique en 1997, tandis que les économies d'Asie du Sud ont 
été préservées dans une large mesure en instaurant un contrôle sur leurs marchés des capitaux. 
Depuis lors, la libéralisation du marché des capitaux est reconnue comme un conflit majeur 
dans le débat sur la mondialisation et l'intégration. Depuis, l'incidence des crises financières 
au cours des années 1990 est plus étroitement liée à la libre circulation des capitaux. Ainsi la 
section 4 se concentre particulièrement sur le lien entre crises financières et libéralisation des 
marchés de capitaux. 
L'analyse des crises jusqu'à maintenant révèle clairement que l'instabilité financière 
résulte de la libéralisation et de la mondialisation financière, et que ces tendances, à la fin du 
XXème siècle, ont accru la probabilité de conséquences néfastes de l'instabilité financière sur 
les performances économiques. Ainsi, contrairement à ses affirmations fortes pour apporter la 
stabilité, la LF dans les pays émergents a produit le contraire, en introduisant l'instabilité dans 
leurs systèmes financiers. Ainsi, les conséquences néfastes des crises asiatiques et latino-
américaines des années 1990 ont magnifié la question de la stabilité financière, qui est 
devenue objet de débats politiques en vue d'atteindre une croissance économique durable. Ces 
enjeux sont discutés dans la section 5, de même que l'analyse de divers mécanismes tels que 
la contagion, les marchés des produits dérivés, la manipulation, la spéculation, les 
investissements étrangers directs à court terme, ou encore les booms. En outre, cette section se 
penche également sur le défi de maintenir la stabilité financière sans inhibition de l'efficacité 
économique, car une structure excessivement protectrice du système financier peut, elle aussi, 
réellement nuire à la croissance économique. 
Cependant, un certain degré de protection reste souhaitable, compte tenu de la 
fréquence des crises dans le cadre d’une ouverture du compte de capital et de la libéralisation 
des marchés financiers. Bien que cette thèse considère plus particulièrement le cas des crises 
asiatique et latino-américaine de 1997-98 comme objet d’illustration, la crise monétaire de 
1992-93 en Europe et la crise de 1994 au Mexique ont également motivé la modélisation des 
attaques spéculatives sur les taux de change contrôlés. Depuis lors, cela est devenu une 
pratique habituelle pour regrouper divers traitements analytiques des crises dans les modèles 
de première, deuxième et troisième générations. Afin de justifier de la nécessité des contrôles 
sur les capitaux, les modèles de troisième génération d'attaques spéculatives sont explorés 
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dans la section 6 du présent chapitre. Les modèles de troisième génération explorent 
l'interaction entre les crises du système monétaire et celles du système financier. Par exemple, 
le surendettement des banques pour financer l'aléa moral est une forme cachée de la dette 
publique puisque les gouvernements doivent alors renflouer les banques insolvables ou 
résoudre la crise de change conduisant à la crise bancaire en cas de grandes transformations 
des dettes en devises, en particulier dans le cadre des garanties gouvernementales. Les 
modèles de troisième génération prévoient la possibilité d'équilibres bon ou mauvais mettant 
davantage l'accent sur les intermédiaires financiers privés. L'évaluation des contrôles de 
capitaux est le plus pertinent dans le contexte de ces modèles d'équilibres multiples de la 
structure financière. Certains modèles portent aussi plus spécifiquement sur les ruées à la 
liquidité, les restrictions bancaires, la suspension des règlements entre créanciers et débiteurs, 
l'investissement en actions, les paniques rationnelles et les mécanismes d’assurance contre les 
attaques. 
La dernière section aborde l'analyse détaillée des diverses formes et la conception des 
contrôles de capitaux, en particulier pour contrôler les flux de capitaux à court terme, ainsi 
que leurs coûts, avantages et limites. Ce point également donne lieu à débat entre partisans et 
détracteurs des contrôles sur les mouvements de capitaux. La sagesse conventionnelle 
considère que les pays en développement devraient recourir à des restrictions de capitaux, 
puis les démanteler progressivement avec le développement du cadre institutionnel. Mais ce 
cadre est trop simpliste pour être pratique. Cette « monotonie » dans les contrôles, à savoir la 
diminution régulière de leur ampleur, n'est pas pertinente et souhaitable. Au contraire, il est 
plus réaliste de déterminer une combinaison optimale des contrôles en phase avec le stade de 
développement du pays et de ses capacités économiques et institutionnelles. Dans cette 
optique, le plus important est la capacité d'ajuster les contrôles en fonction de l'évolution des 
conditions économiques. Cela implique que les gouvernements des pays émergents et en 
développement aient une autonomie suffisante pour imposer et réimposer des contrôles en 
fonction de leurs circonstances propres, au lieu de suivre à la lettre les recommandations du 
Fonds monétaire international (FMI). À cet égard, une question fondamentale est de savoir si 
les interventions pour contrôler les flux de capitaux peuvent rester efficaces dans le cadre de 
marchés libéralisés et intégrés, ce qui questionne la pertinence et l'adéquation des outils de 
gestion du capital dans le processus de développement. 
Par ailleurs, la croissance du marché des produits dérivés a rendu la gestion du capital, 
ainsi que la bonne formulation et la mise en œuvre des réglementations plus complexes. Cela 
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fait que certains économistes et décideurs affirment même la nécessité d'abandonner les 
techniques traditionnelles de gestion du capital en raison de leur inefficacité dans le contexte 
actuel. Cette sophistication des marchés financiers et de capitaux a également rendu la 
possibilité de contourner les restrictions plus aisée. Certains chercheurs affirment alors 
l'incapacité des contrôles de capitaux à arrêter efficacement la fuite massive de capitaux et les 
crises de balance des paiements. Malgré une perte de puissance au fil du temps, les techniques 
améliorées pour renforcer l'efficacité de la réglementation traditionnelle peuvent encore aider 
à modérer les flux de capitaux et leur volatilité. Une classification importante à cet égard 
réside entre les contrôles directs et indirects. Les contrôles directs sont des règlements fondés 
soit sur les prix soit sur les quantités. Les contrôles indirects représentent généralement les 
règles prudentielles imposées aux institutions financières afin d'influer indirectement sur les 
flux de capitaux. 
 
CHAPITRE 4. LA CRISE FINANCIERE ACTUELLE DU MONDE DEVELOPPE : 
UN NOUVEAU DEBAT SUR LA FORME NEOLIBERALE DU CAPITALISME 
FINANCIARISE 
 
Une crise financière a débuté en 2007 aux Etats-Unis et s'est rapidement propagée à 
l'Europe. La genèse de cette crise du monde développé était le défaut sur les prêts 
hypothécaires à risque et sur les titres de créance adossés à ce type de prêts. La survenance de 
cet important volume de défauts de paiement sur les prêts hypothécaires subprime va alors se 
propager à d'autres secteurs de l'industrie financière en juillet 2007, lorsque Bear Stearns 
annonce la dévalorisation des actifs détenus par deux de ses fonds spéculatifs à risque. Il s’en 
suit un effondrement du marché des valeurs mobilières, et la faillite de Bear Stearns en mars 
2008. De là commence une série de faillites, de crashs, de crises et une récession économique. 
La plupart des analystes compare ce phénomène à la Grande Dépression des années 1930. La 
première section est étroitement centrée sur l'apparition de la crise financière actuelle en 
décrivant brièvement les mécanismes par lesquels le système financier mondial s'est effondré. 
Les prises de risques inconsidérées, grâce à des innovations complexes, comme les 
instruments financiers dérivés, ainsi que l'inefficacité des mesures réglementaires et certaines 
notes de crédit irresponsables sont considérées comme les explications principales de cette 
crise. Mais ses racines profondes vont encore beaucoup plus loin. La crise actuelle s'est 
293 
 
Université Joseph Fourier / Université Pierre Mendès France /  
Université Stendhal / Université de Savoie / Grenoble INP  
produite en dépit de diverses mesures à caractère international, comme certaines règles 
fondées sur des exigences en capitaux propres compte tenu des risques, des organismes 
internationaux comme le G-7 et du G-10 collaborant avec la BRI et le FMI, etc. Mais ces 
efforts ne peuvent suffire à assurer une plus grande divulgation et la transparence de 
l’information face à un environnement financier de plus en plus intégré et sophistiqué depuis 
les années 1980, grâce à la libéralisation et à la mondialisation financières. Il est également 
accompagné par les progrès technologiques et les enjeux tenant aux institutions financières 
non bancaires, comme les hedge funds ou les fonds d'actions. Cette tendance à l’efficacité 
accrue du financement privé en termes variés réduit la pertinence et l'efficacité des approches 
de réglementation et de surveillance. Cela a conduit à de nouveaux risques non mesurés qui 
contribuent à la volatilité, à l'instabilité et aux crises, qui ont alors tendance à se propager au-
delà des frontières virtuelles ou géographiques. 
Dans ce but, la section 2 du présent chapitre examine en détail la faiblesse des 
fondements de la structure financière mondiale. Les filets de sécurité, implicites ou explicites, 
agissent à titre d'aléa moral pour les banques et autres institutions financières couvertes par ce 
réseau parce que la présence des assurances inconditionnelles donne un nouvel élan aux prises 
de risques insensés. Les plans de sauvetage qui en résultent constituent une erreur car ils 
mettent la charge d’ajustement sur les contribuables sous forme de fiscalité accrue, laquelle 
bénéficie aux riches preneurs de risques et aux spéculateurs. Une autre faiblesse est l'absence 
de distinction entre le « risque » de « l'incertitude », en ignorant idée de Keynes selon laquelle 
l'incertitude joue également un rôle important dans l’affaiblissement des systèmes financiers. 
En outre, les banques ont profité des instruments financiers dérivés et d'autres innovations et 
s'impliquent davantage dans la mouvance spéculative et risquée. Mais elles ont oublié, dans 
leur recherche de rentabilité croissante, de distinguer le risque de l'incertitude. Les crises sont 
avant tout liées à l'incertitude qui découle de la prise de risque irrationnel. Cela a également 
rendu la discipline de marché inapte à jouer un rôle significatif dans la détection précoce et 
dans la prévention des déséquilibres susceptibles de croître au-delà de certaines limites. En 
outre, diverses dynamiques de marchés financiers ont aussi beaucoup changé pour devenir 
plus propice au phénomène récurrent d’ « abondance et rareté », qui magnifie l'ampleur et la 
fréquence des crises. En plus de cela, la nature du risque systémique est également modifiée, 
ce qui exige une transformation des mesures de prévention. Les outils classiques sont basés 
sur l'hypothèse que le risque systémique peut être étudié en termes microéconomiques, à 
travers les systèmes de couverture individuelle. Or, le risque systémique implique la 
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circulation de problèmes entre institutions par les relations interbancaires et le système de 
paiement, entre autres, pouvant susciter une ruée sur les dépôts qui menace alors l'ensemble 
du système financier. Par conséquent, l’hypothèse classique tend à minimiser les menaces 
réelles en ne tenant pas compte des possibilités étendues pour la prise de risque. 
Le fait de ne pas réaliser complètement et avec précision ces faiblesses dans les 
fondations des systèmes financiers a joué un rôle clé dans la crise actuelle. Or, actuellement, 
les mesures pour faire face à cette crise sont principalement basées sur les principes de la « 
répression financière », une mesure longtemps rejetée par les économies développées et 
également prohibée pour les pays émergents et en développement. Les économies 
développées font ainsi exactement le contraire de ce qu'elles préconisaient aux économies 
émergentes et en développement en cas de crise. La section 3 de ce chapitre examine 
soigneusement les diverses mesures répressives des économies développées afin de montrer 
que ces derniers appliquent désormais la répression financière dans le cadre de leur politique 
« macroprudentielle » pour sauvegarder leurs économies.  
Il serait pertinent de mentionner ici la différence entre l’échelle micro et macro de la 
réglementation prudentielle. La micro-réglementation prudentielle examine les facteurs qui 
affectent la stabilité des établissements individuels, alors que la réglementation 
macroprudentielle examine les facteurs qui influent sur la stabilité du système financier dans 
son ensemble. Les réformes à venir pour la stabilité du système financier mettent de plus en 
plus l'accent sur le cadre macro-prudentiel dont nous parlerons dans la section finale de ce 
chapitre. Par souci de sauvetage et de rétablissement, les gouvernements des économies 
touchées sont directement intervenus pour quasiment nationaliser les différentes grandes 
banques en injectant des fonds propres. Souffrant consécutivement d'une quantité 
considérable de dettes privées et publiques, les gouvernements sont alors contraints d'abaisser 
le coût de la dette en maintenant artificiellement des taux d'intérêt bas. Ces taux plus faibles 
deviennent même négatifs dans le scénario d'inflation stable. Contrairement aux impôts 
directs ou à des coupes dans les dépenses, ce genre de répression financière agit comme un 
impôt indirect. La répression financière à la suite de la crise a des antécédents historiques, car 
la fin du laissez-faire a également été promue après la Grande Dépression et la 2ème guerre 
mondiale. La répression financière moderne a également des implications différentes, y 
compris pour les économies émergentes et en développement, lesquelles sont discutées dans 
la même section. 
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La dernière section considère les liens entre la crise actuelle et la forme néolibérale du 
capitalisme. Comme cette crise est survenue au coeur du capitalisme, diverses voix se sont 
levées sur le caractère intrinsèquement instable du capitalisme. Cependant, le vrai problème 
réside dans le « néo-libéralisme », qui a amené la mondialisation et la libéralisation 
financières et a conduit au « capitalisme financier », par opposition à « l'âge d'or du 
capitalisme », des années 1940-1970, caractérisé par des réglementations et un capitalisme 
d'Etat. La création de richesses fictives, incompatible avec la création de richesses réelles est 
la principale caractéristique de ce capitalisme financiarisé qui devait s’effondrer un jour. 
L’attitude irresponsable et malhonnête des institutions financières est également essentielle à 
cet égard, laquelle propulse l’« économie politique » au premier plan. En dépit d’un nombre 
important de suggestions pour transformer la réglementation et la surveillance, aucune mesure 
concrète n'a été prise pour supprimer l'hégémonie du capitalisme financiarisé. Et les chances 
d'une telle suppression semblent tout aussi minces actuellement. La seule attitude claire à ce 
niveau est l'accent sur le cadre macro-prudentiel pour assurer la stabilité des systèmes 
financiers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Le triptyque libéralisation-mondialisation-financiarisation a non seulement conduit à 
des conséquences pénibles pour les pays en développement et les économies émergentes au 
cours des années 1990, mais les résultats ont été tout aussi dévastateurs pour les économies 
développées au cours des années 2000, c’est-à-dire des économies avec des secteurs 
financiers « apparemment » bien développés. Cette conclusion générale est dérivée de 
plusieurs volets thématiques analysés tout au long de cette thèse. 
En passant en revue une littérature exhaustive sur le lien entre finance et croissance, il 
peut être déterminé que la croissance économique et le développement sont étroitement liés à 
la « finance », bien qu'il y ait des divergences de points de vue sur l'orientation de la causalité, 
ainsi que sur l'importance relative des différentes structures des systèmes financiers. Il peut 
être également établi que les systèmes financiers exercent un effet significativement positif 
sur la croissance économique, via la fourniture de différents services financiers qui facilitent 
la réduction de certaines frictions sur le marché. L'évolution des théories de la croissance et 
du développement ont suffisamment progressé pour distinguer la « monnaie » et le « crédit » 
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et les mécanismes de transmission reliant la monnaie et le revenu. Cela a donné lieu à des 
politiques financières restrictives caractérisées par l'intervention du gouvernement, lesquelles 
sont identifiées comme relevant de la « répression financière ». En fait, les gouvernements des 
pays en développement et des économies émergentes intervenaient depuis longtemps sur les 
marchés financiers pour atteindre leurs objectifs de politique de développement. Parallèlement 
à ces objectifs, les gouvernements ont également essayé de réduire la concentration des 
richesses et du pouvoir de monopole, de générer des ressources fiscales, et de canaliser les 
ressources vers la plupart des parties favorisées par le système financier. Dans ce but, les 
autorités ont maintenu les taux d'intérêt à un niveau artificiellement bas. En plus de cela, 
l'octroi de subventions de crédit aux entreprises favorisées dans l’industrie et l'agriculture 
pour atteindre les objectifs de développement représentait également une idée séduisante. 
Ainsi, les gouvernements accentuaient en général la fourniture de subventions directes et des 
aides pures et simples à l'agriculture ou au secteur industriel. 
Il est difficile de trouver un pays qui ne soit jamais intervenu dans le secteur financier, 
d'une manière ou d'une autre. Une grande partie du vingtième siècle a vu l’intensification de 
la répression financière. Surtout dans les années qui suivirent la Grande Dépression et la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale, les gouvernements ont tenté de maintenir les taux d'intérêt bien 
inférieurs à ceux du marché en instaurant un plafond artificiel et un contrôle de l'allocation de 
crédits par le biais de leurs directives, soit directement, soit par l'intermédiaire de leurs 
banques et de leurs institutions financières. Les restrictions sur les taux d'intérêt, les lourdes 
réserves obligatoires sur les dépôts bancaires, et l’arbitrage sur les allocations de crédits 
interagissent avec l'inflation sur les prix courants afin de réduire la possibilité de détenir des 
créances sur le système bancaire national, puisque le taux d'intérêt réel sur les actifs 
monétaires peut alors devenir négatif. Cependant, les économistes du développement ont 
persisté à favoriser l’« épargne forcée » à travers l’inflation, les subventions et les crédits  à 
des taux d'intérêt inférieurs à ceux du marché. Cela était vu comme le principal moyen de 
stimuler les investissements socialement souhaitables. Le secteur financier n’était alors pas 
considéré comme un élément majeur dans la croissance économique et le processus de 
développement, à moins d’être manipulé et réprimé. Les distorsions qui en résultaient, les 
érosions et l’éventuelle détérioration du système financier ont commencé à être considérées 
comme la conséquence de la répression financière. Par conséquent, « l'intervention du 
gouvernement » est devenue synonyme d’ « échec politique » en raison de ses inefficacités 
économiques associées. En particulier, les travaux fondateurs de McKinnon (1973) et de 
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Shaw (1973) et les cadres stratégiques qui en ont découlé ont considéré la répression 
financière comme l'un des principaux maux entravant la croissance économique dans les pays 
émergents et en développement.  
Les opposants de la répression financière ont alors suggéré de maintenir les taux 
d'intérêt positifs et uniformément élevés en supprimant leur plafonnement, ainsi que les 
lourdes réserves obligatoires et autres formes d'allocation contrôlée de crédit. Ce n'est que 
dans un tel réglage que les épargnants et les investisseurs pourraient être en mesure d’intégrer 
le véritable prix du capital, et donc de diminuer la dispersion excessive de la rentabilité des 
investissements dans les différents secteurs de l'économie. À cet égard, McKinnon et Shaw 
ont opposé la « libéralisation financière » à la « répression financière », ce qui est devenu le 
fondement théorique pour l'analyse du secteur financier à la fin des années 1970. 
Dans cette perspective, l’agenda néolibéral est initié au cours des années 1980, et 
connu sous le nom « Consensus de Washington ». Il a fusionné avec la mondialisation 
financière et l'intégration croissantes qui met en place la LF dans les pays émergents et en 
développement, en particulier les économies asiatiques et latino-américaines. Ce programme a 
été poursuivi par les institutions financières internationales, principalement sous le contrôle 
des États-Unis et d'autres économies développées, afin de forcer les pays en développement et 
émergents à adopter la LF en tant que conditionnalité pour accéder aux prêts concessionnels.  
Tout en rappelant que les années 1990 correspondent, pour les pays en développement, 
aux réformes de libéralisation, la même période représente également les crises financières 
périodiques qui se sont propagées de manière rapide et imprévisible. Ces crashs et les crises 
consécutives ont abouti à des confusions et à des dilemmes sur la logique et la mise en œuvre 
des réformes de libéralisation. Dans ce but, la prise en compte de certaines conditions 
préalables ainsi que le séquençage optimal, consistant à commencer par la libéralisation 
interne des taux d'intérêt et en n’instaurant la libéralisation du marché des capitaux qu’à la fin, 
ont été recommandés par les partisans de la LF dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des 
réformes. Toutefois, le respect de ces conditions ne peut garantir le succès de la LF en raison 
des défauts inhérents aux marchés financiers qui rendent les modèles et les théories 
d’efficience des marchés impertinents. La démonstration des différents goulots d'étranglement 
dans les économies en développement, comme les externalités négatives, l'asymétrie 
d'information, des ratios d'endettement élevés, un faible système de réglementation, implique 
que les théories et les politiques qui en découlent sont basées sur une représentation inexacte 
et incomplète des réalités institutionnelles et structurelles qui prévalent dans ces économies. 
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On peut en déduire que l'économie du développement devrait se préoccuper davantage 
de ce qu'il peut faire en présence des limites existantes. Il s’agit alors d’une politique qui 
nécessite un changement important dans la structure et les institutions avant la mise en œuvre, 
pour avoir une certaine validité et de la valeur. Une question cruciale qui se pose à cet égard 
est de savoir quel rôle est laissé à la théorie dans de telles circonstances. En fait, une théorie 
qui prend en compte les réalités structurelles et institutionnelles peut contribuer à reconnaître 
la limite du changement aussi bien que les possibilités de progrès. Malheureusement, toutes 
les variétés de LF ont échoué en raison d’une compréhension faible et imparfaite de ces 
réalités structurelles et institutionnelles, ce qui a abouti à des épisodes de crashs et de crises. 
Afin de renforcer l'opposition contre la LF, les crashs et les crises en Asie et en Amérique 
latine au cours des années 1990, accompagnés par l'instabilité du système financier, sont 
utilisés comme argument principal. Bien qu'il existe des arguments importants en faveur de la 
mondialisation et de l'intégration financière, les épisodes répétés de crises exigent de repenser 
le problème de la stabilité financière. 
En particulier quand il s'agit de flux de capitaux, leur fragilité est présentée comme un 
risque principal associé à la libéralisation des marchés. Ceci implique que la libéralisation ne 
doit pas être poussée dans certains pays, et il est du devoir des économistes et des décideurs 
politiques de présenter leurs analyses et leurs recherches d'une manière accessible et 
convaincante afin de protéger les pays en développement et émergents des pressions indues en 
faveur de la libéralisation financière. En fait, l'interaction entre la libéralisation nationale et 
internationale pourrait aboutir à un scénario où les flux de capitaux internationaux alimentent 
la réduction du bien-être que l'intermédiation financière du secteur financier domestique 
pourrait soutenir. Les avantages de la libéralisation des marchés de capitaux ne peuvent être 
importants que si les pays ont leur « maison en ordre », car une libéralisation en l'absence 
d'une réglementation adéquate et d’une supervision efficace peut facilement et rapidement 
conduire à des vulnérabilités qui amplifient les distorsions existantes. Ainsi, la mise en garde 
quant à la présence d'une infrastructure institutionnelle adéquate implique que la libéralisation 
mettra encore du temps dans les pays en développement et les pays émergents. Les avantages 
supposés de la libéralisation sur la croissance économique et le développement ne semblent 
pas compenser le coût des crises, ce qui implique une restriction sur le fonctionnement libre 
des marchés, en particulier via le rétablissement des contrôles sur les flux internationaux de 
capitaux. Les nouveaux développements théoriques soutiennent également que les marchés 
financiers sont différents des autres marchés, par exemple des marchés de matières premières, 
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parce que les « défaillances du marché » sont plus fréquentes et répandues en matière 
financière, ce qui suggère la nécessité, dans une certaine mesure, d'une intervention 
« intelligente » du gouvernement. 
Cependant, il y a eu certains développements et innovations sur les marchés financiers 
internationaux, comme l'utilisation croissante de produits dérivés, qui rend leur gestion plus 
complexes et difficiles que jamais, même pour les pays développés d'Europe et États-Unis, 
comme en témoigne la crise financière de 2007-08 qui s’est finalement transformée en 
récession mondiale en dépit de la présence d'outils macroéconomiques pour lutter contre le 
phénomène d’’expansion-récession, ainsi que d’un cadre réglementaire et de surveillance 
sophistiqué. Avant 2007, une crise de cette ampleur ne pouvait être imaginée par les 
économistes et les responsables politiques, même dans leurs pires cauchemars, parce qu'ils 
étaient confiants quant à la solidité des systèmes financiers des pays développés en raison de 
leur grande taille. En comparant les pays en développement à des petits bateaux sur la mer 
orageuse de la finance internationale, Paul Volcker, ancien gouverneur de la Réserve fédérale, 
a déclaré que même si un « grand paquebot d’océan » comme les États-Unis pouvait naviguer 
en toute sécurité à travers une tempête, les autres navires, même très robustes, étaient 
susceptibles de chavirer (Volcker, 1998). La possibilité de survenue de la crise aux Etats-Unis 
comme celles survenus en Asie et en Amérique latine était également fortement rejetée par 
lui, en comparant les systèmes bancaires de l'Indonésie, de la Thaïlande ou de la Malaisie à 
une banque américaine de taille importante. Cependant, ce n'est que quelques années après 
cette proclamation que le monde a vu « les États-Unis faire naufrage comme un navire ». 
Telle une question de faits, la série de crises qui s'est produite dans les économies 
émergentes d'Asie et d'Amérique latine au cours des années 1990 à la suite de la LF a été 
considérée comme un problème propre à ces économies. Les décideurs politiques des pays 
développés ont prescrit davantage de LF et de déréglementation dans ces pays sujets aux 
crises. Certains ont même estimé que la LF constituait un phénomène « irréversible ». 
Cependant, la crise financière actuelle aux Etats-Unis et en Europe cherche réponse dans 
l'intervention de l'État et dans des mesures répressives, ce qui revient non seulement à 
envisager deux poids deux mesures pour les gestionnaires mondiaux, mais aussi à réhabiliter 
le rôle de l'intervention publique sur les marchés financiers. Face à surendettement d’une 
ampleur historique, les responsables politiques des pays développés sont obsédés par la 
gestion et la réduction de la dette, et d'autres efforts pour maintenir le coût de la dette à des 
niveaux soutenables. Avec le double objectif de maintenir des taux d'intérêt bas et de 
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contrôler l’opinion publique, la répression financière se renouvelle et prospère dans ses 
nombreuses formes. Les gouvernements des pays déchirés par la crise ont massivement 
injecté des liquidités dans les institutions financières et sont directement intervenus sur les 
marchés financiers. 
Ceci implique qu’il n’est pas rationnel de simplement écarter le gouvernement de la 
route des marchés et d’attendre qu’une « main invisible » prenne en charge et corrige tous les 
déséquilibres avant que ces derniers ne deviennent systémiques. La crise actuelle a non 
seulement rejeté l'idée d’un « démantèlement complet du rôle du gouvernement », mais a 
également démontré la nécessité d'une intervention de l'État et d’une main mise appropriée 
sur les marchés financiers. Avec elle émane la nécessité de réglementer les innovations 
financières, qui sont si complexes que les banques centrales sont confrontées à un défi d’une 
taille considérable pour mesurer, surveiller et contrôler le total des liquidités dans l'économie. 
À cet égard, les décideurs politiques aux États-Unis et en Europe proposent de nouveaux 
outils et des règlements pour améliorer la surveillance prudentielle, les informations 
comptables et la transparence. Alors que les marchés évoluent et deviennent complexes, les 
cadres réglementaires et de supervision doivent être constamment réévalués et adaptés à la 
nature variable du risque financier et du risque systémique. 
Le défi commun pour la supervision bancaire, la surveillance du marché et 
l'élaboration des politiques financières est d'équilibrer les efforts pour maintenir la stabilité 
financière et la gestion des risques systémiques avec les efforts pour s'assurer que les 
participants au marché supportent le coût de leurs prises de risques imprudentes, et qu’ils 
aient par conséquent des incitations appropriées pour éviter de telles imprudences. Ce défi 
doit être relevé sans nuire à l'efficacité économique et la croissance à long terme. Le rôle des 
agences de notation doit également être revisité avec une amélioration de l'examen public. En 
plus de cela, l'expansion budgétaire, afin de faire face à la récession, doit également être basée 
sur des contrôles sur la mobilité des flux financiers mondiaux. Dans le cas contraire, des 
variations spéculatives à grande échelle d'un pays à l'autre conduisent à déstabiliser la 
politique budgétaire. Les économies émergentes ont déjà ressenti cette peur et ont alors 
instauré des contrôles sur les mouvements de capitaux. 
Suite à la crise actuelle, le débat sur la nature intrinsèquement instable du capitalisme a 
de nouveau refait surface. Bien que les crises soient considérées comme étant inhérentes aux 
économies capitalistes, il n'est pas rationnel de corréler le caractère cyclique des crises 
financières, en particulier en termes d'ampleur, de topographie et de conséquences, à 
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l’approfondissement de celui-ci. Cette crise n'est pas intégrée dans le seul système capitaliste, 
il s'agit plutôt de la forme la plus fragile du capitalisme. C'est le capitalisme financiarisé qui a 
émergé à partir de l’agenda néolibéral et qui a abouti à la déréglementation, à 
l'autoréglementation, et à la création de richesses fictives, se révélant incompatible avec la 
vraie richesse. En particulier dans les pays les plus développés, le total des actifs financiers 
représente un multiple de la production économique annuelle, accompagnée d'une croissance 
phénoménale des actifs obligataires et des marchés d'actions. Ainsi, les mesures possibles 
pour les économies capitalistes, au regard de cette crise, dépendent de la mesure dans laquelle 
ils peuvent faire face à l'hégémonie du capitalisme néolibéral, une hégémonie qui s'est 
répandue depuis les années 1980 en raison de la peur du socialisme et de la transformation de 
l'économie néoclassique en tant qu’économie dominante. 
Mais l’amère vérité est que la série de crises dans les économies émergentes et en 
développement d'Asie, d'Amérique latine et en Russie au cours des années 1990, ne pouvait 
pas conduire à cette prise de conscience des décideurs mondiaux, car cette série ne pouvait 
alors être considérée comme significative, par rapport à la crise des économies développées 
des États-Unis et Europe plus tard, dans les années 2000. Par ailleurs, les crises des années 
1990 ont souvent été considérées comme un embryon du « sous-développement » des 
économies touchées, tandis que la nature « fragile » des marchés financiers sous le 
capitalisme néolibéral a été ignorée jusqu'à l’apparition de la crise actuelle. 
Avec un capitalisme néolibéral entrant dans une période de crise chronique, les notions 
jusque-là dominantes de « libre marché » et de « laissez-faire » ont rapidement perdu leur 
légitimité. Cela semble analogue à la disparition rapide de l'idéologie keynésienne en faveur 
d’un capitalisme « réglementé » au cours des années 1970. Aujourd’hui, une fois de plus, le 
capitalisme pourrait être restructuré dans les années à venir aux États-Unis et, 
consécutivement, dans ensemble de l'économie mondiale. Mais le produit final de ce 
processus de restructuration est encore opaque et incertain. Une suggestion pour un futur 
programme de recherche est de s'éloigner de l'orthodoxie économique généralisée et 
traditionnelle, pour élaborer des modèles alternatifs, parce que les théories classiques qui ont 
contribué à la libéralisation des politiques nous ont conduit à cette crise sans, de toute 
évidence, nous fournir la moindre indication sur la façon de répondre. Le développement et la 
mise en œuvre de ces solutions de rechange constituent toujours le principal défi auquel les 
théoriciens et les décideurs politiques sont confrontés à l'heure actuelle. 
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